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GLOSSARY

Asymmetric cryptography. A cryptographic system where encryption and decryptim
are performed using different key.
Certification authority. A trusted company or organization that will accept your publ
key, along with some proof of your identity, and serve as a repository of digital
certificates. Others can then request verification of your public key from the
certification authority.
Certificate revocation list. Certificate Authorities must maintain a list of digital
certificates that are no longer valid (not including those expired).
Cipher. A set of rules used to transform original information into its coded form.
Cipher text. The encoded form of a message.
Cryptographic algorithm. A mathematical function that combines plain text or other
intelligible information with a string of digits (called a key) to produce
unintelligible cipher text.
Data encryption standard An algorithm or block cipher that uses a 56-bit key and
operates on a block of 64 bits. Created by ffiM and endorsed by the United State
government in 1977, the data encryption standard is relatively fast and often usee
to encrypt large amounts of data at one time.
Digital certificate. An electronic document, issued by a certificate authority, used to
establish a company's identity by verifying its public key.
Digital signature. This special signature for signing electronic correspondence is
produced by encrypting the message digest with the sender's private key.
Electronic fund transfer. A system that optimizes the transfer of electronic payments,
including remittance information, over secure private networks between banks.
Electronic signature. A data in electronic form in, affixed to, or logically associated
with, a data message, which may be used to identify the signatory in relation to
the data message and indicate the signatory's approval of the information
contained in the data message.

Xll

Key. A string of digits, which when used with a cryptographic algorithm, produces
cipher text.
Message digest. The representation of a body of text as a single string of digits created
using a one-way hash function.
One-way hash function. This is formula used to convert a message of any length into a
string of digits called a message digest. The length of the function determines the
length of the digest, and no key is required.
Private key. A key used to encrypt a message but kept private to the originator.
Public key. The key used by a message's recipient to decrypt a message and it can be
divulged to as large an extent as is necessary or convenient.
Public key cryptography. An encryption method that uses a pair of keys: one public
and one private. Messages encrypted with either key can be decrypted by the
other. Public key cryptography is based on asymmetric encryption algorithm.
Smart cards. A credit card-sized plastic card with a special type of integrated circuit
embedded in it. The integrated circuit stores information in electronic form and
controls who uses this information and how.
Symmetric encryption. Symmetric encryption is based on the same key with which
both the sender and the recipient can encrypt and decrypt data.
Tokens. Strings of digits representing a certain amount of currency.
Web browser. A software program that allows you to connect with network servers in
order to access HTML documents and their associated media files (that is, Web
pages) and to follow links from document to document, or page to page. The
server may be on a private network or the Internet.
Web server. A software program that manages data at the website, controls access to
that data, and responds to requests from Web browsers.
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SECURING ONLINE COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
BY DIGITAL SIGNATURES:
A COiv1PARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. E-SIGN ACT
AND THAI E-TRANS.ACTIONS ACT

1

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction
A. An Overview of Online Commerce

As a result of the rapidly changing and technologically advanced nature of the
world of computer technologies, computers are being used not only for simple and
routine tasks such as typing, editing, and storing information, but also for establishing
connections with computer networks, such as the internet. The Internet is defined as a
large number of computers that are globally connected by various means throughout the
world. 1 The Internet was established by the US Department ofDefense in 1969 as a
result of concerns over the possible effects of a nuclear attack on its computing facilities. 2
This concern led the Defense Department agency to develop ways to connect computers
to each other so as to create a nationwide network that could operate independently and
allow borderless communications. 3

1 JAMEST. PERRY &
2 GARY P.

GARYP. SCHNEIDER, NEW PERSPECTIVE ON:

THE INTERNET 14 (1998).

SCHNEIDER AND JAMES T. PERRY, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE

3

13 (2000).

WARWICK FORD AND MICHAELS. BAUM, SECURE ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: BUILDING THE
INFRASTRUCTURE OF DIGITAL SIGNATURE AND ENCRYPTION 14 (2000).

2

As an advanced technology, the Internet is the most ubiquitous
telecommunication system\ performing a wide range of global communication services.
The Internet has provided new types of electronic communications, such as electronic
messages 5, advertising, academic journals, billing and payment, banking, Internet Real
Time Communications6 and commerce over conventional means of communication. The
Internet is an inexpensive electronic medium for communication which keeps individuals
connected to each other. Communication through the Internet is borderless and fast as
two parties residing in different countries can interchange data via the Internet within
seconds.
The Internet is globally the most popular network because it is widely used by
millions ofpeople. 7 People who have access to the Internet can connect to a part of the
Internet called the World Wide Web (the Web). 8 The Web is a subset of the computers
that are connected to each other in such a way as to make contents of the website and
computers much more accessible to the internet users. 9 The Web provides an easier

4

THOMASP. VARTANIANET AL., 21 51 CENTIJRY: MONEY, BANKING& COMMERCE 595(1998).

5

RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE FUTURE OF LAW: FACING TilE CHALLENGES OF INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY 152(1996).
6

Richard M. Georges, Feature: The Impact of Technology on the Practice ofLaw-2000, 71 FLA.
BAR J. 36,38 (1997). The examples oflnternet Real Time Communications are as follows:
Internet Relay Chat (IRC) which allows the internet users to engage in real time communication
with one or more person anywhere in the world, internet phone and video teleconferencing.
7

NIELSEN/ NETRATING, Global Internet Population Grows An Average ofFour Percent YearOver-Year 2 (February 2003), available at http://www.nielsen-netratings.com/pr/pr 030220.pdf.

According to Nielsen/Netratings' Global Internet Trends Survey, 580 million people now have
Internet access. The Nielsen Rating, the global standard for Internet audience measurement and
analysis, indicates that the United States has the largest Internet population ( 168.1 million),
accounting for 29 percent of the world's Internet population, followed by Europe with 23 percent
(135.3 million), Asian & Pacific with 13 percent (75.5 million), and Latin American with 2
percent (14.3million).
8

SCHNEIDER & PERRY, supra note 2, at 2.

3

means for users to surf the net for information on a wide range of topics, to communicate
electronically with friends via e-mails and to conduct their business onli~e through the
commerce of both tangible and intangible product. Because of this technological change,
more businesses and consumers now purchase and sell goods and services
electronically. 10 The Internet today plays a crucial role not only as a medium for the
exchange ofprivate information, but also as a model for anew form of commerce called
"online commerce.,,
Online commerce is commonly defined as the electronic purchasing and selling of
goods and services between online merchants and consumers via a computer network, or
the so-called Internet. 11 A number of other commercial activities, such as advertising,
licensing of goods, services or information can also be conducted electronically. 12 Online
commerce has primarily targeted consumers who prefer to shop at home through the
Internet rather than go shopping at conventional superstores where queues for cashiers
are often too long. Online shopping is also a good way of saving time and money as
there is no need to drive in heavy traffic in order to get to conventional stores. To shop
online, consumers simply access the Internet and enter their credit card details as
payment for their purchases which would subsequently be delivered to the address
provided.
9

PERRY & SCHNEIDER,

supra note 1, at 1.4.

10

R. J. Robertson, Jr., Electronic Commerce on the Internet and the Statute ofFrauds, 49.S.C.L.
REv. 787, 787(1998).
11

GARY P. SCHNEIDER AND JAMES T. PERRY, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 8 (2000). IBM had defined
electronic business to be "the transformation ofkeybusiness processes through the use oflntemet
technologies."
12

ROLLY K. TOWLE, ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS AND CONTRACTING, SECOND ANNUAL
INTERNET LAW INSTITUTE 2(1998).

4

Online commerce is becoming an increasingly critical part of many businesses
due to the strategic advantages it creates for onliJ.?.e merchants in terms of operational
efficiency, the reduction in costs of transactions, consumer relationships, product
innovation, convenience and timesaving. The concept of online commerce may not be a
truly new commercial dimension since online commerce had previously existed for many
years, but the rules and regulations that control and facilitate online commerce have been
implemented gradually. As online commerce is in the stage of rapid growth, strict
regulations on its conduct could prove to be a major barrier to growth rate. In addition,
consumers also still prefer the traditional paper-based for reasons of transaction security.
Hence, it should no doubt be the case that an enhancement of transaction security would
eventually attract more online users to make their purchases over the Intemet. 13
Unlike online commerce, traditional commerce, especially in the prehistoric era,
began when our ancestors first decided to specialize in their everyday activities. Each
family specialized in either crop-growing, hunting or tool-making traded some of their
products to meet the demand of others. 14 The result was a form of commerce commonly
known as an economy based primarily on barter. Bartering gradu~lly evolved into trade
with money being created as a medium of exchange. Trading transactions were created
to facilitate trade and make them easier to settle. 15
Traditional commerce is at present heavily conducted by paper-based transactions
under the so-called paper-based society where individuals deal with each other in person
13

ROBERT E. LITAN AND WILLIAM NISKANEN, GOING DIGITAL: A GUIDE TO POLICY IN THE
DIGITAL AGE 55(1998).
14

SCHNEIDER & PERRY, supra note 2, at 4.

IS

Jd.

5

and within physical timeframes. Conventional commercial instruments, such as
contracts, checks, letters, invoices, purchase orders, receipts, and a number of other
business documents have been commonly prepared, concluded, exchanged, and stored in
tangible form: i.e. paper16 and ink based format. Paper has a tangible quality that provides
a contract with a discrete and independent existence. 17 Paper-based documents are easy
to read, move and filed. As a result, parties involved in traditional commercial
transactions always have confidence when conducting business on paper since signed
documents have inherent security characteristics which are not available in computerbased records. 18 This has been the case despite the fact that paper does have some of its
particular vulnerabilities, such as to damage or destruction by fire.
Paperless transactions appear to be unreliable and insecure to a number of
shoppers who hesitate in providing their credit card numbers to online merchants. Many
fear the possibility of their credit card numbers being intercepted during their
transmission to online merchants. Thus, major global problems concerning online
commercial transactions are strongly related to the security measures of such transactions,
which include Internet security, authentication and the non-repudiation of transactions
concluded over the Intemet. 19 For reasons of transaction security, a highly reliable
technology must be applied to online commercial transactions in order to ensure their
security and confidentiality.
16

RAYMOND A. KURZ, INTERNET AND THE LAW: LEGAL FUNDAMENTALS FOR THE INTERNET USER

156(1996).
17

M. ETHANKATSH, LA WIN A DIGITAL WORLD 120(1995).

18

FORD & BAUM,

supra note 3, at 5.

19

ROBERTS. MACGREGOR ET.AL., WWW.SECURITY:HOW TO BUILD A SECURE WORLD WEB
CONNECTION 47(1996).

6

The law governing traditional commerce is unclear as regards its application to
online commercial transactions. 20 This has led to numerous and considerable concerns
amongst online parties and lawmakers. Lawmakers in a number of countries have been
trying to formulate policies in support of the implementation of online commerce by the
gradual and systematic enactment of laws to recognize online transactions, agreements,
contracts, and records as well as the technology applied to online commerce? 1 Online
shoppers, merchants, and legislators must take into account transactions security,
authentication, reliability, and the integrity of online transactions.

B. Historical Perspective of Authentication
Knowledge of the identity of individuals who transact conventional commercial
transactions is essential for parties need to know where liability for damages will fall in
the event of a breach of agreement. Sale or purchase offers sent from one party to the
other need to be authenticated to ensure that no one forges or alters the messages while
they are being delivered. More authentication m'easures-will be devised as society
becomes more complex and more sophisticated approaches are required.
During the Roman times, messages were made secure by the process of sealing
and stamping messages with an insignia. 22 If someone wanted to send an important

20

Stephen Leal Tupper, From Sea Seal to Cyber-Notary: Uncertainty in Electronic Commerce
and The Case for a Digital Signature law in Michigan, 45 WAYNE L. REv. 237, 237(1999).
21

Singapore enacted the "Electronic Transactions Act" in 1998. In 2000, Congress of the United
States passed the "Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act" (the Federal ESign Act). Hong Kong also passed "Hong Kong Electronic Transactions Ordinance in 2000. In
2001, Thailand enacted the "Electronic Transactions Act, B.E. 2544(2001)" to govern electronic
transactions, signatures and records.
22

RAYMOND GREENLAW & ELLEN HEPP, IN-LlNFiON-LlNE: FUNDAMENTALS OF THE INTERNET
AND THE WORLD WIDE WEB 449(1999).

7

message to another person, he had to seal the envelope by dripping wax on the outside of
the envelope and stamping his insignia on it. The insignia was highly detailed and
difficult to replicate23 , thus the opportunity for making an exact copy was nearly
impossible.
Persons who were familiar with the insignia could reasonably believe that a
message that was properly sealed and stamped originated from the person who owned the ·
insignia. This method was used for the authentication of both messages and senders in
this less complex society. In contrast, if a receiver had never known the insignia of the
sender he would not be able to establish the authenticity of the insignia. It was also
possible for someone to falsely represent himself as being someone else by stamping the
insignia of another person ,which had been acquired by theft or deception.
Current legal frameworks require that certain types of transactions be made on
paper and with signed signatures.

24

Signed signatures on paper-based documents indicate

that persons who signed their own signatures understand the content and have an
intention to be legally bound. Written signatures are useful not only for formalizing
agreements, but also for evidencing consent. 25 In a traditional paper-based society, in
order to make documents official, a trusted third party, knoWn as a notary public, played

24

Symposium, Emerging Technologies and the Law: Comment: The Pandora's Box of
Cyberspace: State Regulation of Digital Signature and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 33 GONZ.
L. REv. 417,418 (1997/1998). In Thailand,§ 1656 ofthe Civil and Commercial Code of
Thailand provides that a will must be made in writing, dated at the time of the making of the will
and signed by the testator before at least two witnesses ....
25

Anthony Martin Singer, Electronic Commerce: Digital Signatures and the Role of the Kansas
Digital Signature Act, 37 WASHBURN L. J. 725, 726(1998).
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a key role in notarizing documents or written statements to make them official so as to be
widely and generally accepted by most parties involved in the transaction concerned.
AI; today's society is much more technologically sophisticated, conventional

methods of authentication have fallen behind the evolution of online commercial
practices. Numerous commercial transactions are at present being conducted on the
Internet. Hence, there is a need for advanced authentication techniques to authenticate
both online commercial transactions and online parties. Digital signatures ar~, in this
regard, a revolutionary breakthrough.

C. Characteristics of Secure Online Transactions
Online commerce has been generally and globally conducted on open networks,
such as the Internet. Today, security over the Internet is the main concem?6 The lack of
security over the internet is a critical barrier to online commerce, as potentially sensitive
information, such as personal profiles, internal corporate documents, or payment
information27 contained in transactions transmitted via unsecured communications
facilities could be exposed to unidentified parties. Commercial information, exchanged
between either familiar or unfamiliar parities, needs to be secured.
In order to increase the level of certainty, making online commercial transactions
secure is essential for online users. Applications which provide information security are
necessary to satisfy global security requirements for more secure online commercial
transactions. The degree of protection required in each circumstance may vary according

26

27

PAMELA A . GRAY, OPEN SYSTEMS: A BUSINESS STRATEGY FOR THE 1990s 39(1991).
FAJSAL HOQUE, E-ENTERPRlSE: BUSINESS MODELS, ARCHITECTURE, AND COMPONENTS

208(2000).

9

to a number of factors. 28 One of the essential characteristics of a secure online
commercial transaction is authenticity. The parties involved must be able to ensure the
authenticity of online communications29and identify the online parties involved.
Another characteristic of a secure online transaction is access control. Since
business information may be sensitive and valuable, such information should be restricted
to the necessary parties. 30 Leaving business information available to outsiders could be
damaging. Thus, access control is a mechanism which has been designed to prevent
unauthorized persons from accessing and abusing valuable information.
Confidentiality must also be maintained so as to prevent attackers from
intercepting and perhaps modifying information sent over the Internet. The key
technology for making messages confidential is encryption, which serves to protect the
secrecy of data 31 and detect modification ofmessages. 32 An encrypted message remains
confidential and prevents others, except key holders, from intercepting messages or
sensitive information while stored or sent over the Internet. Parties who received
encrypted message will be confident that messages have not·been deciphered or
intercepted in transit.

28

JOHN T. SOMA, COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY AND TilE LAW 254(1983). Major factors for higher
degrees of protection depend upon the following: (1) circwnstances of the databank use;(2}
sensitivity of the stored infonnation; (3) economic value; and (4) availability for use outside the
databank.
29

D.W. DAVIES & W .L. PRICE, SECURITY FOR COMPUTER NETWORKS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
DATA SECURITY IN TELEPROCESSING AND ELECTRONIC FuNDS TRANSFER 251(2d ed.1989).
30

See GARY P. SCHNEIDER AND JAMES T. PERRY, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 201 (2000). Access
control refers to the control of who and what has access to the cq_mmerce server.
31

AVIELD. RUBINET AL., WEBSECURITYSOURCEBOOK325(1997).

32

RAVI KALA.I<.OTA & ANDREW B. WHINSTON, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: A MANAGER'S GUIDE
138(1997).
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The integrity of online commercial transactions is also critical. Parties certainly
need to receive the entire communication as a whole free from any tampering whilst in
transit between one party and another.

33

Lastly, non-repudiation prevents anyone from
4

denying online transactions after they have been completed? This ensures that all parties
are protected from unreasonable denial. If these security requirements are met, online
users will feel secure enough to conduct online commercial transactions.

D. Need for Digital Signatures
As the paper-based society is turning into paperless society, electronic records or
data contained in computer systems are increasingly replacing paper documents. Buyers
and sellers may have more difficulty identifying each other as they may never meet
personally. An impostor may claim himself to be a buyer or seller, and impersonate one
of the parties involved in an online commercial transaction. Much risk is involved in
supplying products to online customers who place large orders without certain methods
of proving their authenticity. 35 Thus, the identification and authentication of online
commercial parties are of the essence.

33

Jd. at 135.

34

See WARWICK FORD AND MICHAELS . BAUM, SECURE ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: BUILDING THE
INFRASTRUCTURE OF DIGITAL SIGNATURE AND ENCRYPTION 334 (2000). The term repudiation
refers to "denial by one of the entities involved in a communication of having participated in all or
part of the communication." In the legal context, repudiation refers to the legitimate right of a
party to deny the validity or enforceability of a contract on numerous grounds, such as forgery,
duress, illegality of the subject matter, and incapacity of one of the parties. Misrepresentation of a
signatory's identity may also be a ground for repudiation. Repudiation also refers to the wrongful
refusal of a party to perform his or her obligations under a valid and enforceable agreement.
35

DAVID JOHNSTON AND SUNNY HANDA, CYBERLA W: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT DOING
BUSINESS ONLINE 96(1997).
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The conventional way of proving identity in traditional commerce is signatures as
certified by other identification documents36 , such as a driver's license, passport and
other kinds of identity cards. Similarly, computer specialists have made a major
breakthrough in authentication technology by creating digital signatures for online
transactions which provide much of the same identification functions as passports or
driver's licenses. Digital signatures also provide for status confirmation, transit safety,
and reliability in the same way as certified mail. 37 Pen and ink signatures can easily be
forged, but attempting to forge digital signatures may prove to be far more difficult. 38
A carefully designed technology called the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) 39 was
developed to increase levels of confidentiality and security of online transactions and can
be used to identify parties who conduct online commercial transactions. 40 Ron Rivest,
Adi Shamir, and Len Adleman originally developed the public key system during the late
1970s.41 Considered a key technology, digital signatures created by PKI can be deemed
unforgeable. 42 Digital signatures are virtually impossible to break because key pairs are

36

!d. at 96.

37

HOQUE, supra note 27, at 254.

38

VARTANIAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 393.

39

SIMSON GARFINKEL, WEB SECURITY & COMMERCE 102( 1997); see also WARWICK FORD AND
MICHAELS. BAUM, SECURE ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: BUILDING THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF
DIGITAL SIGNATURE AND ENCRYPTION 251 (2000). Warwick Ford and Michael S. Baum have
defined a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) as the set of infrastructural services that support the
wide-scale use of public-key-based digital signatures and encryption. PKI includes certification
authorities and certification authority structures, repositories, or directories associated with
certification authorities.
40

LANCE ROSE, NET LAW: YOUR RIGHTS IN THE ONLINE WORLD 181(1995).

41

PETER WAYNER, DISAPPEARING CRYPTOGRAPHY: BEING AND NOTHINGNESS ON THE NET
22(1996).

42

Lonnie Eldrige, Internet Commerce and the Meltdown of Certification Authorities: Is the
Washington State Solution a Good Model?, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1805, 1814 (1998).
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mathematically created by asymmetric cryptography, a technique which converts plain
text into a coded cyphertext fonn.

43

E. Significance of Digital Signatures
Identity verification is one of the major issues in today's online commercial
transactions. Digital signatures will assist in the elimination of electronic impostors and
provide a higher degree of trust between the parties. It may be up to a hundred percent
effective in verifying a party's identity. 44 The validity of digital signatures and the
identities of parties involved will be verified by trusted third parties, known as
certification authorities, who perform the same functions as notary publics in traditional
paper-based commerce.
The use of digital signatures also enables the detection of any changes in
concluded online commercial transactions. This assures both parties that such concluded
transactions have not been forged or altered during transmission. Owing to the increase
in the confidence in the identity of the parties and confidentiality of online transactions,
parties will be more willing to make online commercial transactions.

45

43

CIPHER A. DEVOURS, COMPliTER SECURITY HANDBOOK 228(Arthur E. Hutt et al. eds., 2d
ed.l995).

44

CHAIWAT WONGWATANASAN ET AL., EXPLANATION OF THE ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT,
B.E. 2544 81 (2002). A digital signature based on public key cryptography is at present a single
technology that provides a systematic and effective mechanism for identity verification.
45

NATIONAL ELECTRONIC AUTHENTICATION COUNCIL (NEAC), LEGAL LIABILITY AND ETRANSACTIONS: A SCOPING STUDY FOR THE NATIONAL ELECTRONIC AUTHENTICATION COUNCIL
iii(Aug, 2000), available at
http://www .noie.gov.au/publications/N 0 IEINEAC/publication utz 15 08 .pdf.
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Digital signatures are unique to each user and are strictly confidential.

46

The

creation and verification of digital signatures are primarily based on cryptography, a
method of transforming a message into unintelligible forms and back again. 47 Key pairs
are used by computers in concert with complex mathematical formulas called algorithms
to encrypt and decrypt messages. 48 One of the keys called the private key is kept
confidential while the other key called the public key is made publicly available.
To create a digitally signed message, the signer can use his private key to encrypt
the message or particular documents49 and electronically send it to the receiver, who can
in turn reliably verify the messages by using the signer's public key. The key pairs
system offers much more convenience because unlike the single key system, two keys are
separately available and there is no need to share the same key to decode the messages.

50

Public key cryptography is inexpensive, convenient, secure, and reliable. 5 1 These
characteristics are strong points in support of the use of digital signatures. The
requirements of secure online transactions are satisfied whilst performing the same
functions as hand written signature.

46

Lyle T. Millham, Digital Signature Act, UTAH L. REv. 1157, 1157 (1995). If a sender encrypts a
message by the use of a recipient's public key, only the private key of the recipient will be able to
decrypt the encrypted message.
47

HOQUE, supra note 27, at 255.

48

GRALLAPRESTON, HOWlNTRANETS WORK 87(1996).

49

DOUGLAS E. COMER, COMPUTER NETWORKS AND lNTERNETS 497(2d ed. 1999).

50

l.C. PALMER & G.A. POTTER, COMPUTER SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT 98(1999). The single
key system applies the shared secret key for encoding and decoding the message. For instance, the
National Bureau of Standards published DES, the Data Encryption Standard, for use by the US
Federal Government. This standard is a mathematical description of an encryption algorithm and
its inverse decryption algorithm based on a single secret key.
51

Id. at 99.
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F. An Overview of the Legal Recognition of Digital Signatures
Online parties may secure online transactions and authenticate both signers and
contents by the use of digital signatures. The operation of online commercial transactions
would be difficult if existing laws do not recognize digital signatures. As legal systems
vary from country to country, the formal requirements for legal transactions and
signatures vary accordingly. It is thus proposed that a Model Law in this area is needed.

In many jurisdictions where no particular laws on digital signatures exist, online
users may face problems concerning the legal status of digitally signed online
commercial transactions. This raises a number of potentially difficult and critical legal
issues regarding digital signatures, for example, whether electronically consummated
online commercial transactions would satisfy legal requirements that certain information
be contained in writing in a signed document. 52

In certain jurisdictions where laws on digital signatures have been enacted, digital
signatures are treated as traditional hand-written signatures 53 and cannot be denied legal
effect on the sole ground that they are in electronic form.54 The main aim ofthe
Electronic Signature Act is to facilitate commerce by means of implementing a reliable

52

R. J. Robertson, Jr., The lllinois Electronic Commerce Security Act: A Response to Martin Behn,
24 S. ILL. U. L. J. 473, 474 (2000).

53

Utah Code Ann. § 46-3-40301(1996) provides that "a message is as valid, enforceable, and
effective as if it had been written on paper if it bears in its entirely a digital signature .... " In
addition,§ 6 of the Hong Kong Electronic Transactions Ordinance (2000) stipulates that "a digital
signature of the person satisfies the signature requirement on the condition that the digital
signature is supported by a recognized certificate and is generated within the validity of that
certificate."
54

E-Sign § lOl(a) provides that "a signature, contract, or other record relating to such transaction
may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because it is in electronic
form .... "
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electronic messages system. 55 At the international level, there has been an attempt to
draft a Model Law on electronic signatures by the UNCITRAL Working Group on
Electronic Commerce for the international harmonization of the laws for supporting
electronic signatures and the certification processes which also includes digital
authentication and certification technology. 56 The Draft UNCITRAL Model Law on
Electronic Signatures was approved in September 2000.

57

This model law consists of

internationally recognized guidelines, which take technology neutrality into consideration
without mentioning digital signatures or cryptographic technology. These guidelines,
themselves are not binding legislation58, they afford guidance to governments and
legislative authorities that are drafting and studying legislation on electronic signatures
consistent with a global electronic signature movement.
The federal government of the United States passed a law on Electronic
Signatures (theE-Sign Act) in 2000. 59 A number of states, including Utah60 , California61 ,

55

RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY: RIGHTS, LICENSES,
LIABILITIES 14.69 (3d ed.2001).

56

FORD & BAUM, supra note 3, at 301.

57

Report of the Working Group on Electronic Commerce on the work of its thirty-seventh session,
U.N Commission on International Trade Law, 34th Sess., at 39, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/483 (2000).
Draft UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures was approved by the UNCITRAL
Working Group on Electronic Commerce at its thirty-seventh session, held at Vienna From 18 to
29 September 2000.
58

B .P. Aalberts & S. van der Hof, Digital Signature Blindness, Analysis of Legislative Approaches
Toward Electronic Authentication, 30 (November, 1999), at http://cwis.kub.nl/-frw/people/hof/dsfr.htm.
59

This Act may be officially cited as "Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce
Act (E-Sign).
60

Utah state government passed the "Utah Digital Signature Act" in 1995. The Utah Act was
significantly amended by Utah S.B. 188, which was repealed and re-enacted in 1996. Utah Code
Ann.§ 46-3-403 provides that "a message is as valid, enforceable, and effective as if it had been
written on paper, if it bears in its entirety a digital signature .... "
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Washington62 , Illinois 63 , and Kansas 64 , have enacted laws on digital signatures that permit
their use, confirm their legal effect, and admit digital signatures as evidence in a court of
law. They enforce digitally signed contracts as if they were traditional contracts, as
digital signatures were considered as satisfying the traditional requirements for
signatures. 65 However, the imposition of legal liabilities on certification authorities have
not been uniformly stipulated on a number of issues, such as those relating to the
qualifications of Certification Authorities, the allocation of risks in contractual disputes,
the reliance of digitally signed documents in tortious actions, and the use of digitally
signed documents as evidence in judicial proceedings. 66 There is a need for stronger
policies on these issues need to be implemented.
At the same time, Thailand has also been concerned with the increasing use of
advanced technologies in conducting online commerce and has been implementing the
law on electronic authentication in order to foster, facilitate and enhance online
consumers' confidence in online commercial transactions. A new Bill on Electronic
61

California government enacted the "Government Code" and the "California Digital Signature
Regulations" in 1998. § 16.5 ofthe Government Code provides that "the use of a digital signature
shall have the same force and effect as the use of a manual signature ...."
62

In 1997, the State of Washington enacted the "Electronic Authentication Act" to facilitate online
commerce by means of reliable electronic messages. The Act provides that "where a rule oflaw
requires a signature, or provides for certain consequences in the absence of a signature, a digital
signature satisfies that requirement."
63

The People of the State oflllinois enacted the Electronic Commerce Security Act which takes
effect July 1, 1999. § 5-120 of the Act provides that "where a rule ofla~ requires a signature, or
provides for certain consequences if a document is not signed, an electronic signature satisfies that
rule oflaw."
64

In 1997, the State of Kansas enacted the "Kansas Digital Signature Act" to confirm that the use
of digital signatures has the same force and effect as any other form of signature.
65

J. DIANNE BRINSON & MARK F. RADCLIFFE, INTERNET LEGAL FORMS FOR BUSINESS: 12
READY-TO-USEFORMS FORDOING BUSINESS ON THE INTERNET 21(1997}.
66

JOHNSTON & HANDA, supra note 35, at 99.
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Signature has been drafted based mainly on the principles of data integrity, authentication
and non-repudiation. 67 These core principles are used to formulate a legal framework for
secure and reliable digital signatures which can be used to confirm both the' signers'
identities and their intent to approve and be bound by the contents. The House of
Representatives approved the Bill on 27th September 2000 and was subsequently passed
by Parliament on 18th October 2001 .68

1.2 Use of Terms
A. Electronic Signatures
Under the Federal Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act,
an electronic signature is information or data in electronic fonn, attached to or logically
associated with a contract or other record and executed or adopted by a person with the
intent to sign a contract, agreement, or record. 69 The Federal E-Sign Act provides a
broader range of authentication techniques that can be used to authenticate both a signer
and the contents by broadly stipulating that an electronic signature could be in the form
of electronic, computer data, symbol, or series of symbols, any of ~hich could be
attached to a message, contract or record by signers who intend to be bound by the signed
content and to authenticate electronic messages.

67

A New Draft of the Electronic Signature Law, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY NEWS, July 5, 2000,

at 10.
68

This Act may be officially cited as "the Electronic Transactions Act, B.E. 2544 {2001). TheETransactions Act came into force on April 3, 2002.
69

E-Sign § 106 stipulates that "electronic signature" means an electronic sound, symbol, or
process, attached to or logically associated with a contract or other record and executed or adopted
by a person with intent to sign the record.
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Sophisticated biometric devices, for instance, a fingerprint computer recognition
system70 , irises, hand prints, voice prints or even simply a character that stands for a
name, could qualify as an electronic signature on the condition that users have an
71

intention to use and be bound. A faxed signature or typing your name at the end of email with intention to be bound could also qualify as an electronic signature as well. To
satisfy the requirements of an electronic signature, the key element is that the symbol or
method must be adopted or executed with signer's intent to give consent to the electronic
messages' content. Electronic signatures are technology neutral, including any computer
method, public key systems and digital signatures.

B. Digital Signatures

From a technology expertise's viewpoint72 , a digital signature is a data item,
created and verified by public key cryptography, which accompanies or is logically
associated with a digitally encoded message which can be used to ascertain and
authenticate both the originator of the message and the integrity of the message whether
or not that message has been modified or forged since it has been sent .from the
originator. 73

70

Daniel Greenwood, Electronic Signatures and Records: Legal Policy and Technical
Considerations, available at http://www.magnet.state.ma.us/itd/legal/article9.doc (last visited
Nov. 7, 2002).
71

JOHNSTON & HANDA,

72

FORD & BAUM, supra note 3, at 109.

73

!d.

supra note 35, at 97.
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,
The Utah Digital Signature Act created and standardized a specific electronic
commerce technology by defining digital signatures 74 as the transformation of a message
using an asymmetric cryptosystem. Another requirement of digital signatures is that the
originator of the message must use his private key to encrypt the messages. The signer's
public key can be used to accurately determine whether the transformation of the
messages, created by using the private key that corresponds to the signer's public key,
has been altered since the transformation was made.

75

The California Code of Regulation

stipulates that a digitally signed communication is a message that has been processed by a
computer in such a manner that ties the message to the individual that signed the
message. 76
Unlike electronic signatures, digital signatures are pieces of data attached to a
communication in order to indicate that a certain party agreed to or authorized the
contents of the communication and to verify both the source and the integrity of the
communication. 77 The use of digital signature functions as a special seaf 8used to
authenticate electronic messages in the same manner as a seal in traditional written
signatures. Digital signatures are technology specific and based on public-key-based
technology, called the public key cryptography. The process of forming digital signatures

74

BENJAMIN WRIGHT & JANEK. WINN, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 14-31(3d ed.l998).

75

Utah Code Ann.§ 46-3-103(10)(1996) provides that digital signature means a transformation of
a message using an asymmetric cryptography such that a person having the initial message and the
signer's public key can accurately determine whether: (a) the transformation was created using the
private key that corresponds to the signer's public key; and (b) the message has been altered since
the transformation was made.
76

CAL. CODE REGS. tit.2, § 22000(1998).

77

BRINSON & RADCLIFFE, supra note 65, at 21.

78

WARWICK FORD, COMPUTER COMMUNICATION SECURITY: PRINCIPLES, STANDARD,
PROTOCOLS, AND TECHNIQUES 78( 1994}.
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is created by the signer's private key and a hash function. The signer's public key and
private key are compared in order to assess whether or not the message is authenticated,
tampered with, or altered.

In order to enable digital signatures to be used widely and effectively, a publickey infrastructure based on key pairs must be applied. In this regard, the private and
public key is the most significant and effective model. 79 PKI also engages the services of
trusted third parties, namely certification authorities, guaranteeing the validity of digital
signatures. Without a third trusted party, trustworthiness of digital signatures in today's
online commercial transactions may be insufficient.

1.3 Objects and Purposes of Study
Advanced technology has played a critical role in changing conventional
commerce primarily based on paper-based transactions to paperless or online commercial
transactions. There is a need for new legal frameworks to regulate, facilitate, and foster a
new model of online transactions. As highly advanced and designated technology has
been designed and adopted to make online commercial transactions secure, problems
relating to the use of such digital signature technology have become a great concern to
online parties.
Thailand is a technologically developing country that has recently enacted ecommerce laws, collectively called the Electronic Transactions Act. The Act regulates
electronic signatures and digital signatures. The main aims of this act are to facilitate
online commercial transactions and to recognize and enforce electronic signatures, the

79

See WONGWATANASAN ET AL., supra note 44, at 81.
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most important of which are digital signatures. A comparison ofUnited States and Thai
laws indicates a number of significant legal differences, especially the differences in the
United States E-Sign Act and Thailand's E-Transactions Act in matters relating to the
law of evidence, law of contracts, torts, and laws on consumer protection.
Main Objects and Purposes of Study:
1. To explore, analyze and identify characteristics of secure online commercial
transactions concluded by digital signatures;
2. To study the technology used to create secure digital signatures as well as to
harmonize the technical and operational criteria which set the technical
standards of digital signatures;
3. To study various schools of thought concerning electronic signatures, which
includes digital signatures;
4. To analyze the provisions of Thailand's Electronic Transactions Act;
5. To compare the differences in the Federal E-Sign Act and Thailand's ETransactions Act and to determine any prospective Royal Decree that may
later be promulgated;
6. To analyze legal issues relating on how to adduce digital signatures as
evidence in civil trials in the United States federal courts and Thai courts;
7. To study the allocation and management of risks and liabilities involving
digital signatures among subscribers, certification authorities, and relying
parties;
8. To study the mechanisms for the protection of consumers in the use of digital
signatures; and
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9. To identify other legal problems relating to the practical developments in
digital signatures.

1.4 Method of Study
The study of digital signatures has been carried out on the basis of a systematic
documentary research and a comparative study using in depth information on digital
signatures from both English and Thai language sources . . The data has been
systematically organized, analyzed, and compared. In certain cases, case analysis has
been performed in order to predict the result of the court's decisions relating to digital
signatures.

1.5 Scope of Study
The study of digital signatures in online commercial transactions consists of five
chapters.
Chapter 1 is an introduction of online commerce, which offers a historical account
of authentication techniques. It describes characteristics of secure online transactions, the
need for digital signatures, and the scope oflegal recognition of digital signatures. It also
includes an elaboration of the use of terms, the objects and purposes of study, the method
of study, the scope of study, assumptions, and the benefits to be acquired from the study.
Chapter 2 introduces the digital environment and tells us how to ascertain the
identity of parties toe-commerce. It includes an illustration of a historical view of
traditional hand-written signatures and an overview of digital signatures. It explains in
detail authentication techniques, the public key cryptography used to create secure digital
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signatures, and the formative steps for creating digitally signed documents through digital
signatures.
Chapter 3 divides electronic signatures into three different schools of thought.
This chapter analyses the legal position of the Thai Electronic Transactions Act and
includes a comparative study between the U. S. E-Sign Act and the Thai E-Transactions
Act. This chapter also includes a comparison of the use of digital signatures as evidence
in civil trials in the United States Federal courts and the Thai courts of law, especially on
the issues regarding burdens of proof, relevancy, requirements for evidence in writing,
the best evidence rule, authentication and evidential weight, hearsay, expert witness, and
presumption of reliability.
Chapter 4 is concerned about the allocation of risks of digital signatures among
subscribers, certification authorities and relying parties in tort liabilities. This chapter
includes the management of risks and liabilities of parties involved in the use of digital
signatures.
Chapter 5 presents the conclusion and offers some recommendations as well as
mechanisms for the protection of consumers.

1.6 Assumption of Study
At present, lawmakers and online users are concerned with the security and
reliability of transactions conducted on the Internet. Without digital signatures, online
commercial transactions are not a hundred percent trustworthy. Thus, the underlying
assumption is that the application of digital signatures makes transactions more secure
and reliable than the use of simple electronic signatures. Even though biometrics provides
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the strongest form of electronic signatures, it is not practical for online commerce due to
the lack of availability of technical devices. A digital signature is the most practical form
of electronic signatures.
The legal status of digital signatures has been recognized in the United States but
not in all other countries. Legal issues on digital signatures will be best resolved by
applying laws which have been specifically enacted for online commerce, rather than by
applying existing laws which have been designed for traditional commerce. In this
· regard, Thailand's Parliament has just passed a Law on Electronic Transactions and
Digital Signatures. Conducting a study of legal issues on digital signatures would be
extremely useful and beneficial to both online parties who conduct online commercial
transactions by digital signatures and lawmakers who lay down the legal frameworks for
digital signatures as applied to online commerce.

1.7 The Benefits of Conducting a Study on Digital Signatures
Conducting a study of digital signatures explores a new technology in online
commerce and enhances the understanding of the secure technology used to create digital
signatures. This study will examine the legal concepts and frameworks for digital
signature laws of the United States concerning the application of digital signatures to
online commerce. This study will demonstrate the legal problems arising from the
application of theE-Transactions Act. Finally, this study provides not only a
comprehensive account of the law for online parties, but it also recommends the adoption
of specific regulations to handle, regulate, facilitate and foster the use oftechnologically
advanced digital signatures in line with modem commerce practice.
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CHAPTER2
GENERAL CONCEPT OF DIGITAL SIGNATURES

The digital environment increasingly affects our lifestyles, particularly in the way
we live, shop and communicate. As society turns more and more into a digital society,
digital devices such as digital mobile phones, digital cameras, digital cable and computers
are increasingly used for communication. The Internet, another phenomenon of the
digital environment, has also affected traditional commerce and provided a great deal of
useful commercial strategies, particularly those designed to serve remote consumers who
are not easily accessible to local shopping malls. The Internet has provided online
customers with a variety of goods, services and information as well as an intriguing
advertising potential. These characteristics play key roles in the increase of sale volumes,
the reduction in operational costs and time saving in an age of economic recession.
Many corporations are currently facing a serious economic crisis. A number of
businesses have reduced and avoided unnecessary transaction costs by reducing paper
transactions and employing paperless or online transactions instead. This is one of the
many ways of cutting the costs of running a business and increasing a business'
competitiveness.
Pacific Bell or SBC, a large telephone company, launched an online billing and
payment service and urged its consumers to go online rather than send a check by mail to
pay their phone bills. This method not only provides for savings in the operational costs
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of the company, but it also offers savings in terms oftime, stamps and checks for the
customers.
Online transactions are not limited to the purchase and sales of goods and services,
but they also include e-mail offers to sell securities, utility online payments, electronic
funds transfers, in-home shopping and banking, accessing private data bases, electronic
contracts and tax returns as well as other transfers of proprietary and private
information. 80 Most online transactions involving commercial and financial services
require highly secure technology to maintain the confidentiality of information in the
conduct of transactions on the Internet network. Owing that the Internet is open,
borderless, and insecure, highly sensitive business information, such as trade secrets, may
be exposed to unidentified persons causing an unexpected loss to online parties. As there
are no trusted gatekeepers to authenticate the identity of consumers conducting online
transactions 81 , there is a great need for digital identification in today online transactions.
The online environment allows a potential imposter to impersonate the identity of
another person or assume a fictional identity. 82 Thus, parties involved in online
transactions need to verify or authenticate the other parties' identification.
Dating back to Roman times, wax was used to seal and authenticate important
messages. 83 If a seal was broken, it was assumed that the message was not authentic or
had been intercepted. During the middle Ages, a seal made of clay was affixed to a

°KURZ, supra note 16, at 156.
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Charles R. Merrill, Proof of WHO, WHAT and WHEN in Electronic Commerce, available at
http://www.abanet.org/scitechlammerr.html (Feb. 27, 1997}.
82

ALAN M. GAHTAN ET AL., INTERNET LAW: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR LEGAL AND BUSINESS
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document to authenticate a marked contract. 84 In 1851, the Supreme Court of the United
States similarly noted that wax was the most convenient and the only material used to
receive and retain the impression of a seal.

85

Today, the hand-written signature is the

most widely accepted form of authentication.

2.1 Ascertaining the Identity of Parties in an Online Transaction
In today's age of advanced technology, there is a need for transaction security

when individuals conduct their business in a cyber world. The most basic element of
transaction security in online transactions is the ability to ascertain the parties' identity. 86
Conducting online transactions differs from traditional face-to-face transactions in its
need for a specific technology for the verification of online identity and the
authentication of messages.
One available technology used to prove online identity and make online
transactions secure and confidential is cryptography. Cryptographic technology utilizes
special methods for the digital identification of persons that can be sent through computer
networks with messages or files. It is a useful technology for authenticating messages 87
and online transactions. By introducing public key cryptography into online commerce,
online commercial transactions can be conducted in a highly secure manner.
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Each business community may have different standards for identity verification.
The most common forms of identification are the driver's license, passport or other photo
ID cards. Identities are verified by an examination of the signatures. Because of the
importance in distinguishing the uniqueness of each signature, specific measurement
methods and criteria must be prescribed for the examination of signatures. For instance,
signature verification requires a visual inspection to judge similarities in the writing
strokes, and in the case of a dispute, expert witnesses are usually called to give testimony
on the authorship of a particular piece of handwriting. 88
The banking community is often stricter when it comes to the verification of
identity in conjunction with the execution of certain financial transactions such as money
withdrawals or transfers. In traditional face-to-face banking transactions, the identity of
banks' customers is usually ascertained by an examination of certain legal documents,
such as a driver's license or a passport. 89 In some countries such as Thailand, the
banking community applies even stricter standards for the examination of signatures
associated with legal identification documents.
In the United States, money withdrawals are affected by the presentation of an
identification document which contains a photograph and a signature, such as a driver's
license or a passport, from which the teller may verify the withdrawer's ownership of an
account. 90 When a driver's license or passport is presented, bank tellers are usually not
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seriously concerned with the signatures. If you claim to be an account owner and you
have an ID card, your signature is assumed valid. Generally, banks also do not verify
signatures on a check unless the check has been written for a substantial amount, being
$30,000 or more.

91

By contrast, bank customers in Thailand face stricter and more complicated
requirements when making face-to-face withdrawals at a local bank office. Banks issue
passbooks to customers, at the back of which is a specimen of the customer's signature.
The specimen is not visible to the naked eye, but it may only be viewed by the bank
official with a signature verifier used exclusively at the bank.
Bank tellers compare the signatures on the back of the passbook with that on the
identification card and on the withdrawal form. If the signature on the withdrawal form
is not exactly identical to that originally signed on the back of the passbook, the bank
tellers will refuse to make that transaction until a proper signature can be provided. Thus,
even if you really are the owner of the account and have valid identification documents,
you may nevertheless not be allowed to withdraw your inoney until you are able to affix a
signature on the withdrawal form identical to the one on the back of your passbook. 92
Remote transactions in banking services have dramatically increased through the
use of electronic machinery. Telephones, Automatic Teller Machines (ATM), and the

matricular consular ID issued by the Mexican government. For certain transactions, the bank may
also require thumbprint to cash a check or additional information to verify customers' identity.
91

Jonathan Angel, PKI and the Law, at 4, available at
http://www.networkmagazine.com/article!NMG2001 004SOO 10/3 (2000).
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It may be possible that two persons are so alike and have identical first name and last name, but
a signature can distinguish one from another. If the bank pays someone who claims to be the
account owner by presenting the bank teller with an identical ID card, but that person is not able to
affix a signature on the withdrawal form identical to the one on the back of the passbook, the bank
may be in breach of contract.
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Internet are examples of advanced technologies for non-face-to-face transactions. Thus,
there is a need for a specific method of identity verification beyond physical signatures
and photo ID cards.

In order to make a telephone banking or other telephone financial transaction, the
operators must verify your identity by asking a secret question such as your mother's
maiden name or your social security number. Personal Identification Numbers (PIN) are
also commonly used as a means of authorization.

In most automatic credit card information databases accessible by phone93 , such
as American Express, the card issuer normally requires a cardholder to provide the last
four digits of his year of birth, zip code, or social security number. However, this
technique is not likely to be used in transactions requiring a high level of security since it
is possible for intruders to acquire knowledge on the background of the authorized

The e-mail is now very popular amongst online users as it is a convenient way of
communicating with each other directly and rapidly. There is a general trust that e-mails
are sent by the account holders themselves. Nevertheless, it is possible for impostors to
break into someone else's e-mail account in breach of security or create a false e-mail
account to impersonate another account holder. It is therefore not advisable to trust an email sent from an unfamiliar person as there is no way of verifying the identity of such

93

Krung Thai Bank Public Company Limited has launched a "Card Center" to offer information,
assistance, and convenience to bank customers. The bank's representative normally requires a
credit card holder to provide his or her credit card numbers and the flfteen digits of identity
numbers appeared on his or her ID card so as to confirm identity before providing services.
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person. 95 The application of a digital identification procedure would provide a higher
degree of trust in digital communications, and in particular, online transactions.

2.2 Authentication Techniques
An authentication technique is a mechanism employed for the effective
verification of identity. The primary purposes of an authentication technique are to verify
that a person is who he or she claims to be96and that a message or transaction is truly
from that person.
Authentication is the most essential of all the security devices because it controls
access, permission, and authorizations. 97 Authentication is not only valuable as a means
of proving origin, but also for promoting non-repudiation and reliability. The use of
these techniques depends on the level of security. Where a higher level of security is
required, a more secure method is employed.
Both physical and non-physical authentication techniques are used to authenticate
users. Signature verification, fingerprint and hand geometric verification, retinal pattern
and lip print identification and voice identification98 are examples of sophisticated
authentication techniques by means of physical parts, which are generally known as
95

Online users may sign up for free e-mail accounts provided by Hotmail, the world's largest
provider of free, Web-based e-mail. The provider normally requires the online users to register and
provide their personal information in order to obtain e-mail accounts. However, the provider
normally does not verify such information. Although they provide false information, they are still
able to obtain e-mail addresses. Someone may obtain the account in the name of another person.
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biometrics. Non-physical authentication techniques are essentially verification methods
performed by making references to a user's knowledge or to what a user possesses.
Authentication techniques are mainly classified into 3 groups, namely,
authentication by a user's knowledge, a user's characteristics and what a user possesses.

A. User's Knowledge
User's knowledge is a non-physical authentication technique that depends on
knowledge that belongs solely to the authorized user. The basic example of this
technique is the user ID-password. 99 The user ill-password (also called the "sign-on") is
unique to each user. A password is deemed to be a basic form of digital identification
used to authenticate users, whether they may be used to authorize a user for entry into a
system or access to s.ensitive data.

100

The main function of a password is to protect highly classified information or data
from being intercepted by unauthorized persons. The mechanism of passwords depends
on the security of user IDs and passwords. User IDs are generally made public, like
telephone numbers listed in telephone directory, but passwords have to be kept
confidential. 101 Identity verification through passwords have been used in a wide range of
situation, from Ali Baba's opening of the magic cave through to military applications and
protocols for accessing computer systems. 102 User IDs and passwords are popular in most
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23( 1988).

fonns of banking business. Online customers, for instance, are required to have unique
user IDs and passwords in order to view statements and make electronic fund transfers.
Proof of a user's identity is achieved by comparing the user-provided passwords
and with that stored in the computer system. 103 Access is gained simply by typing a
password into the computer system. If the password entered matches the one stored on
the computer, the user's identity has been proven.
The most serious concern over password management is how to keep passwords
confidential. Passwords must be exclusively known to the user. The basic duty of
password holders is to take reasonable care in preventing the negligent or accidental
exposure of passwords. It is also essential to require that passwords be kept secure and
confidential at all times as well as being changed frequently. If an unauthorized person
obtains your password, such person can claim to be you, and the efficiency and security
of authentication will thereby be compromised or breached. 104
To set passwords, passwords must be carefully chosen such that they are not
easily deciphered like common dictionary words. 105 Passwords which are easy to
remember are also easy to guess. Most people often use their maiden name, name of
spouse, name of pets, birthdays, years ofbirth, telephone numbers, or names of favorite
sport teams as passwords. These secret words may be discovered by a close acquaintance
who knows your background and persistently guesses until he finds the right words.
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Passwords may be cracked through tricky, tedious persistence and exhaustive
search, known as brute force attack. 106 ''Brute force attack" is a tactic where a hacker
tries all possible combinations of valid symbols, up to a certain length, to access into a
system. Unadulterated bad luck and negligence of part of the user

107

,

such as writing

passwords down on a table or on top of computers are examples of failures in the
safekeeping of passwords.
One defect of passwords is that it is impossible to distinguish between a
legitimate user and a hacker who knows or has obtained a user's password. 108 A
successful signing on or logging in makes reference only to the user concerned where in
actual fact such a person may be an intruder or a hacker. In the fable of Ali Baba, an
intruder who knew Ali Baba's secret word could invade the magic cave of Ali Baba and
the magic cave could not tell that he was not Ali Baba. Another example of password
compromise by an intruder is the theft of email address. W ebsites, such as Hotmail or
Yahoo, providing email services, have security mechanisms to protect the passwords of
email addresses from hackers. If the email address is hacked by a hacker, the real owner
of that email address or the website operator may not know of the breach of security at all
because an intruder can sign in successfully as if he were the real owner of that account.
The hacker may consequently use that email account to impersonate the user or commit
fraud by misrepresenting himself as the real account owner.
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Even though authentication by passwords is widely used in a number of areas, its
property is fit for limited usage, such as for authorization clearance. Passwords are not
suitable for authenticating online identity as they do not tell who you really are.
Authentication by personal identification number is another example of a user's
knowledge authentication technique. It is popularly used, particularly in ATM systems.
Like a password, the PIN is typically a secret four-digit number that users enter along
with their ATM cards to verify that they are the authorized users. 109 ATM cards are
useless without a valid PIN. PINs and passwords are similar because PINs must be
associated with information contained in magnetic strip cards.
In order to prove one's identity, one must insert an ATM card into an ATM
machines and then enter correct PINs. The system will compare the information on the
card and the PINs with the information contained data bank. A match means that your
identity is confirmed and you are authorized to make transactions from your account. A
mismatch would reject your request to access the account. PINs also share a common
defect with passwords because a person could steal your-PINs and ATM card and access
a system as if he were the authorized user without being detected as an intruder or a
hacker.
B. User's Characteristics
Authentication by a user's characteristics is based on the examination of physical
human body parts. 110 Such a technique is also known as biometrics. Biometrics has been
traditionally applied in criminal investigation and forensics analyses, such as for tracking
109

ELAINE LAWRENCE ET AL., INTERNET COMMERCE: DIGITAL MODES FOR BUSINESS

110

ROBERT J. THIERAUF, ELECTRONIC DATA INTERCHANGE IN FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING

39(1990).
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139(1998).

and matching criminals. Without biometric methods, the police would face difficulties in
identifying a wrongdoer. The use of biometrics allows the police to identify crime
offenders by their handprints, fingerprints, voice patterns, and even DNA samples.
Biometrics can also prove an individual's identity in criminal trial.
The pace of technological change has led biometric authentications to be applied
not only for seizing criminals, but also securing online commerce. Today, an individual's
physical traits or biological characteristics

111

,

and even an individual's behavior

112

are

increasingly being used for verifying the identity of individuals before giving them access
to highly sensitive areas such as microchip production facilities, military ipformation
centers, highly restricted areas and other highly secured places. Sophisticated biometrics
is considered to be highly effective from a technical viewpoint as biological
characteristics are unique to each person and nearly impossible to replicate. 113
Some physically unique characteristics of the user, such as palm prints,
fingerprints, iris patterns, and lip or retinal patterns can be used to recognize

114

and

identify an individual. 115 The voice and face of individuals are other means of biometric
authentication in usage today.
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Authentication by retinal patterns, which are highly characteristic of the
individual, is considered the most secure biometric authentication process of all because
of its complexities.

116

It is, however, also viewed as frightening, threatening and

dangerous due to concerns that the devices which emit infrared beams might cause harm.
Biometric verification mechanisms are based on actual measurement and stored
records. To verify an identity, an individual has to physically present his or her physical
parts to special sensors. These sensors convert the patterns of individual's biometrics, i.e.
his or physical or biological characteristics, into a signal which are then compared to the
previously stored signals in the system. 117 The computer matches the actual biometric
patterns with that in the files. If the signals match, a person's identity is verified.
Biometric authentication devices are currently only available for specific
characteristics, such as fingerprints, handprints, retina patterns, voice patterns, signatures,
and keystroke patterns. Devices that will be used to check footprints, lip prints, wrist
vein patterns, brainwaves, skin oil characteristics, facial geometry, and weight/gait
pattem118 are now under experiment in order to new pos·sibilities for the use of these
biometrics.
Even though an accurate examination of human traits or characteristics is difficult
to achieve, the current biometric devices have proven to be reliable. It is not guaranteed,
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however, that every measurement made would match the filed specimen. There are still
problems concerning false positives and false negatives.

119

The former is concerned with

an error where the system mistakenly accepts non-users and allow them to access systems.
The latter is the denial of legitimate users.

120

The complexities of human biometrics mean that it is essential for inventors to
invent biometric devices that work accurately, leaving as little margin for error as
possible. Mobile phones, for instance, now have a voice recognition function that makes
an outgoing call upon an input of a voice command. Such devices, however, still have
problems with precision. A user who does not make an exact voice command similar to
the one recorded in the mobile phone system may not be granted access. The problem
lies in the fact that the actual voice pattern may be different from the recorded one. The
system may not be able to tell apart minor differences if only one sample of the voice
pattern is recorded. Thus, in order to provide more efficiency, the mobile phone must be
able to record several voice patterns of a user in order that access could still be granted to
a user who catches a cold and ends up with a slightly altered voice pattern.
Precision seems to be problematic and is deemed a .security concern. Designers of
biometric authentication systems who invent more accurate physical readers may solve
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this problem. Reliability could also be increased if passwords or PIN codes are used in
conjunction with these biometric authentication devices.

121

Another security concern over biometric authentication is related to the
inadvertent exposure ofbiometric data. If an individual's characteristics or traits are
disclosed to an unidentified person, confidentiality is considered to be permanently
compromised as human physical parts cannot be changed or reset like PIN codes or
passwords. Thus, once biometric data on a human physical part has been exposed, such
revealed part should no longer be used for verifying the individual's identity.
In conclusion, the use of biometric authentication technologies as a means of
verifying identity may not be quickly and smoothly accepted in the online commerce
community for a number of reasons. First of all is the limited availability of effective
specific devices. Secondly, biometric devices are costly and beyond the means of most
users. Thirdly, biometrics is technically insufficient in providing a complete basis for
authentication in secure online commerce as there is a major limitation to this approach 122,
namely precision. Fourthly, there are considerable technical dif:ficulties 123 involved in
the use of biometric mechanisms. A technician, guard or receptionist should be made
available at all times to assist the user where a problem arises as to the failure to provide
a precise identification. 124 Finally, disabled persons may also face numerous obstacles
when using biometric identification machines because of their physical limitations.
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C. What a User Possesses
Examples of authentication techniques that can be used to prove an individual's
identity through something in his or her possession includes physical tokens, smart cards,
·and a key-pair (a private and public key). A token is a physical object that is carried by
an individual and used to prove identity.

125

Dating back to the ancient times, the king' s

ring was used as a token to identify the king. A person who carried the king's ring or
held the king's ring in procession was deemed to be the king's representative and could
speak for the king. 126 An access card is a good example of a present day token. A token,
however, typically does not provide a precise proof of a person's identity. 127 A person in
possession of a lost or stolen token will have access as if he were the true owner of that
token. At the same time, a person who loses his token may be denied access although his
identity remains unchanged.
The smart card is the latest example of an authentication device via an object in
possession. Smart cards were originally invented in France. 128 A smart card may also be
called a chip card, an integrated circuit card, a personal computer in your wallet, or a
database on a card.
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Smart cards resemble other bankcards in terms of appearances, but
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a smart card takes one step further by containing a ROM microprocessor chip embedded
in the card 130which stores and processes both programs and digital information on a smart
card holder. Because of its highly secured nature, smart cards are considered as a secure
means of identification. 131 A smart card may be used to conduct off-line transactions by
referring to information stored on the card. In the case of an unavailability of a telephone
line or an on-line link, a smart card provides more convenience than a card that needs to
be verified online.
There are many types of smart cards, but the most advanced of which contains a
cryptographic capacity that provides the authentication and payment capacities to
authorize real-time transactions.

132

To increase the level of security, a smart card can also

be used in conjunction with other authentication techniques such as passwords and I or
PIN codes stored in a secret zone of the read-only memory. 133 The main benefit of a
smart card lies in the difficulties of counterfeiting.
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Figure 1 Smart cards Source: Elaine Lawrence ET AL., Internet
Commerce: Digital Modes for Business (1998). John Wiley & Sons
Australia, Ltd.

Telephone cards are generally produced in the form of smart cards. 135 In the
credit card business, a major credit card company, American Express, issues smart cards
that function as credit cards. 136 Similarly, in Thailand, Thai Farmer's Bank issues smart
cards that combine a consumer's emergency medical records with smart bank IDs and
electronic purse services. 137 Entertainment providers in Thailand, such as EGV, also
provide consumers with rechargeable movie cards that perform the same function as
smart cards and can be used to buy movie tickets.
135

Telephone Organization of Thailand produces phone cards (TOT cards) in the form of smart
cards.
136

American Express issues Blue cards containing Smart Chip embedded in the card. This enables
cardholders to surf the Web, shop, and manage their finances with ease, security, and convenience.
Blue cards also store cardholders' favorite URLs, log-in, and personal data on the Smart Chip. In
addition, Smart Chip provides the enhanced online security.
137

KORPER &

ELLIS, supra note 129, at 171.

43

A key pair is another form of authentication technique by an object in possession.
A public key system consists of two separate keys, the private and public key. The former
must be kept confidential by the user, but the latter can be made public. The
authentication process by a key-pair generally involves a computer-to-computer
communication. 138 To verify the identity of the originator of the message, the recipient
uses the originator's public key to verify the message. Each of the keys in a key pair is
capable of establishing the authenticity of senders and messages created by its
correspondent key.

2.3 Digital Signatures
Online users are not usually required to present identifications as in entering a
foreign jurisdiction where official identification documents such as passports are required.
Impersonations may be made either by creating a false identity or by forging another
person's identification. In 1993, a student at Dartmouth University made and sent a
forged email, stating that the midterm exams on the Latin American course taught by
Professor David was cancelled. 139 This caused more than half of the class to miss the
exams. 140 Such was an example of one of many cases where online users have been
deceived by forged electronic messages. Thus, reliance cannot be placed on online
transactions, including emails, if there were no way of telling whether online messages or
transactions were authentic.
138
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139

GARFINKEL,

supra note 39, at 17.

140 Id.

44

Digital identification is becoming an essential part of conducting online
transactions because it identifies online users and authenticates messages electronically in
both commercial and non-commercial transactions. A currently available technology in
this regard is the digital signature technology. It is difficult to know whether online
transactions and electronic messages are truly authentic without digital signature
technology. Numerous types of frauds, particularly impersonation, stealing of
identification, and false messages, are on the increase. It is necessary for the online
environment to encourage online users to use digital signature technology to prevent such
fraud.
However, an appropriate legal framework for supporting and regulating digital
signatures as used for securing online commercial transactions has not yet been well
defined. 141 The technology itself is rather dynamic. Online merchants, users, attorneys,
and other parties involved in online commerce are aware of the legal uncertainties
governing the use of digital signature technology in online commerce.
In 1996, the Information Security Committee of the American Bar Association
Section of Science of Technology published the Digital Signature Guideline. 142 The
document aimed at defining and forming a system ofPKI to utilize the current
asymmetric cryptography technology and build a legal framework to regulate and
recognize this potential technology. This guideline was the effort of leading
technologists and attorneys from all over the world.
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Although Thailand passed the Electronic Transactions Act, B.E. 2544(2001), the Act leaves
several legal issues to be addressed by a Royal Decree. Examples of those issues include
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A. Characteristics ofDigital Signatures

Using digital signature technology as a means of digital identification offers great
promises for secure online commerce. A digital signature, by definition, is a
tranSformation of a message using an asymmetric cryptosystem and a hash function such
that a person having the initial message and the signer's public key can accurately
determine (1) whether the transformation was created using the private key that
corresponds to the signer's public key, and (2) whether the initial message has been
altered since the transformation was made.
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Based on the above definition, a digital signature is not a physical handwritten
signature or a digitized image of a handwritten signature or a type signature such as
IS/John Doe144, but indeed it is a data item that uniquely depends on both the sender's
identity and the contents of the message.
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Figure 2 The Digital Signature. Source: Simson Garfinkel, PGP:
Pretty Good Privacy (1995). O'Reilly & Associates, Inc.
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A digital signature is logically attached or associated with a message or
transaction that is sent over the online environment electronically. A digital signature is
simply attached to a message and it does not make the attached message secret, but a
digital signature, based on encryption technology, provides confidential protection at a
certain level.
Digital signatures are based on an asymmetric cryptosystem consisting of two
separate keys, which perform the function ofboth encryption and decryption. Another
technique used for detecting changes is a one-way hash function.
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The basic

mechanism of creating a digital signature is that the originator of the message run that
message into a one-way hash function, and then uses his private key to sign the message.
Any potential receiver can use an originator or a signer's public key to prove that the
sender is the true originator of the message, and that the message has not been altered in
transit. 147
Anyone who knows a sender's public key can verify the validity of digital
signatures and access the message, thus confidentiality of messages is not guaranteed.
Without a public key, it is nearly impossible to break the encryption and retrieve the
information under encryption. 148 It is a foolproof way for a recipient to check the
integrity of the message by having only access to the signer's public key. The private
key of the signer must be uniquely and solely under the control or authority of the proper
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FORD & BAUM, supra note 3, at Ill. The hash function has the property that if the message is
changed in any way, even by just one bit or by adding a space or another letter, an entirely
different value is produced by the hash function.
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FORD & BAUM, supra note 3, at 109.
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/d. at 111. The decryption key can be made publicly known without compromising security.

47

signer. Each digital signature is unique both to each message and signer. It is said that a
digital signature provides proof of origin and identity.
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The message run through a hash function is digested and unreadable. It is quite
difficult to find two different messages which yield the same hash result.
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Even a minor

change of a message, such as an omission of a dash mark, or an addition of a space, will
be detected by the use of digital signatures because the change will cause the hash
function to produce different results. This will ensure the relying party that a message is
not altered after the sender digitally signed it, hence ensuring the authenticity and
integrity of messages.
By applying digital signatures, no one can possibly compute the signer's digital
signature, including changes in the message without the signer's private key. This makes
digitally signed transactions unforgeable 151 , unless the private key is compromised. Time
and date stamping digitally signed transactions prevents a signer from claiming that
others have used his or her private key to sign those transactions.
In summary, a digital signature mainly guarantees security in three aspects.
Firstly, a digital signature proves the authenticity of a signer (ass~g the recipient that
the alleged sender had in fact generated the message). Secondly, it ensures the integrity of
messages (to confirm that the message had not altered since it was signed). 152 Finally, it
provides non-repudiation because digitally signing a message make it impossible for
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signers to deny their own signing due to their exclusive control of a private key and time
•

.

stampmg servtce.
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B. Use ofDigital Signatures in Online Commercial Transactions
The requirement for a higher level of security is one of the core reasons why

digital signatures are becoming popular. A number of technologies have been used to
keep online transactions as secure as possible, but in terms of digital transmission,
authentication and integrity, digital signatures have proven to be efficiently superior and
are deemed secure. 154 The use of digital signatures to sign online checks, contracts, credit
cards, and other online commercial transactions is becoming an essential part of online
society155 because physical handwritten signatures cannot be adapted for use in the online
environment. Thus, a digital signature provides a replacement for a hand-signed
signature in online transactions
As traditional businesses operate on the basis of written signatures, certain aspects
of the existing legal framework for traditional commerce 'may not be suitable for
application to online commerce. For example, a legal provision ;may require that a sales
transaction valued at over a prescribed amount be signed by a person or otherwise such
transaction would be rendered unenforceable. 156 The offer to sell or purchase securities
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See MADRON, supra note 149, at 71.
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E-COMMERCE: STRATEGY, TECHNOLOGIES AND APPLICATIONS 208(2000).

BACARD, supra note 152, at 85.
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Subject to the Civil and Commercial Code of Thailand [C.C.C.), § 456 provides that a contract
of sale of movable property where the agreed price is five hundred baht (approximately $12) or
upwards is not enforceable by action unless there be some written evidence sigr~ed by the party
liable or unless earnest is given, or there is part perfonnance. See also E. ALLAN FARNSWORTII &
WILLIAM F. YOUNG, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 288 (5th ed.1995). In the United States,
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will bind the offerer only where his or her signature has been affixed on a written
promise.157 In the banking industry, the identity of bank consumers is the most crucial
concern in making online banking transactions. If the identity is not definitely confirmed,
banks may find themselves with huge liabilities from financial loss due to fraud.
With digital signatures, the use of credit cards online may be much more reliable

in Thailand. 158 Credit cards have been used for more than 30 years in Thailand, but it was
only in the recent years that the credit card business witnessed a boom in the industry.
Credit cards are now issued by both commercial banks and superstores, such as Tesco
Lotus, Central, The Mall etc. 159 Previously, banking practices did not allow credit card
holders to make purchases without their signatures. Banks did not normally allow
payment in the absence of cardholders and signatures due to fears of fraud. This made
online shopping not possible for the potential online shoppers.
Digital signatures can be used to solve these problems by providing a method
whereby online users could be held responsible for their online transactions. The digital
a statute of frauds requires certain agreements and promises to be in writing and signed by the
party to be charged or by his or her agent. Those agreements include: (a) a special promise of an
executor or administrator to answer damages out of his own estate; (b) a special promise to answer
debt, default, or miscarriage of another person; (c) an agreement made upon consideration of
marriage; (d) a contract for sale of real estate, or any interest in or concerning the same; or (e) an
agreement that is not to be performed within one year from the making.
157

C. C.C. § 456 also applies to an agreement to sell or to buy any movable property where the
agreed price is five hundred baht or upwards.
158

Thailand-Credit Card Security, available at http://www.travelideas.net/thailand.hotels/creditcard.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2003). Even when a cardholder uses a secure server connection, if
the PC has been infected with certain "mobile code viruses", the credit card information may be
sent secretly behind this secure connection. It is important to note that sending credit card details
by fax rather than by the Internet I e-mail is infinitely more secure because the information is
likely to only stay in printed form, not on someone's PC.
159

History ofShell Fleet Card, available at
http://www.shell.co.th/shellfleetcardlenglish/generaVhistory.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2003).
Shell, the leader in a wide spectnun of Thailand's petroleum and chemicals industries, launched
the Shell Fleet Card in Thailand in April1996.
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signature attached to the end of a message or transaction functions as a crude form of
signature160 which other online parties can easily validate. Serving as an online identity
service, a digital signature may also have a number of other possible uses, such as to
prevent someone from changing or forging critical information in an email, or in news
postings. Corporate bodies may use digital signatures along with the distribution of price
lists and catalogs containing verified prices. Government agencies and other
organizations may also apply a digital signature to official signed online announcements,
press releases, rules, regulations, and other official documents.
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As Thailand is currently developing a policy of information technology, the Royal
Thai government requires that economic information collected from throughout the
country must be stored in computers in order that it can be made globally and swiftly
available. 162 As such information in electronic form may be manipulated and modified by
unauthorized parties, there is a need for a mechanism that maintains both proof of origin
and integrity. Thus, the application of digital signatures will provide such a protection.
The application of digital signatures is gradually gaining in popularity among
online users because of its foolproof authentication method and difficulties of
counterfeiting. If a dispute arises regarding the validity of digital signatures, a relying
party, which includes third parties, can verify the validity of a signature and the integrity
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NATIONAL INFORMATION COMMI1TEE OF THAILAND, E-THAILAND INITIATIVE 2 (March, 2002),
available at http://unpanl.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/docurnents/apcity/unpan003070.pdf. The
purpose of e-govemment is mainly to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of government
administration and public services by allowing citizens to be able to access the services anytime,
from anywhere in the country.
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of a message without having to acquire the signer's private key.
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One of many ways of

encouraging people to use digital signatures like their conventional signatures is to
publicly use them. Greater certainties in the legal status of digital signatures help to
convince more online users to use them as they become legally binding in more and more
jurisdictions.

2.4 Differences between Handwritten Signatures and Digital
Signatures
A conventional handwritten signature is the result of a physical action that a
person who has an intention to be bound to the messages or contents in a document signs
his or her name on the document concerned. As society changes, a signature may be
stamped or typed or created by the use of certain reliable authentication techniques on the
condition that such methods offers sufficient proof of an agreement and the identities of
the parties thereto.
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A digital signature, by nature, is created by technology, not by a

physical action. A digital signature performs a similar function to a written signature in
that it is mainly used to verify the origin and contents of a message. 165
A number of laws have provided definitions for handwritten signatures as
described in detail in the following sub-sections:
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2.4.1 Conventional Handwritten Signatures
A. International Conventions
The United Nations Convention on International Bills of Exchange and
International Promissory Notes Art S(k) provides that "signature means a handwritten
signature, its facsimile or an equivalent authentication effected by any other means."

166

Based on this convention, a traditional signature is basically a signature that is physically
signed by a signer, which includes its exact copy produced by means of facsimile. In
other words, by signing one's name on a document and faxing it to another person, the
faxed document that has your signature is valid as if the signature were physically written
on that facsimile. This convention also allows signing by means of an equivalent
authentication effected by other means. The convention did not provide for what
amounted to other means. Thus, certain technological developments may well qualify as
signatures.

B. Uniform Commercial Code
Under United States law, the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) emphasizes the
intent of a party to use any symbol as a signature. Subject to U.C.C. 1-201(39), any
symbol, without restriction, executed or only adopted by a party with a present intention
to authenticate a writing 167 is qualified enough to be a signature. The most important
factor is the intent of such person to use a symbol, which could be a mark or any form of
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United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) drafted a multilateral
convention regulating international negotiable instruments. The final text was adopted in May
1988.
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THOMAS M. QUINN, QUINN'S UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CODE COMMENTARY AND LAW DIGEST
1-49(2d ed.l991).

53

symbol, to authenticate a document for such a symbol to be considered as a signature and
valid under the U.C.C. A complete signature is not always necessary. That signature may
be in a printed or stamped or written form. Initials or a thumbprint are also sufficient as
long as the person who wrote the initial or made the thumbprint had an intent to be bound.
As the law prescribes a wide definition of signatures, courts must use common
sense and commercial experience in determining whether a mark constitutes a
signature. 168 Various interpretations have been offered by the courts. In 1864, the court
noted that a written signature means a handwritten autograph or, if the signer cannot
write, a proper mark. 169 This is consistent with the U.C.C. 1-201(39) because in order to
determine whether or not a mark is a signature, the intent is the main factor to be taken
into account. Disabled persons who cannot write may make or use a proper mark in lieu
of a physically affixed signature.
In the earlier cases, a typewritten name on U.C.C. financial statements did not
qualify as signatures 170, but those decisions were later reversed in subsequent
decisions. 171 In 1989, the court had a chance to examine the status of a fax signature
where it held that a fax signature was an adequate declaration. 172 The court in another
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Ames v. Schurmeire, 9 Minn. 221(Gil.206)(1864).
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In re Carlstron, 3 UCC Rep. Serv.766 (Callaghan)(Bankr.D.Me 1966).
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Matter ofSave-on-Car.pets of Arizona, Inc., 545 F.2d 1239(9th Cir.1976). The court held that a
typewritten signature on a financing statement filed with the Secretary of State created a valid
security interest. The court further held that§ 44-3141 permitted a person to sign a financing
statement by a typewritten signature.
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case determined that a typewritten name on a telegram constituted a signature under the
Statue ofFrauds

173

,

consistent with a 1989 decision.

C. The Thai Civil and Commercial Code §9
The general concept of a signature under the Thai Civil and Commercial Code is
slightly different from the United States' perspective. The law of the United States
places much emphasis on intent as a main factor for determining the sufficiency of a
signature, but under the Thai Code, the mere intent to be bound may not sufficiently
constitute a valid signature.
§9 of the Thai Civil and Commercial Code provides that
"Whenever a writing is required by law, it is not necessary that it
be written by the person whom it is required, but it must bear his signature.

If a person is in the habit of affixing a seal in lieu of signature, the
affixing of such seal is equivalent to a signature.
A finger print, cross, other such mark affixed to a document is
equivalent to a signature if it is certified by the signature of two witnesses.
The provisions in the foregoing paragraph shall not apply to a
finger print, cross, or other such mark affixed to a document before the
competent authorities."
According to the above section, the Thai Code first does not require a person to
prepare a document by himself, but he must affix his signature on it. Secondly, the
signature must be handwritten, but under certain circumstances, a person who habitually
173

Hillstrom v.Cosnay. 188 Mont. 388, 614 P.2d 466(1980). The court held that the telegram did
constitute a sufficient written memorandum to satisfy the requirements of the statute of frauds.
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uses a seal on a document may affix such a seal instead of a signature. The law
recognizes a stamped seal as a signature on the condition that such person is in habit of
stamping a seal in lieu of a signature.
Thirdly, a person who cannot write an autograph signature may use his fingerprint
or make a cross, or affix such other mark on a document. A fingerprint, or cross, or other
such mark is invalid if it is made without being certified by the signature of two witnesses.
The two witnesses must sign their own physical signatures to certify that that person in
fact made such a mark. The code does not allow those witnesses to make a thumbprint,
fingerprint, or stamp a seal. 174 Finally, if a fingerprint, cross, or other such mark is
affixed before a competent authority, the law deems such a mark as legitimate without
having to obtain the certification of two witnesses.
The Thai Code focuses on both the intent to use a mark and its certification in the
determination of its validity as a signature. Even though the law recognizes a fingerprint,
cross, or other such mark as a signature, the recognition is rather limited. The law is
concerned with fraud committed by forging a fingerprint, cross or other such mark.
Subject to the Thai Civil and Commercial Code, a fingerprint, cross, or other such mark
is legally valid only when made in the presence of a competent authority. A fingerprint
made before the court pursuant to the Civil Procedure Code § 50(1) is valid even if made
in the absence of a competent authority.
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Kumpipaksa Sandeeka [Supreme Court] 98811930 (B.E. 2473)
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2.4.2 Objects of Traditional Handwritten Signatures
Ordinary physical handwritten signatures have four main objects. Firstly, a
conventional signature provides a strong evidentiary probative value because a signature
verifies the identity of an individual signing a message or document associated with his
signed message or document. 175 The identity of a signer is confirmed when the signer
writes his own signature on the document with the intent to be bound. A physically
signed document creates more evidentiary weight than an unsigned document because the
inky signature still adheres to paper, and the handwriting style is unique to each signer. 176

A signature also creates a record that is more reliable. Unsigned documents may be less
reliable, as the court would be hesitant in relying on a document where no one is
responsible for both the contents and the identity of the issuer.
Secondly, a traditional signature provides a formal ceremony for an individual to
actually sign the document and be considered as committing a legal act and be legally
responsible for the contents of a document. 177 A signature as affixed on a document
binds the signer who cannot deny such signed document or repudiate it. Thirdly, a
signature either by law or custom is a means of proving the signer's approval or
authorization of the writing. 178 This shows that the signer has an intent to be bound as
well as demonstrates a clear understanding of the contents. The signing action means the
signer has an intention to give it legal effect. 179

175 JOHNSTON & HANDA, supra note 35, at 97.
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Finally, a physical signature creates a sense of clarity and finality in the
transaction. 180 The signer is bound to the final content that he actually agreed before
signing. Further changes or additions to that document would not be binding on a signer.

2.4.3 The Distinctive Differences between Digital Signatures and Traditional
Handwritten Signatures
A conventional handwritten signature and a digital signature fulfill much of the
same fundamental purposes, but a digital signature also contains some distinctive features.
The main distinguishing factor lies in the fact that a digital signature is not a real, or
physically signed signature, but is a substitute for a real signature created by
cryptographic technology. A digital signature is not physically attached to the document
on a piece of paper like a handwritten signature, 181 but is a data item, logically attached to
online transactions, such as email, and credit card transactions. A digital signature is an
authentication technique that is understandable by most computer specialists, but not by
most people, while a physical handwritten signature is widely and readily recognized.
Another distinctive difference is that a written signature .o f a signer remains the
same regardless of the documents being authenticated, but will vary for each signer
according to their styles. Digital signatures depend on both the text of a document and
the signer. 182 Each time a signer digitally signs a message; it is uniquely valid to that
signed transaction.
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1998).

2.4.4 Use of Digital Signatures in lieu of Traditional Handwritten Signatures
Although handwritten signatures have long been used as proof of an agreement,
the possibilities still remain for the contents of a document to be altered and for
signatures to be forged. 183 Scientists are of the opinion that a handwritten signature can
be easily forged and the authentication of a conventional signature very much depends on
the right circumstances and the availability of several good specimen signatures.
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Those

problems relating to the forgery of signatures and their detection can now be solved by
the application of digital signature technology. However, as will be explained below, the
application of digital signatures is still limited.
The possibility of applying digital signatures in lieu of traditional handwritten
signatures depends on a number of factors. Firstly, a digital signature has to meet all the
legal requirements of a signature. A digital signature is used to authenticate data origin
and to verify the identity of a sender. Digital signatures can also safeguard a message's
integrity because they make it possible to detect whether the signed message has been
tampered or interfered with or altered during transmission. 1~ 5
Digital signatures also confirm message delivery, as registered mail does. 186 The
sender or receiver cannot deny that he or she did not send or receive a message and the
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Benjamin Wright, A Cyberspace Perspective: Eggs in Baskets: Distributing the Risks of
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THOMAS W. MADRON, NETWORK SECURITY IN TilE 90'S: ISSUES AND SOLUTIONS FOR
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through notarization by a trusted third party. See also RAYMOND GREENLAW & ELLENHEPP, INLINE/ON-LINE: FUNDAMENTALS OF TilE INTERNET AND TilE WORLD WIDE WEB 449(1999). A
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parties cannot deny the conclusion of an online transaction. Thus, a digital signature
effectively serves as non-repudiation guarantee in online transaction. It is therefore
generally considered that digital signatures meet the legal requirements for message
authentication and may be used to digitally sign an online transactions whether
commercial or not.
Secondly, since digital signatures are not real signatures, but only a form of
digital identification, the application of a digital signature is therefore limited to the
online environment, i.e. transactions effected between computers or on the Internet. Thus,
even though a digital signature meets all the legal requirement of a signature as well as
contain superior qualities to that of a physical handwriting, it cannot be signed on
conventional paper.
Thirdly, a number of transactions cannot be executed by digital signatures.
Certain non-commercial issues such as those related to personal rights, wills, family, or
spouse issues, such as martial status, letter of consent to divorce, by nature, require a real
or physical signature. As a result, digital signatures are not recognized on those
documents.

2.5 Benefits of Digital Signatures
Digital communications today are increasingly made in an open system, which is
more complicated than a closed system. The open system, the Internet, is not a secure

digital signature is like an official seal on both a document and the envelope that protects the
document from being altered.
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computer network. 187 Sending sensitive information, such as a credit card nwnbers, over
the Internet may be intercepted or altered. Electronic impostors may deceive online users
by claiming to be someone else or establishing a bogus website to trick online consumers
into providing their credit card numbers. A person can go online without any proper
digital identification in the same manner as a person having no identification card to
verify his identity. Thus, the application of a digital signature in the digital community
minimizes imposters.
A digital signature also provides a great deal of benefits to online users,
guaranteeing authentication and integrity of messages. A digital signature offers proof of
origin of the data and verifies whether such data have been altered or not. 188 It is seen that
after applying digital signatures, a minimum-security criteria (identity, authentication,
integrity and confidentiality) is met. The use of digital signature technology reduces the
problem of message corruption and increases the reliability of online commercial
transactions.

2.6 Cryptographic Technology
There are a number oftechnologies that can be used to authenticate the identity of
persons, but only one technology seems to be dominantly effective. Such technology is
commonly known as the digital signature. The supporting technology behind a digital
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PAMELA A. GRAY, OPEN SYSTEMS: A BUSINESS STRATEGY FOR TilE 1990s 39(1991). It bas
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GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS 173(1999).
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signature is cryptographic technology. Cryptographic technology, or the technique to
make something secret, is generally used to protect confidential information. 189
Cryptography has been applied for use in digital identification and the security of online
commerce.

2.6.1 Overview
The term cryptography comes from the Greek words "kryptos" and "graphos". 190
The former means secret and whilst the latter means writing. Cryptography is a science of
the study of secret words by transforming plain text into an unreadable text sent from one
party to another. Without cryptographic knowledge, the transformed words are
completely incomprehensible. A system which allows an individual to encrypt a plain
writing into an encrypted one, called "cipher text" or a cryptogram191 , is "cryptosystem".
The process of transforming plain text into cipher text is called "encryption" and the
reverse process is called "decryption". 192 The processes ofboth encryption and
decryption require a special key or keys to run. The high efficiency of cryptographic
technology depends on key management. 193
The cryptosystem mechanism provides a useful means of preserving the
confidentiality of information from exposure to unauthorized persons. An "algorithm" is
189

190
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See PALMER& POTIER, supra note 50, at 99. To maintain a strong cryptographic system, the
key management system must be unimpeachable. This includes proper generation, distribution and
use of key pairs.
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a mathematical formula that is used to decode a cipher text, or in contrast, encode a
plaintext back into a cipher text. 194 Cryptography has traditionally been applied only by
government bodies, especially by military, diplomatic and intelligent agencies who need
to conceal classified information from unauthorized parties.
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During World War IT, cryptography played a crucial part in military
communication services. A device called the Enigma Machine 196 was used by Hitler to
disseminate confidential messages to all his military units. 197 The Japanese also
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The enigma machine used in the World War ll is an example of a symmetric-key encryption
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BACARD, supra note 152, at 74.
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deliberately disseminated false news over communication channels with the intent of
deceiving the military forces of the United States at Pearl Harbor. Even though the US
army intercepted such broadcasts and international calls, it had not been able to decode

all the messages due to the Japanese,s application of cryptographic technology. 198
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Highly confidential messages require equally sophisticated cryptography to avoid
interception and decipher. Queen Mary ofEngland lost her life in the 16th century due to
an encrypted message which she sent from prison being intercepted and decoded. 199

As the Internet is now overwhelmingly used in society, the security of online
transactions, particularly in commercial and financial transactions, is of great concern.
Cryptography, as formerly applied in highly classified military services, is now also

I
being applied in a wide range of confidential and secure services. Cryptographic
technology offers a means for identifying senders, authenticating message contents,

°

preventing denial of message ownership, and protecting privacy.20 Cryptography is now
considered an essential tool for security and trust for online transactions in open
networks.

201

I

2.6.2 Encryption
Encryption is a technique for limiting access to sensitive data sent out on a
network202by turning or encoding a plain text into an illegible text so that no one can read

I
I

it unless a special key is used to decode it. Traditionally, encryption was based on simple

i

algorithms and a shorter key length. Today's algorithms are so extremely complicated
that deciphering them is prohibitively expensive and infeasible. 203

11 1

I

199

20

GARFINKEL, supra note 39, at 62.

°KOSIUR, supra note 87, at 67.

201

GREWUCH, supra note 188, at 173.

202

CRAIG HUNT, TCPIIP NETWORK ADMINISTRATION 396(2d ed.1998).

203

COMPliTERCOMMUNICATIONNETWORKS 260(Gill Waters ed., 1991).

65

I

The reasons for encrypting data are to prevent casual browsers from
eavesdropping or intercepting sensitive data files; to prevent both accidental and
intentional disclosure of sensitive data; to prevent privileged users, such as website
administrators, from viewing either private or business data files; and to prevent intruders
from cracking or accessing important data or even a system's files?

04

Encryption can be mainly classified into two groups: symmetric and asymmetric
encryption. The former is used the same key (a secret key) for both encrypting and
decrypting, but the latter consists of a separate pair of keys (a private and public key) that
will only work in conjunction with each other. 205
The principle underlying symmetric encryption is that senders and receivers or
06
other parties share a single secret key to authenticate one party to the other? That is, if

one party sends an encrypted message to other parties using a shared secret key, the
recipient can authenticate the sender's identity and message. The technology commonly
used for a single secret key is the password. 207
If a party can enter a matched password, then that party's identity is verified. The
keys used for encrypting a data file is called a secret key and is

sto~ed

in encrypted

format. The key is kept by the parties and not by the computer system?08

204

HUNT, supra note 202, at 397.

205

WENDY G. LEHNERT, INTERNET 101:

A BEGINNER'S GUIDE TOTiiElNTERNET ANDTIIEWORLD

WIDE WEB 428(1998).
206

BRUCE & DEMPSEY,

supra note 86, at 241.

207

SeeMACGREGORET.AL., supra note 19, at 49. The essence of a symmetric-key encryption or
bulk encryption is that both parties share a password, secret code, or shared secret and use it as a
key to encrypt and decrypt a message.
208

See BRUCE & DEMPSEY, supra note 86, at 241.
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Figure 5 Symmetric Encryption. Source: David Kosiur,
Understanding Electronic Commerce: How online Transactions Can
Grow Your Business (1997). Microsoft Press.

Key distribution is the most crucial issue, and the symmetric mechanism is
compromised if any unidentified person has access to the shared key, for he or she will be
able to impersonate that party. The level of protection offered by the encrypted messages
is measured by the key length. The general principle is that the longer the key length, the

67

higher the level of security.

209

If a key length is longer than 56 bits, such as 64 or 128

bits, it would be extremely difficult to break a key by means of a brute force attack. 210 At
present, key lengths should be at least 64-bits

211

for financial transactions in order to

provide sufficient transaction security. Longer key lengths of 128 bits have been encoded
in financial transactions, especially in the banking industry, to ensure even greater
•

secunty.
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Figure 6 Estimated Time to hack DES Encryption Key. Source:
Information Security Special, Technology Forecast (1997).

209

See MACGREGORET.AL., supra note 19, at 49. All symmetric-key algorithms can be broken,
but if the key size increases, it will be more difficult and impossible to crack the code
economically.
210

According to information regarding the estimated time to crack Data Encryption Standard
encryption key, a casual hacker may take 5 hours to a crack 40-bit key length, but 38 years to hack
a key length of 56 bits. An intelligent agency may take only .0002 seconds to hack 40 bits key
length, and 12 seconds for 56 bits.
211

Encryption is subject to export control in the United States. In principle, in 1997, the United
States allowed only encryption key lengths of 40 bits to be exported, while 56 bits could be
exported to specified countries on the condition that the law enforcement officer would be able to
recover the encrypted information. Currently, keys lengths of 128 bits are allowed for use only for
banking and financial purposes and are highly prohibited from exportation.
212

GREENSTEIN &

FEINMAN,

supra note 115, at 247.
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Wbifield Diffie and Martin Hellman originally invented public key encryption,
commonly known as asymmetric encryption in May 1975.

213

Asymmetric encryption

utilizes a set of pair ofkeys, one ofwhich is a private key kept confidential by the holder.
The other is a public key, stored in the Internet network or an online database, and can be
generally revealed to other parties. The pair of keys is mathematically related and a key
can only work with its corresponding key. It is computationally impossible to derive the
private key from the public key?

14

Even though a number of online parties may know the

public key of a signer, they cannot derive that signer's private key from the public key.
This is the principle of irreversibility.

215

Encrypting messages by a public and private key is accomplished in a twofold
process. On the one hand, if the sender encrypts the message with his private key, only a
sender's public key can decrypt that message. The decrypting process by sender's public
key is a means of identification. The potential receivers will know the true identity of the
sender by decrypting the message with the public key of the sender. The entire encrypted
message serves as a digital signature as it is not possible to alter message without access
the sender's private key. 216 This process does not provide confidentiality of messages, as
anyone knowing a sender's public key can use that key for decryption.
To assure that a message is not altered during transit, the encrypted message is
attach~d

to a copy of the plain text message so as to allow the receiver to compare the

213

214

215

216

BRUCE & DEMPSEY, supra

note 86, at 244.

FRED HAI.SALL, DATA COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTER NETWORKS AND OSI
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,

514(2d ed.1988).

supra note 143, at 10.

WILLIAM STALLIN OS, CRYPTOGRAPHY AND NETWORK SECURITY: PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE

168(2d ed.l999).
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encrypted and the plain version. If the two are the same, the receiver can be assured that
the identity of the sender and the content of the messages have not been changed en
route.

217

On the other hand, if the sender uses a receiver' s public key to encrypt the
message, only the private key of the receiver can be used to decrypt the message. This is
a means of receiver authentication, which also provides for confidentiality in the message
sen.
t

218

217

FORD & BAUM, supra note 3, at 111.

218

See WA YNER, supra note 41, at 22. In this case, only the private key holder will be able to
view the message.
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Figure 7 Asymmetric Encryption. Source: David Kosiur,
Understanding Electronic Commerce: How Online Transactions Can
Grow Your Business (1997). Microsoft Press.
The integrity of the message can be tested when the sender sends a copy of a plain
text attached to the encrypted message. When the receiver decrypts the encrypted
message, he compares it with the plain version. If they are the same, he can be certain
that no one has tampered with the message.
Asymmetric encryption provides numerous advantages, particularly in the
creation of digital signatures. The problem of key management is resolved, as there is no

71

need to share a secret key. It is convenient for each party to send an encrypted message to
the other without worrying about the keys, as both keys can be used to encrypt and
decrypt messages, and the public key of a recipient is publicly available either in an
online database or directory.
Any potential message recipient can examine a signature without having to
compromise key management security? 19 With this property, asymmetric encryption is
the technology that will make transaction security effectively possible in an open network
like the Internet.

220

219

FORD, supra note 78, at 79.

220

HUNT, supra note 202, at 397.
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Figure 8 Maintaining Message Confidentiality. Source: David Kosiur,
Understanding Electronic Commerce: How online Transactions Can
Grow Your Business (1997). Microsoft Press.

2.6.3 Key Pairs
A key pair plays a vital role for both encrypting and decrypting messages and
making electronic transactions. The key pair is algorithmically related221 and has a
separate benefit of providing a great deal of convenience and security for the parties

221

GOLLMANN, supra note 108, at 212.
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involved. A key pair is comprised of a private and public key. A key is commonly a 1024
bits or 2048 bits string ofbinary digits.

222

A. Private Keys
A private key is used for encrypting messages and also decrypting encrypted
messages encoded by a public key. The holder of a private key has a duty to maintain the
private key in a way that is highly secure so that no one else can have possession of the
private key. Thus, a holder is under a duty to protect the private key from loss or theft? 23

If a private key is in someone else's possession, or control by the private key holder is
lost, key security is compromised and forgery becomes possible.
In order to enhance security, a private key can be stored on computers that require
other access control technologies. A password or pass phrase or hardware token, smart
cards and even biometric methods 224 may be used in combination with standard computer
security for guarding a private key. A private key may be stored in a portable form
similar to bankcards, such as by magnetic card, memory card, smart card or super card.
The best way to keep a private key secure is to keep it in conjunction with a PIN or
password which is committed to memory without having to write it down, unless one can
be sure that the writing is well protected. 225

222

HOQUE, supra note 27, at 253.

223

The Thai Electronic Transactions Act, B.E. 2544(200 1) § 27 imposes a duty upon each
signatory to exercise reasonable care to avoid unauthorized use of his signature creation data. A
private signing key is under a definition of signature creation data because it can be used to
generate a digital signature.
224
225

JOHNSTON AND HANDA,

supra note 35, at 93.

PHILIP R. ZIMMERMANN, THE OFFICIAL PGP USER'S GUIDE 32( 1995).
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B. Public Keys
A public key is used for both encryption and decryption to match a private key. A
public key can be published and widely disseminated over the digital environment.226 The
distribution of public keys is a significant issue in key management. One possible way of
making public keys publicly available whilst maintaining a degree of security is to list
them in a publicly available directory of public keys

227

that is managed and controlled by

a trusted entity. The owner of a key pair should register with that directory authority
either in person or through a secure authenticated communication method. 228

2.6.4 Certification Authorities
Public key cryptography alone may not provide the level of reliability sufficient
for online users, as there is no trusted third person to certify the online transactions. PKI
has been introduced to provide a variety of online certification services and functions as a
notary public similar to that in traditional commerce?29 As holders of private keys have
to publicly list their public keys as well as give notice to a number of potential parties230 ,
a key distribution and management procedure must operate under a ~igh level of security.

226

Id. at 10.

227

STALLINGS, supra

228

Id.

note 216, at 183.

,.,.

229

CARLISLE ADAMS & STEVE LLOYD, UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC-KEY INFRASTRUCTURE:
CONCEPTS, STANDARDS, AND DEPLOYMENT CONSIDERATION 88(1999). A certification authority
(CA) is responsible for issuing public-key certificates. These certificates are digitally signed with
the private key of the issuing CA.
230

£-TRANSACTIONS ACT § 27 (2)(2001) imposes a duty upon a signatory, without delay, to
notify any person that may reasonably be expected to act on the basis of the electronic
signature ....
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Allowing public keys to be guarded by a trusted third party agency is the most
effective way of ensuring security. Without a third party working as verifier, the public
keys may be forged. Certification authorities are trusted third parties responsible for the
maintenance of public keys which are kept alongside some proof of the subscriber's
identity. In principle, a certification authority must prove the true identity of the
subscriber by examining identification documents, such as a passport or a driver's license,
and then certify a public-private key pair in the possession of that subscriber as an
assurance that the private key really corresponds to the public key.

Verisign, Cybertrust, and Norte/ are examples of certification authorities which
issue and verify online digital certificates on the Internet today. The core responsibilities
of certification authorities are threefold: to examine a user's identity, to issue digital
certificates and to verify the validity of digital certificates. 231 Digital certificates make
non-repudiation possible on the Internet because they are difficult to forge. 232Digitally
signed transactions or messages attested by certification authorities minimize cases of
fraudulent representations233 and provides a means for tracing the use of digital signatures
and certificates.
The current digital certificate which meets international standard requirements is
known a~ X.509v3, which provides adequate digital information such as the name of the
private key holder (the subscriber), the name of the issuing certification authority, the
period during which the certificate is valid and a copy of the subscriber's relevant public

231

KOSIUR,

supra note 87, at 76.

232

DANIEL AM OR, THE E-BUSINESS(R) EVOLUTION: LIVING AND WORKING IN AN
INTERCONNECTED WORlD 127(1999).
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233

Lupton,
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supra note 84, at 14.
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key. 234 A certificate works as a notary seal on a document, and is valid only for a specific
period of time. It may be cancelled or revoked upon a report it has been lost or stolen.

2.7 Creation of Digitally Signed Documents by Digital Signatures
Digital signatures are technically created by the use of asymmetric encryption, but
the aforesaid process doubles the volume of an encrypted message. Thus, a hash function
is needed to generate a message digest and verify a digital signature. A hash function is
simply an algorithm that creates a digital representation or fingerprint in the form of a
hash value or hash result? 35 It is impossible to reverse engineer or derive the content of
the messages based on the resulting message digest. 236
The great advantage of using a hash function is to ensure message integrity?37
The main attribute of a hash function is that, if the message digest is tampered with or
altered, even an addition of a space or dash mark, it will change the value of a message
digest. A one-way hash function maps value from a huge domain into a comparatively
small range238 , but unique to it. After running a one-way haSh function, a size of a typical

234

235

Greenwood, supra note 70
AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION,

supra note 143, at 10.

236

See Greenwood, supra note 70. The process of reverse engineer may be called "computational
infeasibility." See also BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY: PROTOCOLS, ALGORITHMS
AND SOURCE CODE INc 30-31(2d ed.l996). As hash functions are normally many-to-one, it is
infeasible to use them to determine that the two inputs are equal, but it can be used to get a
reasonable assurance of accuracy. There is little or no chance that two messages will produce the
same hash result. See also CHARLIE KAUFMAN, RAI>IA PERLMAN & MIKE SPENCINER, NETWORK
SECURITY: PRIVATE COMMUNICATION IN A PUBUC WORLD 102(1995).
237

GREENLAW & HEPP,

238

FORD & BAUM,

supra note 22, at 447.

supra not 3, at 111.
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message, around thousands or millions of bits in length, would shrink to around 160 bits

. 1 gth .239
men

2. 7.1 Parties Involved in use of Digital Signatures
There are commonly three parties involved in digitally signed transactions. Firstly
is the signer, or a person who possesses a private key. If a private key holder registers a
corresponding public key with a trusted entity, that person is called a subscriber.
Secondly, persons receiving digitally signed messages or transactions are called relying
parties, which includes recipients as well as other parties in online transactions. Finally,
a trusted third party or organization which performs a verification function is called a
certification authority.

2.7.2 Formative Steps to Creating Digital Signatures
The steps in the creation of digital signatures may vary from technology to
technology, but most of them share the following overall operational pattem. 240
The first step in creating a digitally signed document by 8: digital signature is to
prepare a boundary or precise area of a data unit, or a plain text document, or software, or
other information that is in electronic form. If the information is on a paper, you have to
scan that information and store it in a file.
The second step, called data digest, is done by running a one-way hash function
program on the data, or documents, or online transaction. In this process, a one-way hash
239

Id. at 114. The U.S. government's Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1} is the most extensively
used hash function for e-commerce because it can generates a 160-bit output.
240

AMERICANBARASSOCIATION,

supra note 143, at 13.
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function computes a hash result (sometimes called an appendix or a signature) unique to
the message and a hash result or an appendix is attached to and transmitted along with an
original plain text.
The third step is to transform or encrypt (in case of making it confidential) a hash
result or the message digest with a private key of a sender. This process provides a
digital signature that is unique to both the message and the private key used to create it. 241

241

Id. at 10.
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Figure 9 Verifying a digital signature. Source: David Kosiur,
Understanding Electronic Commerce: How Online Transactions Can
Grow Your Business (1997). Microsoft Press.
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To ensure confidentiality, the entire message should be encrypted. After
encryption by a private key, the entire encrypted message also serves as a digital
signature attached to its message

242

and is ready to be transmitted electronically to any

relying party. The final step is to examine the authenticity of an encrypted message by
checking both the corresponding public key of a signer and a new one-way hash result.
The application of the signer's public key to decrypt the message demonstrates that the
associated private key was actually used to generate the digital signature. Running the
new hash function will confirm the authenticity of the message if the newly computed
hash result matches the original hash result. 243
Upon receiving the message along with the appendix, the recipient must first run a
one-way hash function software program on the original message to make his own
message digest. The hash result is simply an actual digest. Second, the recipient has to
decrypt the appendix by the use of the sender's public key, which should yield an
expected digest. The recipient then needs to compare the new hash result (a number)
reached by his or her hash function software program (an actual digest) with the one that
was previously sent with the message (an expected digest). If the two-hash results are
identical, it is clear that the message has not been altered after it was sent. 244

242

Id. at 10.

243

Id. at 11. Hash functions provide evidentiary correlation to the original message content and
effectively assure that the message has not been modified after it was digitally signed.

244

FoRD & BAUM, supra note 3, at 112. If the two digest values are identical, the recipient can
conclude that the originator knew the private key and the message contents were not tampered
with en route.
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The processes of both generation and examination of digital signatures may
appear to be complex, but in actual fact they are operated by computer software which
are relatively easy to use over a short period of time.

2.7.3 Absence of Distinction between Authorized and Unauthorized Digitally
Signed Documents.
A physical handwriting may be forged or altered after being signed, but such
forgery or changes may be much easier for signature specialists to detect. To prove a
forged signature, signature specialists compare and analyze a specimen ofthe authentic
signature and the forged one. A signature of one person that is signed by someone else
may not be precisely the same because each person has his own unique signature. Each
time a signer physically signs a signature, either slightly or substantially different from
the example one, that signature is still authentic.
Unlike physical signatures, there is no distinction between an authorized and
unauthorized digitally signed message as such. Each message is uniquely connected to
the signer and it is infeasible to forge a digital signature unless a private key is
compromised.245 The process of creating a digital signature is based on a private key, and
if someone else has access to the private key, they can create undetectable digital
signatures. Thus, a person who is able to access another person's private key can
digitally sign online messages without being detected by means of comparison as
employed by signature specialists. If the real private key holder denies such signing, he

245

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 143, at 13. The digital signature cannot be forged,
unless the signatory lost control of the private key (a compromise of the private key), such as by
disclosing it or losing the media or device in which it is contained.
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bears the burden of proof that the private key was used without his authority either
through loss or the:ft. 246 Otherwise, he will be held responsible for such digitally signed
transactions.

2.7.4 Efficiency of Authentication Process by Digital Signatures
Digital signatures utilize public key technology and a hash function in the creation
process. From a technical point of view, digital signatures are a relatively effective means
of authenticating both the identity of senders and preserving the integrity of messages in
online commerce. Digital signatures are also better than an integrity check-value
mechanism247 because the integrity check value technique does not support nonrepudiation like digital signatures248 , and since the recipient knows the keys used to
generate a check-value, problems of false values may occur.
Digital signatures provide irrevocable evidence as to the contents and originator
of a message. 249 Physical handwriting signatures may be forged, but not digital signatures.
As digital signatures have the valuable property of being·unique to each signed message
246

Proper mechanisms for the protection of signatories are necessary because it is sometimes
beyond the signatories' capability to protect the private key if the attack has been done by the
hacker.
247

Integrity check values are also known as cryptographic checksums, modification detection
codes, or message integrity codes. An integrity check value refers to a mathematical value
(checksum) attached to a file that can be used to test the file to verify the data contained in a file
has not been altered. This mechanism is created by a sophisticated series of mathematical
operations (known as a cryptographic algorithm) that converts the data in the file into a message
digest called a hash value (known as a checksum). If an authorized person does not know which
cryptographic algorithm was used to create the hash value, it may not be possible for him to
change data without inadvertently changing the corresponding checksum. See Cryptographic
checksum, available at
http://searchsecurity. techtarget.com/sDefinition/O,sid 14 gci869866, 00 .html (last visited Mar. 17,
2003).
248

Encryption and Digital Certificates, supra note 97.

249

BRUCE & DEMPSEY, supra note 86, at 252
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and signer, they are a stronger authentication technique than handwritten signatures.

250

,.I.

Some legal experts are of the opinion that digital signatures, when used properly, are
more trustworthy than handwritten signatures because of the message digest which
guarantees that the original document has not been altered after the signature was
digitally signed.

251

To implement digital signature technology more efficiently, the PKI has been
introduced to handle a number of services. The term PKI refers to a certification
infrastructure based on public key technology, comprised of certification authorities,
certificates, digital signatures, and the hardware and software used to implement the
infrastructure. 252 PKI makes digital signature technology more reliable and effective, as
PKI strongly supports non-repudiation which prevents a party who has executed a
digitally signed transactions from successfully denying such actions.

'·
I·

In the application of PKI, there is a trusted third party involved in digitally signed
transactions, known as certification authorities (CA). Certification authorities now play
an increasingly important role in the verification of the signer's validity. Digital
certificates are trustworthy if it contains sufficient informati<;>n of a private key.
One possibility for the effective use of digital signatures is in bankini 53 , or in
particular, online credit card payments.
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GREENSTEIN & FEINMAN, supra note 115, at 243.
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Baum, supra note 117, at 3.
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COMPUTER SECURITY: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE 17(James H. Finch and E. Graham Dougall eds.,
1984).
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credit card provide not only a source of transaction, but also the identity of cardholders.
Conventional credit card transactions are recorded on transaction slips and verified by
physical signatures. 255 As online payment does not require a cardholder to present
himself or herself to the online merchant, transactions become less secure and fraud more
feasible. Credit card fraud online is simply a matter of acquiring a credit card number
and some other details such as the card's expiration date and the name of cardholder.
Hackers may intercept a credit card number which has been sent over the Internet and
fraudulently use such information. Knowing or intercepting someone else's credit card
details causes enough damage for that card. The affixation of a digital signature to the
online use of credit cards suppresses both the fraudulent use of credit cards and the
interception of credit card details.
Another instance of an effective application of digital signatures in online
commerce is when online consumers need to ascertain the authenticity of online
merchants' orders. In contrast, merchants also need to ensure that online customers
cannot fraudulently revoke their orders. Digitally signed orders provide both customers
and merchants with a high level of confidence that such electronic orders have not been
made fraudulently, or altered after they were placed. Merchants can also be assured that
consumers cannot later repudiate their orders by simply claiming that they did not place
those orders.

254

Digital signatures may be used to ensure the accuracy of sensitive electronic information, such
as financial data and related transactions, personnel and payroll data, proprietary data, system
control and audit data. See I. C. PALMER & G.A. POTIER, COMPUTER SECURITY RISK
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2.7.5 Restrictions on Authentication by Digital Signatures
The application of digital signatures has some restrictions. Firstly, the validity of
digital signature technology is dependent upon the security of the signer's private key. 256

As long as a signer carefully maintains the confidentiality of his or her private key, this
authentication technique works effectively. Secondly, the reliability of authentication by

li

digital signatures is limited by the date of digital certificates. If certificates have expired,

r
digital signatures are less reliable and may .even be invalid. A relying party must first
examine the validity of the certificate against the revocation list maintained by CA's to
ensure that a certificate has not been revoked. If a private key is lost or stolen or a holder
loses control of the key, they are required to report those situations immediately, and the
certificate must be revoked at once in order to prevent anyone from relying on the
cancelled certificate. 257
Thirdly, authentication by digital signatures must be performed in conjunction
with a proper means of indicating the time of commitment. Without a digital timed
indication, a private key holder might find other ways of escaping his or her liability by
claiming that he did not sign the digital signature. The defense that could be raised is the
loss or theft of the key. A mechanism for digital time stamping is needed to provide proof
of the exact date and time when the digital signature was generated.
A digital time stamp indicates the date and time of actually signing, thus
minimizing problems of dishonesty. Algorithmic computations which generate time

256

STALLINGS, supra note 216, at 301. If there is a breach of security mechanism for protecting a
private signing key, this could cause losses on anyone who relies on such digital signature.
257

E-TRANSACTIONS ACT § 27 (200 1) requires a signatory, in the case of loss or a compromise of
the private key, to report any relying party and certification authority immediately.
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58

stamps link the specific record bits to a specific time.2 Because of this, digital time
stampings provide for non-repudiation as they prove the exact times of conducting a
transaction. If the time of signing a message occurs prior to the time of key compromise,
it can be concluded that such a signer truly made that transaction.
Finally, digital signature technology detects any changes in signed messages or
transactions, and determines whether such transactions have been tampered with.
However, digital signature technology cannot tell exactly what has been changed or how
much has been changed in the signed documents. This makes a tampered message wholly
invalid and unreliable as the recipient has no means of finding out how the message had
been altered. The recipient's only option is to request the sender tore-send the message
thereby incurring a waste of time.

2.8 Summary
Today's society is becoming more sophisticated because of the introduction of
computer technology, especially the Internet. Increasingly rapid technological changes
have an impact on the w~ys individuals usually conduct their business, communicate with
-

each other and carry out their lives. A number of individuals now make online purchases
from electronic malls through the use of credit cards instead of making face-to-face
purchases and payments at conventional retail stores. Conducting online transactions
with insecure websites or insufficient data protection mechanisms grants hackers with a
great opportunity to intrude databases and steal business information like credit card
numbers or intercept them en route.

258

GREENSTEIN & FEINMAN,

supra note 115, at 256.
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Online networks users entering networks are not required to hold identification
cards in the same manner as foreigners required to present passports when entering into
foreign countries. Knowing the true identity of online parties with whom you conduct
business is a core element of online transaction security. The authentication and integrity
of online transactions are also of great concern.
There are a number of technologies that may be used to authenticate online
identities and transactions, examples of which include passwords, PINs, tokens,
biometrics, and electronic signatures such as digital signatures. Biometrics is now
acquiring much attention from computer technologists for providing online commerce
security, but biometrics is by its nature technically difficult and very expensive. Digital
signatures based on public key technology are on the cutting edge of electronic
authentication, and are highly efficient mechanisms for securing online transactions
especially when a trusted third entity is involved in the validation of the digital signatures.
Although it is a state-of-the-art technology, the degree of security still depends on private
key management. If a private key is compromised, the digital signature mechanism fails.

1:
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CHAPTER3
THE LEGAL CONCEPT OF DIGITAL SIGNATURES
Technology is an increasingly significant factor in the facilitation of business in
Thailand. Merchants are starting to conduct business online in order to reduce operational
costs. However, traditional ways still remain popular for certain types of commerce, such
as for the purchase of gold or gold accessories. Although information technology is still a
novel concept in Thailand, the volume of online businesses is growing rapidly, and the
decrease in fees for Internet service enables more and more people to have access to the
Internet.
With the development oflnternet services, Thai exports and commercial activities
conducted online now form a greater share of the Thai market economy. 259 Technology is
not only pushing Thailand's economy toward a new era ofinformation technology,
generating economic and social growth, but also leading Thai people to a digital
environment where the Internet and computers are increasingly replacing traditional
methods of conducting commercial activities. In the light of these technological
developments, it is important that the Royal Thai government implements appropriate
legal and technological measures as a framework for the conduct of affairs between
online users and merchants.
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Thaweesak Koannatakool, Cu"ent Status and Future of the Internet and E-Commerce in
Thailand, available at http://www.asiamf.org/newsletter/vo14/dr koanantakool.html (2000).
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There are still many barriers to the development of e-commerce in Thailand.
Unsecured online orders and payment transactions, high cost oftechnologi 60 , and lack
oftechnological training are examples of factors which impede the advancement of ecommerce. The government realizes that the development of information technology
requires a long-term strategy to upw-ade Thailand to a level comparable to that of the
major technologically advanced countries. With a view to achieving this policy, the
government founded the National Information Technology Committee (NITC) in 1992 to
devise and implement policies and strategies for technological development and
deployment in Thailand?61 The government also established a research and development
(R&D) section to carry out technological research and development, known as the
National Electronics and Computer Technology Centre (NECTECi

62

,

an autonomous

governmental entity designed to initiate a legal framework for information technology
and to promote the use of information technology in Thailand. The establishment of
NECTEC was an important step by the government to promote the growth of ecommerce in Thailand.
Thailand is a civil. law country whereby most cases are decided
on the basis of
.
codified rules oflaw such as those enacted in the criminal and commercial codes, and not
on judicial precedents as in common law countries such as the United States or the
United Kingdom. By the end of the year 1999, NECTEC completed the first draft of the
Electronic Transactions Bill, which included certain provisions on electronic signatures,

260
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Junavit Chalidabhongse & Surangkana Kaewjumnong, PKI Conference: Country Report on
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) in Thailand (2001).
262

Thaweesak Koannatakool, Electronic Commerce Development in Thailand, at
http://www.nectec.or.th/userslhtk/e-commerce/intro.html (last updated May 22, 1999).
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to govern online transactions and e-commerce. The Bill was submitted to the Cabinet on
December 28, 1999 for approval. Thereafter, the Bill came under Senate scrutiny for
approximately a year and a half. The Electronic Transactions Act, B.E. 2544 (200 1), the
first information technology law in Thailand, was enacted on December 4, 2001 and
63

came into force as from April 3, 2002? This law provides a legal infrastructure for
online transactions, electronic signatures, and certification authorities.
Besides the Electronic Transactions Act, B.E. 2544 (2001), other relevant laws
concerning e-commerce, such as laws on data protection, universal access, computer
crimes264, and electronic fund transfer are in the pipeline. These movements for legal
reforms have been strongly supported by the Royal Thai government pursuant to the egovernment policy. 265 It was envisaged that such reforms would eventually create a
system of fundamental laws for e-commerce.
The government has taken a pivotal step towards becoming an e-govemment by
introducing digital certificates to be used internally among various government bodies as
a means of enhancing information security. Since August 3, 2001, the Ministry of Interior
The Electronic T~actions Act, B.E. 2544(2001) was published in the Government Gazette
Vol. 118, Part 112a, dated 4th December, 2001.

263

264

The draft of Computer Crime Act has been approved by the NECTEC commissions on May 2,
2002.
265

Jirapon Tubtimhin, Frequently asked questions on E-Government in Thailand, available at
http://egov.thaigov.net/fag/Jirapon/main.html (last visited Mar.17, 2003). The National
Information Technology Committee {NITC) has endorsed "IT2010- a policy framework for IT
development" to improve and enhance efficiency and effectiveness of government administration
and public services to citizens. £-Government strategies (IT2010) includes the following:
1) Completion of"e-Government Strategic Plan", Departmental Action Plans, and budget
allocation;
2) Public sector re-organization (reform);
3) Human resource development in public organizations;
4) Back-office and front-office development in public organizations;
5) Computer & network and information infrastructure development; and
6) Citizen and private sector participation in e-government development.
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has applied digital certificates to internal electronic messages (e-mails) to ensure the
authenticity and integrity of information.

266

In order to increase efficiency in the

performance of various public services, the Ministry of Interior needs to improve the way
of sending and receiving significant communication to and from officers who are in
charge in remote areas to ensure instant and accurate interchange.

267

The government has started to use digital certificates with insignificant exchanges
of information, a remarkable start to becoming an e-government. However,
comprehensive law has not yet been enacted. The Electronic Transactions Act,
promulgated on December 4, 2001, does not clarify alrlegal issues regarding the
application of digital signatures to online transactions. Hence, it is necessary to provide
the courts of law not only with technical, but also with legal information on digital
signature technology and how the courts should determine points of law concerning
digital signature technology for securing online transactions.
This chapter seeks to identify the key concepts of digital signatures as well as
clarify their legal implications with a view to making a comparison between the United
States Federal E-Sign Act and theE-Transactions Act, B.E. 2544 (2001). The evidentiary
value of a digital signature in legal proceedings will also be examined. The first point of
discussion is the divergent schools of thought regarding digital signatures.
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Lalida Ratanasrithai, Thailand's £-government, THAI RA111, Sep. 3, 2001.
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Sending E-mail Instead of Letters, DAILY NEWS (Bangkok), Oct. 25,2001, at
http://www.dailynews.co. th/politics/16122.html
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3.1 Schools of Thought Regarding Electronic Signature
Legislation: Neutral or Specific Technology
The high speed development of technology in the computer industry, particularly

in relation to security measures has opened up a number of options which are currently
available as tools to safeguard computers and electronic data from unauthorized access by
backers and impostors. Authentication technologies are increasingly employed by the
parties in cyberspace to secure online transactions. Digital signature technology, a form
of electronic signature, is a highly effective method for ensuring transaction security
which enables the identification of parties and maintains the integrity of messages.
Digital signatures are currently supported by PKI technology based on public key
cryptography and a hash function. However, other technologies of electronic
authentication also exist, ranging from simple passwords to the most complex biometrics
methods. There are three main schools of thought behind the regulation of electronic
signatures.

3.1.1 Technology Specific Approach
The first school of thought recognizes only one specific technology as a qualified
technique for the creation of digital signatures in electronic messages and online
transactions. This technology specific approach provides that only the use of such
identified technology will have any legal consequences. 268 At present, public key
cryptography is the only form of technology which has been granted legal recognition.
Thus, only signatures digitally created by identified technology will be endorsed by law
268

MARK A. LEMLEY ET AL.,

SOFTWARE AND INTERNET LAW
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1045(2000).
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and deemed as highly secure, while other authentication technologies have to struggle
with the current uncertainty in the law.

269

Businessmen and computer technologists as

well as lawmakers have paid close attention to the effectiveness and efficiency of the use
of digital signatures to verify online identity in online commerce.
Digital technology began to be viewed as the leading secure technology when in
1992, the Information Security Committee of the Electronic Commerce Division, Section

I.

of Science and Technology of the American Bar Association began to take into its

I.

consideration the legal and information security aspects of electronic commerce. The

I

Committee, which consisted of lawyers, government policy and management
professionals, information technology and security professionals, notaries from various
legal systems, trade facilitation experts and various other qualified persons270 , formulated
the Digital Signature Guidelines which favoured one particular technology for the
security of electronic commerce, viz., digital signatures created by public key
cryptography.
In 1995, Utah was the first State in the United States to enact a law which
recognized the use of specific technology by singling out a public key encryption and
relying on certification entities to perform authentication functions.Z 71 The Utah Digital
Signature Act, a model law on digital signatures, established a comprehensive legal
framework and support for PKI by giving legal effect to digitally signed documents272 ,

269
270

271

Id.
AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION,

supra note 143, at 1.

See NIMMER, supra note 55, at 14-68.

272

Utah Code Ann.§ 46-3-401(1996) stipulates that "where a rule oflaw requires a signature or
provides for certain consequences in the absence of a signature, that rule is satisfied by a digital
signature ... "
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imposing duties on both subscribers and certification authorities273 , and providing for
legal presumptions.274 Because of digital signatures' unique security and authenticity
attributes, the State gave legal recognition only to the use of digital signatures in online
transactions and the public key cryptographic technology used to create them whilst
excluding other technologies.

275

The State provided options for online parties to adopt (opt in) this system with
legal implications for the legal status of the signatures and the validity of digitally signed
documents created in the manner provided for in the Act.

276

Thus, the Utah Act provided

l
I,

an official endorsement of the PKI.

273

Utah Code Ann. § 46-3-305(1996) provides that ''by accepting a certificate issued by a licensed
certification authority, the subscnber identified in the certificate assumes a duty to exercise
reasonable care to retain control of the private key and prevent its disclose to any person not
authorized to create the subscnber's digital signature." See also Utah Code Ann.§ 46-3301(1996). For instance, a licensed certification authority or subscriber shall use only a
trustworthy system....
274

Utah Code Ann. 46-3-406(1996) provides that "in adjudicating a dispute involving a digital
signature, a court of this state shall presume that:
( 1) a certificate digitally signed by a licensed certification authority and either published in a
recognized repository or made available by the issuing certification authority or by the subscriber
listed in the certificate is issued by the certification authority which digitally signed it and is
accepted by the subscnber listed in it;
.
(2) the information listed in a valid certificate, as defined in Section 46-3-103, and
confirmed by a licensed certification authority issuing the certificate is accurate;
(3) if a digital signature is verified by the public key listed in a valid certificate issued by a
licensed certification authority:
(a) that the digital signature is the digital signature of the subscnber listed in that certificate;
(b) that the digital signature was affixed by the signer with the intention of signing the
message; and
(c) the recipient of that digital signature has no knowledge or notice that the signer:
(i) breached a duty as a subscnber; or
(ii) does not rightfully hold the private key used to affix the digital signature; and
(4) a digital signature was created before it was time stamped by a disinterested person
utilizing a trustworthy system"
275

However, the E-Sign Act mandates state courts not to deny legal effect of a signature solely
because it is in electronic form See E-Sign § 101(a).
276

See NIMMER, supra note 55, at 14-68. See also Utah Code Ann. 46-3-201(1996). A licensed
certification authority is protected by the liability limit. See also Utah Code Ann 46-3-309(1996)
which provides that ( 1) by specifying a recommended reliance limit in a certificate, the issuing
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Besides the State ofUtah, some other States, such as Washington
279

and some countries such as Malaysia

277

and Kansas

278

r

and Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

ofChina280 have followed this technology specific approach and passed comprehensive
digital signature legislation based on a reliable PKI.2 81 Other States recognize digital

certification authority and the accepting subscnber recommend that persons rely on the certificate
only to the extent that the total amount at risk does not exceed the recommended reliance limit.
(2) unless a licensed certification authority waives application of this subsection, a licensed
certification authority is:
(a) not liable for any loss caused by reliance on a false or forged digital signature of a
subscriber, if, with respect to the false or forged digital signature, the certification authority
complied with all material requirements of this chapter;
(b) not liable in excess of the amount specified in the certificate as its recommended reliance
limit for either:
(i) a loss caused by reliance on a misrepresentation in the certificate of any fact that the
licensed certification authority is required to confirm; or
(ii) failure to comply with Section 46-3-302 in issuing the certificate;
(c) liable only for direct, compensatory damages in any action to recover a loss due to
reliance on the certificate, which damages do not include:
(i) punitive or exemplary damages;
(ii) damages for lost profits, savings, or opportunity; or
(iii) damages for pain or suffering.
271

In 1997, the State ofWashington enacted the "Electronic Authentication Acf' to facilitate
online commerce by means of reliable electronic messages. The Act provides that where a rule of
law requires a signature, or provides for certain consequences in the absence of a signature, a
digital signature satisfies that requirement.
278

In 1997, the State of"Kansas enacted the "Kansas Digital Signature Act" to confirm that the use
of digital signatures has the same force and effect as any other fonD. of signature.
279

Malaysia enacted "Digital Signature Act" in 1997. § 64 provides that "digitally signed message
deemed to be written document if:
( 1) A message shall be as valid, enforceable and effective as if it had been written on paper if(a) it bears in its entirety a digital signature; and
(b) that digital signature is verified by the public key listed in a certificate which(i) was issued by a licensed certification authority; and
(ii) was valid at the time the digital signature was created.
{2) Nothing in this Act shall preclude any message, document or record from being considered
written or in writing under any other applicable law."
280

Hong Kong also passed "Hong Kong Electronic Transactions Ordinance in 2000. § 6 provides
that "if a rule oflaw requires the signature of a person or provides for certain consequences if a
document is not signed by a person, a digital signature of the person satisfies the requirement but
only if the digital signature is supported by a recognized certificate and is generated within the
validity of that certificate."
281

Baum, supra note 117, at 5.
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signatures by enacting enabling statutes but places certain restrictions and limitations on
•

therruse.

282

The rationale behind a technology specific approach is the need to encourage a
more widespread and efficient use of an available technology such as the PKI which has
not been fully utilized283 • At present, trends seem to indicate an increasing use of digital
signatures in the United States. For instance, a test equipment manufactured in Palo Alto,
California, used digital certificates served by Verisign for it's 40,000 employees in lieu of
passwords as a key for gaining access to the firm's computer system.
have also been increasingly used in the pharmaceutical industry.

284

Digital signatures

285

Although in certain instances, other authentication technologies, such as
passwords or biometrics may have been adopted for security reasons, their attributes may
not always be suitable for securing online transactions. 286 It is expected that up to 80

282

Kalama K. Lui-Kwan, VI.Business Law: 1. Electronic Commerce: a) Digital Signature: Recent
Developments in Digital signature Legislation and Electronic Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.
J. 463,472 (1999). For example, Alabama bas permitted the use of digital signatures in the online
filing of tax returns and other documents with the Department of Revenue. See Ala. Code
40.30(1997). Colorado bas permitted the use ofPK.I-based digital signatures only for the
electronic filing ofU.C.C. financing statements. See also §97-115, 1 st Reg. Sess. ( Colo.1997).
Maine bas limited the application ofPK.I-based digital signatures to the Motor Vehicle Code. See
also §473, I 19th leg., 1 st Reg. Sess.(Me. 1997). Hawaii bas also enacted legislation recognizing
the use of digital signatures, but only for filing court documents electronically. See also Haw.
Rev. Stat. 601(1995). Nevada limits the use of digital signatures to financial transactions with the
states and to filings with State court and public agencies. See also § 42, 69th Leg., 151 Reg. Sess.
(Nev. 1997). Missouri allows the use of digital signatures by business organizations only for
filing documents with the Secretary of State and for electronically filing reports by candidates for
public office. See also § 844, 89th G.A., znd Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1998).
283

Samuel Greengard, E-sign on the Dotted Line, at
http://www. biometrix.com/news/inthenews 18.html (200 1).
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Biometrics is not capable of securing information as a cipher. In addition, its characteristic is
inadequate to provide a systematic process for authentication in securing online transactions.
Biometric technologies, however, can be used in conjunction with digital signatures when

97

percent of large U.S enterprises will have experimented with the use of digital certificates
by the year 2003.

287

3.1.2 Technology Neutral Approach
A key concern over online commerce legislation is that legislation may be too
specific. It may endorse only one specific technology, thereby creating a barrier to the
growth of online commerce and other authentication technologies. Moreover, the nature
of technological evolution is often dynamic and unpredictable. Thus, legal experts and
technologists have both called for legislation based on a technology-neutral approach in
order to catch up with the growth of technology while at the same time maintaining an
open market for other technologies and prevent market domination by one specific
technology such as the PKI. Some jurisdictions have adopted a technology-neutral plus
(hybrid) approach. Under this approach, electronic signatures may be divided into two
classes: simple electronic signatures and secured or enhanced or advanced electronic
signatures.

A. The United States
In the United States, after the enactment of the Digital Signature Act by Utah in
1995, a number of other States displayed some concern over the lack of flexibility in
technology specific legislation in the light of the dynamics of authentication

particularly strong assurances of identity are essential. See WARWICK FoRD AND MICHAEL S.
BAUM, SECURE ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: BUILDING THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF DIGITAL
SIGNATURE AND ENCRYPTION 129 (2000).
287

See Greengard, supra note 283.
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tecbniques. 288 Thus, they have moved towards a less regulatory, less technologically
specific approach. 289 Technology neutrality aims to promote various technologies for
securing online commerce which may eventually be invented, such as biometrics or other
means of authentication. In principle, technology neutrality does not favor PKI or any
specific technolo~ 90 • This approach, however, supports any technology which meets
the technologically neutral requirements and grants legal effect to their use. 291
Many states have increasingly subscribed to the notion of technology neutrality
by passing electronic signature statutes, ensuring legal equivalence for all electronic
signatures regardless of the specific technology used to create them. Electronic

signaturi92 is a generic and technology-neutral term that refers to any of the various
methods by which a person can sign online transactions and documents electronically. It
is a binary substitute, a series of ones and zeroes, and may take many forms, and can be

288

Greenwood, supra not 70.

289

!d.

290

Baum, supra note 117, at 4.
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For example, the Federal Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (E-Sign
Act)(2000) § 101 stipulates that "( 1) a signature, contract, or other record relating to such
transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because it is in
electronic form; and (2) a contract relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect,
validity, or enforceability solely because an electronic signature or electronic record was used in
its formation."
292

E-Sign § 106 (5) defines electronic signature as "an electronic sound, symbol, or process,
attached to or logically associated with a contract or other record and executed or adopted by a
person with the intent to sign the record." See also The THAI ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT,
B.E .2544(2001) § 4 defines electronic signature as "letters, characters, numbers, sound, or any
other symbols created in electronic form and affixed to a data message for establishing the
association of a particular person with the data message for the purpose of identifying the
signatory in relation to such data message and indicating that such person has approved the
information contained in the data message."

99

created by many different technologies. 293 Biometrics is another authentication technique
that is gaining considerable popularity among technologists and legal experts alike.
Technology neutrality allows biometrics to be used as an electronic signature on the
condition that it meets all the requirements of minimum security standard.
The technologically neutral statutes in some jurisdictions provide the court with
wide discretion to determine the validity of a signature with regard to the security of the
used technology.

294
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The basic authentication techniques may satisfy the requirements for

writing and form, but they may not be entitled to any presumption regarding the intent
and identity of the signer?95 The statutes endorsing this notion list a class of approved
technologies on the basis of standard criteria296 , for example, that the mechanism must be
able to ascertain the exclusivity of the use of a signer and uniquely link the signer and the
signed message or that the electronic signature is based on asymmetric cryptography, or
other technologies approved by statutes. This approved technology is generally called a

293

Thomas J. Smed.inghoff & Ruth Hill Bro, Article: MoviTJg the Change: Electronic Signature
Legislation as a Vehicl~for Advancing £-Commerce, 17 J. MARsHALLJ. COMPUTER&
INFO.L.723, 728 (1999).
294

Lupton, supra note 84, at 19.

295

INTERNATIONAL WORKING GROUP ON ELECTRONIC AUTHENTICATION, International

Consensus Principles for Electronic Authentication, available at
http://www.ilpf.org.digsig/intlprin.html ( 1999).
296

This notion is known as a ''technology neutral plus (hybrid) approach" because it addresses
certain technological requirements and leaves room for new technological developments. See also
B.P. Aalberts & S. van der Hof, Digital Signature Blindness, Analysis ofLegislative Approaches
Toward Electronic Authentication, 29 (November, 1999), at http://cwis.kub.nll-frw/people/hof/dsfr.htm. See also The Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act (1999) § 5-105 stipulates that
"security procedure" means a methodology or procedure used for the purpose of (1) verifying that
an electronic record is that of a specific person or (2) detecting error or alteration in the
communication, content, or storage of an electronic record since a specific point in time. A
security procedure may require the use of algorithms or codes, identifying words or numbers,
encryption, answer back or acknowledgment procedures, or similar security devices. See also
KRisANA CHANGKLOM, RESEARCH: DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW (DRAFT) 92( 1997).
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"secure" electronic signature297 and it is legally endorsed by stronger legal consequences,
such as presumptions concerning identity and intent of the signer as well as shifting the
burden ofproof. 298 The lllinois Electronic Commerce Security Act is an example of this
kind of legislation.
Subject to the lllinois Electronic Commerce Security Act, simple or ordinary
electronic signatures299 may be electronically created regardless of the process, but the
technology used to create a secure electronic signature is subject to the lllinois Secretary
of State's certification. In other words, the Secretary of State must certify that the

I,

I
l

technology used to create a secure electronic signature is trustworthy. 300 Such qualified
technology must be capable of creating a signature in a manner that is unique to the
signer and can be used to identify the person signing the electronic record. It must be
reliable and exclusively created by the owner of the signature and linked to the electronic

297

The Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act (1999) § 10-110 stipulates that "if, through the
use of a qualified security procedure, it can be verified that an electronic signature is the signature
of a specific person, then such electronic signature shall be considered to be a secure electronic
.
,,
.
s1gnature ....
298

The Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act (1999) § 10-120 provides that
"(a) In resolving a civil dispute involving a secure electronic record, it shall be rebuttably
presumed that the electronic record has not been altered since the specific
point in time to which the secure status relates. (b) In resolving a civil dispute involving a secure
electronic signature, it shall be rebuttably presumed that the secure electronic signature is the
signature of the person to whom it correlates. (c) The effect of presumptions provided in this
Section is to place on the party challenging the integrity of a secure electronic record or
challenging the genuineness of a secure electronic signature both the burden of going forward
with evidence to rebut the presumption and the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the
nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence. (d) In the absence of a
secure electronic record or a secure electronic signature, nothing in this Act shall change existing
rules regarding legal or evidentiary rules regarding the burden of proving the authenticity and
integrity of an electronic record or an electronic signature."
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The lllinois Electronic Commerce Security Act (1999) § 5-105 defines electronic signature as"
a signature in electronic form attached to or logically associated with an electronic record."
300

The Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act (1999) § 10-135 empowers the Secretary of
State authority to certify security procedures.
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record in a manner that if there is a change after the establishment of the signature, the
.
. mv
. al'd
s1gnature
1s
1 ated .301
In order to harmonize divergent electronic signature laws passed by a number of
states with different criteria and to remove legal discrimination on the validity of
electronic signatures, the U.S Congress, after comprehensive study, ultimately adopted a
technology-neutral approach in a bill, the Federal E-Sign Act, otherwise officially known
as Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act. Former President Bill
Clinton, used a smart card encoded with numbers to sign theE-Sign Act into law. 302 The
E-Sign Act came into effect on October 1, 2000 and acted as a nationwide standard for
electronic signature legislation. The E-Sign Act creates a single and non-discriminatory
standard for electronic signatures. The E-Sign Act is mainly aimed at granting an

i'
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electronic signature the same legal validity as a handwritten signature, as long as certain
conditions are met. 303 Online contracts will have the same legal effect as paper
contracts. 304
The E-Sign Act endorses the use of any online technology and electronic
authentication agreed by the parties in the conduct of electronic tr~sactions. The E-Sign
Act removes all legal uncertainties regarding writing and signatures that are required in
traditional paper-based commerce and provides legal certainty for businesses that use the
301

Smed.inghoff & Bro, supra note 293, at 748. See also§ 10-110 of the Illinois Electronic
Commerce Security Act ( 1999).
302

Deborah Charles, Clinton Signs Digital Signature Bill, REliTERS, June 30, 2000, available at
http://www.zdnet.com/zdnnlstories/news/0,4586.2597132,00.html
303

Asha Richards, E-Sign and State Electronic Commerce Laws: What Comes Home in the Sea of
Legislation?, available athttp://www.tilj.com/contentlecomarticle0414010l.htm (Apr. 16, 2001).
304

E-Sign § 101(a)(1). State courts may not deny the legal effect, validity, and enforceability of a
contract because it is in electronic form.
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electronic method such as electronic signatures, online contracts, and other electronically
related transactions. Under the E-Sign Act, electronic transactions may not be denied
legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because they are in electronic form. 305
The E-Sign Act provides characteristics of an electronic signature in compliance
with technology neutrality approach by not specifying or singling out any particular
technology to be used to generate electronic signatures, but leaving to the parties the
option to choose their agreed system or technology to validate an online agreement. 306
The intent of a signatory to be bound by a contract is more important than the technology
itself. The characteristics of an electronic signature may include under §106(5) an
electronic sound, symbol, or process, attached to or logically associated with a contract or
other records and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record. 307

B. UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce

I'

On the international level, the United Nations Commission on International Trade

Law (UNCITRAL) has proposed a Model Law on Electronic Commerce. 308 This model
law consists of internationally recognized guidelines, which take technology neutrality

I

' .

into consideration without mentioning digital signatures or cryptographic technology.
These guidelines, themselves are not binding legislation309, they afford guidance to

305

E-Sign § lOl(a).

306

Larry M. Zanger, The Federal E-sign Law: The Electronic Signatures In Global and National
Commerce Act, available at http://www.mbc.com

307

E-Sign § 106(5).

308

UNCITRAL approved the "Model Law on Electronic Commerce" on December 16, 1996.
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See Aalberts & van der Hof, supra note 58, at 30. See also WARWICK FoRD AND MICHAELS.
BAUM, SECURE ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: BUILDING THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF DIGITAL
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governments and legislative authorities that are drafting and studying legislation on
electronic signatures consistent with a global electronic signature movement. Examples
of countries that have adopted this Model Law on Electronic Commerce are Australia310,
Bennuda311 , Colombia312 , France313 , Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of
China31 \ Ireland, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore315 , Slovenia, the states of
Jersey (Crown Dependency of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland), the State oflllinois316 , and Thailand317 •
Subject to Article 7, the Model Law stipulates that
(1)

"Where the law requires a signature of a person, that requirement is met in
relation to a data message if:
(a)

A method is used to identify that person and to indicate that person's
approval of the information contained in the data message; and

SIGNATURE AND ENCRYPTION 294 (2000). The Model Law on Electronic Commerce may be
binding among commercial parties if the terms are incorporated by reference in their trading
partner agreements or other contracts.
310

Electronic Transactions Bill of 1999 (no. 162, 1999).

311

Electronic Transactions Act of 1999.

312

Electronic Commerce Law 527(August 1999).

313

Electronic Signature Bill (Sept.1999).

314

Hong Kong Electronic Transactions Ordinance (2000).

315

Singapore Electronic Transactions Act (1998).

316

Electronic Commerce Security Act (1999). The Federal government of the United States has
also adopted this Model Law and enacted the Federal Electronic Signatures in Global and National
Commerce Act (2000).
317

Electronic Transactions Act, B.E. 2544(2001).

104

(b)

That method is as reliable as was appropriate for the purpose for which the

I·
I

data message was generated or communicated, in the light of all the

I
I

circumstances, including any relevant agreement.
(2)

Paragraph (1) applies whether the requirement therein is in the form of an
obligation or whether the law simply provides consequences for the absence of a
signature.

(3)

The provisions ofthis article do not apply to the following: [ ... ]."318
Article 7 stipulates that a message that was required to be authenticated should

not be denied legal effect for the sole reason that it was not authenticated in a specific

I
I

r

manner. Thus, Article 7 adopts a wider approach based on technology neutrality and
establishes the general conditions under which a message would be regarded as
authenticated with sufficient creditability and presents no barrier to online commerce. 319
The requirements for qualifying as a signature under the Model Law allow for
technology-neutral methods. The model law recognizes any method that performs the
basic functions of identifying a, signer of documents and confirming a signer's approval

in a reliable manner. Such method must be appropriate for that typ~ of communication
depending on the level of security. The factors used to determine whether an
identification method is appropriate and reliable are as follows: 320
(1)

The high technology for the devices used by each of the parties;

I'

I
(2)

318

The nature of their commercial activities;

UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE WITH GUIDE TO ENAClMENT

art.

7

(1996).
319

!d. art 7.

320

!d.
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The frequency at which commercial transactions take place between the

(3)

parties;
(4)

The type and size of transactions;

(5)

The function of signature requirements in given statutory and regulatory

I
I
I

environment;

(6)

The capacity of communication systems;

(7)

The compliance with authentication procedure set forth by intermediaries;

I

(8)

The range of authentication procedures made by any intermediary;

I·
I

(9)

The compliance with trade customs and practices;

(1 0)

The existence of insurance coverage mechanisms against unauthorized

I

I'

messages;
(11)

The significance and the value of the information contained in the data
message;

(12)

The availability of alternative methods of identification and the cost of

I

implementation;
(13)

The degree of acceptance or no acceptance of the identification method in
the relevant industry or field;

(14)

L

Any other relevant factor.

I.
I

Under the Model Law, signing electronic documents by means of an identification
method that has a function equivalent to a handwritten signature does not automatically

I
I

The Model Law merely prescribes legal recognition for any

I
I

identification method to be used to electronically sign online documents by not favoring

I

make them legally valid.

321

321

'·

/d. at 61.

106

any specific technology. Thus, legal validity of electronically signed documents is based
on the applicable law governing online transactions.
Although the Model Law does not specifically impose requirements for digital
signatures, the digital signature based on the PKI model effectively performs the
functions of indicating a signer's approval and identifying the signer. The PKI method is
a dependable and appropriate method that meets the imposed requirements.

C. UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures
In March 2001 the UNCITRAL Working Group on Electronic Commerce

approved the new Model Law on Electronic Signatures, which would be a very effective
I'

tool for states to modernize their electronic signature legislations.

322

Electronic Signature

I

Legislation varies from country to country, so there is need for uniform legislation that
lays down the basic rules of laws as well as technical principles necessary for
interoperabililf

23

• This

new Model Law aims to assist States in establishing a modern,

harmonized and fair legislative framework which addresses the issues of electronic
signatures effectively. 324

I

'

The new Model Law on Electronic Signatures adopted a technology-neutral
approach with the purpose of fostering and facilitating the use of electronic signatures.
This guidance secures understanding and confidence in the use of electronic signature

.'·
I

322

UNCITRAL Working Group on Electronic Commerce, Electronic Signatures: Draft Guide to
Enactment ofthe UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures, 38th Sess., at 11, U.N
Doc.A/CN.9/WG.IV/WP.88 (2001).

I

I

323

/d.

324

/d.
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techniques, as well as supports the economy and promotes efficiency in international
trade.325
An electronic signature under the new Model Law means data in electronic form,
affixed to, or logically associated with, a data message which may be used to identify the
signatory and his or her approval of the information contained in the data message.

326

The

new Model Law provides broad characteristics of electronic signatures in order to
encompass current as well as any future mechanisms that may be used. For instance, a
biometric device based on hand-written signatures allows the signatory to sign manually
on the computer screen or on a digital pad. 327 The computer analyzes the identity of a
signatory and then stores the identity as a set of numeric values. The identity may then be
attached to a data message and displayed by the recipient for authentication purposes. 328
The Model Law also leaves room for multiple methods of authentication such as
using a PIN in combination with a fingerprint, digitized versions of hand-written
signatures, clicking an "OK-box"329, or facial recognition. Because of the terrorist attack
on the United States on September 11, 2002, stringent security measures have been taken
to examine the identity of people in the public through a means of facial recognition. 330

32S

/d.

326

UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES art. 2 (2001 ). "Electronic Signature"
refers to "data in electronic form in, affixed to, or logically associated with, a data message, which
may be used to identify the signatory in relation to the data message and indicate the signatory's
approval of the information contained in the data message.
327

UNCITRAL Working Group on Electronic Commerce, supra note 322, at 17.

328

Id, at 18.

329 !d.

°

33

Kevin Bonsor, How Facial Recognition Systems Work, available at
http://computer.howstuffworks.com//facial-recognition.htm (last visited Mar.18, 2003). The
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This method requires a digitally taken photograph of the person which would then be

I

compared to the information in the database maintained by government agencies such as
the DMV and the FBI in order to match and conclusively identify the person's identity.
The notion of facial recognition is now gaining in popularity. 331 It is sometimes used in
combination with digital certificates, which in turn increases the level of security for
online commerce.
The Model Law also stipulates requirements for reliable electronic signatures in
Article 6. These requirements are that:
(a)

Signature creation data are, within the context in which they are used,
linked to the signatory and to no other person;

(b)

The signature creation data were, at the time of signing, under the control

I(

of the signatory and of no other person;
(c)

Any alteration to the electronic signature, made after the time of signing,
is detectable; and

(d)

Where a purpose of the legal requirement for a signature is to provide
assurance as to the integrity of the information to which it relates, any

I
I.

Tampa Police Department has tested a new technology called "Facelt" that allows snap shot of
faces from the crowd to be compared to a database of criminal mugshots.
331

/d. Potential applications offacial recognition include ATM and check·cashing security. The
software can swiftly verify a customer's face. A digital camera will capture a "digital photo" of the
customer. The Facelt software then generates a face print of the photograph to protect customers
against identity theft and fraudulent transactions. Facial recognition software provides enhanced
identity verification without a need for a picture ID, bank card or personal identification number
(PIN).
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I

I

t.
alteration made to that information after the time of signing is
detectable. 332
To avoid discrimination against legal recognition of electronic signatures, the new
1:

Model Law does not divide an electronic signature into a sub-class like the EU Electronic
333

Signature Directive

,

but stipulates requirements which are as reliable as secure

electronic signatures. Reliable electronic signatures under the Model Law must be linked
to the signatory, under the control of the signatory, and detectable if there is any
alteration after the time of signing.
Since it is difficult to distinguish the original message from a copy or an altered
version, fraud is potentially possible. Messages or completed online transactions can be
intercepted and altered without detection. The speed of processing is often instantaneous.
The Model Law requires detection technology that can assure both ends that a transaction
has not been interfered with.
Detection is necessary, especially in the use of e-mails. The typed name at the end
of an e-mail could be considered as an electronic signature if it is affixed with the intent
332

UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES art. 6 {2001 ). See also UNCITRAL
Working Group on Electronic Commerce, Electronic Signatures: Draft Guide to Enactment ofthe
UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures, 38th Sess., at 11, U.N Doc.NCN.9/WG.IV/WP.
41 (2001). Any electronic signature technique used with intention to sign a data message under
article 7{1){a) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce would be likely to produce
legal effects, provided that it was adequately reliable in light of all the circumstances, including
any agreement between the parties. The determination of what constitutes a reliable method of
signature under article 7 can be made only by a court or other trier of fact. In contrast, the
reliability requirements as enunciated in article 6(3) of the Model Law on Electronic Signatures
create a benefit in favor of certain techniques, such as digital signatures, which are recognized as
particularly reliable.
333

EU. Electronic Signature Directive art 2 defines "electronic signature" as data in electronic
form which are attached to or logically associated with other electronic data and which serve as a
method of authentication; "advanced electronic signature" means an electronic signature which
meets the following requirements: {1) it is uniquely linked to the signatory; (2) it is capable of
identifying the signatory; (3) it is created using means that the signatory can maintain under his
sole control; (4) it is linked to a data to which it relates in such a manner that any subsequent
change of data is detectable.
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I
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to authenticate the message and be bound by such. However, such simple electronic
signatures may not meet the criteria of a reliable electronic signature due to its potential
flaws. The signed e-mail sent through Internet servers may be altered with no way of
detecting any modification or verification of authenticity. Without a detection technique,
the contents of signed e-mails may not be wholly trusted. Thus, detection technology or
other means of verification, such as a personal verification through phone call or face-toface is needed to ensure confidence of the parties involved in the online transaction.

D. The European Union
The European Union has also formulated a legal framework for electronic and
digital signatures. A report was released which revealed an increasing but somewhat
divergent recognition of digital signature legislation in the member States of the EU334 • In
order to harmonize such divergence, in December 1999 the European Parliament finally
adopted a technology neutral approach, as recommended by the Commission, and passed
the EU Electronic Signature Directive335 , which imposed a legal framework for electronic
signatures. The EU Directive unifies the laws of the member States by requiring that their
national laws apply the same principles contained therein. 336 The EU Directive requires
member states to provide a minimum protection for any entity or legal or natural person
who reasonably relies on the digital certificates. 337

334

Lupton, supra note 84.

335

This Directive may be cited as" Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures."

336

FORD & BAUM, supra note 3, at 299.

337

EU Directive 1999/93/EC, art. 1, 1999.
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The provisions of the EU Signature Directive incorporates a broad term for an
electronic signature, which is defined as data in electronic form which is attached to or
logically associated with other electronic data and which serves as a method of
authentication. The EU Directive also contains a separate provision and standard
requirements for "advanced electronic signatures." According to Article 2 of the
European Signature Directive, an advanced electronic signature must meet the following
requirements:
(1)

It is uniquely linked to the signatory;

(2)

It is capable of identifying the signatory;

(3)

It is created using means that the signatory can maintain under his sole

control; and
(4)

It is linked to the data to which it relates in such a manner that any

subsequent change of the data is detectable. 338
The EU Directive formulated a technology-neutral plus approach and did not
address any specific technology applied to electronic signatures. Most electronic
signatures are recognized to a certain extent. However, high.standards and specific
requirements are stipulated for advanced electronic signatures under which ordinary
electronic signatures or simple authentication techniques may not qualify. In practice,
only one solution is currently available in the technology market that meets all these
requirements, that is the electronic signature which applies the digital signature technique
or those which apply the public key system. 339

338

EU Directive 1999/93/EC, art. 2, 1999.

339

J. Dumortier, Directive 1999/93/EC on a Community Framework for Electronic Signatures, at
http://www.law.kuleuven.ac.be/icri. It can be concluded that the EU Directive is based on a

112

Besides leaving room for modem technologies, the EU Directive also provides for
the legal recognition and admissibility of advanced electronic signatures with favorable
presumptions applying where such electronic signature are created by qualified
certificates and secure-signature-creation-devices. 340 Even though there is no mention of
any specific technology, the directive favors electronic signature by means of an
asymmetric cryptographi41 as the first set of technology for advanced electronic

\I

signatures because such digital signatures potentially meets all four specific requirements;
individuality, authentication, exclusivity, and detectability, as imposed by the EU
Directive.

E. Singapore
In June 1998, Singapore passed the Electronic Transactions Act on the basis of
technologically neutral plus criteria. The Act provides for a distinction between electronic
and secure electronic signature. The former, by definition, is any set ofletters, numbers,
or other symbols in digital .form attached to, or logically associated with, an electronic
record, and executed or adopted with the intention of authenticating and approving an

technology- neutral plus approach (hybrid) because the Directive divides an electronic signature
into a sub-class based on the level of security. The Directive not only addresses certain
technological requirements, but also leaves room for new technological advances. See also B.P.
Aalberts & S. van der Hof, Digital Signature Blindness, Analysis ofLegislative Approaches
Toward Electronic Authentication, 31-32 (November, 1999), at
http://cwis.kub.nll-frw/people/hof!ds-fr.htm.
340

FORD & BAUM, supra note 3, at 300. See also EU Directive 1999/93/EC, art. 5, (1999)
stipulates that "Member States shall ensure that advanced electronic signatures which are based on
a qualified certificate and which are created by a secure-signature-creation device; (a) satisfy the
legal requirements of a signature in relation to data in electronic form in the same manner as a
hand-written signature satisfied those requirements in relation to paper-based data .... "

341

Lupton, supra note 84.
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electronic record. 342An electronic signature in principle could be anything because the
Act stipulates a broad range of technology used for authentication. The latter must be
either a digital signature that complies with the standard specified in the Act, or a
commercially reasonable security procedure consented by both parties.

343

The Act also sets the fundamental criteria for secure electronic signatures as
follows: (1) unique to the person using it; (2) capable of identifying the person; (3)
created through a means that is under the sole control of the person using it; and (4)
linked to the electronic record in such a way as to confirm the integrity of the
document.

344

342

INTERNATIONAL WORKING GROUP ON ELECTRONIC AUfHENTICATION, supra note 295. See
also Singapore Electronic Transactions Act 1998 § 2 "electronic signature" means "any letters,
characters, numbers or other symbols in digital form attached to or logically associated with an
electronic record, and executed or adopted with the intention of authenticating or approving the
electronic record." It can be said that the Singapore Electronic TransaC?tions Act (1998) is a
technology-neutral plus legislation (hybrid) like the EU Directive because it addresses certain
technological requirements and leaves room for new technological advances. See also B.P.
Aalberts & S. van der Hof, Digital Signature Blindness, Analysis ofLegislative Approaches
Toward Electronic Authentication, 33-34 (November, 1999), at
http://cwis.kub.nll-frw/people/hof/ds-fr.htm.
343

Singapore Electronic Transactions Act 1998 § 20 provides that "when any portion of an
electronic record is signed with a digital signature, the digital signature shall be treated as a secure
electronic signature with respect to such portion of the record, if
(a) the digital signature was created during the operational period of a valid certificate and is
verified by reference to the public key listed in such certificate; and
(b) the certificate is considered trustworthy .. ." See also § 17 imposes a requirements for secure
electronic signatures as: (a) unique to the person using it; (b) capable of identifying such person;
(c) created in a manner or using a means under the sole control of the person using it; and
(d) linked to the electronic record to which it relates in a manner such that if the record was
changed the electronic signature would be invalidated, such signature shall be treated as a secure
electronic signature.
344

/d. § 17.
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3.1.3 The Minimalist Approach
The minimalist approach prohibits the discriminatory treatment of electronic
signatures and records 345by broadly recognizing as valid any type of electronic signature
which complies with the specific requirements. The difference between the minimalist
approach, the technological neutral approach and the specific technological approach lies

in the degree of security technolow 46 required to generate an electronic signature. Even
though the minimalist approach does not require a highly advanced technology like that
imposed by the Utah Digital Signature Act, the minimalist imposes specific standards for
valid electronic signatures.

347

The state of California has taken the minimalist approach and recognized the use
of digital signatures with certain standards. 348 Subject to the California Code, "digitally
signed communication" is defined as a message that has been processed by a computer in
a manner that ties the message to the individual who digitally signed the message. 349 The
California Digital Signature Act is not as comprehensive as the Utah Act, but the
California Act also provides. a procedure for new technologies to be added to the list of
acceptable technologies. 350 The California Act currently recognizes digital signatures
created by two technologies: Public Key Cryptography and Signature Dynamics. 351

345

FORD & BAUM, supra note 3, at 304.

346

Michael J. Hays, TheE-Sign Act of2000: The Triumph ofFunction over Form in American
Contract Law, 76NOTREDAMEL.REv.1183, 1198(2001).

347

FORD & BAUM, supra note 3, at 304.

348

/d. See also CAL. Gov'T CODE§ 16.5 (d) (1998) defines "digital signature" as an electronic
identifier, created by computer, intended by the party using it to have the same force and effect as
the use of a manual signature.
349

CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 22000(1998).
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The California Digital Signature Act does not require a specific technology to be

II

used to generate a digital signature, but it broadly imposes specific requirements in order
to recognize a wide range of new technologies that will be used to create digital
signatures. The Act also imposes fundamental security requirements specifying the
attributes of digital signatures.

352

In order to qualify as a signature, the digital signature

must, first of all, be unique to the person using it. Secondly, it must be capable of
verification. Thirdly, it must be under the sole control of the person using it. And finally,

II

it must be linked to the data in such a manner that if the data is altered, the digital
signature is invalidated. 353 A potential technology must be able to verify the signer's

350

Lupton, supra note 84. See also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 22004(1998) provides that "any
individual or company can, by providing a written request that includes a full explanation of a
proposed technology which meets the requirements of Section 22002, petition the California
Secretary of State to review the technology. If the Secretary of State determines that the
technology is acceptable for use with the state, the Secretary of State shall adopt regulation(s),
pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, which would add the proposed technology to the
list of acceptable technologies in Section 22003 ...."

I.

351

CAL CoDE REGS. tit. 2, § 22003(1998) provides: (a) the technology known as "Public Key
Cryptography" is an acceptable technology for use by public entities in California, provided that
the digital signature is created consistent with the provisions in Section 22003(a)1-5 .... " (b) the
technology known as "Signature Dynamics" is also an acceptable techpology for use by public
entities in California, provided that the signature is created consistent with the provisions in
Section 22003(b)(1)-(5) . . .. See also CAL CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 22003(b)(D)(1998) defines
"signature dynamics" as a method which measures the way a person writes his or her signature by
hand on a flat surface and links the measurements to a message created by the use of
cryptographic techniques.
352

CAL. Gov'T CODE§ 16.5 (1998) provides that "(a) in any written communication with a public
entity, as defined in Section 811.2, in which a signature is required or used, any party to the
communication may affix a signature by use of a digital signature that complies with the
requirements of this section. The use of a digital signature shall have the same force and effect as
the use of a manual signature if and only if it embodies all of the following attributes:
( 1) It is unique to the person using it.
(2) It is capable of verification.
(3) It is under the sole control of the person using it.
(4) It is linked to data in such a manner that if the data are changed, the digital signature is
invalidated ...."
353

FORD & BAUM, supra note 3, at 304.
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identity and detect any alterations of the data. It must also be unique to and under the sole
control ofthe signer.
The California Government Code imposes a duty of reasonable care on private
key holders in maintaining exclusive control of their private keys and preventing their
disclosure to unauthorized persons. 354 The Code establishes approved lists of certification
authorities in California who are public entities authorized to issue digital certificates for
digitally signed documents, but the Code does not address matters regarding liabilities,
which is left to the discretion of the court oflaw. 355

I

I.

The use of digital signatures in California creates the fastest way of issuing arrest
warrants. Judges previously used to issue warrants through facsimile, but at present, with
the use of digital signatures, arrest and search warrants can be issued via e-mai1356 from a
judge's private computer at his own residence.

357

j·

354

See CAL. GoV'TCODE § 16.5(1998).

355

Lupton, supra note 84.

,.
j,

356

Peter Blumberg, Judges May Soon Issue Arrest, Search Warrants Using E-Mail, L.A. DAILY J.,
Apr. 17, 1998, at 1.

I'

357

John Christopher Anderson, Transmitting Legal Documents Over the Internet: How to Protect
Your Client and Yourself, 27 RUTGERS COMPUTER& TEcH. L. J. 1, 34(2001).
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3.2 Digital Signatures under Thailand's Information Technology

Law
3.2.1 An Overview and History of the Electronic Transactions and Signatures
Law
Initiated by the National Electronics and Computer Technology Center
(NECTEC), the Digital Signature Law was originally developed on the basis of a
technology-neutral plus (hybrid) approach which favored the PK.I.

358

However, in the

I~

I

light of certain international movement in information technology laws, such as the
International Guidelines on Electronic Signatures, the United States Federal E-Sign Act,

I

Singapore's E-Transactions Act of 1998 and the Cyber Law ofMalaysia359 , NECTEC's
position eventually altered to one which adopted a technologically neutral approach
which was reflected in the Bill finally proposed. 360

358

Information Technology News, available at http://www.ecomm.erce.or.th (June, 2000). The
draft divided an electronic signature into two sub-classes: electronic and secure electronic
signatures. The former refers to any technology, but the later may be either the digital signatures
or other electronic signatures agreed by the parties regardless of technologies used to create them
This approach called "technology neutral plus approach" because it recognizes all types of
electronic signatures, but provides presumptions of reliability and httegrity for secure electronic
signatures. See also Pachara Saksucharit, Laws Concerning Digital Signature
174(2000)(unpublished Master of Law thesis, Chaulalongkom University)( on file with the
Chulalongkom Univeristy Library). See also Visit Sripibol, Information Technology Law in the
Aspect of Consumer Protection, Intellectual Property and International Trade Court Forum:
Special Issue 284, 286(2000). The draft dated on February 2, 2000 had fined the definition of"a
digital signature and key pairs", but theE-Transactions Act (2001) does not mention about digital
signatures or secure electronic signatures. See also NECTEC, Memorandum of the Principle and
Reasons Pertaining to the Draft ofElectronic Signatures 1 (Feb. 2, 2000). The draft dated on
February 2, 2000 also regulated the use of digital signatures by imposing several duties upon a
signatory as well as certification authority.
359

Draft ofE-Commerce Law Ready, at http://www.bbl.co.th/mreview/200003 mup l.htm (Feb. 4,
2000).
360

The Electronic Transactions Act, B.E. 2544 (2001) is based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on
Electronic Signatures. For example, the Act provides a broad definition of electronic signatures
and imposes requirements for determining what constitutes reliable electronic signatures in § 26.
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In order to leave room for new technologies, the proposed law did not specify any

~I

particular technology and did not place restrictions on the use of such technology. 361 But
owing to the technologically complex nature of digital signatures, the proposed law
would be supplemented by a Royal Decree which stipulates standards for digital
signatures and secure electronic signatures so as to create and maintain the necessary
supporting infrastructure.

I

I

The Bill, called the Electronic Transaction Bill, consisted of elements from
previous versions of the Electronic Transaction and Electronic Signature Law. The Bill
was officially submitted by the Deputy Prime Minister on November 5, 1999 and was
approved in principle by the House of Representatives on September 27, 2000. However,
the passage of the Bill suffered some delay as Parliament was dissolved before
endorsement by the Senate could be attained362 • The provisions of the Electronic
Signature Law were formulated on the principles of data integrity, authentication, non-

I·.

repudiation and technology neutrality. 363 The proposed draft contained guidelines for the
establishment of an e-commerce committee to supervise-development of Thailand's ecommerce industry.
Although the Senate gave its full support to the Bill, it took more than a year

r

scrutinize the proposed provisions in detail. The Thai Computer Association noted that

361

Thailand's First Digital Signature Law: Security Technology is Trustworthy, but What about
Security Operation?, at
http://www.ethailand.com/IT/Colurnns/Siamrelay/watching the watchers.btm

.,

ji

362

Karnjana Karnjanatawe, Thailand's E-Transactions Bill Faces Further Delay, at
http://www.newsbytes.com/news/Ol /1681 02.hbnl (200 1).

I

h
363

NECfEC, Memorandum of the Principle and Reasons Pertaining to the Draft ofElectronic
Signatures 1 (Feb. 2, 2000).
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more business confidence was destroyed with each delay the Bill suffered. 364 Due to its
being the first national information technology law, the legislature and the scrutinizing
committee found it necessary to conduct an in-depth analysis of all sections where both
the technical and legal aspects had to be considered in order that the proposed Bill could
provide an adequate means for consumer protection whilst at the same time serve to
promote e-transactions.

..

I

,.
3.2.2 Reasons
There are several reasons why there should be a law on electronic signatures. First,
because of technological advancements, novel methods of communication by means of
electronic technology are being adopted in order to facilitate convenience, swiftness, and

j.
efficiency. However, those methods are in many aspects different from traditional
methods of transactions which are regulated by the existing laws. 365 It is essential and
imperative for the government to devise a legal framework in order to support the use of

I·

such methods of communication and remove all legal barriers pertaining to their

I

admissibility in legal proceedings.

I

Electronic authentication technology has also been increasingly used in Thailand
to verify electronic documents and online identity. Those highly advanced technologies

I•

I
364

Sasiwimon Boonruang, E-Commerce Law not yet Passed, at
http://www.bangkokpost.net/e2001/e-013.html (2001).

365

Memorandum of the Principle and Reasons Pertaining to the Electronic Transactions Bill
l(Sep. 27, 2000).
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should be properly supported by a legal regime which recognizes electronic signatures
.

•

•

• 366

meeting a certam cntena

.

I

Second, to promote the reliability of e-commerce, legal recognition of such
electronic transactions must be addressed by providing legal recognition of electronic
signatures and treating them as the functional equivalent of a traditional handwritten
signature on the condition that such electronic signatures are capable of verifying the
signatory's identity and indicating the signatory's approva1. 367 Because of the worldwide
usage of digital signatures, it is appropriate to lay down internationally consistent
regulations and methods for digital signatures that are deemed as secure electronic
signatures. 368 The regulations should include the generation of digital signatures,
certification authorities, and digital certificates since digital signatures are the most
practical form of electronic signatures because they are considered extremely secure
would engender confidence in security. 369
Finally, to foster the reliability of electronic signatures, the Electronic Signatures
Commission must be established to lay down policies and prescribe rules for overseeing
the operation of certification services in association with electronic signatures as well as

366

NECTEC, supra note 363, at 2.

367

Id.

368

For example, Singapore Electronic Transactions Act (1998) provides when any portion of an
electronic record is signed with a digital signature, "the digital signature shall be treated as a
secure electronic signature" with respect to such portion of the record ....
369

See WONGWATANASAN ET AL., supra note 44, at 81. Digital signatures based on Public Key
Infrastructure provide an effective and systematic authentication technique for identity
verification.
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to promote and follow up the technologies applied for generating and utilizing electronic

.II
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signatures domestlca

370

3.2.3 Analysis
Development of information technology laws by the enactment of the Electronic
Transactions Act, B.E. 2544 (2001), which includes the law on electronic signatures,
remains on the right track with the adoption of a technologically neutral approach in line
with international legislatures. The advantage oftechnologically neutral legislation is the
allowance it makes for future technologies that may be invented to verify the authenticity
of electronic documents and the identity of online parties. In this regard, the concept of
electronic signatures is clearly defined under the new Electronic Transactions Act, B.E.

I·

II

I

2544 (2001). Section 26 also prescribes security features which could be used to
determine the reliability of electronic signatures. This law essentially implements the
reliable standards prescribed by the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures.
A comparison between the enacted Electronic Transactions Act, B.E. 2544
(200 1), hereinafter referred to as "the E-Transactions Act", and the draft approved by the
House of Representatives on 27th September 2000, hereinafter referred to as ''the draft",
reveals a number of interesting points worth mentioning. Changes in ideas regarding
security issues over the lapse of time have been illustrated by these differences.
Although the two versions are somewhat similar, it is essential that they be noted for their
differences. An example of a point of similarity between the two is their defmition of the
term "electronic signature", which has been identically defined under theE-Transactions

370

See Memorandum of the Principle and Reasons Pertaining to the Electronic Transactions Bill,
supra note 365, at 2.
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Act and the draft. Electronic signatures by definition may include "letters, characters,

·[

numbers, sound, or any other symbols created by an electronic means and attached to a
data message for establishing the linkage of a particular person with the data message for
the purposes of identifying the signatory and indicating that such person has approved
and agreed to be bound by that data message."371
This broad defmition encompasses any letter, character or number in both English
and Thai. The definition also extends to sound and any symbol, such as a voice
recognition, cross mark or x, or seals of companies which are in an electronic form on the
condition that they are attached to data messages uniquely used by particular persons, and
that they are able to identify the signatory and prove that the signatory is bound by that
signed message. Both the draft and the E-Transactions Act avoided using the term
"digital signature technology" in order to escape criticism.
Major differences, however, do exist between the draft and the E-Transactions
Act, the first being the draft's division of electronic signatures into two sub-classes:
electronic and secure electronic signatures. 372 Although the E-Transactions Act does
specifically provide for secure electronic signatures, section 26 prescribes stringent

I.

criteria for reliable electronic signatures.
A reliable electronic signature must meet the following criteria:
(1)

"The signature creation data are, within the context in which they are used,
linked to the signatory and to no other person;

371

ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT, B.E. 2544 (200 1) [E-TRANSACTIONS ACT] § 4.

372

The draft only defined "an electronic signature" while leaving the definition of secure
electronic signatures to be prescribed by the Royal Decree.

·.
tl
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(2)

The signature creation data were, at the time of creating the electronic
signature, under the control of the signatory and of no other person;

(3)

Any alteration to the electronic signature, made as from the time of its
creation, is detectable; and

(4)

In the case where a purpose of the legal requirement for an electronic
signature is to provide assurance as to the integrity of the information, any
alteration made to that information as from the time of signing is

,I

I'

detectable. " 373
A second point to be made is that the draft did not prescribe specific standards for
secure electronic signatures. Section 33(1) of the draft empowered the government to
issue a Royal Decree to specify an internationally accepted standard for secure electronic

.,

signatures, such as that for digital signatures generated by Public Key Technology, a
technology globally recognized as a highly effective and efficient method for
authenticating electronic documents. 374 This was subject to 33 (2), which provided that,
by the agreement of the originator and the addressee, an electronic signature created
under the sole control of a particular originator at the time of its creation using the agreed
upon method, making a unique linkage of the originator with an electronic signature, will

•,

be deemed a secure electronic signature. Section 33(2) upgraded an ordinary electronic

373

ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT, B.E. 2544 (2001) [E-TRANSACTIONS ACT]§ 26. This
provision, however, does not bar any party from establishing or adducing of any evidence of the
non-reliability of an electronic signature.
374

§ 33 of the draft approved by the House of Representatives as of 27th September, 2000 provides
that" the following electronic signatures shall be deemed secure electronic signatures: (1) an
electronic signature as prescribed in the Royal Decree under section 24; (2) where the originator
and the addressee so agree, an electronic signature which is created under the sole control of a
particular originator at the time of its creation using the creation method which makes a unique
linkage of such person with such electronic signature."

I
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signature to a secure electronic signature if certain conditions were met, namely the sole
control of the originator and a linkage between the originator and the signed docwnents.
The draft, however, contained no provisions on either the "minimwn requirements
I.

for a secure electronic signature" or the "requirement that a secure electronic signature
should be capable of detecting subsequent changes." The draft also prescribed
requirements for security measures concerning secure electronic signatures which seemed
to be less strict than those in most other countries and the EU. Many of the provisions
were also inconsistent with the international standards for secure electronic signatures.
For instance, Article 6 of the Model Law on Electronic Signatures specifies the attribute
to "detect any alteration" made after the time of signing as one of the reliability
requirements. 375 One of the minimum requirements for secure electronic signatures under

~

r
1.

I

the EU Directive is that the data and signatures are linked in such a manner that the
signatures are "capable of detecting any subsequent change."376
Because of these defects, section 26 of the E-Transactions Act reflects the
modifications made to the draft in order to incorporate the significant security features·of
international standards on secure electronic signatures. One of those features, section 26

375

The Model Law on Electronic Signatures stipulates requirements for reliable electronic
signatures in Article 6. The requirements are stated as: (1) The signature creation data are, within
the context in which they are used, linked to the signatory and to no other person; (2) The
signature creation data were, at the time of signing, under the control of the signatory and of no
other person; (3) Any alteration to the electronic signature, made after the time of signing, is
detectable; and (4) Where a purpose of the legal requirement for a signature is to provide
assurance as to the integrity of the information to which it relates, any alteration made to that
information after the time of signing is detectable.
376

EU Directive 1999/93/EC, art. 2, 1999. Advanced electronic signatures are also known as
"enhanced or secure electronic signature." "Advanced electronic signature" means an electronic
signature which meets the following requirements: (1) it is uniquely linked to the signatory; (2) it
is capable of identifying the signatory; (3) it is created using means that the signatory can maintain
under his sole control; (4) it is linked to a data to which it relates in such a manner that any
subsequent change of data is detectable.
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(3), makes electronic signatures secure and reliable by requiring that any alteration to
either electronic signatures or electronically signed information must be detectable. These
reliability requirements also leave room for the recognition of other technologies that
meet the standards. As a result, one technology, cryptography, which has those required
attributes especially in its ability to detect alternations, is now being fostered. Thus, the
most significant improvement of the E-Transactions Act over the draft lies in its
compliance with internationally accepted standards.

3.3 Comparison Between the Federal Electronic Signatures in
Global and National Commerce Act (E-Sign Act) and Thai
Electronic Transactions Act (E-Transactions Act), B.E. 2544
(2001)

3.3.1

General Features of the Acts
A. lJnitedStates

The Federal Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (E-Sign
Act) is intended to provide basic procedural rules pertaining to electronic transactions,
and not necessarily to govern their comprehensive substantive legal rules. One of these
procedural rules as stated in §101(1) provides that "a signature, contract, or other record
relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability
solely because it is in electronic form ...." 377 This provision assures that data messages

mE-Sign§ 101(1). See also§ 101(a)(2) provides that a contract relating to such transaction may
not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because an electronic signature or
electronic record was used in its formation.
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or electronic signatures will not be barred from admission in the trial because they are
communicated, conducted, or stored electronically.

378

.I.
B. Thailand
The Electronic Transactions Act, B.E. 2544(2001) is a "hybrid" legislation379
I

which consists of both procedural and substantive legal rules. For instance, procedural

\

rules are provided in § 11 which states that "the admissibility of a data message in

~

~.

evidence shall not be denied in legal proceeding on the sole ground that it is a data
message." Paragraph 2 also stipulates that "in assessing the evidential weight of a data
message so as to conclude whether and to what extent it is reliable, the court has to regard
the reliability of the manner in which or the method by which the data message was

,·,

generated, stored or communicated .... " 380 In effect, the E-Transactions Act prohibits the
courts from denying the validity, enforceability, or admissibility of a data message, or
other kinds of evidence for reasons of its electronic form.

§11 is a mandatory rule whereby even electronic evidence made by a hacker or
was a result of a computer error could not be denied evidentiary value if it was not
possible to prove that the hacker broke into the computer system or that the computer
I_
378

William R. Denny, Electronic Contracting in Delaware: The E-Sign Act and the Uniform
Electronic Transactions Act, 4 DELL. REv. 33, 35 (2001).
379

Visit Sripibol, Information Technology Law in the Aspect of Consumer Protection, Intellectual
Property and International Trade Court Forum: Special Issue 284, 287(2000).

380

E-TRANSACTIONS ACT § 11 provides that "the admissibility of a data message in evidence shall
not be denied in legal proceedings on the sole ground that it is a data message.
In assessing the evidential weight of a data message so as to conclude whether and to
what extent it is reliable, regard shall be had to the reliability of the manner in which or the
method by which the data message was generated, stored or communicated, the manner in which
or the method by which the integrity of the information was maintained, and the manner in which
or the method by which its originator was identified or indicated and also to all relevant
circumstances."
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malfunctioned. 381 §11 paragraph 2 provides for the court to determine the evidentiary
weight of a data message or electronic evidence on the basis of how it was generated,
stored or communicated. Thus, a court of law has to admit electronic messages into
evidence and then consider its evidentiary weight.
The E-Transactions Act also comprises of substantive provisions regarding
contractual negotiation such as an offer and an acceptance.

382

Substantive provisions

include record retention383 , electronic signatures, and reliability of electronic
signatures. 384 There are also provisions on the duties ofsignatories385 , certification

381

Sripibol, supra note 379, at 288.

382

£-TRANSACTIONS ACT§ 13 provides that "an offer to make a contract and an acceptance may
be expressed in the form of a data message and the contract shall not be denied legal effect on the
sole ground that the offer or acceptance with respect to that contract was made in the form of a
data message."
383

E-TRANSACTIONS ACT § 10 provides that "in the case where the law requires that any
information be presented or retained in its original form as an original document, if the
presentation or retention is made in the form of a data message in accordance with the following
rules, it shall be deemed as the presentation or retention of the. original document under the law:
(1) a reliable method is used with that data message for assuring the integrity of the information
from the time when it was generated in its final form; and
(2) the information is capable of being subsequently displayed.
The consideration of the integrity of the information under (1) shall be made by having regard to
its completeness and absence of alteration, apart from any additional endorsement or recordation
or any change which may arise in the normal course of communication, storage or display of the
information,_which does not affect the integrity of that information;
In determining the reliability of the method used for assuring the integrity of the information under
( 1), regard shall be had to all the relevant circumstances, including the purposes for which the
information was generated."
384

E-TRANSACTIONS ACT § 26 provides that "an electronic signature that meets the following
features shall be deemed to be a reliable electronic signature:
( 1) the signature creation data are, within the context in which they are used, linked to the
signatory and to no other person;
(2) the signature creation data were, at the time of creating the electronic signature, under
the control of the signatory and of no other person;
(3) any alteration to the electronic signature, made as from the time of its creation,is
detectable; and
(4) in the case where a purpose of the legal requirement for an electronic signature is to
provide assurance as to the integrity of the information, any alteration made to that information as
from the time of signing is detectable.
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authorities386, and relying parties387 • Where the provisions are non-mandatory, the parties
may agree otherwise, such as: an electronic offer and acceptance (§ 13); electronic
declaration (§14); ownership of messages {§15); method of sending and receiving
messages (§ 16); secure electronic signatures ( §26); duty of a signatory (§27); duty of
Certificate Authorities (§28); reliability of system of certification authorities (§29); duty
of relying party (§30); and foreign certificates (§31).

The provisions of paragraph one does not imply any limitation that no other method
exists for establishing the reliability of an electronic signature or does not limit the adducing of
any evidence of the non-reliability of an electronic signature."
385

E-TRANSACTIONS ACT § 27 stipulates that "in the case where signature creation data can be
used to create a signature that has legal effect, each signatory shall:
(1) exercise reasonable care to avoid unauthorized use of his signature creation data;
(2) without delay, notify any person that may reasonably be expected to act on the basis
of the electronic signature or to provide services in support of the electronic signature when:
(a) the signatory knows or should have known that the signature creation data
has been lost, damaged, compromised, unduly disclosed or known in a manner inconsistent with
their purpose
(b) the signatory knows from the circumstances that there occurs a substantial
risk that the signature creation data may have been been lost, damaged, compromised, unduly
disclosed or known in a manner inconsistent with their purpose;
(3) in the case where a certificate is issued to support the electronic signature, exercise
reasonable care to ensure the accuracy and completeness of all material representations made by
the signatory that are relevant to the certificate throughout its life cycle or that are specified in the
certificate."

w

I
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386

E-TRANSACTIONS ACT § 28 provides that "in the case where a certification service is provided
to support an electronic signature that may be used for legal effect as a signature, the certification
service provider shall:
(1) act in accordance with the policies and practices it has represented;
(2) exercise reasonable care to ensure the accuracy and completeness of all material
representations made by it that are relevant to the certificate throughout its life cycle or that are
specified in the certificate;
(3) provide means for reasonable access that enable a relying party to ascertain from the
certificate all the material representations . ... "
387

E-TRANSACTIONS ACT § 30 provides that "a relying party shall:
( 1) take reasonable steps to verify the reliability of an electronic signature;
(2) in the case where an electronic signature is supported by a certificate, take reasonable
steps to:
(a) verify the validity, suspension or revocation of the certificate; and
(b) observe any limitation with respect to the certificate."
I'

i
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3.3.2 Technology Neutrality
A. United States
Both the E-Sign and the E-Transactions Act implement the principle of
technology neutrality by not specifying or favoring any particular technology used to
create an electronic signature. Both Acts are intended to leave room for new technologies
or models later invented. Subject to §106(5) of theE-Sign Act, the term "electronic
signature" means an electronic sound, symbol, or process, attached to or logically
associated with a contract or other record and executed or adopted by a person with the
intent to sign the record. 388 The basic technology that may be considered an electronic
signature includes a typed name at the end of e-mail messages, digitized images, smart
cards, passwords, personal identification numbers, or biometrics such as thumbprints,
voiceprints, or retina scans.389 A more enhanced technology, digital signatures, is one
form of well-known and acceptable electronic signatures.
The term electronic signatures, under the E-Sign Act has a wider meaning than
under theE-Transactions Act because theE-Sign Act also ·recognizes the "process" as an
electronic signature. The process may be a secret method known only between the parties.

It also includes the use of passwords, credit card numbers390, or the use of a mouse to
click an "I accept" button displayed on the website. These processes may be considered
as electronic signatures on the condition that the person who participates in a secret

388

E-Sign § 106(5).

389

Denny, supra note 378, at 41.

390

Jonathan E. Stern, V. Business Law A, Electronic Commerce 1. Digital Signatures a) Federal
Legislation: The Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 16 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 391, 394(2001).
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sharing process or clicks on the "I accept" or "I agree" button adopts it with intent to sign
and be bound.

391

The E-Sign Act is a flexible statute allowing online parties to choose any
technology or electronic characters to constitute a valid signature while also fostering the
development of upcoming electronic signatures. Yet, flexibility can create security
concerns. If nearly anything could amount to a valid electronic signature, it may be
difficult to verify identity.

392

B. Thailand
Under the E-Transactions Act, the term "electronic signature" includes letters,
characters, numbers, sound or any other symbols. 393 Created in electronic form and
affixed to a data message for associating a particular person with the data message, these
letters, characters, numbers, sounds, or any other symbols identify and indicate that such
person has approved the information contained in the data message. The E-Transactions
Act focuses on "letters, characters, numbers, sounds and other symbols. " 394 An electronic
signature must be used for identifying and indicating the approval of the signatory.
Technologies that may be considered as electronic signatures include a typed
name at the end of e-mail messages, digitized images, smart cards, passwords, personal
391

If the person adopts the process by clicking on the "I accept" or "I agree" or "Ok" button with
intent to be bound to the transaction, the electronic transaction bears his electronic signature.
392

For example, a person may sign up for an e-mail account with false information and if someone
relies on the information contained in e-mail sent by him, this creates a reliance on false identity.
393

E-TRANSACTIONS ACT § 4 defines "electronic signature" as letters, characters, numbers, sound
or any other symbols created in electronic form and affixed to a data message for establishing the
association of a particular person with the data message for the purposes of identifying the
signatory in relation to such data message and indicating that such person has approved the
information contained in the data message.
394

/d.
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identification numbers, biometrics such as thumbprints, voiceprints395 , or retina scans, or
digital signatures. An electronic signature under the E-Transactions Act does not include
a process like the E-Sign Act.
Although the E-Transactions Act does not include a process in the definition of an
electronic signature, as does the E-Sign Act, a process such as "sharing secrets" or
''putting a credit card number in online form" could qualify as an electronic signature396
because such process can identify the parties and indicate the approval of the parties to
conduct online transactions. "Clicking an I accept button" alone may not constitute a
valid signature under the E-Transactions Act because such processes may possibly be
flawed, but clicking an "OK-box"397 may amount to an electronic signature on the

t .

condition that such clicking of an "OK-box" is used in combination with a PIN, a
fingerprint, or other electronic signatures. The process of clicking an "OK-box" or "I
accept" or "I agree" button may be considered an electronic signature if it is transformed
into a unique digital data affixed to or attached with the electronic transaction in a
manner that such a digital data establishes a link between the individual who clicks an
"OK-box" and the data message and indicates the individual's app!oval. 398
To increase the degree of public trust in electronic signatures, §26 of theETransactions Act provides certain criteria for determining the reliability of electronic

395

Pinai Na. Nakorn, Electronic Commerce and Electronic Signature Law, 56 THAI BAR LAW
JOURNAL (Botbundit) 1, 23(2000)(B.E 2543). A voiceprint, if transformed into a digital data
attached to an electronic message, is considered to be an electronic signature.

396

See WONGWATANASAN ET AL., supra note 44, at 111.

397

UNCITRAL Working Group on Electronic Commerce, supra note 322, at 18.

398

E-TRANSACTIONS ACT § 4. The major elements of an electronic signature are a connection
between the message and the person who signs it and the approval of the signatory.
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signatures. 399 The current technology that meets all of these requirements is digital
signatures based on cryptographic technology. This provision may be an indirect
disincentive for signatories to use other authentication methods that do not possess these
reliability features.

400

3.3.3 The Principle of Technology Adequacy

J\. lJnitedStates
The most crucial principle under the E-Sign J\ct is that a signature or contract
may not be denied validity owing to its electronic form. §lOl(a) provides that
(1)

"J\ signature, contract, or other record relating to such transaction may not
be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because it is in
electronic form; and

(2)

J\ contract relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect,
validity, or enforceability solely because an elecA:ronic signature or
electronic record was used in its formation.'·.40I

399

E-TRANSACTIONS ACT § 26 states that "an electronic signature 1:luit meets the following features
shall be deemed to be a reliable electronic signature:
(1) the signature creation data are, within the context in which they are used, linked to the
signatory and to no other person;
(2) the signature creation data were, at the time of creating the electronic signature, under
the control of the signatory and of no other person;
(3) any altemtion to the electronic signature, made as from the time of its creation, is
detectable; and
(4) in the case where a purpose of the legal requirement for an electronic signature is to
provide assurance as to the integrity of the information, any altemtion made to that information as
from the time of signing is detectable."
400

See UNCITRAL Working Group on Electronic Commerce, Electronic Signatures: Draft Guide
to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures, 38th Sess., at 11, U.N
Doc.A/CN.9/WG.N/WP. 41 (2001). This provision favors certain techniques, such as digital
signatures, which are recognized as particularly reliable.
401

E-Sign § 101(a).
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Whenever an individual enters into a contract with another party by electronic
means, such as telephones, or electronic messages, it can be considered an electronic
contract although the agreed terms are not printed out. The key point is that both parties
formulate the intent to have an agreement formed electronically through not only
computerized message, but also other similar electronic means.

402

In order to determine

whether the formed contract is enforceable, the law governing the contract must be taken
into consideration.
Both traditional contracts based on paper and electronic or online contracts, if
they are related to a sale of goods, are within under the scope of the Uniform Commercial

I

Code. The Uniform Commercial Code (U .C.C. ), adopted by most jurisdictions in the

1.'

United States, governs commercial transactions in goods. Under the U.C.C. 2-105(1),
"goods',4°3are all things including movable manufactured goods that are for sale.404
Article 2 of the U.C.C. governs most computer related transactions, including sale of
computer hardware, and lease-purchase of computer systems. 405
Thus, a contract to perform a service or copyright licensing is not under the
application of the U.C.C. In such cases, the common law of contracts applies. 406 The

402

KENT D. STUCKEY, INTERNET AND ONLINE LAW

1-32.1(2000).

403

U.C.C § 2-105(1) defines goods as "all things including specially manufactured goods that are
movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than money in which the price is
paid."

404

E. AllAN FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F. YOUNG, SECTIONS FOR CONTRACTS: UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE, REsTATEMENT SECOND, UN SALES CONVENTION, UNIDROIT FORMS,
FORMS 23(1998).

405

DAVID F. SIMON, COMPUTER LAW: HANDBOOK: SOFTWARE PROTECTION, CONTRACT,
LITIGATION, FORMS 64(1990).
406

STEVEN L. MANDELL, COMPUTERS, DATA PROCESSING, AND THE LAW, TEXT AND CASES

9(1984).
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court makes its decision based on a case-by-case analysis of whether the sales or services
aspect predominates each transaction. 407 If the sales aspect forms an essential part of the
contract, the U.C.C. will apply. In Triangle Underwriters, Inc, v. Honeywell, Inc408 , the
court ruled that the U.C.C. did not apply to software. In Computer Servicenters, Inc v.

Beacon Manufacturing Co. 409 , the court decided that the oral contract made by the
defendant who agreed to perform data-processing services is not governed by the U.C.C.
since services, not goods, were involved. The Court of Appeals in Indiana State has ruled

I

r

that a contract to develop customized software is a contract for services and is not
governed by the U.C.C. 410 The requirement for formal writing is stipulated under §2-201
ofthe Uniform Commercial Code:
"A contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not
enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to
indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the parties and signed by
the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or his
broker.'t4II

407

JAMES V. VERGARI & VIRGINIA V. SHUE, FUNDAMENTALS OF COMPliTER-HIGH TECHNOWGY
LAW 103(1991).
408

Triangle Underwriters. Inc. v. Honeywell. Inc .. 457 F. Supp. 765(E.D. N.Y. 1978). The
plaintiff was purchasing the product, not only the programs or software, which requires effect to
produce. The court thus ruled that a data processing system was tangible and is more readily
characterized as "goods" than "service".
409

Computer Servicenters. Inc v. Beacon Manufacturing Co., 328 F. Supp. 653( D.S.C. 1970),
aff'd 443 F.2d 906(4th Cir.1971).

410

Data Processing Serv .. Inc. v. L.H Smith Oil Cmp .. 492 N.E 2d 314(Ind. App. 1986).

411

FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra not 404, at 25.
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This requirement is commonly called the Statute ofFrauds. Historically, the
Statute ofFrauds was rooted in English law and adopted in most jurisdictions in the
United States, except for Louisiana.

,.

412

The principle of freedom of contract allows two parties to create a binding
contract so long as the binding contract does not violate public morals, rules of evidence,
or substantive laws regarding the formal requisites of writing and signature.

413

This

limitation is intended to reduce the risk associated with oral transactions and to protect
the interests of third parties. 414 The protection of interests is maintained by the Statute of
Frauds.

I

jl

415

I ,

The Statute of Frauds was intended to make certain significant contracts

'

unenforceable unless put in writing. 416 The Statute ofFrauds assures that plaintiffs
cannot use the courts to enforce non-existent agreements by procuring false testimony on
their behalf 17 and without written evidence showing such legal relationship.
A piece oflegal writing performs an evidentiary function, a cautionary function,
and a channeling function.

418

Providing some proof of the fact that the promisor made the

412

Alan Tikwart, The Admissibility ofDigital Signatures and E-cash in Relation to the Statute of
Frauds, available at http://www.ravem/cc/ilams/edu/-cybermom/CLJ/tickwart.html (1998).
413

ANTIIONY T. KRONMAN AND RICHARD A. POSNER, THE EcONOMIC OF CONTRACT LAW
253(1979). For instance, two persons cannot form a binding agreement to commit a crime or a tort
on a third party.
414

ld.

415

ld.

416

FARNSWORTII & YOUNG, supra note 404, at 287.

417

Shawn Pompian, Is the Statute ofFrauds Ready for Electronic Contracting?, 85 VA. L. REV.
1447, 1453 (1999).

418

E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, UNITED STATES CONTRACT LAW 36(1991).
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alleged promise is an evidentiary function of a writing.

419

A cautionary function of

writing, such as in a suretyship contract, warns the promisor of the significance of the act

°

of promising, and prevents ill-considered and impulsive promises. 42 Finally, a piece of
legal writing, such as in a land contract, performs a channeling function by furnishing a
simple test of enforceability to separate enforceable contracts from unenforceable ones. 421

,,

.

,,

Examples of other agreements that fall within the scope of the Statute of Frauds

.

I·

'·

are:

1) A contract of an executor or administrator to answer for a duty of the decedent;

~

(·
I

2) A contract to answer for the duty of another, such as guaranteeing the

'
I'
'l

performance of another in a repayment of a loan, or other kind of debts;
3) A contract made upon consideration of marriage;

,.'• '·'

4) A contract for the sale of an interest in land; and;
5) A contract that is not to be performed within one year from the making

..

I

thereof.422
Thus, a person being sued must have signed such written evidence; otherwise the
court will refuse to allow it to be enforced against him or her. If the party being sued
does not raise the Statute ofFrauds as a defense, the court will enforce the agreement. 423
Under the U.C.C. the term "written" or "writing" includes printing, typewriting or
any other intentional reduction to tangible form. 424 It would be sufficient if there was a
419

/d.

420

/d. at 37.

421

/d.

422

FARNSWORTH & YOUNG,

423

A. JAMES BARNES ET AL., LAW FOR BUSINESS 169(3d ed. 1987)

I
~

supra note 404, at 288.

137

'·

piece of legal writing or some equivalent documents, such as printing or engraving on a
substance capable of receiving and retaining legible characters.

425

Under the U.C.C., the

writing requirement with respect to a sale transaction requires the message to be reduced
to tangible form. The law does not require the entire agreement to be made in writing or
that the writing be in a single document. 426 Such writing can be made any time before suit
is filed.

427

To meet the writing requirement, the party must present the court with sufficient
evidence convincing the court that the agreement between parties was created by
electronic means that can be retrieved in tangible form for subsequent reference. The
identity of the parties to contract must be indicated in some ways, and the subject matter
of the contract must be proven with reasonable certainty. 428
Telexes, tape recordings, faxes, and magnetic recordings of data on computer
disks have been found to be writing. 429 In New Hampshire, a court held that a telegraphed
contract is a sufficient writing under the Statue ofFrauds. 430 Tangible written text
produced by computer retrieval may be sufficient to satisfy writing requirements.

431

In

Barman v. Union Oil Co., 1999, the Federal Court held that numerous e-mail messages
424

u.c.c. § 1-201(46).

425

GROVER C GRISMORE,

426

BARNES ET AL., supra note 423, at 176.

427

KRONMAN & POSNER, supra note

428

BARNES ET AL., supra note 423, at 176.

429

ld.

THE PRINCIPLE OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 129(1965).

'·

413, at 253.

f

430

Larry M . Zanger, Electronic Contracts: Some of the Basics, available at http://www.mbc.com
(n.d).
431

GAHTAN ET AL., supra note 82, at 244.
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and memoranda amounted to other writing constituting a contract. 432 Similarly, in People
v. Avila, the court held that data digitally stored on a computer disk is a written
instrument for purposes of establishing a violation of a statute prohibiting forgery of
written instruments.433 Thus, digital signatures containing a binary code usually stored on
a computer disk or on the computer's hard drive amount to a writing instrument.434
There are some other types of message, such as a message exchanged on an
Internet Relay Chat (IRC) facility or online chat facility which may not have sufficient
permanence to constitute writing435unless the parties involved have saved the chatted
messages into their hard drive and reprinted it later. IRC facilities may not allow parties
I.

to save messages typed in the chat room, so when one leaves the chat room, everything is
gone. So it may not be possible to later produce these online messages.
Not only does the Statute of Frauds require a writing in order for a contract to be
enforced, but the contract must also bear a signature of the liable party. The term
"signed" includes "any symbol executed or adopted by a party with present intention to
authenticate writing.'.436 The purpose of the requirement for a signature is to protect
against denial of writing by a signing party or authorship of contract.437 A signed
agreement is usually presumed authentic unless someone can present evidence that it was

432

Barman v. Union Oil Co., No. 97-569-AS, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13973(D. Or. Aug. 13,
1999).

433

People v. Avila, 770 P.2d 1330 (Colo.App.1988).

434

Tikwart, supra note 412.

435

GAHTAN ET AL.,

436

U.C.C 1-201(39).

437

MICHAELS. BAUM & HENRY H. PERRITT,

supra note 82, at 245.

JR., ELECTRONIC CONTRACTING, PUBUSHING, AND

EDI LAW 337(1991).
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forged. 438 Signing a contract in a traditional way makes people feel like they are agreeing

'·,

to something when they sign the contract form. 439
Traditional contract law recognizes that a formal handwriting signature is not

l

necessarily needed to satisfy the signature requirement under the Statute ofFrauds.440
The U.C.C. requires the intent of a person who uses a symbol, such as a mark or any form
of symbol, as a means to authenticate a document. They are then considered as a
signature and valid under the U.C.C. A complete signature is not always necessary. That
signature may be in a printed, stamped, or written form. Initials or a thumbprint are also

I
1-"

'

I
.I

sufficient to be a signature on condition that the person who writes the initial or makes a
thumbprint has the intent to be bound.

I

...

•

A signature subject to the US Restatement (Second) of Contracts may also be any
symbol made or adopted with intention, actual or apparent, to authenticate the writing as
that of the signer.

441

0

I'•
)•

A signature may thus include an arbitrary code sign442 on condition

that the adoption of code is for authentication. 443 The signature can appear in any place,
at the beginning or ending of the content.

j.:

438

ROSE, supra note 40, at 82.

439

/d.

.·r

too

440

LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ON-LINE BUSINESS: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: SUPPLEMENT NO.}
659(Dennis Campbell et al. eds., Sweet & Maxwell 1999).

I·

441

GAHTAN ET AL., supra note 82, at 244. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 134 ( 1999) provides that "any symbol may serve as a signature if it is made or adopted with the
intent of authenticating the writing at issue."
442

/d. at 246.

443

NIMMER, supra note 55, at 14.31.

i'.
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I

The term 'signature' is broadly construed, so courts must use common sense and
commercial experience in determining whether a mark constitutes a signature.444 The
courts have interpreted the term signature in various ways. In 1864, a court noted that a
written signature means a handwritten autograph or, if the signer cannot write, a proper
mark. 445 This is consistent with the U.C.C. 1-201(39) because in order to determine
whether or not a mark is a signature, the intent to use is the main factor to take into
account. Disabled persons who cannot write may make or use a proper mark instead of
signing their signatures physically.
In some cases, a typewritten name on a U.C.C financing statement is not qualified

(·

as a signature. 446 Though sometimes it may be, such as when a higher court reversed a
•

case by holding that a typewritten name on a U.C.C. financing statement was a
signature. 447 In 1989, still another court had a chance to determine whether a faxed
signature was a signature. The court made a ruling that a faxed signature was adequate
for a declaration. 448 In Hillstrom v. Cosnay, the court determined that a typewritten name
on a telegram was a signature under the Statute ofFrauds .449
In Hessenthaler v. Favzin 450 the court held that a mailgr~ satisfied the

requirement for a signature under the Statute ofFrauds in Pennsylvania. Also, in

444

!d.

445

Ames v. Schurmeire, 9 Minn, 221(Gil.206}(1886).

446

In re Carlstron, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.766 (Callaghan)(Bankr.D.Me 1966).

447

Matter ofSave-on-Caroets of Arizona. Inc., 545 F.2d 1239(9th Cir.1976).

448

Madden v. Hegadom, 236 N.J. Super. 280,565 A.2d 725( Law Div.),aff'd, 239 N.J. Super.268,
571 A.2d 296 (App.Div.1989).

449

Hillstrom v.Cosnay, 188 Mont.388, 614 P.2d 466(1980).

450

Hessenthaler v. Favzin, 564 A. 2d 990(PA Super. Ct.1989).
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I

Doherty v. Registration ofMotor Vehicles 451 , a district court found that a notation made
by a state trooper was sufficient to satisfy the state's petjury statute signature requirement.
In Parma Tile Mosaic & Marble Co. v. Estate ofShorl52 , the court examined
whether the printed heading showing the name of a sender on the top of a facsimile
constitutes a signature that meets a requirement for a signed guaranty or not. In this case,
the court held that letterhead might constitute a valid signature if it is clear that the faxed
heading was made with intent to authenticate the content. Usually, fax machines print a

I
l
f

l

heading showing the sender's name, but it does not mean that that person authenticated

·,

the faxed message; therefore, it cannot be assumed that all facsimiles are signed
I

<

documents. 453

I

To eliminate discriminatory treatment against electronic signatures, the E-Sign
Act mandates that state courts not deny the legal effect, validity, or enforceability of
online transactions on the ground that they are made and signed electronically. Under the
E-Sign Act, a simple name typed at the end of an e-mail qualifies as a signature on the
condition that it was created with the intent to be bound.454 The signature file often
automatically or manually appended to e-mail can be considered as a form ofletterhead
and thus a signature455 on condition that it was made with intent to authenticate the
content. The widely used approach of creating a valid signature under the E-Sign Act is

451

Doherty v. Registry of Motor Vehicles, 97 CV0050 (Dist. Ct., Suffolk Co., 1997).

452

Parma Tile Mosaic & Marble Co. v. Estate of Short, 663 N.E. 2d 633(N.Y. 1996).

453

Holly K. Towle, £-Signatures: Basics of the U.S. Structure, 38 Hous. L. REv. 921, 925(2001).

454

Zanger, supra note 430. See also E-SIGN ACT§ 106.

455

MICHAEL CHISSICK & AUSTAIR KELMAN, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: LAW AND PRACTICE 89(2d
ed.2000).
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r
the "shared secrets" approach. This involves the use of passwords, social security
numbers, and credit card numbers for intent to enter into a contract.

456

Most

authentication methods, such as PINS, secret codes, smart cards, biometrics, and digital
signatures used with the intention to authenticate and be bound to such online transaction
are deemed to be valid under the E-Sign Act.

457

t

As electronic transactions in a digital world bind parties to a process

458

,

the act of

clicking one's mouse on the "I agree" button, generally known as "click wrap contracts,"
or "click-through, click and accept, web-wrap agreements" probably amount to a signing

r'

of the agreement459 if such users have intent to be bound and have not made such clicks
•

by mistake. If the user simply clicks on the "Proceed" button with intent to read further, it

["I

I
I

I
o

may not be deemed authenticated by the user and does not meet authentication
requirements. 460 In the beginning of the information technological era, courts in the
United States held that shrink-wrap licenses are not enforceable.461 A shrink-wrap
contract or license is one form of standardized contracts in which one party presents
already established terms in a preprinted form to the other party. 462 The other party is not

456

Stern, supra note 390, at 394.

457

The court may not deny legal effect because they are transmitted or signed electronically. See
BAUM, SECURE ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: BUILDING THE
INFRASTRUCTURE OF DIGITAL SIGNATURE AND ENCRYPTION 295 (2000). See also E-SIGN ACT §
101.

WARWICK FORD AND MICHAELS.

458

M. ETHAN KATSH, LAW IN A DIGITAL WORLD 129(1995).

459

See Michael J. Hays, TheE-Sign Act of 2000: The Triumph ofFunction over Form in American
Contract Law, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1183, 1206(2001).

460

TOWLE, supra note 12, at 519.

461

COPYRIGHT AND ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: LEGAL ASPECTS OF ELECTRONIC COPYRIGHT
MANAGEMENT 269(P. Bernt Hugenholtz et al. eds., Kluwer Law International2001).
462

JANEK. WINN & BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 6-3 (4th ed. 2001 ).
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given an opportunity to negotiate or change any term stated in the preprinted form.

463

The

reason why it is called a shrink-wrap contract is that the terms of a contract is printed on

.·

the outside of the package and begins with language such as, "By breaking this seal, you
agree to the following terms and conditions .....464 In Vault v. Quaicf 65 , for example, the
court ruled that shrink-wrap agreements in question was a contract of adhesion which
could only be enforceable if it did not touch upon the area of federal copyright law. In
this case, the provisions were held unenforceable on the grounds that they were
preempted. A shrink-wrap contract may also be unenforceable if its provision is
unconsciousable. The court sometimes relieved a party from the burden of an
unconscionable action466 when the court found that such one-sided contract was onerous
and unfair. 467

In ProCD Inc. v. Zeidenberg in 1996468 , the court made a remarkable ruling that
the shrink-wrap agreement was considered as valid. It noted that the defendant may have
not known the content of a contract at the time of purchase, but realized that the license
terms would be part of contract. The defendant not only accepted the software after
checking the package, but also was also aware of the license term~ while he was

r.

463

/d.

464

Technology Law, available at htt,p://www.pcnet.coml-ibrans/tech.html.

465

Vault v. Quaid 847 F.2d 255, 270(5th Cir. 1988).

466

ROBERTP. BIGELOW & SUSAN H. NYCUM, YOURCOMPUTERANDTHELAW 111(1975).

467

VERGARI & SHUE, supra note 407, at 115.

468

ProCD Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
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'I
installing the program.469 Thus, the court was of the opinion that the defendant had
accepted the terms by his conduct.
In Federal Trade Commission v. Verity International, Ltd"10 , the court determined
that telephone line subscribers were not liable for calls made from the subscriber's
number unless the biller for online services could prove that the subscriber was the
person who consented to the online contract or was the person who clicked "I accept." In
this case, an unauthorized person used the subscriber's telephone line to access the
website and downloaded the dialing program without the line subscribers' authorization.
The court held that the telephone company must prove that the subscriber was really the
person who clicked the agreed button and not an impostor.
To ensure that an online transaction is enforceable, an online merchant must have
that transaction in a single electronic document, preferably in a commonly used format
like ASCTI or Word, bearing the electronic signature of each party to the deal. 471 Online
merchants have to maintain a reproducible record of the terms of the agreement and a
record of the user's response stored in the computer's memory, such as a record of a
buyer's e-mailed response to your offer stating the buyer's intent to form a contract. 472

469

BERNARDINE W.M. TROMPENAARS, LEGAL SUPPROT FOR ONLINE CONTRACT, IN COPYRIGHT
COMMERCE: LEGAL ASPECTS OF ELECTRONIC COPYRIGHT MANAGEMENT, supra
note 341, at 270.
AND ELECTRONIC

°Federal Trade Commission v. Verity International, Ltd., 124 F. Supp. 2d 193 (S.D.N.Y 2000).
In this case, the defendant used Automatic Number Identification for billing line subscribers for
the services. The court ruled that such device was barred unless ( 1) the line subscriber previously
entered into an express agreement authorizing such billing, or (2) the bill contained an express
statement that the line subscriber was not obliged to pay the bill unless he or she personally agreed
or authorized another to agree to pay for those services.

47

471

ROSE, supra note 40, at 79.

472

BRINSON & RADCLIFFE, supra note 65, at 21.
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I
The names that the buyer filled out in the form may be considered to be his signature473 if
he puts his name with intention to authenticate the order.
A problem that may occur is that the user may have hit the wrong button by

I.

accident, called "accidental assent." Online users without sufficient knowledge of
sophisticated computer programs may make mistakes that should not be deemed a real
assent to be bound. It is the duty of online users to prove accidents in order to avoid
liability.
Online users must read and understand the terms of contracts before they
conclude online contracts because they will be held to these contracts. The court in one of
~

I

these cases ruled that the user must exercise his or her right to read and understand the
online terms and condition.474 A person who reads a written document, and has the
capacity to understand if he reads it, or without reading it has it read to him, and signs it,
will be bound by his signature.475
There are some exceptions to binding the online user, on the grounds that such
terms and conditions are not legible, or insufficiently noticed to the attention of the
user. 476 The user's assent results from fraud or mistake may also invalidate the terms and
conditions.477

473
474

475

I· ,

/d.
STUCKEY,

supra note 402, at 1-42.

Rossi v. Douglas, 203 Md. 190, 192, 100A.2d 3, 7 (1953).

I·

476

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 208 (1998) provides that" if a contract or term
thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a court may refuse to enforce the
contract, or may enforce the reminder of the contract without the unconscionable tenn, or may so
limit the application of any unconscionable term to avoid any unconscionable result."
477

STUCKEY,

supra note 402, at 1-42.
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Conducting business-to-consumer (B2C) online transactions does not seem to be a
problem to online merchants since the E-Sign Act is broad enough to give legal validity
to both simple and complex signatures if the requirement of intent is met. Online

I,

merchants may find themselves in a difficult situation in enforcing such signed online
agreement if it was not signed by the individual, but by an employee.

478

Such issue will

I

'·

'

involve a consideration of whether an employee has power and authority to accept on
behalf of the company. To prevent this situation from occurring and to ensure

I

I·

authenticity and security, the online merchant when conducting business with another

'I·
corporation, or business-to-business (B2B) transactions, should require that a digital

I,..
r.·

signature be affixed by an employee having authority to bind his or her employer to the
online agreement.

479

The online merchant should check the status of the information of the signatory
by reviewing a digital certificate. A digital certificate may contain information regarding
the age of the signatory, or authority to act on behalf of a corporation, so as to ensure that

~

.
,.

(

a person with legal capacity has digitally signed the online transaction. If a minor signed
the transaction, it is voidable at the minor's option.480 So knowing the status of the parties
involved is essential under some circumstances.

, ..

478

Douglas T. Tsoi ET.AL., Click-Wrap Agreement.·-Background and Guidelines for
Enforceability- Hale and Dorr LLP, at http://www.haleanddorr.com 2 (Aug. 11, 2000).
479

!d.

I

I

I,

480

A person who concludes a contract before reaching the age of majority (at present 18) can
disaffirm that contract and avoid being bound. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, UNITED STATES
CONTRACT LAW 137(1991). See also Kieferv. Fred Home Motors. Inc., 39 Wis. 2d 20, 158
N.W.2d. 288 (1968). The court noted that the minor was immature in both mind and experience,
and, thus, he should be protected from his own bad judgments as well as from adults who would
take advantage ofhirn.
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II
I

,,'

·,
147

,

I'

Under the Statute ofFrauds, a contract evidenced in writing is enforceable against
the signing party only. A party who did not sign the contract may not be sued. For
example, if the online merchant did not sign any transaction, the online purchaser might
not be able to file a claim against him. In the interest of consumer protection, consumers
should request a written or electronic confirmation bearing an electronic signature of the

r
I

merchant in order to hold him responsible in the event of any failure to perform an
481

obligation. This makes theE-Sign Act the most dramatic legislative action to date

which grants legal recognition to all electronic authentications without discriminatory
requirements.

B. Thailand
TheE-Transactions Act also implements the principle of technology adequacy. 482
§7 stipulates that "information shall not be denied legal effect and enforceability solely
on the ground that it is in the form of a data message. " 483 §13 allows an offer to make a
contract and an acceptance to be expressed in the form of a data message. The ETransactions Act assures that the contract shall not be denied le~al effect for reasons that

'·
481

.

I

Hays, supra note 346, at 1191.

482

This Act is intended to recognize the use of information technology necessary for the
development of businesses, communications and educations through the Internet. In addition, the
Act is aimed at recognizing legal status of electronic information, including signatures. See Visit
Sripibol, Information Technology Law in the Aspect of Consumer Protection, Intellectual Property
and International Trade Court Forum: Special Issue 284, 285(2000). See also CHAIWAT
WONGWATANASAN ET AL., EXPLANATION OF THE ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT, B.E. 2544
12(2002). This Act adopts functional equivalent approach to provide equal legal effect between
transactions made on paper-based and computer-based format.
483

E-TRANSACTIONS ACT

r:

§ 7.
l
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the offer, acceptance, or signature is made in electronic form. 484 This part will be

I
I

I

discussed in detail in relation to the scope of applicability of the Thai E-Transactions Act.

I:

3.3.4 Scope of Applicability
A. lJnited States
The E-Sign Act governs interstate commercial transactions conducted through
electronic means. "Transaction" under the E-Sign Act by definition is an "action or set of
actions relating to the conduct of business, consumer, or commercial affairs between two

r·
I·

or more persons, including any of the following types of conduct:

I· 1
I
( '

(

1) the sale, lease, exchange, licensing, or other disposition of (i) personal
property, including goods and intangible, (ii) services, and (iii) any

Ir

2) the sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition of any interest in real property,
or any combination thereof.'.4ss
The applicability of the E-Sign Act emphasizes commercial transactions
conducted in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce486 , in order to avoid any
discrimination caused by differing legal provisions governing online transactions
between the states. For example, if one party living in New York purchases a computer
online with an online merchant whose main business office is in California, the E-Sign

484

I,

,.

E-TRANSACTIONS ACT § 13 states that an offer to make a contract and an acceptance may be
expressed in the form of a data message and the contract shall not be denied legal effect on the
sole ground that the offer or acceptance with respect to that contract was made in the form of a
data message.

...

485

E-Sign § 106(13).

'•

486

E-Sign § lOl(a).

149

'.

I I'
'\ r
I .

r

combination thereof; and

l

Act governs the transaction because it is an interstate transaction. The law of California
only recognizes an electronic signature that meets qualified security standards so if the
buyer who lives in New York uses a simple electronic signature, such a signature would

·.

not meet the requirements under the California Law and thus the transaction could not be
completed. The E-Sign Act removes all divergent statutes that create different standards

I,

and holds e-signatures to a nationally recognized single standard.
Although the E-Sign Act governs interstate online commercial transactions, it
does not require any person to agree to use or accept electronic records or electronic
signatures. 487 Any person may decline to accept or use any kind of electronic signature

.,.
I

..
and may revert to a traditional paper-based approach. The E-Sign Act is intended to
facilitate e-commerce by allowing certain transactions to be conducted electronically.488

'

'

I

~~ '

)1

•

A sale contract of either tangible or intangible goods is a transaction governed by
·1: I.

the E-Sign Act. Computers, software programs, electronic information, databases,

j.

I

:!

II

I

'

r •· r

electronic appliances, phones, cell phones, calling cards, foods, canned foods, cooking

~'

.," '

~

utensils, cars, and books are examples of goods that are currently traded online. 489 TheESign Act also governs "leases" which are transactions concerning the renting of either

'

I
I

movable or real property. Interstate car or house rentals conducted online are governed by
the E-Sign Act. The scope also applies to an "exchange", which includes an exchange of
487

E-Sign § 101(b)(2).

488

E-Sign Act endorses the use of electronic contract formation, signatures, and record keeping in
private transactions by recognizing legal equivalence between: (a) the contracts written on paper
and contracts in electronic form; (b) pen-and-ink signatures and electronic signatures, and (c) other
legally-required written documents and the same information in electronic form See OMB,
Guidance on Implementing the Electronic Signatures In Global and National Commerce Act (ESIGN) 2 (2000).
489

RICHARD D. WILLIAMS & BRUCE T. SMYTH, COMPliTER AND INTERNET LIABILITY:
STRATEGIES, CLAIMS AND DEFENSES 6-86(2d ed.2000). E-Sign Act provides for the enforceability

I

'I

of contracts created electronically without immediate human involvement.
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cars, and other movable properties. Online transactions relating to intellectual properties,
i.e. involving copyrights, trademarks and patents, such as the sale of exclusive rights,
licensing in the context of film making rights, use of trademarks, or the production of
certain kinds of industrial products, are called "licensing" and are under the application of
the E-Sign Act.
The E-Sign Act also applies to disposition of personal and real property, services,
the sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition of any interest in real property or any

..

combination thereof. 490 Traditional transactions dealing with any interest in real property
may differ from state to state. If these transactions are conducted online, the E-Sign Act,
as applied to these transactions, reduce or eliminate divergent rules regarding traditional
real property transactions.

B. Thailand
Subject to §3 of theE-Transactions Act, the Act shall apply to "civil and
commercial transactions made by means of a data message, unless exempted from the
entire or partial applicability of this Act by a Royal Decree.'.491 The E-Transactions Act
applies not only to commercial transactions, but also to civil transactions. This is a
distinctive difference from the E-Sign Act since the E-Sign Act applies to commercial

I~

transactions only. The scope of applicability of the E-Transactions Act covers a wider
range of transactions no matter whether they may be commercial or not. TheETransactions Act also applies to transactions regarding Administrative acts. This paper
~·

490

491

E-Sign § 106(13)(B).
I"

E-TRANSACTIONS ACT§ 3.

~·
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limits the discussion on the application ofthis E-Transactions Act to civil and
commercial matters only.
A ''transaction" is defined as "any act related to a civil and commercial activity or
in the performance of the State affairs as prescribed in Chapter 4.'.4

92

Transactions that

can be conducted in the form of data message include the performance of legal _acts, such
as a sale of real property, an appointment of agent or the formation of wills. "Data
message" by definition is information generated, sent, received, stored or processed by an
electronic means such as electronic data interchange, electronic mail, telegram, telex or
facsimile. 493 TheE-Transactions Act is intended to facilitate e-commerce by allowing
some commercial acts, such as offers, acceptance and signatures to be made through email, electronic data interchange (also known as E.D.I.), telegram, telex, facsimile and
other means to be conducted via the Internet networks. Unlike the E-Sign Act, the ETransactions Act simply governs civil and commercial acts without specifying in detail
what transactions it actually governs. This leaves room for doubt and allows flexibility
of interpretation.
Commercial activities include matters arising from all relationships of a
commercial nature, whether contractual ornot. 494 Commercial transactions also includes
the supply or exchange of goods or services, distribution and representation agreements
as well as agreements in various commercial activities in finance, banking, insurance,
agency, factoring, leasing, construction, consultation, engineering, investment,

492

493

E-TRANSACTIONS ACT

§ 4.

Id.

494

Mark Driscoll, Legal Developments Regarding £-commerce in Thailand, at
http://www .coudert.com/practice/thaiecommlhtm (2000).
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'··
exploitation agreement and concession, joint venture and other industrial and business
incorporations and carriage of goods or passengers by air, sea, road, and rail. 495
Contracts may be oral or in written form. Written agreements may be more
secure than oral ones in some circumstances. 496 Oral contracts deal with unimportant
rights497 , but some agreements relating to real property are required to be made in written

'·

I'
'

form.49B
The Civil and Commercial Code (C. C. C.) governs most civil and commercial
activities conducted within the Kingdom of Thailand. Traditionally, whenever the law
requires some evidence in writing, such written evidence may not necessarily be in any
one single document. Written evidence may be found in a memorandum of
understanding, minutes, or any record on paper. If the law requires a contract to be made

in writing, it means that such contract must be reduced to paper and manually signed by
both parties. Some transactions have to be registered with a competent official, such as
the registration of transfer of land ownership.499
The definition of signature under the C.C. C. has not been clearly defined.
Guidance may be sought from the Code itself as well as decisions of the Supreme court.

1. '

§9 of the Thai Civil and Commercial Code provides that

495

UNCITRAL Working Group on Electronic Commerce, supra note 322, at 5.

496

THOMAS J.HARRON, BUSINESS LAW 211(1981).

r.·
[.

497

See The Civil and Commercial Code of Thailand [C.C.C.] § 456 paragraph 3. A contract of sale
of movable property where the agreed price is less than five hundred bath (approximately $12) is
not subject to writing and signature requirements. See also§ 653. A loan of money for a sum of
less than 50 baht (approximately $1.20) is not subject to written evidence requirement.

498

C.C.C. § 456 provides that a sale of immovable property is void unless it is made in writing and
registered by the competent official. This rule also applies to the sale of ships or vessels ....
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"Whenever a writing is required by law, it is not necessary that it be
written by the person whom it is required, but it must bear his signature.

If a person is in the habit of affixing a seal in lieu of signature, the affixing
of such seal is equivalent to a signature.
A finger print, cross, other such mark affixed to a document is equivalent
to a signature if it is certified by the signature of two witnesses.

'
'!

The provisions in the foregoing paragraph shall not apply to a finger print,
cross, or other such mark affixed to a document before the competent
authorities." 500
A signature must be a physical or manual handwritten signature. The law also
provides that a seal may be used in lieu of signature if a person is in the habit of affixing
a seal. A finger print, thumb print, cross, or other mark or symbol may be used as
signature if two witnesses certify that the person who affixes such finger print, cross or
'

mark has an actual intent and understanding that he or she is obligated to his or her own
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affixing.
,, ,

The Thai Supreme Court Decision No.3046/1994 (B.E 2537) confirmed the rule
that a party's signature is necessary for the imposition of any liability in a written

,.'

..

evidence. The Thai Supreme Court held that a contract for the purchase of rice
concluded through telex is completed when the offer and acceptance is made over the
I'
I

telex, but it is not enforceable, as §456 paragraph 3 requires some evidence in writing

7
i·

signed by the liable party. In this case, the court interpreted the telex message as a
writing, but concluded that it was not signed by the party as the court did not construe

°CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL CODE (C.C.C.] § 9.

50
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any letter in any part of the telex as a signature. Thus, the court refused to enforce the

.~~ '
'

agreement against the defendant.
However, as of April3, 2002, the Supreme Court's ruling no longer applies since
the E-Transactions Act does not allow the court to refuse the validity or enforceability of
electronic transactions, including electronic signatures, on the sole ground that it is in
electronic form. §7 of E-Transactions Act, a mandatory rule, stipulates that "information
.,

shall not be denied legal effect and enforceability solely on the ground that it is in the

1
I

form of data message. " 501 Applying this new rule to the set of facts in the Supreme
Court ruling stated above would result in the enforcement of the contract for the purchase
of rice because a communication through telex is one form of data message and a typed
name at the end of the telex is considered as an electronic signature even though it was
• I
~·,.

typed electronically.

~

In applying the E-Transactions Act to civil and commercial activities under the
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C.C.C, we must take into account the nature of civil and commercial activities, certain
written evidence requirements, rules in relation to forms,- the nature or form of signature
i

and registration requirements. Legal formality, as stated in §152 ofthe Civil and

I'

Commercial Code makes "any act that is not made in compliance with the mandatory
rules of formality prescribed by law ... null and void."502
Civil and commercial activities under the C. C. C. are divided into three groups.
1)

Civil or commercial activities which the C. C. C. does not require written or
oral form. In this group parties to transactions can form a valid contract

501

E-TRANSACTIONS ACT

.

§ 7.
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C. C. C. § 152 states that any act which is not in the form prescribed by law is void.
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without having to conform with any formality prescribed by law.
Examples include:

(.

-An offer;
i•

-An acceptance;

-A loan of money for a sum not more than 50 baht, approximately
1 U.S. dollar (§653 paragraph!);

.

I·

I'

-A hire of service (§575);
-A loan for use (§641);

I.

-A loan for consumption (§650 provided that the contract is

I.

'·. ,
',.
r.,

completed upon delivery of the property);

,,,,

-A hire of work (§587);
-A carriage contract (§608);
-A deposit (§657) including deposit of money (672);
-A pledge (§747).

i.
Analysis

.,I

These contracts occur with the meeting of minds of both parties. No form is
required. These transactions may be conducted by oral agreement or may be evidenced

.

1_,

'

in writing or made in written form. Civil and commercial acts are void if they violate any
law pertaining to public order or good morals. The opposite is also true: a civil or
commercial act is not void on account of its differing from any provision of any law if
such law does not relate to public order or good morals. 503 Civil and commercial

503

C.C.C. § 151 says "an act is not void on account of its differing from a provision of any law if
such law does not relate to public order or good morals."
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activities classified in the first group are directly governed by the E-Transactions Act, as
there is no mandatory rule requiring such transactions to be in compliance with a specific
form, to be evidenced in writing or completed through registration.
Examples of electronic transactions governed by the E-Transactions Act include a
hire of movable property, such as a car, bicycle, book, boat, floating house and beasts of
burden, such as an elephant, horse and cow. These may be made electronically transacted
through e-mail, facsimile, E.D.I., and other electronic processes, such as online bidding.
Parties to the contracts may submit electronic evidence so a court may verify that such
I'

transaction indeed has been made.

'

'

j

'
I

2)

'

Civil or commercial activities which the C. C. C. requires evidence in
writing signed by the party against whom the claim is sought or otherwise
the court would refuse to enforce such civil or commercial claims. This

}t ·:

group of activities consists of more significant contracts. These contracts
are valid ifboth parties have a meeting of the minds, but they are
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unenforceable if the party being sued raises the issue of the absence of
written evidence. Examples include:

-An agreement to sell or purchase real property, or a promise to

',,
\

sell such property. This requirement also applies to agreements to
sell or purchase ships or vessels of six tons and over, steam

•

.•

launches, motorboat of five tons and over, floating houses, and
beasts of burden (§456 paragraph 2)504 ;

..
1·.
l'
I

504

I

C. C. C. § 456 paragraph 2.

t
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-A contract of sale of movable property where the agreed price is
500 baht (approximately 10 U.S. dollars) or more is not
enforceable without written evidence signed by the party liable.
Such evidence in writing is not required if earnest money has been
paid, or if there has been partial performance of the contract (§456
paragraph 3)505 ;
-A hire of real property is not enforceable without written evidence
signed by the party liable (§538)506 ;
-A loan of money for a sum exceeding 50 baht (approximately 1
U.S. dollar) in capital (§653 paragraph 1)507 ;

I"
I

I'
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-A contract of suretyship (§680)

508
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-An appointment of agent contract; the law requires the
appointment of an agent to be made in writing if the law requires

,
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written evidence for such transaction for which the agent has been

'

authorized to enter (§798 paragraph 2i09 ;

I·

..,." ....

.I

C.C.C. § 456 paragraph 3.

~·

506

C.C.C. § 538 states that hire of immovable property is not enforceable by action unless there be
some written evidence by the party liable.
If the hire is for more than three years or for life of the letter ofhirer, it is enforceable
only for three years unless it it made in writing and registered by the competent official.
507

C. C. C. § 653 paragraph 1 provides that a loan of money for a sum exceeding fifty baht in
capital is not enforceable by action unless there be some written evidence of the loan signed by the
borrower.
No payment of a loan of money evidenced by writing may be proved unless there be
some writing evidence signed by the lender, or the document evidencing the loan has been
surrendered to the borrower or cancelled.
508

C.C.C. § 680 states that a contract ofsureteyship is not enforceable by action unless there be
some written evidence signed by the surety.

I'•

509

C. C.C. § 798 paragraph 2 states that if the transaction is required to be evidenced by writing,
the appointment of an agent for such transaction must also be evidenced by writing.

I
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-A contract for settlement of dispute; if parties mutually agree to

I·

settle a dispute out of court, a contract of compromise is not
enforceable by action unless evidenced in writing and signed by
the party liable or his or her agent (§851) 510 ;
-A contract of insurance is not enforceable by action unless
evidenced in writing and signed by the party liable or his or her
agent (§867) 511 ;

-An agreement to partition a piece of land is not enforceable unless

,.
.'

evidenced in writing and signed by the parity to be made liable or
his agent (§ 1750)512 ;

-An appointment of attorney; as an exception, theE-Transactions
Act does not apply to the appointment of a lawyer under the Civil
Procedure Code, §61, Civil and Commercial Code does not make a
similar discrimination. The appointment of an attorney must be in
writing signed by the party himself or herself and by the lawyer
and filed with the court to be attached to the case file. 513

r'
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°C.C.C. § 851 states that a contract of compromise is not enforceable by action unless there be
some written evidence signed by the party liable or his agent.

51

m C.C.C. § 867 states that a contract of insurance is not enforceable by action unless there be
some written evidence signed by the party liable or his agent ....
512

C. C. C. § 1750 paragraph 2 states that that if partition is not effected according to the foregoing
paragraph but is made by agreement, such agreement is not enforceable unless there be some
written evidenced signed by the party to be liable or his agent . ...
513

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE § 61 provides that the appointment of a lawyer shall be in writing
signed by the party himself and by the lawyer, and filed with the Court to be attached to the file of
the case ....
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Analysis
The C.C.C. requires that this group of civil and commercial activities be

,.

evidenced in writing and signed by the party liable or his or her agent as a condition for
the enforcement of the contract. This is a similar requirement to the Statute of Frauds in
the United States.

In this regard, electronic means might also suffice for agreements to sell or buy
real property, contracts of sale of movable property where the agreed price is 500 baht
(approximately 10 U.S. dollars) or more, rentals of real property, loans of money for
sums exceeding 50 baht (approximately 1 U.S. dollar), contracts of suretyship51 \
contracts of compromise, insurance contracts, and agreements to partition a piece ofland.
The natures of these contracts are all suited for electronic form, viz., electronic data

I·
11

,.

interchange, e-mail, facsimile, and voice message.
The first legal issue is whether or not the electronic forms for these civil and
commercial activities satisfy the requirements imposed in §8 of the E-Transactions Act.

.. .
1.-~~

§8 provides that "in the case where the law requires that any transaction be made in

I

writing or evidenced by writing or supported by a document which must be produced, if
the information is generated in the form of a data message which is accessible and usable

I
'I·

for subsequent reference without its meaning being altered, it shall be deemed that such

I

,,.

I
514

I
CHUMPHON JANTARATIP, AN EXPLANATION OF SURETYSHIP, MORTGAGE, AND PLEDGE 10 (4th

ed. 1993 ). A contract of suretyship is not subject to the form prescribed by law. A contract of
suretyship may be concluded orally. See also Supreme Court Decision Case No. 109/1935{B.E.
2478) the court to enforce a contract of suretyship, the plaintiff must present the court with
evidence in writing, such as a letter, memorandum, indicating a relationship between the surety
and debtor.
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information is already made in writing, evidenced by writing or supported by the
produced document."

515

Hence, a transaction may be deemed as made in writing or evidenced in writing if
the information in data message form is accessible and usable for subsequent reference
without being altered. The requirement that information is "accessible" means electronic
information must be recorded, kept, stored, or maintained in readable form or
interpretable by computer program.

516

If such data message is securely encrypted,

r

t

decryption means must be provided to all authorized persons to gain access to that data

t:

message in order to read and understand its content. 517

:i. r
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I~ .
\

I.

To meet the requirement of''usable for subsequent reference" such information

..

't'l .

must be retrievable without being subject to alterations by either human or automatic
computer programming. The contents of information must also be stored in a permanent,
readable and intelligible manner.

518
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However, even if such transactions are considered to

have been made in writing under §8, the requirements of signature remain. The

ll•~·
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enforceability of such transactions depends on the signature of the liable party or his or
her agent.
'j

§9 of E-Transactions Act provides that "in the case where a person is to enter a
signature in any writing, it shall be deemed that a data message bears a signature if:

'·
l

SiS

E-TRANSACTIONS ACT§ 8.

s16 See WONGWATANASAN ET AL., supra note 44, at 64.1nformation must be readable and

interpretable by computer software.
Si?
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Na nakorn, supra note 395, at 23.

See WONGWATANASAN ET AL., supra note 44, at 64. Electronic information must be usable
either by human or computer processing. Such information must also be created by using
minimum security standards and stored in readable and intelligible format.
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(1)

A method is used which is capable of identifying the signatory and
indicating that the signatory has approved the information contained in the
data message as being his[ or her] own; and

(2)

·',.

Such method is as reliable as was appropriate for the purpose for which
the data message was generated or sent, regarding to surrounding
circumstances or an agreement between the parties."519

This provision stipulates signature requirements that are completely different
from traditional handwritten signatures. Generally, electronic authentication methods are
aimed at creating trust for both sides of the electronic parties. Electronic signatures
I

'

' •<

T :.
1)

2)

Whether a person who signs an electronic document is the person who he
or she claims to be;

I~·~

Whether a person who signs an electronic document is an authorized

!';., !("
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person;
I

3)

Whether a person signing an electronic document approves of the content;

4)

Whether the document has been altered after it was signed. 521

519

f
I

E-TRANSACTIONS ACT § 9.

520

See E-TRANSACTIONS ACT § 4. Electronic signatures are affixed to data messages in order to
establish the association of a particular person to the signed document for the purpose of
identifying the signatory and indicating the approval of the signatory. See also Chris Reed, What is
a Signature?, The Journal oflnformation, Law and Technology(JILT), 16(0ct. 31, 2000), at
bttp://eli.warwick.ac.uk/iilt/00-3/reed.html. Effective signatures must provide evidence of: the
identity of the signatory; his intention to sign; and his intention to adopt the contents of the
documents as his own.
521

See BAUM & PERRITT, supra note 437, at 339. Both traditional and electronic signatures share
common authentication purposes to enhance a degree of formality and to indicate actual assent to
the terms contained in the signed document. They also serve to identify the signed document with
the signer.
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If the law requires that any transaction be signed as a condition for enforceability,
that requirement is met when the signatory utilizes a method, which could be an
authentication method522 , such as those based on:
(1)

The signatory's knowledge, a password, a PIN, a secret code;

(2)

What the signatory possesses, a smart card, a digital signature; or

(3)

The signatory's characteristics, or biometrics such as fingerprints,
voiceprints, or retina scans.
~

I

Such methods must have attributes that can identify the signatory's identity in a
transaction or the signatory's actual consent or approval of the data message content and

,.

that such consent or approval was not a result of a mistake or system error.

IF

/'·1

The E-Transactions Act also provides that such methods must be reliable and

I'
I

appropriate for the purpose for which the data messages generated and sent.

523

•
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The court

has to determine the reliability of such methods by considering the circumstances
surrounding the contract consummated between the parties. 524 The court may consider

.

~
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the efficiency of the method used to generate an electronic signature, including the
characteristics of the business, dealings of the parties, the types and size of transactions,
efficiency of communication systems, and trade customs.525 For example, if a person

522

KruSANA CHANGKLOM, REsEARCH: DIGITAL SIGNA1URE LAW (DRAFT) 28(1997). See also
BAUM, SECURE ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: BUILDING THE
INFRASTRUC1URE OF DIGITAL SIGNA1URE AND ENCRYPTION 120-121(2000). Authentication
method is a means of gaining confidence that remote people or things are who or what they claim
to be. Examples of other forms of authentication are evidence presenting that the claimant is at
some particular place or network address and confirmation made by other trusted third party who
has already established the claimant's identity.
WARWICK FORD AND MICHAELS.

523

E-TRANSACTIONS ACT § 9(2).

524

/d.

525

WONGWATANASAN ET AL., supra note 44, at 114.
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sends by e-mail an offer to buy real property from anther person, and the prospective

r
I

seller can enforce this agreement against the buyer if he is able to produce a signed
agreement to buy; otherwise such an agreement is unenforceable under §456 paragraph 2.

An e-mail can be deemed as writing if it can later be accessible and later referred to
without being altered.
If the e-mail does not bear any electronic signature, the court will refuse to
enforce this agreement. Even though the e-mail contains a typed name of the buyer, such
simple electronic signature, by itself, cannot provide sufficient evidence of the
signatory's identity. 526 E-mails can be easily interfered with by either impostors or

I
I

t: ·.

.

hackers. 527 Thus, the court needs further evidence to establish a link between the
signature key and the signatory. 528
If the offerer affixes a digital signature to the e-mail, the signatory's identity can
then be verified. It also indicates approval of the transaction and guarantees non-

t '
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repudiation. Because digital signatures are secure and widely accepted, the court will not

~
,..,

..~ ~ .

I~~~

01,. ..

be unwilling to enforce this digitally signed e-mail 529 On the other hand, if the offerer
types his or her name at the end of an electronic message with an intention to be bound,

I

I·.

this e-mail offering may or may not be enforced, but not on the grounds its being in
electronic form, but on the grounds oflack of reliability.
526

Christopher Reed, Legally Binding Electronic Documents: Digital Signatures and
Authentication, 351NT'LLAW 89, 8(2001).
527

Michael Power, Bill C-6: Federal Legislation in the Age of the Internet, 26 MAN. L. J. 235,
244(1999).

528

Reed, supra note 526, at 8.

529

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 143, at 13. The digital signature cannot be forged,
unless the signatory loses control of the private key (a compromise of the private key), such as by
disclosing it or losing the media or device in which it is contained.

I
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Although a person may type his name to identify himself as the signatory and
I,

indicate his approval to be bound to buy real property, the authenticity or real identity of
a signatory, and his real intent is still be unclear. Impersonation remains a possibility
through unauthorized access. It is for this reason that the law of evidence still casts some
degree of doubt on e-mail messages. An e-mail can be viewed as roughly analogous to
an unsigned letter written on letterhead stationery.

530

'

I

The indication of the source of

information is susceptible to misappropriation and unauthorized use. 531 Thus, further
·'

evidence to prove the authenticity is indispensably required.
Some e-mail service providers provide an e-mail system that can automatically
affix the name of the sender at the end of the e-mail. This sometimes happens without
the knowledge of the sender. Absence of an intention to authenticate that message or to
be bound by it would exclude the sender's liability despite the display of his name on the
e-mail.
In submitting to the court evidence of an intent to sign and accept the contents, the
acts of selecting from an on-screen menu or button where -t he signature key is stored on
the signatory's computer can be evidence that the signatory has approved the content and
is willing to sign. 532 This also includes using a PIN or presenting a smart card in which
the signature key is stored before the signature software can affix the signature. 533 Since
a digital signature applies to both the use of special key pairs (a sender uses one privately,

530

JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 225(5th ed.l999).

531

/d.

532

Reed, supra note 526, at 8. Such intent to sign an electronic message must be made without
mistake or accident.
533

Reed, supra note 526, at 8.
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and the other is registered online and used publicly by the recipient) the process of using
this technology indicates real intent for legal commitment.
Caronna v. Sweeney534 is an example to illustrate the serious nature of using this
kind oftechnology. In that case, the plaintiffs eligibility for unemployment was
terminated on the grounds that the plaintiff violated the rules oftelephone registration by
letting his wife use a confidential PIN, which the state accepted as his electronic
signature, to certify his continuing eligibility for unemployment by means of a telephone
call. Although the plaintiff did not appreciate the seriousness of allowing his wife to use
his PIN on his behalf, he lost eligibility for unemployment benefits. This is an example
of how letting someone use your PIN may be considered as forgery despite its
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misleadingly simplicity.
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Another simple electronic signature is the e-mail picture of a signature, called
535

"Signature-mail."

f· ' .
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The Signature-mail is a picture of one's actual signature attached to

an e-mail message. Even though it meets the definition of electronic signature both under

,~ ~ r:'

; r·

.-"
. r:
, ..

uc
~..-

.....

I

the E-Sign Act and the E-Transactions Act, this technique carries the risk of forgery and
unauthorized uses. Such a signature could be attached to the message by anyone who has
access to the computer. It may also be easily manipulated by hackers. 536 Although
considered as an electronic signature, the Signature-mail remains unreliable.
To make e-mail reliable, a sender could sign e-mails by digital signature
technology and attach an identity certificate issued by a trusted third party to establish a
534

Caronna v. Sweeney. 660 N.Y.S. 2d 171(App. Div 1997).

,·

535

See Signature-mail, available at http://www.signature-mail.com/ (last visited Mar. 19,2003).
Signature-mail is a graphic program that stores and processes your handwriting images.

536

Barnaby J. Feder, £-Signing Law Seen as a Boon to £-Business, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 4, 2000, at
Cl.

t.
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reliable link between the digital signature and the signatory.

537

Ifthe trusted third party

verifies the signatory's identity, the signatory is deemed as having never lost control of
the private key used to sign e-mail, which allows the recipient to assume the genuineness
of the signature.

538

In its determination on the reliability of an electronic signature, Thai courts have
to examine the circumstances surrounding the method used by the person against whom
the claim was brought. 539 §26 stipulates that reliable electronic signatures must meet the
following features:

(1)

''The signature creation data are, within the context in which they are used,
linked to the signatory and to no other person;

I•
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(2)

The signature creation data were, at the time of creating the electronic

..f'·r..
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signature, under the control of the signatory and of no other person;
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537

Jane Kaufman Winn, The Emerging Law ofElectronic Commerce, available at
http://www.smu.edu/-jwinn/mbacbapter.htm (last updated on May 12, 2001).
S38
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539

See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT art. 7
(1996). The factors used to determine whether identification method is appropriate and reliable
are as follows:
(1) The high technology for the devices used by each of the parties;
(2) The nature of their commercial activities;
(3) The frequency at which commercial transactions take place between the parties;
(4) The type and size of transactions;
(5) The function of signature requirements in given statutory and regulatory environment;
(6) The capacity of communication systems;
(7) The compliance with authentication procedure set forth by intermediaries;
(8) The range of authentication procedures made by any intermediary;
(9) The compliance with trade customs and practices;
(10) The existence of insurance coverage mechanisms against unauthorized messages;
( 11) The significance and the value of the information contained in the data message;
(12) The availability of alternative methods of identification and the cost of
implementation;
(13) The degree of acceptance or no acceptance of the identification method in the
relevant industry or field;
(14) Any other relevant factor.
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(3)

Any alteration to the electronic signature, made as from the time of its
creation, is detectable; and

(4)

In the case where a purpose of the legal requirement for an electronic
signature is to provide assurance as to the integrity of the information, any
alteration made to that information as from the time of signing is
detectable. "

540

To consider an electronic signature reliable, the court has to consider the
characteristics of the signature creation data. Signature creation data refers to the secret
keys, codes, asymmetric cryptography, and biometrics. 541 The signatory must have
exclusive control over such signature creation data at the time of signing. The court then
has to determine whether or not there were any modification or alteration to the electronic
signature or the signed electronic document. In assisting the court to adjudicate the

I~

I ''

'

I J

reliability of the technology used to create electronic signatures, the court may make due
regard to industry practices, trade usages, as well as technology standards widely
recognized, including but not limited to technology standards subsequently developed by
International Standards Organization (ISO), Internet Engineering Task Force ( IETF). 542
If the court is of opinion that such electronic signature satisfies the reliability
requirements, the court may determine that such electronic signature be considered as
reliable.

540

E-TRANSACTIONS ACT § 26.

541

WONGWATANASAN ET

542

!d. at 118.

AL., supra note 44, at 116.
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The above requirements do not prevent the usage of other authentication methods
that can establish the reliability of an electronic signature. Under §9 (2) the parties are
allowed to agree on any other method that they feel secure and reliable. 543 They also are
allowed to adduce any evidence of the non-reliability of an electronic signature even
though such agreed method for creating an electronic signature meets the security and
reliability requirements under §26 paragraph two. 544
Even though the law provides that the court cannot deny the validity of such
electronic signatures on the ground that it is not a manual signature or is in an electronic
form, the court may refuse to enforce that contract if the court finds that such evidence

,..
I

indicates that the concluded transaction is not reliable. The ability of hackers to penetrate
a computer system or the application of poor hardware, or software to monitor or
maintain security procedure can reduce its credibilicy545 and are factors which the court
might consider in refusing the enforcement of a contract.
There is a legal issue as to whether the E-Transactions Act should be applicable to
extra-judicial settlement of commercial disputes. The law in this area is currently
provided by the Arbitration Act, B.E. 2530 (1987). §6 provides that "an arbitration
agreement shall be binding upon the parties only when there is evidence thereof in

543

E-TRANSACTIONS ACT § 9(2) states that "such method is as reliable as was appropriate for the
purpose for which the data message was generated or sent, regarding to surrounding circumstances
or an agreement between the parties."
544

/d. § 26 paragraph 2 provides that ''the provision of paragraph one does not imply any
limitation that other method exits for establishing the reliability of an electronic signature or does
not limit the adducing of any evidence of the non-reliability of an electronic signature."
545

DAVID I BAINBRIDGE, INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTER LAW
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345(4th ed.2000).
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r.
writing, or there appears an agreement in an exchange ofletters, telegrams, telexes, or
other documents of a similar nature. "

.•

546

Arbitration is a means for the extra-judicial settlement of civil and commercial
disputes. Parties to civil or commercial agreements may mutually agree to submit present
or future civil disputes arising out of their agreement to be heard by arbitrators. 547 An
arbitration agreement is classified in the second group of contracts where the law requires
evidence in writing as a condition for enforceability. 548 The arbitration clause is usually
incorporated in online transaction clauses and shrink-wrap agreements as a way of preselecting a method of dispute settlement. To enforce an arbitration clause, the law
requires some written evidence of an arbitration agreement, which may appear on the
.·.
correspondent letter, telexes, telegrams, or in other documents such as in e-mail,

t

a:

••

i ·~ 1
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facsimile, and E.D.I.

549

·•(

In the United States, an arbitration clause contained in a shrink-wrap agreement
has been held to be valid on the condition that an individual has an actual intent to be

r.!::.

t~

..f~.

~....,

10:.·.

bound by the contract, even though he or she might have not realized of the existence of
an arbitration clause. In Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc. 550, the court held that a clause

I"

.I

'

I

I

546

ARBITRATION ACT § 6.

547

ARBITRATION ACT§ 5 provides that "arbitration agreement means an agreement or arbitration
clause in a contract whereby the parties agree to submit present or future civil disputes to
arbitration, irrespective of whether there being the designation of an arbitrator."
548

SAOWANEE AsAWAROJ, AN EXPLANATION OF AN ARBITRATION ACT 56 (2000). § 6 of the
Arbitration Act (1987) requires evidence in writing in order for the court to enforce the arbitration
agreement. It is, however, not the form prescribed by law as enunciated in § 152 of C. C. C.
Although there is no evidence in writing, the arbitration agreement is not void.
549

!d. § 6 of the Arbitration Act (1987) requires only evidence in writing and it is not necessary to
be signed by the party liable.
550

Brower v. Gateway 2000. Inc., 246 A.D.2d 246, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d(CBC)54(N.Y.App.
Div 1998).
:'
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requiring conswners to submit all disputes to arbitration under the International Chamber
of Commerce procedures was not valid due to the excessive costs it imposes on

'·

i·I,
,,

individual conswners. Since I.C.C. procedure requires conswners to deposit an advance
sum of $4,000 to cover expenses prior to the commencement of an arbitration, where
one-half of the deposited fee is non-refundable regardless of the outcome, the court found
that the arbitration clause created too onerous a burden to the individual and was deemed
to a unconscionable. Hence, the court held that such clause was not enforceable.
In the application of theE-Transactions Act to an arbitration clause, the Thai
court may be willing to enforce an arbitration clause despite its electronic form. An
exchange of e-mails which makes references to an arbitration clause may be considered
as having satisfied the requirements for evidence in writing. Thus, arbitration agreements

r·
I
I.
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/
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.I
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are within the scope of applicability of the E-Transactions Act.

l'i.....'
.c:

3)

C.C.C § 152 requires some civil and commercial activities to comply with

·"·
I
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. "i.•

either one of two forms prescribed by law or otherwise considered as

l.::

void. 551 This third group is further divided into the following sub-groups:

I

I

.-I

3.1

The law requires some acts to be in writing and registered by the

.

'I

competent official.
3.1a

This rule applies to a sale of real property, ships, or vessels of six
tons and over, steam launches or motor boats of five tons and over,
floating houses and beasts of burden (§456 paragraph 1). 552

551

C.C. C. § 152 says an act which is not in the form prescribed by law is void.

'I ,,

552

C.C.C. § 456 paragraph 1 says a sale of immovable property is void unless it is made in writing
and registered by the competent official.

1.1
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3.1 b

An exchange of such foresaid property must also be made in

writing and registered by a competent official, and the same
requirements apply to a gift of such property (§525). 553
3.1c

A contract of mortgage must be made in writing and registered by
the competent official (§714). 554

3.1d

Acquisition, by juristic act of real property or of real right
appertaining thereto, is not complete unless the juristic act is made
in writing and the acquisition is registered by the competent
official (§1299). 555

3.1e

The same rule in 3.1d applies mutatis mutandis to modification,
extinction and revival of real right appertaining to real property
and to ships, or vessels of six tons and over, steam launches or
motor boats of five tons and over, floating houses and beasts of
burden (§1301 and 1302). 556

3.2

The law requires some acts to be made in writing, but not to be
registered.

553

c.c.c. § 525.

554

c.c.c. § 714.

555

C.C.C. § 1299. Even though acquisition by juristic act of immovable property is not complete
unless the juristic act is made in writing and is registered by the competent official, such
acquisition can be used against the party who has lost the right in the immovable property but such
acquisition may not be set up against a third party who acts in good faith and obtains such
immovable property by consideration.
556

C.C. C. § 1302,1302.
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3.2a

The assignment of an obligation under the law on obligations is not
valid, unless it is made in writing (§306). 557

3.2b

A hire-purchase contract is void unless made in writing (§572). 558

3.2c

If a right represented by a written instrument is transferred to

r.

another person under a gift contract, the gift is not valid unless
such instrument is delivered to the donee and notification is given
to the drawee under such instrument (§524). 559
3.2d

The parties to a loan of money may agree that the interest due for
not less than one year shall be compounded to capital, but such
agreement must be made in writing (§655). 560

3.2e

r

1 ~.'·l',

I'·
..

The notification for foreclosure of a mortgage must be in writing
(§728).561

3.2f

The appointment of an agent for a transaction by law required to be
made in writing must be made in writing (§798). 562

3.2g

Bills of exchange, promissory notes, and checks must be made in

.. .
l'tf

;.. ·

I...P,..?'..
I .·..

writing (§908, 982, 987). 563

I''

I'

557

C § 30 6 .
c.c..

558

c.c.c. § 572.

559

C.C.C. § 524.

560

c.c.c. § 655.

561

c.c.c. § 728.

,.I

562

c. c. c. § 798.

I'
,.

,,.
I

I

I

563

c.c.c. § 908,982,987.

I
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3.2h

The transfer of shares is void unless it is made in writing and
signed by the transferor and the transferee(§ 1129).564

3.2i

A will must be made in the following form, that is to say, it must
be made in writing, dated at the time of the making of the will and
signed by the testator in the presence of at least two witnesses who
shall then and thereat sign their names certifying the signature of
the testator. 565

.

j·l

.'

II,

Analysis
The most significant legal concern is whether civil and commercial activities
under the third group should be governed by the E-Transactions Act. This group mainly
consists of civil and commercial acts relating to acquisitions, exchanges, and dispositions
of real properties. The law prescribes formal requirements due to the importance and
value of these acts. If the parties fail to comply with the legal formalities, their concluded

loQr

transactions are null and void. 566
It is not appropriate for these activities to be covered by the E-Transactions Act

'I
"

because the main purpose of the registration system is to make records of transactions

I

publicly available. Allowing transactions classified in the sub group 3.1 to be made
electronically and without being registered with the competent authority prevents any
third party from acquiring knowledge on the legal status of the real properties as to

564

c.c.c. § 1129.

565

c.c.c. § 1656.

566

C.C.C. § 152 says "An act which is not in the form prescribed by law is void."
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whether they are subject to mortgages, servitudes, or other real rights. The formality of
writing and registration protects a third party from fraudulent misrepresentations may
have disposed of his interests in the property to a third party. Even though the real
property has been sold to other parties without registering the transfer of ownership, the
prior selling may not be set up against the third party who has acted in good faith and
acquired the ownership of the real property in exchange for value.567 The registration
system thus provides protection to any interested person by permitting him or her to
inspect the public records concerning the status of the real property, including the name
of the previous owners or other obligations appertaining thereto.
§457 provides that ''the costs of a contract of sale are borne by both parties
equally."568 The law requires that both parties pay the transfer fee in equal proportions
when the transfer is made and registered by the competent officer, subject to agreements
to the contrary. It is inevitable that a system of online transfer of real property without a
registration process will greatly diminish transfer fees collections by the govemment. 569
Therefore, the E-Transactions Act should not apply to transactions where formal
requirements of writing and registration by a competent official are imposed by law. 570
Those transactions include: (1) the sale of real property; ships or vessels of six tons and

r
I.

over; steam launches or motor boats of five tons and over; floating houses and beasts of
burden; (2) a gift and an exchange of such foresaid property; (3) a contract of mortgage;
(4) acquisition by juristic act of real property or of real right, including modification,
567

C.C.C. § 1299 paragraph two.

568

c.c.c. § 457.

li

I'

569

Memorandum of Principle and Reasons Pertaining to the Electronic Transactions Bill2 (Nov.
5, 2000).
570

I.

!d.
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extinction and revival of real right appertaining to real property, including ships or
vessels of six tons and over, steam launches or motor boats of five tons and over, floating
houses and beasts of burden.
Another question is whether or not the civil and commercial activities required by
law to be made in writing but without the need for registration should be governed by the
E-Transactions Act. The tendency is to support such an application. For instance, in a

I.

I

loan transaction (§655), the agreement by which the parties to a loan of money agree that
the interest due for not less than one year shall be compounded to the capital may be
made electronically. The loan transaction is allowed to be made through a computerized
message. An agreement to calculate interests may also be made through electronic means.
There are, however, some other transactions classified in the third group which falls
outside the scope of the £-Transactions Act. The details will be discussed in 3.3.5
Specific Exception

3.3.5 Specific Exceptions
'I

A. lJnitedStates

l

The E-Sign Act governs not all commercial transactions. The law considers that
some transactions are extremely important and should be made in the traditional way, that
is to say, in writing. Some transactions, by nature, should not be conducted electronically
in order to maintain formality in terms of form and evidentiary value. Restricted
transactions are classified into five classes: wills; matters of family law; legal proceeding;
notices; and documents accompanying hazardous materials.

176

§ 103 of the E-Sign Act excludes the application of the Act to the creation and
execution of wills, codicils, or testamentary trusts
of family law.

572

571

,

adoption, divorce, or other matters

TheE-Sign Act carves out contracts or other records to the extent that

l'
I

they are governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, other than Sections 1-107 and 1206 and Article 2 and 2A.

573

Court orders or notices, or official court documents, including briefs, pleadings,
and other writings required to be executed in connection with court proceedings

574

are

..'·

...
•

excluded from the scope of the applicability of theE-Sign Act. To protect consumers
from abuse oftechnologies, theE-Sign Act provides that any notice of the cancellation or
termination of utility services, including water, heat, and power575 is not governed by the
E-Sign Act, which means such notice cannot be made or sent or announced electronically.
For example, power suppliers cannot bind their customers to a term which states that if a
customer defaults on the payment of electricity bill, a notice of termination of power
would be sent through e-mail. The E-Sign Act stipulates a specific exemption where a
customer cannot receive or have access to that information.

..
•',

571

E-Sign § 103(a)(1). SeeRAYMONDT. NIMMER, THELAWOFCOMPUI'ER TECHNOLOGY:
RIGHTS, LICENSES, LIABILITIES, 2001 CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT N0.1 14.29 (3d ed.2001).
§ 103 specifies certain situations in which Congress concluded that the principle as enunciated in
§ 101(a) and (b) should not apply.
572

E-Sign § 103(a)(2).

573

See Jennifer C. Debrow and H. Allen Blair, Electronic Contracting & Record-Keeping,
available at hty>://www2.mnbar.org/benchandbar/2000/nov00/lawyer at large 11-00.htm (Nov.
2000). E-Sign Act does not apply to certain sections of the Uniform Commercial Code, which are
revised separately to address electronic procedures.
574

E-Sign § 103(b)( 1).

575

E-Sign § 103(b)(2)(A).

177

l.

I··

I
The E-Sign Act also does not apply to any notice of default, acceleration,
repossession, foreclosure, or eviction, or a rental agreement for the primary residence of
an individual. 576 Other exceptions regarding consumer protection policy are the
cancellation or termination of health insurance or benefits or life insurance benefits
(excluding annuities) 577 , recall of a product, or material failure of a product that risks
endangering health or safety. 578
Finally, The E-Sign Act does not apply to any document required to accompany
any transportation or handling of hazardous materials, pesticides, or other toxic or
dangerous materials. 579 The Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Assistant
Secretary for Communications and Information, is empowered to evaluate and review the
operation of the exceptions580 , over the period of three years, whether such exceptions
continue to be necessary for the protection of the consumer or not. 581
After notice and an opportunity for public comments, if a Federal regulatory agent
is of the opinion that one or more such exemptions are no longer necessary for the
protection of consumers and eliminating such exceptions will not increase the material

576

E-Sign § 103(b)(2)(B).

577

E-Sign § 103(b)(2)(C).

578

E-Sign § 103(b)(2)(D).

579

E-Sign § 103(b)(3).

580

E-Sign provides for ongoing review by the Commerce Department to lay down further
exceptions. See JANEK. WINN & BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE §
5.04(4th ed. 2001).
581

E-Sign § 103(c)(l).

178

I.

·"

~

r.

risk ofharrn to consumers, such agency may extend the application of §101 to the
exceptions identified in this finding. 582

B. Thailand
The E-Transactions Act does not clearly stipulate any specific exception as does
the E-Sign Act, but a Royal Decree may prescribe a list of transactions exempted from
the entire or partial application of this Act. A Royal Decree may list exempted
transactions by citing their characteristics, degrees of importance, and whether they are to
be made in electronic form. This consideration includes a mandatory form as prescribed
by applicable law for the protection of consumers, and judicial tradition.
Whenever mandatory rules govern transactions in which written form and
registration are essential, such transactions are exempt from the E-Transactions Act. The
C. C. C. considers certain civil and commercial acts exceptionally important so as to
require the parties to make a written agreement signed by both parties. Both parties are
bound because the written agreement bears both of their signatures. These types of
transactions may be subject to determinations regarding the applicability of theETransactions Act.
Although some civil and commercial transactions may be reduced to electronic
form, others may be inappropriate for electronic means, such as an agency contract under
§797 of the Civil and Commercial Code. §797 provides that "agency is a contract
whereby a person, called the agent, has authority to act for another person, called the

582

E-Sign § 103(c)(2).
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principal, and agrees so to act. Agency may be express or implied."

583

The appointment

of an agent is deemed as an important act since the agent has the authority to act on
behalf of another person, called the principal. The principal would then be responsible
for their agent.

In an agency agreement, the possibility of fraud is magnified if the technology
used to create an electronic document and signature is not sufficiently secure. 584 To
'

I

prevent any modification, unauthorized signing, or fraud, such acts should be made by
way of traditional paper-based documents in order to protect the principals and third
parties from any loss through abuse oftechnology. Thus, the Royal Decree excludes an

.;;

..

:.J.',

f.:
agency agreement from the scope of application ofthe E-Transactions Act.
Exempted transactions include those where rights and interests of third parties are
involved. For example, if the law requires notification to be given to a third party in
writing, such requirement is established in order to protect the interests of the third
parties involved. If such transactions are within the scope of theE-Transactions Act, a
third party who does not have an access to electronic information will risk not being
informed of any such notification.
Transactions related to the rights and interests of a third party include:
-The assignment of an obligation performable to a specific creditor (§306);
-The assignment of a right represented by a written instrument by way of a
gift contract is not valid, unless such instrument is delivered to the donee,

.,'

and the gift is notified in writing to the debtor of such right (§524).

583

C.C.C. § 797.

I'

584

See Memorandum of the Principle and Reasons Pertaining to the Electronic Transactions Bill,
supra note 569, at 2.
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The next legal issue is whether the E-Transactions Act covers "hire-purchase

I

contracts". A hire-purchase is a contract whereby a property owner lets out the property
with a promise to sell such property to, or that it shall become the property of, the hirer,
on the condition that certain number of payments have been made. 585 A hire-purchase
contract is void unless made in writing (§572 paragraph 2). A hire purchase contract
must always be in writing and signed by both the owner and the hirer regardless of
~·

whether the property in question is a movable or real property.

I'

The purpose of a hire-purchase contract is to transfer ownership from the owner
(

to the hirer on the condition that the hirer makes a certain number of payments. The

f.·
.

t;

difference between a hire-purchase contract and a sale contract is that in the former the

ii

~-:.

1-

-\.1

owner still maintains the right of ownership and can bring suit against any illegal

4.
.....
,,p ;

rJ~,

possession. The hirer has the option to terminate a hire-purchase agreement at any

t-' ~

IJ

I

time. 586 The owner may terminate the contract, forfeit all previous payments, and resume

~~

possession of the property in the event of default on two successive payments. 587

....
.....

~~:.
[f;·.
~

..J •

11.~

Although the E-Transactions Act is aimed at replacing traditional paper-based

1. '

transactions with data messages, special contracts such as hire-purchase contracts are
exempted. Hire-purchase contracts are not suitable for the application of theETransactions Act, due to their particular characteristics, and the need for the protection of
both parties.

585

C.C.C. § 572 paragraph 1.

586

C. C. C. § 573 states that the hirer may at any time terminate the contract by returning the
property at his own expenses to the owner.
587

C. C. C. § 574 states that the owner may also terminate the contract in case of default of two
successive payments, or breach of any material part of the contract; in which case all previous
payments are forfeited to the owner who is entitled to resume possession of the property ....
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Bills of exchange, promissory notes, and checks are financial instruments and by
law required to be made in writing. §900 paragraph 2 of the C. C. C. expressly excludes
the effectiveness of any mark, such as a cross or a fmgerprint, from purporting to be a
signature on a bill. Even if certified by witnesses, such marks remain ineffective. 588 This
is a special provision which pre-empts §9 of the C.C.C., which permits a person to affix a
cross or a fingerprint instead of making a physical signature in the presence of two
certifying witnesses.
Under §900 ofC.C.C., a cross or a thumbprint, or even a rubber stamp has no
specific legal effect. The E-Transactions Act does not cover bills of exchange,
promissory notes or checks because these financial instruments are governed by the more
specific provisions of the C.C.C. 589 The C.C.C. also specifically excludes other kinds of

..rc,
li

signatures other than a traditional handwritten signature.
A will is a declaration of an intention to dispose of or deal with one's property in
one way or another after death. §1656 of the C.C.C. states that "a will must be made in
writing, dated at the time of the making of the will and signed by the testator before at
least two witnesses present at the same time and there sign their names certifying the
signature of the testator."590 This first form of will is called an "ordinary will." If the
testator fails to comply with these legal requirements, such as he forgets to physically

588

C.C.C. § 900 paragraph 2 provides that a mere mark, such as a cross or a fmger-print
purporting to be a signature on a bill, even if certified by witnesses, produces no specific effect
under the bill.

(

589

See Singapore Electronic Transactions Act (1998) § 4 stipulates that negotiable instruments are
being exempted from the applicability of the Act.
59

t'
I

°C.C.C. § 1656.
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sign his name or has only one witness, the resulting will is rendered as void for noncompliance with the form prescribed by law.

591

A will may also be holographic592 , that is, one where the whole text has been
handwritten by the testator, as well as dated and signed by him.

593

Fraud would be

dramatically eased if the law allowed this kind of will to be made electronically, such as

in the form of e-mails, as there would be no way proving the testator's handwriting or
signature. A potential fraudster could prepare a will in someone else's name, and when
such supposed 'testator' dies, contend that the e-mail serves as a will of the deceased in
order to acquire benefits from the forged will. Clearly, the E-Transactions Act should not
apply to wills.

594

591

See PRIEP HUTANGKUL, AN EXPLANATION OF LAW OF SUCCESSION 164-165 (7th ed. 2000). The
C.C.C. requires a witness to afftx his handwritten signature to the will and does not allow the
witness to use a cross or seal. There is only one exception as enunciated in C.C.C. § 1663 that
allows a person to make an oral will when he is under exceptional circumstances such as imminent
danger of death, or during an epidemic or war. He must declare his intention regarding the
disposition of the will before at least two witnesses present at the same time. The witnesses must
without delay notify the Kromakam Amphoe. The kromakam Amphoe shall note down the
statement of the witnesses and two witnesses shall sign the statement or may make an equivalent
to signature by afftxing a fmgerprint certified by the signatures of two witnesses. This provision
permits the witnesses to affix his fingerprint to the will.
592

AMPORN NATAKOUTONG, LAW OF SUCCESSION 170(1999). The advantage of a holographic
will is that it is difficult to forge because of the uniqueness of the testator's handwritten style.

,.

593

C. C. C. § 1657. See also AMPORN NATAKOUTONG, LAW OF SUCCESSION 170( 1999). If there is
some texts where are not written by the testator's handwriting, such texts are void. The law does
not provide that the testator has to write his will in Thai. Thus, a will that is written in foreign
language, such as in English, is valid.

r

594

See WONGWATANASAN ET AL., supra note 44, at 15. See also E-Sign § 103. See also
Singapore Electronic Transactions Act 1998 § 4 provides that (1) Parts II and IV shall not apply to
any rule oflaw requiring writing or signatures in any of the following matters:
a. the creation or execution of a will;
b. negotiable instrwnents
c. the creation, performance or enforcement of an indenture, declaration of trust or power of
attorney with the exception of constructive and resulting trusts;
d. any contract for the sale or other disposition of immovable property, or any interest in such
property;
e. the conveyance of immovable property or the transfer of any interest in immovable property;
f. documents of title. See also Hong Kong Electronic Transaction Ordinance 2000, SCHEDULE 1
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Not only should the civil and commercial transactions which fall within the third
group where related to sales, exchanges, gifts of real property, or the creation and
execution of wills be excluded from application of theE-Transactions Act, but civil acts
affecting those rights pertaining to personal status or family rights should also be
excluded from the scope ofthe E-Transactions Act. Certain examples of such excluded
acts may be cited as follows:

§1457 provides that marriage under this code shall take effect only upon
registration being made. 595 The same principle applies to adoption. 596 Even though a man
and a woman may have given consent to take each other as husband and wife by an
exchange of e-mails, such e-mails may not be used as evidence of marriage since the law
prescribes a specific formality to which both the man and woman have to conform. 597
The law does not otherwise recognize the marriage.
In the case of a divorce, the law provides that such acts be effective when there is
mutual consent made in writing and certified by the signatures of at least two witnesses

[ss. 3 & 50] provides that matters excluded from Application of Sections 5, 6, 7, 8 and 17 of this
Ordinance under Section 3 of this Ordinance are:
1. The creation, execution, variation, revocation, revival or rectification of a will, codicil or any
other testamentary document.
2. The creation, execution, variation or revocation of a trust (other than resulting, implied or
constructive trusts).
3. The creation, execution, variation or revocation of a power of attorney.
4. The making, execution or making and execution of any instrument which is required to be
stamped or endorsed under the Stamp Duty Ordinance (Cap. 117) other than a contract note to
which an agreement under section SA of that Ordinance relates.
5. Government conditions of grant and Government leases.
595

c.c.c. § 1457.

596

C.C.C. § 1598/27 says adoption is valid only upon registration being effected according to
law ....
597

See E-Sign § 103.
~·
I
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(§1514). 598 Although letters of consent maybe made through e-mail, or facsimile, the law
requires at least two witnesses to certify the authenticity of the letter of consent as a
measure to prevent fraud. Thus, the law does not allow a divorce to be made solely by
electronic means. 599
The same is true of pre-nuptial agreements(§ 1466). The law states that such
agreements are void if not entered in the Marriage Register at the time of marriage, along
with a statement that the pre-nuptial agreement has been thereto annexed. 600 They are
also void if not made in writing and signed by both spouses and by at least two witnesses.
The law allows either or both spouse to choose to make the pre-nuptial agreement by
either stating the terms in the Marriage Register or by making an agreement in writing

,,

~;
r:.
J

signed by at least two witnesses and entered in the marriage registration. This mandatory
form cannot be reduced into an electronic form since it is necessary enter the registration

~

process and have the written agreement readily available to the public so as to avoid any
dispute regarding rights to manage property.
As far as the rules for the protection of consumers are concemed601 , the ETransactions Act follows the principle of consumer protection in the same way that the El

Sign Act does by excluding any notice of the cancellation or termination of utility
services, water, heat, power, telephone, Internet and cable from the scope of
598

C. C. C. § 1514 states that a divorce may be effect only by mutual consent or by judgment of the
court. Divorce effected by mutual consent must be made in writing and certified by the signatures
of at least two witnesses.
599

See E-Sign § 103.

600

c.c.c. § 1466.

601

lAIN RAMSAY, COMSUMER PROTECTION : TEXT AND MATERIALS 41 ( 1989). Obtaining accurate
and perfect information is a fundamental rationale for consumer-protection measures. Consumers
should be informed about termination of their basic utility services by traditional means of
communication based on paper-based form.
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application. 602 Mortgage foreclosure notifications, which the law requires a written form
pursuant to §728603 , also cannot be made electronically. Other notices, including a notice
of default, acceleration, repossession, eviction, enforcement ofpledge (§764)

60

and the

\

cancellation of insurance policies, including auto, fire, boat, life and health insurance, are
outside the scope of the E-Transactions Act.

3.4 Digital Signatures as Evidence in Litigation
i

Thailand is a civil law country which incorporates its law of evidence into the
Civil Procedure Code as in the other major civil law countries such as France and
Germany. 605 Formal practices under Indian civilization, not codified rules oflaw, were a

!' ..
~

1,_•.

f

1.
•'

major influence in the initial stages of the development of Thai laws of evidence where

...~·\;

the King or his representatives had full power to decide a case. 606 It was not until the

['.:

~-

Ayuthaya era that the first codified law of evidence, the Law of Evidence B.E.1894
(1351), was enacted, which remained in effect until the end of the Ayuthaya era.

607

The Law ofEvidence B.E.1894 (1351) was incori>orated into the Law of
Samduong in the early stage of the Ratanagosin era. It remained in effect and governed
legal proceedings for a period of around 500 years, only to be eventually repealed in B.E.
602

See E-Sign § 103.

603

C. C. C. § 728 states that for the enforcement of a mortgage the mortgagee must notify the
debtor in writing to perform his obligation within a reasonable time to be fixed in the notice ....
604

C.C.C. § 764 says on enforcement of the pledge the pledgee must first notify the debtor in
writing to perform the obligation ....
605

Pomphet Wichitchonlachai, Admissibility ofElectronic Evidence: Problems and Suggestions,
85, 86(1995}.

DULHAPARP
606

607

PORNPHET WICHITCHONLACHAI, LAW OF EVIDENCE

7( 1999).
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2437(1884) when the capital city ofthe Kingdom ofThailand was moved from Ayuthaya
to Bangkok. 608 The reason for this change was that Sadet Nai Krom Louang Ratchaburi
Diregrit decided that the Law of Evidence B.E. 1884 was obsolete and needed to be
revised. 609 He initiated a reform of the justice system and adopted rules under common
law610 , which were incorporated into the Evidence Act Ror. Sor.113 B.E. 2437 (1894). 611
Subsequently, a traditional procedure, Jareednakornbarn, which was a cruel
method of interrogating suspects by means oftorture and physical pain was abolished. 612
The Evidence Act Ror. Sor. 113 B.E. 2437(1894) was a milestone which marked a
change from the traditional means oflegal hearing into internationally accepted standards

..
'·i

The current law of evidence is stated in the Civil Procedure Code. The rules of
hearsay provided in the Civil Procedure Code were much influenced by common law
rules of hearsay owing to the fact that the first judges had previously received legal
trainings in England. Thai courts thus adopted certain common law rules, particularly the
English rules on hearsay. 614 Exclusionary rules of hearsay, such as dying declarations,
were directly adopted and applied the determination of cases, especially in criminal trials.
According to the Supreme Court Decision No.l612/1994 (B.E.2537), statements made by

608

/d.

609

Memorial to Mr. Chern Kosin, Law of Evidence 8(1986).

610

/d.

611

/d. at 7.

613

614

PRAMOOL SUWANNASORN, LAW OF EVIDENCE
WICHITCHORNLACHAl,

f:..
,.

for legal proceedings. 613

612

I·

supra note 606, at 7.
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dying persons did not provide sufficient evidence in court if the dying persons did not
anticipate their death at the time of speaking to the witness in describing the defendant
who attacked them.
Although the E-Transactions Act recognizes most forms of electronic signatures,
this does not imply that court will necessarily offer them equal evidentiary value. To
ensure that the courts give full legal effect to signatures created online, more
sophisticated methods are required. 615
To create trust in a digital environment, both online users and merchants need to
apply technology with some minimum-security features when conducting online
activities. If an electronic signature does not possess these minimum features then it will
not enjoy the joint trust of commerce and the judiciary. 616
The technology used to create electronic signatures must ensure that online
transactions can be completed accurately and are free from any interference. It must also
ensure that identities of parties involved can be accurately verified, that confidentiality is
properly maintained and that transactions cannot be revoked. Digital signature
technology is just one kind of electronic signature, but it works very effectively and
satisfies the requirements of trust in commercial activities conducted on the Internet.
For simple electronic signatures, courts would be hesitant in giving evidentiary
weight to an electronically signed contract if it is not commensurate with the standards of

615

CHISSICK & KELMAN,

supra note 455, at 89.

616

Adrian Mccullagh et al., Electronic Signatures: Understanding the Past to Develop the Future,
UNSW LAW JOURNAL, 1 (Dec. 14, 2000), available at
http://www.law.unsw.edu.au/unswlj/ecommerce/mccullagh.html.
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reliability provided by standardized forms and procedures.

617

i·
While at the same time, the

court may give more evidentiary weight to a more secure electronic signature, such as a

I

digital signature because of its security attributes. To assess the evidentiary value of a

[.

digital signatUJ:e, the court examines the possibilities of fraud and the possibility that
documents other than those alleged to have been signed could have produced the same
numeric identifier. 618 The court may also examine the possibility of deciphering the
encryption algorithm which could have allowed a genuine set of digital signature data
from one document to be linked to a numerical identifier from another source. 619

3.4.1 One Hypothetical Case
The following case may happen when an online merchant receives an online
purchase order digitally signed by the signatory, which the signatory subsequently refuses
to pay for such an order. The most important issue arising from this online purchase
order is whether or not a signature on the particular online transaction was actually
affixed by the authorized user with his or her private key. 620 In order to determine

617

ROSE, supra note 40, at 80. Courts have been willing to enforce contracts made by electronic
devices, such as telegraph, telecopy, and fax machine if there is evidence demonstrating that
signatures were authentic. Absolute certainty is not necessary, but it provides evidence that it is
very unlikely that the signature is false. In addition, the trading partners in Electronic Data
Interchange (EDD may agree that all electronic deals made according to those procedures will be
valid.
618

Chris Reed, What is a Signature?, The Journal oflnformation, Law and Technology (JILT),
16(0ct. 31, 2000), at bttp://elj.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/00-3/reed.html.

619

ld. at 16.

620

The Hon Mr. Justice Jacob & His Honor Judge Overend, Digital Signature Guidelines, Judicial
Studies Board (JSB), 10 (July, 2000).
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whether there has been unauthorized access to the private key, the court has to consider
evidence of the creation, maintenance and use of the private key. 621

I.

Another issue arising from the use of digital signatures is whether there has been
any subsequent alteration of the content of the electronic document digitally signed by a
buyer. Disputes may arise as to the figures in an electronic order for goods, the amount
of money the merchants are authorized to charge, the place of delivery and other material
information. 622 Whenever digital signatures are verified, all parties will want to assume
that there has not been any alteration of that digitally signed document. 623 If there is any
evidence indicating that something has gone wrong with a digital signature or its delivery

.,

and maintenance, then it is necessary not only to prove how the digital signature was
created and kept, but also to examine the verification technology. 624
There are three elements that an online merchant, as plaintiff, must prove in order

.. .
;;;,,_
f
I

to establish a claim against a repudiating online contract signatory. First, that such
transaction was digitally signed by the use of the signatory's private key. Second, that
the online contract was intended by the signatory for signature and that there was no
alteration after the digital signature was affixed. Finally, that such technology had been
reliable and secure.
62t

Id.

622

Id.

623

!d. at 18. The judge may be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that there has been no
modification of the digitally signed message if the digital signature verification process is
satisfactory. See also WARWICK FORD AND MICHAELS. BAUM, SECURE ELECTRONIC COMMERCE:
BUILDING THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF DIGITAL SIGNATURE AND ENCRYPTION 112 (2000). Upon
obtaining the digitally signed message, the online merchant may recalculate the digest and verify
the digital signature by the use of the customer's public key, then compare these two values. If
they are identical, it is assured that the digitally signed message was not altered during
transmission.
624

!d.
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The signatory, as a defendant, may raise a number of possible defenses against
such claims, such as that he or she did not sign that transaction, the transaction was a
mistake or he or she was tricked into signing an electronic document as a result of a
misrepresentation. 625 The defendant may also assert that a hacker may have broken into
the signatory's private key and dishonestly used it to digitally sign the document in the
pretence of being the authorized user. A hacker may also have found ways of interfering
with the electronic document before it was actually signed by the legal signatory. 626

3.4.2 Burden of Proof
A. lJnitedStates
lJ.S. Evidence Law states the principle of burden of proof as "a party has the
burden of proof as to each fact the existence or non-existence ofwhich is essential to the
claim for relief or defense that he is asserting."627 The term burden of proof refers to two
separate and distinctive concepts. The distinction was clearly pointed out by James
Bradley Thayer in 1898. 628
The first concept is defined into four different terms

~

the duty of producing

evidence, the burden of going forward with the evidence, or simply the production
burden or the burden of evidence. 629 The party who bears the burden of production is
obligated to adduce evidence to satisfy the court or the trier of fact whether such fact
625

/d.

626

/d.

627

CAL. EVID. CODE

628

JON R. WALTZ & ROGERS C. PARK, EVIDENCE: CASES AND MATERIALS

629

/d.

§ 500.
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737(9th ed. 1999).

I"

I

exists. The plaintiffbears the obligation to come forward with evidence. Otherwise the
court will decide the issue against the plaintiff as a matter of law, the jury will not be
allowed to deliberate on such issues of facts. 630

,

I.

1

The second concept is expressed in three different terms as the "risk of nonpersuasion," the burden of persuasion, or simply as the persuasive burden. 631 If the
plaintiff has a burden of persuasion on an issue and at the close of evidence the jury
cannot decide whether the facts asserted by the plaintiff exists on the basis of a
preponderance of evidence, that jury must find against the plaintiff on that issue. 632 In a
civil trial, the level of certainty is based on "preponderance of evidence," but in a

1.,.
I

•

r;'

criminal trial the prosecution bears the burden of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" that
the defendant committed every element of the criminal offence.

In a civil trial, the plaintiffbears both the burden of persuasion and burden of
production. The plaintiff will lose the case if he fails to persuade the jury that the facts
exist. The burden of production may shift during the trial. If the signatory confirms that

';f;

".I',
"t.;'

he in fact did sign that digital signature but raises a defence that it was a mistake, the
burden of production will shift to the signatory, and he has an obligation to prove the
mistake he asserts. 633 Thus, in order for the court to grant him relief, the online merchant

630

631

632

EMANUEL LAW OUTLINES: EVIDENCE
WALTZ &

99(2000).

PARK, supra note 628, at 737.

EMANUEL LAW OUTLINES: EVIDENCE,

supra note 630, at 99.

633

See lllinois Electronic Commerce Act§ 10-120 (3) (1998) provides that (c) the effect of
presumptions provided in this Section is to place on the party challenging the integrity of a
secure electronic record or challenging the genuineness of a secure electronic signature both the
burden of going forward with evidence to rebut the presumption and the burden of persuading
the trier of fact that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence. In
Illinois, if the defendant denies and challenges the integrity of his digitally signed message, he
bears the burden of proof.
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I

(the plaintiff) has the burden of proving according to the facts that the buyer did digitally
sign the transaction with intent to be bound

B. Thailand
Under the Civil Procedure Code of Thailand, §84 provides that ''where a party
alleges any fact in support of his complaint or answer, the burden of proof of such fact
lies on the party alleging it."634 The burden of proof under the Civil Procedure Code
means that the party has the duty, prescribed by law, of proving the facts he claims. §172
of the Civil Procedure Code provides that "the complaint shall clearly set forth the nature

t··

II

....,,

of the plaintiff's claim and of the relief applied for, as well as the allegations on which
such claims are based."635 The plaintiff has to state what the grounds for his claim are,
including other necessary facts related to the cause of action. It is the court's duty to

.....

q.

'-!\''

vu

apply the proper substantive law to the case. Where the plaintiff sues a defendant for

t';!l.

r·r

breach of duty, the plaintiff has to state the duty based on the specific law, and prove that
the defendant did fail to perform his duty.
The plaintiff has to show that the signatory made the qnline purchase order and
signed the order with his private key. The complaint must indicate that the signatory
refused to pay for his order. The plaintiff must also raise the applicability of theETransactions Act which imposes a duty of care on the signatory, and that the signatory's
failure to exercise such reasonable care caused damage to the plaintiff. The plaintiffs
burden ofproof(also known as the "legal burden") is imposed by law in the Civil and

634
635

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE

§ 84.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE

§ 172.
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Commercial Code, §456 paragraph 3636 and the Electronic Transactions Act §27 637
according to the nature of the claim.
The duty of adducing evidence is usually placed on the plaintiff. Failure to meet
this duty would result in a judgment made· against him. In Supreme Court Judgment No.

899/1954(B.E. 2497), the court noted that in a civil case the court has to weigh and
compare the credibility of all evidence proffered by the parties. Even if the court is not
completely satisfied with the plaintiff's evidence, the court may rule in favor of the
plaintiff if the defendant offers evidence of less evidentiary value. In compliance with

i·

the Supreme Court Judgment No. 244/1954(B.E.2497), the court ruled that the burden of
proving the accuracy of a loan agreement was on the plaintiff where the defendant denied
the accuracy of the amount of money loaned to him.
I

·-.

"

In Supreme Court Judgment No.3059-3060/1973(B.E 2516), the Supreme Court
held that the plaintiff was by law required to adduce evidence. In this case, the trial court
had ordered the defendant to bear the burden of proof. The Supreme Court stated that
even though the defendant did not object to such order, the trial court could not rule in
favor of the plaintiff. In order to try and adjudicate the case, the court had to be satisfied
that the plaintiff had performed his burden of proof as prescribed by law. As the plaintiff
failed to meet such a burden of proof, he lost the case.
A plaintiff (the online merchant) has to identify the technology used by the
signatory to create the electronic signature. This is necessary in order to prove that such

I
636

C.C.C. § 456 paragraph 3 states that a contract of sale of movable property where the agreed
price is five hundred baht or upwards is not enforceable unless there be some written evidence
signed by the liable party or unless earnest is given, or there is part performance.

,,

1

637

E-TRANSACTIONS ACT § 27 states that each signatory shall exercise reasonable care to avoid
unauthorized use of his signature creation data.

,.
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transaction bears a signature of the buyer and can be enforced against him. Even though
digital signature technology is deemed as highly secure and reliable638 , it will not get
judicial notice. "Judicial notice" is the term used to describe facts known to the court

i'

without the need for adducing any evidence, such as natural events or the location of
I·

provinces in Thailand. 639

'·

These also include what may be considered as common knowledge such as the
I'

meaning of Thai words. The law, such as the Constitution, the Civil and Commercial
Code, the E-Transactions Act and Royal Decrees are judicial notice which the parties
have no burden of proving. However, a party who claims such technology, which does
not fall within the scope of "judicial notice", has to adduce evidence regarding the
characteristics of the technology and its reliability to the satisfaction ofthe court.

§ 177 of the Civil Procedure Code paragraph 2 provides that when the signatory
answers the plaintiffs allegations, ''the defendant shall clearly set forth in his answer
whether he [or she] admits or denies the whole or part of the plaintiffs allegation and his
[or her] reasons for such denial."640 The law requires the defendant to clearly state in his
or her answer whether he or she admits to the allegation. If an allegation is denied, the
defendant must state reasons supporting the denial. If the defendant admits to having
affixed the digital signature, but raises the defence of mistake or deception, the defendant

638

See WONGWATANASAN ET AL., supra note 44, at 104-105. Digital signatures based on public
key system provide authentication, non-repudiation, integrity, and confidentiality.
639

64

SOPHON RATANAKORN, LAW OF EVIDENCE

101(1993).

°CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE§ 177.
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has the onus of proving such facts in his or her defence statement. 641 In order for the
defendant to succeed, he or she has to prove that his or her evidence is more credible.
I·

A problem may arise as to which party bears the burden of proof if the defendant

I
I

denies the complaint without any reason. Moreover, the defendant may also deny the
I

affixation of any digital signature on the online purchasing order, assert that the private
key was used without authorization, or claim that the digital signature was a forgery. A

I

I

t.

hacker may have broken into the computer, stolen the private key, and digitally signed
the online order. The defence that a hacker may have broken in and stolen a private key
allows the defendant to claim that he or she took reasonable care in protecting the private
key, but it was beyond his or her control to prevent a hacker from breaking in to the
computer system. In such a case, the plaintiff still bears the burden of proving that the
defendant signed the online order with his or her private key which was in his or her
exclusive control.

642

...,..

On the other hand, the burden of proving the theft or breach of

access lies with the defendant.

3.4.3 Relevancy
A. United States
Only relevant evidence is admissible at trial. Rule 401 of the Federal Ru1e of

r·

Evidence defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to be the determination of the action more

641

SUPIT PRANEETPOLKANG, LAW OF EVIDENCE: PROBLEM AND PRECEDENTS

3(1995).

642

See Supreme Court Decision Case No. 609/1987 (B.E. 2530). The Supreme Court ruled that
although the defendant denied the complaint without any reason, the plaintiff had to adduce
evidence to support his claim in order for the court to rule in his favor.
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probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. " 643 Rule 402 then
provides "that all relevant evidence is admissible ... Evidence which is not relevant is

{.

not admissible."644

'

'

In United States, Federal courts allow relevant evidence into trial when it
indicates facts as more or less probable. Courts are vested with full discretion to exclude

If .

evidence in certain situations. Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 403 says "although

t

relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by

I
'

the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by

[.

considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
·1•. .

evidence. " 645
As relevant evidence rules in the United States and Thailand are based on the
same principles, the next section jointly analyzes their application.

B. Thailand
Under the Civil Procedure Code of Thailand, §88 also provides the same principle
for the admissibility of evidence, i.e. ''no evidence shall be admissible, unless it relates to
facts to be proven by any party to the case. " 646 Both the plaintiff and defendant must
present the court with relevant evidence in order to support or defend their claims.
Irrelevant evidence is subject to inadmissibility in Thailand as in the United States, and
the exclusionary rules in both countries give full power to the court to determine the
643

644

645

646

FED. R.

EVID. 401.

FED.

R. EVID. 402.

FED.

R. EVID. 403.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE

§ 88.
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admissibility of evidence. Thai courts, like those in the United States may also hold that
any evidence which is "superfluous, dilatory or irrelevant is inadmissible."647 The
relevancy of any evidence is tested by the process of legal reasoning. 648 This is true in

,·

both the United States and Thailand. If such evidence possesses sufficient probative value,
I

it can be entered as evidence. 649

a:

r.

In online commerce, where transactions are made electronically, they are usually

1:

I',.

stored in electronic form by advanced technology. The following four examples of
evidence possess probative value: 1) evidence that a certain technology for online
transactions is working properly and effectively; 2) evidence that such technology can

t..

authenticate both the identity of the signatory, visually or physically and the integrity and

t.
~·

authenticity of the online transactions650 ; 3) evidence of habitual behaviour, such as
regular purchases of certain products by the signatory, for which the signatory had never
denied responsibility; 4) and evidence of the signatory's reasonable care in the
maintenance of security in his or her private key.
If there was an eyewitness of the signatory's signing of the electronic document,
such eyewitness's testimony is considered as relevant. Immediately after the affixation

,·

of a digital signature on a document, the attester may use the signer's public key to verify
647

CML PROCEDURE CODE § 86.

648

FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 2000-200lEDmON 29(2000).

649

ld. See also JON R. WALTZ & ROGERS C. PARK, EVIDENCE: CASES AND MATER.IALS 71 (9th ed.
1999). The judge will determine whether particular items or group of items of evidence are
admissible. See also STEVENL. MANDELL, COMPUTERS, DATA PROCESSING, ANDTHELAW, TEXT
AND CASES 232(1984). It is necessary to show that the online shopper assumed a contractual
obligation to buy the product and digitally signed that transaction and has denied obligation.
650

VERGARI & SHUE, supra not 407, at 332. Computer evidence that processes probative value or
credibility should demonstrate: (a) the integrity of the original data; (b) the integrity of the
computer equipment; (c) the security protecting the data processing system; and the integrity of
the output.

I

I
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the same electronic document and its signature.

651

To formally indicate a witness of

!'
!

signing, the attester can simply apply his private key to sign such digitally signed
document.

652

The software for affixing the signature to the document must indicate the

second signer as an attester, not a primary signatory. 653 An attester's testimony should
then be submitted into the trial as a firsthand witness who had a direct and actual

..
I•

knowledge of the signing process.

I

,.
I

3.4.4 Evidence in Writing

I

A. United States
If an online merchant files a lawsuit against an online buyer to enforce a sale of
goods contract, the online merchant must prove that such transaction has in actual fact
taken place. If the transaction by law required written evidence signed by the party
against whom enforcement is sought, the online merchant has to present some written
evidence in order to make his claim enforceable. In the United States, the Uniform
Commercial Code§ 2-201, generally known as the Statute ofFrauds, provides that "a
contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is.not enforceable by way of
action or defence unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale
has been made between the parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement is
sought or by his authorized agent or his broker."654

651

Mccullagh et al., supra note 616, at 9.

652

/d.

!
1f

653

/d.

654

u.c.c. § 2-201(1997).
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I

I
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The Statute of Frauds governs only contracts for the sale of goods and not

r

I

licensing or servicing contract If the price of goods is $500 or more, the contract is only
enforceable if evidenced in writing, such as in a memorandum, e-mail or exchange of
letters, which provides sufficient proof of the existence of a sales contract

655

The writing

must bear the signature of the party or his authorized agent or broker against whom the
claim is sought Thus, the plaintiff must present the court with some written evidence of
such digitally signed order if the agreed price is $500 or more in order to satisfy the

.
t

~

I

Statute of Frauds.

B. Thailand
Under the Civil and Commercial Code of Thailand, §456 Paragraph 3 provides
that "a contract of sale of movable property where the agreed price is 500 baht
(approximately 10 U.S. dollars) or more, is not enforceable unless there is written
evidence signed by the party liable or unless earnest money has been given, or there has
been part performance". 656 This rule works in the same way as the Statute of Frauds by
preventing a party from making an oral representation by either claiming the existence of
a contract or a clause agreed upon by the other party. The purpose of requiring some
written evidence is to provide the court with concrete evidence. 657 Where the agreed

655

See BAUM & PERRITI, supra note 43 7, at 682. Writing are generally required to ensure the
existence, validity of transactions opposable by third parties, and for protective legislation, such as
consumer protection laws.
656

C. C. C. § 456 paragraph 3.

651

Evidence in writing requirement can be satisfied if an electronic record is accessible and usable
for subsequent reference without its content being altered. See E-TRANSACTIONS ACT § 8
provides that "subject to the provisions of section 9, in the case where the law requires that any
transaction be made in writing or evidenced by writing or supported by a document which must be
produced, if the information is generated in the form of a data message which is accessible and
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order is 500 baht (approximately 10 U.S. dollars) or more, the plaintiff must introduce
some written evidence indicating such digitally signed order so the court may vouch that
such transaction indeed has been made. 658
The plaintiff in both places may additionally introduce digital certificates
certifying the identity of a signatory. A digital certificate, as it may amount to a
representation659, is used to identify a public key with a particular signatory verified by a
third trusted entity. Any party, such as the online merchant or relying party, is entitled to
rely on such digital certificate. If the certification authority confirms that the signatory's

I

I

•' .

[J

private key matches his registered public key, the court may find that a prima facie case
against the signatory has been established.

.

' r

F· J
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3.4.5 Best Evidence Rule

"'"

A. United States
The Best Evidence Rule applies to written evidence regarding digitally signed
transactions and digital certificates as a means for the court to decide on admitting them
into evidence. The purpose of the best evidence rule is to present the court with the best
I

'.

usable for subsequent reference without its meaning being altered, it shall be deemed that such
information is already made in writing, evidenced by writing or supported by the produced
document."
658

The plaintiff may present the court with a computer printout or electronic record that
demonstrates the electronic orders. See CHAIWAT WONGWATANASAN ET AL., EXPLANATION OF
TilE ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT, B.E. 2544 63-64(2002). See also RAYMOND T. NIMMER,
THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY: RIGHTS, LICENSES, LIABILITIES 14-16 (3d ed.200 1).
Subject toE-Sign§ 101(d), the court may validate such printout only if the electronic information
maintained by the merchant is in a form of being retained and accurately reproduced for later
reference by all parties or person who are entitled to retain the contract or other record.
659

Jacob & Ovemd, supra note 620, at 10.
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available evidence. 660 In the United States the Best Evidence Rule is enacted in the
Federal Rule ofEvidence, Rule 1002. It provides that "to prove the content of a writing,
recoding, or photograph, the original writing, recording, or photograph is required, except
as otherwise provided in these rules or by Act of Congress."661 This rule requires the
party to present the court with the original piece of evidence in proving the terms or
contents of the asserted claim.

662

The Common Law requires that original documents, as primary evidence, be
presented to the court. Admissibility of a photocopy of original is very limited. 663 The
court will not admit a duplicate or a copy or testimony testifying to the existence of the
terms or the content so long as there is an original. If the original of such document is
deemed to be unavailable and this was not the fault of the asserting party664 , the court
may accept a copy of such original document. 665
The Best Evidence Rule generally applies to the contents of writing or
recording. 666 It may apply to information affixed on electronic media other than paper, on
the condition that the information is of the essence. 667 A traditional term in writing is

660

MICHAEL D. ROSTOKER & ROBERT H. RINE, COMPUTER JURISPRUDENCE: LEGAL RESPONSES
TO THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION 351(1986).

661

I

'·

FED. R. EVID. 1002.

662

See BAUM & PERRITT, supra note 437, at 351. The Best Evidence Rule minimizes the
opportunity of deliberate and inadvertent fabrication.

663

DIANE ROWLAND ET. AL., INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY LAW 392-393(1997).

664

WINN & WRIGHT, supra note 462, at 20-30.

665

FED. R. EVID. 1003 states that a duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original unless
(1) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original or(2) in the circumstances it
would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original.
666

WINN & WRIGHT, supra note 462, at 20-31.

667

Id.

!.
I
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defined under Rule 1000 as ''writings and records consist of letters, words, numbers, or

l

j'

their equivalent, set down by handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostatting,
photographing, magnetic impulse, mechanic or electronic recording, or other form of data
compilation."668 The term "original of a writing and record" means the writing or record
itself or any counterpart intended to have the same effect by a person executing or issuing
't 669

1.

The Best Evidence Rule examines that the content of writing in fact indicates
f .

what the party claims. 670 Such writing may be a contract, a title deed, or a bill of lading.

In the case where multiple documents were issued at the same time, the intent of the party

I

..
4

involved is the important factor in the determination of their originality. If the parties

~·· .

involved intended every document to be an original, the court will admit all such
documents as originals pursuant to the parties' intention.
Modem communications enable more and more people to exchange information
in electronic form. In a telegraph, the piece of paper on which the sender wrote the
message and was handed to the telegraph operator is considered to be the original671 • In
Anheuser-Busch Brewing Company v. Hutmacher 672, the court decided that the
telegraphic document received by the plaintiff was the original. In Western Union

668

FED. R. EVID. 1000.

669

FED. R. EVID. 1001(3).

670

WINN & WRIGHT, supra note 462, at 20-31.

671

/d.

672

Anheuser-Busch Brewing Company v. Hutmacher, 21 N.E. 626,628(Ill.1889).
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Telegraph Company v. Hopkini 73 the court held that a paper handed to the operator was

I.

1

the original because it was the document which instructed the company to perform the
service.
On a case-by-case basis the court may consider as originals both the written

message handed to the operator and the telegraphic message sent to the recipient. If the
sender argues that the operator failed to deliver the correct message, the court may deem
the piece of paper written by the sender as the original. On the other hand, if the receiver
proves that the received message contained the correct contents, the court may deem the
piece of paper handed by telegraph carrier to the recipient as original.

.
.. .·... .

,.....

The same concept of an original also applies to a conventional fax or telex
because there is evidence on paper at both ends of the communication. 674 The court in
New Y ork675 ruled that the fax was an accurate reproduction for the purposes of the best
evidence rule because the facsimile was reproduced by the use of photocopy technology
widely reputed as being capable of accurate reproduction. 676
For computerized records, Rule 1001(3) states that ~'if data are stored in a
computer or similar device, any printout or other output readable by sight, shown to
reflect the data accurately, is an original."677 This rule recognizes that computer records,
or printouts, or any readable output can be originals if they indicate accurate information.
A printout of an E.D.I. invoice, for example, may be an original on the condition that it
673

Western Union Telegraph ComPanv v. Hopkins, 49 Ind. 223,227(1874).

674

WINN & WRIGHT, supra note 462, at 20-39.

675

People v. May, 557 N.Y.S. 2d 203 (App. Div.)(1990)

676

WINN & WRIGHT, supra note 462, at 20-39.

677

FED.

R. EVID. 1001(3).
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indicates a coded E.D.I. data accurately.

678

The court must consider the accuracy of the

printout since there may potential be alterations or modifications.
An original document in paper form may not have been made in an online
environment. Electronic messages are temporary, dynamic, and changeable. 679 The
dispute over an electronic message will be on the contents of the message, not its form.
Thus, the Best Evidence Rule should not exclude any of the recordings made of the
message if such recordings reflect accurate contents.
The E-Sign Act creates significant and fundamental principles for the accuracy
and admissibility of an electronic original in order to satisfy the Best Evidence Rule.

§101 (d)( 1)(3) of E-Sign Act states that "if a statute, regulation, or other rule of law
requires a contract or other record relating to a transaction in or affecting interstate or
foreign commerce to be provided, available, or retained in its original form, that statute,
regulation, or rule oflaw is satisfied by an electronic record that complies with the
requirements as followings:
Accurately reflects the information set forth in the contract or other

(a)

record; and
(b)

Remains accessible to all persons who are entitled to access by statute,
regulation, rule of law, in a form that is capable ofbeing accurately

678

WINN & WRIGHT, supra note 462, 20-35.

679

!d. at 20-37. See also STEVEN L. MANDELL, COMPUTERS, DATA PROCESSING, AND THE LAW,
233(1984). It is necessary that transaction data be identifiable as a single logical
computer record, separable from other similar data.
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reproduced for later reference, whether by transmission, printing, or
otherwise. " 680
The E-Sign Act governs only electronic records relating to commercial
transactions. The E-Sign Act does not govern the records that are not directly relevant to
commercial transactions, such as personnel or corporate records. 681
A digitally signed transaction, digital signature, and digital certificate, by nature,
all have something in c~mmon. That is to say, they are information generated, sent,

t'
I

I

received, stored, or processed by electronic means. Digitally signed transactions may be

I

kept electronically in the online merchant's website database. A digital certificate is a

r,..:l

data message stored or kept in an online database maintained by a certification authority.
In order to verify such digital certificates, the relying party has to go to an online

directory website and look up that certificate. The relying party may print the certificate

••
! ~·

t,:. .
b
..,·
:'I.,

~~··

fro'
· ,~

....
....
~~

~

and keep it as evidence.

~

To satisfy the requirements of an original under the E-Sign Act, such digitally

:t
~

. .!.
~'
!iii ' '

signed transactions or digital certificates must accurately reflect the information
contained therein. Anyone entitled by law shall have access to the signed transactions or

I•

digital certificates in accurately reproduced forms for subsequent reference or otherwise
I

those digitally signed contracts and digital certificates will not meet the requirements

i.

under the E-Sign Act, and the court may refuse to accept them as evidence.

•'
r
680

E-SignAct § 101(d)(1)(3).

681

WINN & WRIGHT,

supra note 462, at 20-31.
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B. Thailand
The Best Evidence Rule, stated in §93 of the Civil Procedure Code of Thailand,
provides that "original documents only shall be admissible as evidence. " 682 Parties are
required to produce an original document to the Thai courts as in the United States
Federal courts. Where it is impossible to produce such document, the court may allow the
use of a copy or oral evidence.

683

Any document written by hand is an original. 684 Parties entering into a contract
may make two or more copies of a contract at the same time. In this case, both parties
must sign each of the paper contracts, and each document would be deemed an original.
The Thai Supreme Court ruled in the Supreme Court Decision No. 532/1966(B.E.2509)

l'

'·

that a photocopy of a document was not an original and inadmissible. In Supreme Court
Decision No. 2453/1980 (B.E.2523), the court held that a copy of a document proffered
by the plaintiff but attacked by the defendant for authenticity was inadmissible as an
original under § 93 of the Civil Procedure Code.
Electronic communications are by nature made without paper evidence, and it is
impossible to provide the court with an original document of a concluded contract or
evidence of an online transaction. Computer generated evidence is defined as any form of
evidence generated by a machine capable of accepting information, of applying
programmed electronic data processing techniques to it and to other related information

682

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE§ 93.

683

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE § 93 (2) provides that "where an original document is missing, owing
to loss or destruction by force majeure or it is otherwise to produce it, the Court may allow the
production of a copy or oral evidence."
684

See RATANAKORN, supra note 639, at 323.
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and of supplying the results ofthis process. 685 The parties involved may thus present
electronic evidence to the court in the form of printouts, videotapes, or oral evidence by
witnesses who had previously read their contents from a computer printout or an
electronic display device connected to a computer.

686

§93(2) of the Civil Procedure Code provides an exception to the original
.:

requirement by stating that "if an original is impossible to produce, the court may allow
the production of a copy or oral evidence."687 The court may allow use of a duplicate if
the original is unavailable. If the information stored in a computer system is reproducible,

...,

such. reproduction may be admissible. Computerized records may be obtained by printing

u

,.

\.~
~

1:_ ·

out the data electronically stored in a database. The printouts are considered to be the best

!;

"'

['

evidence available.

;'>

688

.t

I·...~

There is no direct precedent relating to this issue, but the Thai Supreme Court
consistently ruled in 884-885/1984(B.E.2527), 5859/1987(B.E.2530), and

..
~·

.,.~~,,,"'

..

~.

3418/199l(B.E.2534) that if there are reasonable grounds indicating that an original is not
obtainable either because it is in the possession of a third party or cannot reasonably be

685

~

~
I'

VERGARI & SHUE, supra note 407, at 313.

'·

686

!d. See also PITIKUL JERAMONGKOLPANICH, LAW OF EVIDENCE: DOCUMENT 16(2001).
Information recorded in a diskette or CD-rom or hard drive or EDI (Electronic Data Interchange)
can be adduced as evidence.
687

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE § 93(2).

,.

688

GUIDE TO COMPUTER LAW 27,3001(Christine A. Grafet al. eds.,2001). See the Supreme Court
Decision Case No.5963/1996 (B.E. 2539). The court ruled that a method of sending a document
by facsimile is an advanced technology, which the sender must insert an original into the machine
in order to send it to the recipient. The machine transmits a digital photocopy of the document to
the recipient's facsimile machine. It is concluded that the document insert into a machine is the
original and the printout that the recipient received is a copy. See also Saowapang Piyarat,
Information Technology: Evidence in Civil Proceeding, 41(1999)(unpublished LL.M. thesis,
Thammasat University)( on file with the Thammasat University Library).
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brought to the court, sufficient grounds exist for the court to admit a copy of that
document as evidence. Thus, where it may be impossible for the party to present the
court with an original document that reflects the concluded online activities, the party
may bring a copy of that transaction, or even a printout of the electronic receipt shown on
the computer screen to persuade the court that such transaction exists.
TheE-Transactions Act, B.E. 2544 (2001) established a new rule for electronic

..

evidence. §10 of the E-Transactions Act stipulates that "in the case where the law
requires that any information be presented or retained in its original form as an original

:(.
H

i·

I•

document, if the presentation or retention is made in the form of a data message in
accordance with the following rules, it shall be deemed as a presentation or retention of

.•

t

,.,.
;;

.

the original document under the law:
(1)

A reliable method is used to assure the authenticity of the information
contained in the message as from when it was generated in its final form;
and

(2)

...

btt

11 ::

~ .I
~
If.

rJ

'8

=-·

The information is capable of being subsequently displayed.

The consideration of the integrity of the information un~er (1) shall be made with
regard to its completeness and absence of alteration, apart from any additional

.•

..

endorsement or recordation or any change that may arise in the normal course of
communication, storage or display of the information, which does not affect the integrity
of that information;

r·

'

r.
t

I

t
,t
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In determining the reliability of the method used for assuring the integrity of the
information under (1), regard shall be had to all the relevant circumstances, including the
689

purposes for which the information was generated. "'

To persuade the court that the defendant did sign the online order with his digital
signature, the plaintiff must adduce either a digitally signed transaction or its printout to
the court. Because such evidence is in electronic form, §10 of Electronic Transactions
Act applies. The plaintiff must prove that such digitally signed transactions are reliable
and retrievable. The court will rely on the evidence provided that the method used for
assuring the integrity of the transaction from the time it was concluded is reliable. 690 The
f'. •

plaintiff must show that the digitally signed transaction is capable of being subsequently

c
r

."
~
(I

displayed.

J

'"~·
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3.4.6 Authentication
A. lJnitedStates
The Federal Rule of Evidence provides the following authentication requirements:
Rule 901 provides that "the requirement of authentication or
identification as a condition to admissibility is satisfied by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its
proponent claims."691

689

E-TRANSACTIONS ACT§

10.

690

See WONGWATANASAN ET AL., supra note 44, at 118. To adjudicate the issue regarding
creation of an electronic signature, the court has to regard the reliability of the method or
technology from the time the electronic signature was created.
691

FED.

R. EVID. 901.

210

Rule 901(b)(4) The authentication of evidence may come from its
"appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns or other distinctive
characteristics taken in conjunction with circumstances."

692

Rule 901(b)(9) "Evidence describing a process or system used to
produce a result and showing that the process or system produces an
accurate result." 693
A handwritten signature affixed to a paper document does not by itself
authenticate the document as coming from any particular person. There must be evidence
that shows identification of handwriting, such as the testimony of a person who saw the
·,;

signer affixed his or her signature69\ or testimony of someone familiar with the
handwriting, either by seeing him or her writing or by exchanging correspondence with

:: . 1

~

'.;

him or her. 695

~

••

t

The proponent may also adduce evidence to show a distinction between a fake
signature and an authentic signature. An expert document examiner may present the court

II

fj '

p
r.

(
c

with a testimony which scientifically analyses a signature either by an examination of the
paper and ink or the signer's stroke on the signed document. 696

692

FED. R. EVID. 90l(b}(4).

693

FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(9).

694

FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 2000-2001EDmON, supra note 648, at 197.

695

ld.

'·

696

See BAUM & PERRITT, supra note 437, at 345. The process of comparing a signature affixed to
one document with another is to establish a link between evidence and the person, place, or thing
to which it purportedly relates and to authenticate the signature whether it is authentic as claimed
by the signatory.
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Authentication of traditional paper document can be determined by appearance,
content, substance or other distinctive characteristics as stated under rule 901(b)(4). 697
To authenticate a document by its content, a particular fact contained in a document
known exclusively to the signatory may be used to authenticate that the message came
from that person. 698 In United States v Eisenberg699, the court ruled that a paper-based
letter can be authenticated by the location it was found, the address and return address on
an accompanying envelope and the letter's content. 700 In United States v Grande 701 the
court held that authentication of a paper invoice may be made through testimony. The

..

court ruled that testimony, showing that such paper invoice was in customary form and
was paid by the party, satisfies the authentication requirements.
In the digital environment, computers are not flawless machines because they may

sometimes malfunction. Software systems frequently crash due to viruses. These defects

n"" ..

create some doubts as to their reliability to the parties involved, especially for a court to
consider relying on such computerized evidence.
Electronic information has some particular technological characteristics different
from traditional paper-based evidence. First, electronic information may be merged with

..
'

691

The purported signature appeared on the face of the writing will not be accepted as sufficient
preliminary proof of authenticity to secure the admission of the writing in evidence. See JON R.
WALTZ & ROGERS C. PARK, EVIDENCE: CASES AND MA.TERIALS 674(9th ed. 1999).
698

WINN & WRIGHT, supra note 462, at 20-11. See also MARGARET A. EMMELHANINZ, EDI: A
TOTAL MANAGEMENT GUIDE 171 (2d ed. 1993). To authenticate the content, the party must prove
origin and integrity.

699

United States v Eisenberg, 807 F.2d 1446(8th Cir.1986).

700

WINN & WRIGHT, supra note 462, at 20-11.

701

United States v Grande, 620 F.2d 1026,1035(4th Cir.1980).
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other electronic information if not controlled by an arrangement system.

702

This could

combine electronic transactions such as purchasing orders with other information in a
database. 703 Second, electronic information can be stored or retrieved without leaving any
trace of the person or the mechanism that recorded it. 704 Thus it is possible for anyone to
manipulate705 such information. It is also difficult to prove that electronic information is
what it purports to be. 706 Finally, electronic information is dynamic and may be instantly
changed, moved, or destroyed without leaving a trace. 707 Because of these particular

I

['

characteristics, traditional forensic approaches may not be appropriate for detecting

I

forgeries in electronic information. Thus, to ensure that the electronic information is
trustworthy, there is a need for the ability to detect whether or not the electronic
information has been intercepted or altered.
To establish the admissibility of electronic information, the proponent must prove
the identity of the person who sent the electronic communication. There must be proof of

,..

..

!!

;

l

p .•l

the contents of the transaction asserted to have taken place between the parties during the
contract formation process. This includes evidence that the sender has given approval for

~ I

~· :~

•

the contents of such transaction. 708

702

BAUM & PERRITT, supra note 437, at 342.

703

!d. See also STEVEN L. MANDELL, COMPUTERS, DATA PROCESSING, AND THE LAW, TEXT AND
CASES 233(1984). For this reason, each transaction's data must be identifiable as a separate
computer record.
704

/d. at 343.

705

Christine Sgarlata Chung and David J Byer, Evidentiary Obstacles to Discovery and Admission
of Electronic Evidence, 4 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 5, 6(1998).
706

BAUM & PERRITT, supra note 437, at 343.

707

/d. at 344.

708

Reed, supra note 526, at 2.

·.

213

~.

:::]

The proponent must convince the court that there is no possibility of either
intentional or inadvertent alteration of the content of the electronic record of the
transactions. 709 To prove such integrity, a testimony on procedures used to screen
messages, or a testimony on the technical reliability of the systern

710

may be introduced to

the court. A chain of custody of electronic records that are under control of a third party
who has no prejudicial interest in them

711

may convince the court to vouch that such

electronic records are authentic.

,,
(>

Subject to the Federal Rule of Evidence, both the online transaction and digital
certificate must be authenticated by proper methods. Authentication of an online
transaction is essential in order to establish a link between the transaction and the

~·

,.
~

originator.

-.~·

712

•i.

Authentication by contents may be used to authenticate an electronic mail (email) where such e-mail correctly refers to private facts known by the sender. The court
in United States v Weinstein

713

ruled that the fact that the defendant replied to a prior

~.
t.;

.••, ..
10

i •

~

$

!

n .....d
~

·-

communication from the defendant. 714 In this case, the defendant denied ownership of the
reply message. As the plaintiffs prior telex message was specifically addressed to the

BAUM & PERRITI, supra note 437, at 344.

710

MARGARET A. EMMELHANINZ, EDI: A TOTAL MANAGEMENT GUIDE 171(2d ed. 1993).

711

/d.

712

Authentication methods, such as passwords, biometric technologies, electronic and digital
signatures, may be used to establish a link between the transaction and the person who concluded
it and to verify the authenticity of online transactions.
713

United States v Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522(11th Cir.1985).

714

WINN & WRIGHT, supra note 462, at 20-11.

,.,
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telex addressed to him is sufficient evidence indicating that the telex in question was a

709

..

214
,·...fC

'l

lr

I

defendant who replied in a telex message back to the plaintiff, the court was convinced
that the reply message was originated from the defendant.
Electronic messages may also be authenticated by means of a competent expert
identifying that a function of that process or system produced an accurate result as stated
under the Rule 901(9). 715 The computer system producing electronic records may not
need to be demonstrated, but evidence indicating the chain of custody of the electronic
records made on a computer tape is essential to prove that authenticity and integrity have
been maintained. The accuracy of computerized records may not be trusted if the
computer program or the equipment malfunctions, or errors occurred because of the data
entry.716

In United Sates v. Jones 717, the court held that a computerized record may qualify

~
l

.

l: "':
~

.

~

under the authentication requirement where a witness identifies the record as authentic

., .. .,,_

and specifies that it was made and preserved in the regular course ofbusiness. 718

~

.:

•

j

In United States v. Moor/ 19, the court held that a business that issued and relied

I ·•

I I
, ,ili

on computer records in the ordinary course of operations was entitled to the evidentiary
presumption that the records were trustworthy. The court also stated in United States v.

Poindexter720 that e-mail records produced by the system are presumed accurate since

715

See MICHAEL C. GEMIGNANI, COMPUTER LAW 515(1985). An expert witness can attest to the
sufficiency and efficiency of the data processing procedures when and where the evidence was
generated.
716

Chung & Byer, supra note 705, at 8.

717

United Sates v. Jones, 554 F.2d 251,251(5th Cir. 1977).

718

WINN & WRIGHT, supra note 462, at 20-14.

719

United States v. Moore, 923 F.2d 910(1st Cir. 1991).

720

WINN & WRIGHT, supra note 462, at 20-16. United States v. Poindexter (Crim. No. 88-00801)(D.D.C. 1990).
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people used the system daily for important communication.

721

As falsification and

intentional tampering with electronic communication become a potential critical
problem,722 courts are willing to assume that a record of electronic communication
indicates a certain transaction occurred723 only if the basis for authenticity is satisfied. It
can be concluded that authentication of electronic records can be established by a witness
testifying that (1) the procedure used to create and preserve the records is reliable, and (2)
a chain of custody of computerized records is maintained.724
A transaction between a Swiss corporation and a Dutch client provides a classic
case concerning authentication methods by secret codes or test keys. The Swiss
corporation sold equipment to the Dutch client in the belief that a large Dutch bank
guaranteed payment to a Swiss bank by telex. The Dutch bank, however, declined to
make the payment and denied having issued the telex. 725 At trial, an expert witness
testified that it was possible for one telex user to masquerade as another if there were no
special security measures.726 Thus, the telex in question was insecure because neither a

I

secret code nor test key was used.

..

'

I

In this case, an expert witness stated that banking custom required test keys to
make telexes secure and binding. The Dutch Bank adduced further evidence that the bank
1

I'

complied with standard practice for issuing a telex with test keys. The court ruled that as
721

!d. at 20-16.

722

ROYN. FREED, COMPUTER AND LAW: A REFERENCE WORK 55(5th ed. 1976).

723

MANDELL,

supra note 406, at 242.

724

WINN & WRIGHT, supra

725

!d. at 20-9.

726

/d. at 20-13.

note 462, at 20-13,20-14.
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the telex in question bore no test key, the Dutch bank was not responsible for the telex
since it was a fake. 727 In this case, the court did not rule against the Dutch bank as the
Swiss bank failed to require test keys for telex authentication and relied on the fake telex.
The result of the case might have been different if the Swiss bank had relied on a secured
telex.

In Standard Bank London Ltd v. The Bank of Tokyo Ltd (1996) the court ruled
against the party who was responsible for the safekeeping of secret keys. The banks
involved authenticated money transfers by telexes with a secret code, i.e., by validated
telexes. 728 Three validated telexes from the Bank ofTokyo were forged, each valued at
several million dollars. The court held that a recipient was entitled to count on a validated

{.·
.
~·

telex unless he or she was notified or unless there was reason to believe that dishonesty

i :·'
,I

was involved. 729

~

The court in this case thus ruled that a party who possesses the codes or keys must

..t

t

'

; I

r i·..•.
I

;J

l,,li,l

exercise reasonable care to protect them. The court will place significant burdens on a

I

party who fails to protect the codes or keys because such party is in the best position to
protect them. 730

727 ld.
728

CHISSICK & KELMAN,

729

!d.

supra note 455, at 90.

730

!d. The party who is obligated to guard the key may be held accountable if he is in beach of
duty of care. See also E-Transactions Act § 27 provides "in the case where signature creation data
can be used to create a signature that has legal effect, each signatory shall:
(1) Exercise reasonable care to avoid unauthorized use ofhis signature creation data;
(2) Without delay, notify any person that may reasonably be expected to act on the basis
of the electronic signature or to provide services in support of the electronic signature when:
(a) the signatory knows or should have known that the signature creation data
has been lost, damaged, compromised, unduly disclosed or known in a manner inconsistent with
their purpose

217
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Requirements for transaction authenticity are satisfied by the use of a digital

....
I

signature731 because it ensures the identity of a signatory and authenticity of a digitally
signed transaction. A digital signature works as a seal attached to an electronic
transaction. A signatory can sign and seal a concluded transaction by applying a private
key and a recipient can use the signatory's public key to read the signatory's personal
seal. 732 The recipient would know of any change made after the seal was affixed to the
transaction because the application of the signatory's public key will produce a different
hash result from the one attached to the transaction. This is how the recipient can check
the authenticity of the signed transaction with the use of the signatory's public key.

I

~

'

~

I'

Courts may find that a digitally signed transaction is authentic, provided that the use of a
public key produces the same hash result as the one attached to the signed transaction.

I
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B. Thailand

I
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In Thailand, the procedural rules for trial are based on the accusatorial
approach733 in which the court has a duty to establish material truths on the basis of
available evidence. 734 Computer records can be presented as evidence, but their weight as

,,,
(b) the signatory knows from the circumstances that there occurs a substantial
risk that the signature creation data may have been been lost, damaged, compromised, unduly
disclosed or known in a manner inconsistent with their purpose; ... "
731

Power, supra note 527, at 244.

732

/d.

733

SUP IT PRANEETPOLKANG, PRINCIPLE OFFACTS ANALYSIS AND WEIGHING OF EVIDENCE 80(3d

ed. 1994).
734

Caslav Pejovic, Legal Challenges in the Implementation ofElectronic Data Interchange in
International Trade, 65 HOSE! K.ENKYU JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLITICS 323, 333 (1998).
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evidence are subject to questions of authenticity and accuracy.

735

Traditional paper-based

evidence may be denied if it were forged in whole or in part, or not a true copy of the
original. § 125 of the Civil Procedure Code stipulates that "any party against whom a
document is relied upon as evidence may ... raise objections to the citing of such
document on the ground that there is no original, or the original is forged in whole or in
part, or that the copy is not a true copy of the original."736
Where a party protests the accuracy of a document, the court may require the
parties to present further evidence relevant to the authenticity of the said document in
'

dispute or otherwise render a decision after having considered all evidence. The court
may examine witnesses who are aware of the existence or contents of any document

h

'

,:

objected to, or who are able to testify as to documents' genuineness or accuracy. The
court may also allow an expert witness to examine the document. A party may adduce
evidence describing a process or system used to produce a result and indicating that the
process or system performs a proper function and produces an accurate result. 737 After
such examination, the court may decide whether such document is authentic.
The Thai Supreme Court found, for example, in the Supreme Court Decision
No.918/1966(B.E.2509), that courts could determine the authenticity of a plaintiffs
signature in a loan agreement by comparing it with a signature signed in other
documents. In Thai Supreme Court Decision No. 817/1978 (B.E.2521), the court ruled
that a forged signature affixed to a contract might be so obvious a counterfeit that courts

I

735

/d. at 333.

•'

736

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE § 125.

'.

737

GUIDE TO COMPUTER LAW 27,305(Christine A. Graf et al. eds.,2001 ).
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could examine genuineness of signature by comparing fake to authentic, as in other
documents, and reach a conclusion of forgery without further assistance. In the Thai
Supreme Court Decision No.685/1936(B.E.2479) the Supreme Court held as convincing

the testimony of a person who has seen the signature of a defendant for 10 years. Such a
witness who has worked as the signatory's subordinate and was able to recognize the

I'

defendant's signature may be considered an expert witness.
Authentication of electronic messages is different from the traditional
authentication of paper documents since electronic documents are in a form that is not

I·

normally visible. Electronic information comes in binaries of 0 and 1 and only advanced

[. :

technology is capable oftesting its authenticity. It is thus necessary to apply

[,··1
)··
I

authentication technology to electronic documents?38
Thai courts may not be able to determine the authenticity, integrity, and accuracy

'I

fl
-~

of an electronic document without the assistance of an expert witness. In the Thai

I =li

Supreme Court Precedent No. 696/1960(B.E.2503) the court stated that the opinion of an

. :rJ''

-

J<li

I

; I] ··

expert witness might indicate forgery of a will, but this testimony alone might not be
sufficient. The plaintiff might have to present other technological authentication
techniques in conjunction with the expert witness's testimony to convince the court that
an electronic document is accurate and reliable.
Special rules for a trial court's determination of the authenticity and integrity of
electronic records are established by §10 of the E-Transactions Act. 739 A trial court has

738

See Saowapang Piyarat, Information Technology: Evidence in Civil Proceeding,
99(1999)(unpublished LL.M. thesis, Thammasat University)( on file with the Thammasat
University Library). Authentication of an electronic document provides high creditability for the
court to determine that such electronic document is reliable.
739

E-TRANSACTIONS ACT§ 10 states that "in the case where the law requires that any information
be presented ... it shall be deemed as the presentation ... under the law : ( 1) if a reliable method is
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I

the discretion to determine the integrity of an electronic information and whether or not
there has been any subsequent alterations. Courts once held that it was unnecessary to
summon the author of an original document where it was inconvenient to do so. 740
A plaintiff must present the court with evidence confirming authenticity of a
digital signed transaction. If a certification authority has issued a digital certificate, the
plaintiff may adduce it as evidence. If there is a question regarding the validity of a
digitally signed transaction, digital certificate, and or certification authority, the court can
examine the totality of the circumstances to determine the reliability of the method used

I.
I

in the electronic transaction and its digital certificate.

741

The court must be satisfied that a

I

digital signature technology is reliable and capable of authenticating transaction integrity.
A plaintiff can enter into evidence any technology that the buyer has used for signature

I' , ,'

and effecting the transaction. The plaintiff can present the court with an expert witness

I '.

' I

I

~.!

testifying to security features of the digital technology for securing online transactions.
Expert witnesses can also affinn the integrity of a digital certificate and testing method

·~
I (

used to determine reliability and proper display characteristics.
If a case is related to international trade matters, such case is subject to
jurisdiction of a specialized court, the Intellectual Property and International Trade Court.
I'

used with that data message for assuring the integrity of the information from the time when it was
generated in its final form; and (2) the information is capable of being subsequently displayed."
740

COLIN TAPPER, COMPUTER LAW 155(1978). For example, if inconvenience of summoning an

,.
I

author of an original outweighs the utility of doing so, the court may not summon him to testify.
741

See E-TRANSACTIONS AcT§ 11 states that "the admissibility of a data message in evidence
shall not be denied in legal proceedings on the sole ground that it is a data message.
In assessing the evidential weight of a data message so as to conclude whether and to
what extent it is reliable, regard shall be had to the reliability of the manner in which or the
method by which the data message was generated, stored or communicated, the manner in which
or the method by which the integrity of the information was maintained, and the manner in which
or the method by which its originator was identified or indicated and also to all relevant
circumstances."
I'
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According to its Rules for Intellectual Property and International Trade Cases B.E. 2540
(1997), rule 33, this court provides that Court "may admit data recorded in or processed
by a computer as evidence in a case, if
1)

The data recording or processing was done in the ordinary course of
business of the user of the computer, and

.

'

2)

The data recording or processing resulted from a proper operation of the
computer according to its due procedure and, even though the computer
may be out of order, the accuracy of the data contained therein has not
I

' ..i

been affected.

,·

I

The use of a computer in ordinary course of business as stated in (1) and the
accuracy of the data recording or processing as stated in (2) shall be affirmed by the

..

~

-:_,

. ,,
f

11.

.,

•I

person involved in the recording or processing, or the person recording or processing the
data."742

. ~J

•). 1:

Rule 33, as stated above, requires online merchants to illustrate that online

<

'!'l ,

transaction records have been made in the ordinary course ·of online business. The rule
also requires a legal proper certification authority to issue digital.certificates in the course
of all electronic business transaction. Certification authorities must be able to maintain
the integrity of digital certificates even if the computer system fails. Rule 33 also

•
I

requires the person keeping an online transaction record or issuing a digital certificate to
affirm the keeping or issuing process as being made in the ordinary course of business
and effected by reliable and accurate procedures.
I

-'
742

RULES FOR INTEllECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE CASES, B.E. 2540 (1997),
Ru1e 33.
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3.4. 7 Hearsay
A. United States
The next issue is whether a digital certificate or a printout of a digital certificate is
considered as hearsay. The exclusionary rule on hearsay dates back to the
Commonwealth Fund Act proposed in New York in 1927 and later adopted by the
Federal government and a number of states. 743 In 1936, the Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws approved a Uniform Act on Business Records, which was widely
adopted by the states. 744 In 1942, the American Law Institutes Model Code proposed the
draft of the Uniform Rule of Evidence. In 1953, The National Conference on

..
I

I' "

J

1

!; 1

Commissioners and the American Bar Association approved of the draft. Ultimately, the

!

•

:

~

,I

Federal Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts and Magistrates came
I

"

.:1,

into effect from July 1975.745

;,.

I ,-,-

t~•~

Hearsay, under the Federal Rule of Evidence §801, is "a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove

• <j•"

the truth of the matter asserted."746 The term hearsay is a statement, oral, written, or
nonverbal conduct of a person, made by other persons than the witness who has not seen,
heard, or known of the fact by himself, but who has heard that statement and later
testified what he has heard to the court. For instance, a statement is hearsay where Bill

743

TAPPER, supra note

740, at 161.

I

744 !d.
745

!d.

746

FED. R. EVID. 801.
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has no direct knowledge of his own but testifies to the court that Jenny told him that she
saw Paul trying to erase a computer program.

747

The hearsay rule excludes evidence that a witness did not have direct knowledge
of and so cannot be effectively examined and cross-examined in the court.

748

To

determine whether that statement is hearsay, the purpose of assertion must be considered,
that is to say, a statement is hearsay if introduced to prove the truth of the facts asserted.

If such statement is not intended to prove the truth of the fact, but for some other reason,
it is not hearsay. 749

I

~ '
I II

In Anderson v. US

750

,

the court stated the principle that out-of-court statements

'l

•I

.,

~. j

constituted hearsay only when proffered as evidence to prove the truth of the matter

I

j.:

I

I

asserted. An out-of-court statement may be introduced as circumstantial evidence of a

•

I ••1
I

•J'

.'I
I

fact in issue, other than a fact asserted in the statement.751

~

'i•I
:.tr

I ,..,

A digital certificate is a digital symbol for your unique signature. It consists of a

f

f~LI

series ofbinary characters that are impossible to duplicate or forge. 752 A digital certificate
i. ,..

or a printout of a digital certificate is an out-of-court stateinene

53

,

which indicates the

identity of the owner of a public key.

747

BAINBRIDGE, supra note 545, at 270.

148

Id. at 339.

749

RONALD J. RYCHLAK, REAL AND DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE: APPLICATIONS AND THEORY
125(1995).

750

'

'

7

I

Anderson v. US, 417 US 211, 219, 94 SCt 2253, 41 Led 2d 20 (1974).

751

DAVID F. BlNDER, THEHEARSAYIIANDBOOK: THEHEARSAYRULEAND ITS40 EXCEPTIONS
1(1975).

752

Mir Hajimiragha et al., Legally Binding Contract Management Over the Internet, at 3,
available at http://www.docutouch.com (n.d.).
753

VERGARI & SHUE, supra note 407, at 334.
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A digital certificate contains not only a copy of the signatory's public key, but
also a statement that the issuer of the certificate has checked the identity of the signatory.

It also contains a statement that the signatory does in fact possess the signature data that
corresponds to the public key and that the issuer has checked that the public key validates
the identified person's digital signature. 754 A digital certificate can be considered real
evidence as it is the object actually involved in the matter of the dispute.

755

If the plaintiff introduces a digital certificate into trial with an intent to prove that
the defendant is the person who digitally signed the online transaction, the digital

I

I

certificate constitutes hearsay since it is not a statement of a first-hand witness. It cannot

I

I I

•

I
1

I. 1'

show or tell that the defendant did sign the online transaction. It can only indicate that a

I i

private key used by the signatory corresponds to a public key belonging to the signatory.
Thus, a digital certificate, if proffered to prove the truth contained in a digital certificate,
is hearsay and barred under the rule of hearsay, unless it qualifies under one of the
I ~I·

l;, It

~:t1:

exceptions.

I

Computerized records of online transactions digitally signed by a signatory are

r·

I

I '

also hearsay if the plaintiff seeks to introduce them at trial to prove that the signer did
sign the transaction. Rule 803(6) of the Federal Rule of Evidence provides exceptions to
I

the hearsay rule for "a memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of

I
I

I ,

acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from
information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of regularly
conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to

754

Reed, supra note 526, at 8.

155

RYCHLAK, supra note 749, at 7.
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make the memorandum, report, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the
custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method or
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The business as used in this
paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling
of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit. " 756
The rationale in support of the admissibility of business records is that records
kept in the ordinary course of business are regarded as reliable for they are normally kept
for a significant purpose. 757 It may be unfeasible to summon all witnesses involved in

l.
I

preparing a large organization's records758 to testify the records' reliability.

I

~ ·i

..

·1

{

Rule 803(6) applies to memoranda, reports, records, or data compilations, in any
form, including microfilm and tapes from an electronic data processing bank. 759 A record
can qualify under the business record exception if:
It reflects someone's personal knowledge;

(1)

...
r =1

'

!)

':I
I 'I

1\'
.,. ,
'I
! ~~ ~
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It is made in the regular course of business, at or near the time the

(2)

f·

•

;1J I.
I

:.tl

recorded event occurred; and
The business regularly makes such records. 760

(3)

If business records meet the above criteria, the court will admit them as evidence.
The term business in this context includes every kind of business, whether for profit or
not. The scope of Rule 803(6) includes records of federal, state, and local governments,
156

FED. R.

EVID.

:·

806(3).

151

WINN & WRIGHT,

758

ld.

159

BINDER, supra note 751, at 69.

760

WINN & WRIGHT,

I•

supra note 462, at 20-19.

supra note 462, at 20-19

I,
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governmental agencies, federal, state, local and academic institutions, and professional
•

•

associations.

761

Proponents must show the court that the method and circumstances from which
the computer printout was made sufficiently demonstrate accuracy and reliability.
Evidence demonstrating accuracy and reliability includes
(1)

The competency of the operator;

(2)

The type of computer used and its acceptance in the field as standard and
efficient equipment;

,·;
I

The procedures used for generating input and output, including the

(3)

controls, testing, and checks for accuracy and reliability;
(4)

The mechanical operations ofthe computer; and

(5)

The meaning and identity of the records themselves.

r

'1
I

11

r,'··J

I:;:

762

'·
Jq.

I •. II

"'"I•
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In U.S v Hernandes 763 , the court held that the computerized records of the

:.I 7"

,

.... I

hnmigration and Naturalization Service were treated as business records and admitted

I· :·
,::J ~·

under Rule 803(6). This law finds trust in records made in the regular course ofbusiness
to prevent parties from using extraneously prepared records in litigation. 764 In Transport
Indemnity Co. v. Sieb 765, the Supreme Court of Nebraska ruled as admissible a computer

I;
I

II
I

I

record kept on magnetic tape. This met the business record requirements on two grounds:

761

BINDER, supra note 751, at 70.

762

GUIDE TO COMPtiTERLAW 27,401( Christine A. Grafet al. eds.,2001).

763

U.S v Hernandes, 913 F.2d 1506(10th Cir. 1990).

764

TAPPER, supra note 740, at 163.

765

Transport Indemnity Co. v. Sieb, 178 Neb. 253, 132 N.W.2d 871(1965).
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I

I·

the record was made on the basis of well-established business procedure and the entry of
the records was systematic and timely. 766

If a party feels that a particular business record does not meet the standards
necessary to invoke the exception to the hearsay rule, such party bears the burden of
proving the untrustworthiness of the disputed evidence. 767 A situation whereby a record
might prove untrustworthy may be a reasonable cause to believe that the person who
maintained, controlled, or managed such records had a dishonest motive.
To persuade the court that a record is trustworthy, the original computer program
I

source must be elaborated along with the procedures for access control and the methods
used to guarantee accuracy and reliability. 768 In Monotype Corporation PLC v.

I.
i

i'I·.
·r

'

r1 ..1~1
I I

;_j

International Typeface Corporation

769

,

the court held as inadmissible an interpersonal

message stored on a business e-mail system. The court stated two reasons. First, the
message contained an unpleasant statement about an employee of one of the litigants; the

:.;··It

;l

:;.11,;··
I

1.

:··,Jr •
:.d~
i.'::j;:t ...

I

,.

:l:•.l
I

'•"

~,1

court decided that the prejudicial nature of the message outweighed its relevance. Second,

:. dr·

the message did not meet the criteria for the business record exceptions to the hearsay

; j;

I.!·

~~:.

rule since the process of recording such e-mails was not adequately systematic. 770 It can

1
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I

I

I·
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766

THE LAW OF COMPUTER 66(Grace W. Holmes & Craig H. Norville eds., The Institute of
Continuing Legal Education 1971).
767

WINN & WRIGHT, supra note 462, at 20-19.
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768

/d. at 20-24. See also MICHAEL D. ROSTOKER & ROBERT H. RINE, COMPUTER
JURISPRUDENCE: LEGAL REsPONSES TO THE lNFORMATION REVOLUTION 351( 1986). To convince
the court to vouch for electronic evidence, there usually is a requirement that a witness present
information demonstrating the accuracy and reliability of the computer system that generated the
evidence.
769

770

Monotype Comoration PLC v. International Typeface Comoration, 43 F.3d 443(9th Cir.l994).
WINN & WRIGHT, supra note 462, at 20-27.
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be concluded that the court will accept as evidence e-mails or other electronic messages if

,I

they satisfy the criteria for reliability as stated in Rule 803(6).

An electronic record submitted to prove the occurrence of an event or the
existence of a transaction is not hearsay. The court will, for instance, accept an electronic
order as evidence if it is proffered to prove the existence of an order. 771 It may not
consider evidence if it is proffered to prove the order's content. The court held in
Sanders 772 that electronic vouchers were not hearsay if it was not intended to prove the

,,.

truth of matters asserted in them. 773 Electronic vouchers in the case were adduced to
prove only a communication giving notice of debt.

In Michaels v. Michaels 774, the court ruled a telex printout admissible as evidence
on the ground that the telex's contents were not submitted as proof of the truth, but it was
only submitted to indicate the interest of one party in pursuing the business transaction. 775
The court admitted the telex to show how the other party reacted upon learning of this
interest. This was a case regarding an electronic transaction. The court did not bar the

.!1. '

~I

rV' ..

proponent from introducing electronic messages into trial when the proponent wanted to

I

I

I

I

,,

prove the message's existence.

I

A transaction record of Automatic Teller Machines (ATM) was held admissible in
Stark v. Indiana 776• In this case, the defendant objected to the record on the ground that

; I

I

I

I"
I

771

/d. at 20-9.

772

United States v. Sanders, 749 F.2d 195(5th Cir. 1984).

773

WINN & WRIGHT,

774

Michaels v. Michaels, 767 F.2d 1185, 1201(7th Cir.l985).

77

supra note 462, at 20-28.

s WINN & WRIGHT, supra note 462, at 20-29.

776

Stark v. Indiana, 489 N.E. 2d 43(Ind.l986).
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it did not represent the knowledge of any person since the machine made the record
automatically when used. The court held that the record was admissible. It was not
hearsay based on two reasons. First, the ATM user's statement was not hearsay since it
was submitted as proof of the message's existence.777 Second, the machine's record
represented the user's statement that no alteration could have happened. 778 Hearsay was
not an issue when the electronic record was made without human intervention. The court
dismissed the objection and upheld admissibility.
I

The record, being directly produced immediately after use of the machine, was

I

I~

admitted into trial for the reason that there had been no human intervention. If the record

I·'
1

!1

had been manipulated, translated, or converted from one media to another, the court

1· .
I

could have denied admissibility if it was not satisfied of the record's trustworthiness

779

for there may be a possibility of a dishonest motive in the record keeper.
Any party may object to the business record on the ground that source of
information indicates untrustworthiness. 780 The source of information is usually a person

;f.J

r.')j
fiJi••

with knowledge. The party may object to the business record if such a person is
dishonest, confused, biased, subject to undue influence or does not establish reasonable

I

I

care with entering the data into computers. For example, a person who was drunk while
recording information can make that record unreliable.

I
I'
I

r
I•
I
717

WINN & WRIGHT, supra note 462, at 20-30.

778

!d.

779

!d. at 20-9.

780

BINDER, supra note 751, at 240.
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If the methods for the preparation ofbusiness records are unreliable, the court
may exclude such records. In United States v. Keplinger 781 , the court held that obvious
inaccuracies, ambiguities, alterations or omissions which appeared in the document was
evidence of the unreliability of the methods of or circumstances surrounding its
preparation.
Even though courts accept that a computer cannot deviate from its program, they
realize that mistakes do occur.

782

An expert witness may testify the failure of a computer

system. This may reduce the degree of reliability. 783 A party may raise poor internal
management to make the business record less reliable. The court in Gulf Coast
Investment Corp. v. Secretary ofHousing and Urban Development, 509 F.
Supp.1321(1980f8\ concluded that a notice that was programmed to mail automatically
was not always reliable. The recipient may object to having received a notice by
adducing evidence which indicates computer errors. The defendant could show the court
that such notice may have been lost or misplaced in the office as a result of bad internal
management control. 785

In conclusion, a digital certificate, a printout of it or a record of a digitally signed
transaction, if adduced as proof of the facts contained therein, is hearsay unless the

781

United States v. Keplinger, 776 F2d 678, 694-95(7th Cir 1985).

782

See GEMIGNANI, supra note 715, at 515.

783

/d.

784

Gulf Coast Investment Corn. v. Secretary ofHousing and Urban Development 509 F.
Supp.1321 (1980).
785

See MANDELL, supra note 406, at 244.
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criteria for the business record as stated in Rule 803(6) can be satisfied where in which
case the court would admit them into evidence.

786

B. Thailand
The United States and England are common law countries where hearsay is an
exclusionary rule of evidence which excludes certain types of evidence from being

I
I..

admitted into trial. A civil-law country like France or Germany has no problem with the
admissibility of hearsay because the court will admit every piece of information as

,

••
evidence, including hearsay, and weigh the value of such evidence. Thailand enacts the
rule on hearsay in the Civil Procedure Code of Thailand §95, which states that "no oral

,,

evidence shall be admissible unless the person is called as a witness ... (2) has directly
and himself seen, heard, or known of the fact with respect to which he is to give

..·

•I •

testimony ...." 787
§95 excludes a witness's testimony whether verbal or in writing if such witness
did not himself see, hear or know of the fact. Diverging opinions have been held
I'

regarding the inadmissibility ofhearsay evidence. The first school of thought strongly
objects to the admission of hearsay evidence. 788 Under such philosophy, the court would

786

A court may admit a digital certificate into evidence because it can establish a link between the
signatory and his public key. The court will be more convinced if the public key contained in the
digital certificate accurately verifies the private key of the signatory. This can be concluded that
the signatory signed such digital signature. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, DIGITAL
SIGNATIJRE GUIDELINES: LEGAL INFRASTRUCTIJRE FOR CERTIFICATION AUTHORITIES AND SECURE
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 12-13(1996).
787

788

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE

§ 95.

KHEMCHAI SHUTIVONG, LAW OF EVIDENCE 114(4th ed. 1992).
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not record any hearsay evidence in its record. 789 It has to inquire the witnesses before
testifying of the nature of the witness' intended testimony. 790 If the court considers that
such witness has no direct knowledge of the facts and is hearsay evidence, the court will
not allow such witness to testify. §95 of the Thai Civil Procedure Code supports this
notion by vesting the court with full discretionary powers to exclude the witness on the
basis of hearsay evidence. When the court is of the opinion that a witness cannot give
testimony or any party objects to the witness, the court may note the reasons for the
objection of the witness before proceeding with the trial. 791
The second school of though admits hearsay evidence into trial but the court has

r.

..

k

to determine the evidential weight of all evidence, some of which may be considered as
hearsay and having no weight. 792 According to the Supreme Court Decision No.

1·.
'·
~:

1315/1939 (B.E. 2482), the court ruled that the testimony of a witness during
interrogation could not be used against the defendant because it was hearsay evidence. In

Supreme Court Decision No. 1120/1978 (B.E.2521), the court ruled that, without

........
--:

~ -.

testifying before the court, a statement made by a third person whom the defendant told
that the he, the defendant, was the robber, could not be used against the defendant.
Following this reasoning, a court may thus allow hearsay evidence to be brought into trial,
but has to regard all hearsay evidence as having no evidential value.

789

/d.

790

ld.

791

792

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE§
SHUTIVONG,

95 paragraph two.

supra note 788, at 114-115.

233

f

I

II

I.

,f,
...

The third school of thought notes that the court has full discretion to admit such
hearsay evidence into trial and give it very little weight. 793 In Supreme Court Decision

No. 2456/1983 (B.£ .2526), the court ruled that hearsay testimony was admissible after
having regard to reasonableness and other surrounding circumstances. The majority of
legal scholars and the Thai Supreme Court follows the second school ofthought. 794
The law provides an exception as stated in §127 for "public documents drawn up
or authenticated by a competent official, certified copied thereof and private documents
found to be genuine and accurate by judgment shall be presumed to be genuine and
accurate and the burden of proof of their spuriousness or inaccuracy will shift to the party
against whom they are produced."795
Documents are classed into public and private documents. The former are
generally issued, made, and certified by competent officials. The competent official must
make that document in his course of duty and the content of the public document must
refer to any people or public matters. 796 People are entitled to use the public document,
or refer to or cite it as evidence. 797 On the other hand, private documents are those issued,
made and created by ordinary people, such as a lease agreement, a sales contract, letter of
consent, notice, receipt and other commercial documents.
The law presumes that public documents are genuine and accurate. Courts
principally consider public documents as having more evidentiary value than private
793

794

195

796

797

WICHITCHORNLACHAI,
SHUTIVONG,

supra note 454, at 203.

supra note 788, at 114

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE§ 127.
RATANAKORN,

supra note 639, at 312.
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documents. 798 The burden of proof of inaccuracy shifts to the party against whom they
are produced. Examples of public documents are a Royal Decree, Royal Proclamation,
Acts ofParliament, registered documents such as marriage certificates799 , title deeds,
birth certificates, death certificates and vehicle registration, official reports and academic
certificates.
The reasons why the law presumes the accuracy of public documents are that

j.

public documents are by nature based on hearsay evidence or has been extant for a long
time such that it may be impossible to find a person who had direct knowledge of that
'

I•

information. 800 There is no incentive to distort the data contained in public documents,

I(·
!

....

because such information are usually statistical data or data prescribed by law. 801 If
anyone provides false information with an intent to mislead or deceive, such person will

,.
t£

be subject to criminal liability imposed by §267 of the Criminal Code. As public
documents are publicly available and may be used as a reference upon request, the

g....,.
'

content of information would always be subject to the scrutiny of the people for any error

.

_

or mistake. 802 Finally, requiring the party to submit an original public document causes
inconvenience for both government officers and parties for public documents have to be
made available to the general public for reference and inspection. 803

798

PRANEETPOLKANG, supra note 733, at 97.

799

Kumpipaksa Sandeeka [Supreme Court] 1426/1954 (B.E.2497). The court ruled that a marriage
registration is a public document.
800

SHUTIVONG, supra note 788, at 167.

801

!d. at 167.

802 !d.
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Private docwnents are not preswned to be accurate, because anyone can issue,
make, or certify private docwnents in the private business or commercial sphere. If a
private docwnent had been determined genuine in a prior case, such docwnent would

~I

bear a preswnption of accuracy and the person against whom the docwnent was produced

t

bears the burden of proving its inaccuracy.
The problem is whether a digital certificate is a private or public document. The
E-Transactions Act, B.E 2544(200 1) defines the term "certificate" as "a data message or

any other record confirming the link between the signatory and signature creation

data."804 A digital certificate by definition is a data message in the form of either an
electronic record or conventional paper establishing the link between the identity of the
signatory and his or her public key. A digital certificate is issued by a trusted third entity,
commonly known as a certification authority that runs the business of validating online
identity and maintaining valid public key information electronically. 805
§32 of the E-Transactions Act provides that "any person has the right to carry out
the business of providing services related to electronic transactions, but in the case where
it is necessary for maintaining financial and commercial security or for strengthening the
reliability and credibility of a data message system or for preventing loss to the public,
there shall be issued a Royal Decree requiring that the operation of a particular business
of providing services related to electronic transactions be subject to prior notification,
- registration or licensing."806

804

E-TRANSACTIONS ACT § 4.

805

See E-TRANSACTIONS ACT § 31. A digital certificate is admissible into evidence and deemed
to be legally effective, irrespective of the location where the certificate is issued or the location of
the place of the business of the issuer of the certificate.
806

E-TRANSACTIONS ACT§ 32.

236

1.:

The law allows any person to run a business providing services in connection with
electronic transactions, that is to say, a certification authority. A Royal Decree may
require that the operation of a particular business of providing services related to
electronic transactions be licensed or registered by a competent officer or may require
only a prior notification for maintaining financial and commercial security and ensuring

li

the reliability and creditability in online systems or for preventing loss to the public.

1'.

The key factor in determining whether a digital certificate is a public or private

,I

q
I

document is the capacity of the person who issued such a digital certificate. A
certification authority may be a public or private entity. If a digital certificate is issued by
a state entity acting as a certification authority, such digital certificate can be considered
as a public document. §28 (3) ofthe E-Transactions Act states that the certification
service provider must "provide means for reasonable access that enable a relying party to
ascertain from the certificate ... " 807 This section requires a certification authority to
provide proper means for anyone to gain access to digital certificates listed on the online

:C
I •

database. Anyone is entitled to refer to or rely on that certificate. Thus, a digital

I

certificate issued by a State certification authority is deemed to be a public document and
I

presumed to be accurate, unless the party against whom a digital certificate is produced is

I

able to prove its spuriousness. A digital certificate issued by a private entity, on the other
hand, would not be considered as a public document would not enjoy the presumption of
accuracy.

In conclusion, there are differences in the application of rules on hearsay between
the United States and in Thailand. In the United States, the plaintiff who offers a digital

807

£-TRANSACTIONS ACT§ 28(3).
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certificate to prove the truth in a certificate's content may be barred from presenting such
digital certificate under the hearsay rule. The court will allow the submission of a digital
certificate that meets the criteria for business records. In Thailand, the plaintiff can
introduce a digital certificate into trial even if it is hearsay. A digital certificate issued by

I·
~

I

a state certification authority is a public document and presumed to be accurate. The
public digital certificate may be used against the signatory, and if the signatory or other
person objects to the accuracy of the digital certificate, the signatory bears the burden of

..
~

proving its inaccuracy. A judge may not rely on the authenticity of a digital certificate if
he has reasons to doubt its authenticity. He may also insist on the submission of further

I_

...
~

evidence before making a final decision. 808

3.4.8 Duty of Care
A. lJnited States
The E-Sign Act does not impose a specific duty for a signatory of a private key to
keep his or her private key secure. lJnder the E-Sign Act, the intention of the signatory is
crucial. If the signatory had no intention of authenticating a transaction by applying and
signing with his private key, the signature is legally not binding on the signatory.

~.

In the lJnited States Federal Courts, the common law of negligence may be cited

to the effect that the signatory has not satisfied the standard of care imposed by law. The
plaintiff bears the burden of proof on the basis of preponderance of evidence that:
1) The defendant had a duty;
2) The defendant breached that duty;

808

ROWLAND ET AL., supra note 663, at 394.
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3) The breach of duty caused harm; and
4) Which resulted in damage809
If the defendant can refute one of the elements stated above, the judges will rule
in favor of the defendant.
Even though the E-Sign Act has no provisions the duty to keep a private key
secret, the common law standard of care applies. The court has interpreted the standard of
care for non-professionals as "the behavior of ordinary reasonably prudent person."810 If
the signatory breaches this standard of care, he will be liable for the resulting damages.
The ordinary person is not required to have any special training or education, but he must
exercise normally recognized standards of behavior.

f,• •.

B. Thailand
To make a signatory liable for the use of his digital signature under theETransactions Act, B.E 2544 (2001), §27 imposes a duty on "a signatory to exercise
reasonable care in avoiding unauthorized use of his signature creation data."811 The
plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the signatory failed to exercise the "reasonable
care" prescribed by law.
The standard of care should be an objective, not a subjective standard. Thus, a

I,

signatory who carelessly stores his private key in a smart card without the protection of
any password or personal identification number and leaves it in the vicinity of a shared
computer in the honest belief that the key is properly secured cannot claim that he has
809

JACK V. MATSON, EFFECTIVE EXPERT WITNESSING 46(2d ed.1994).

810

/d. at 47.

811

I.

£-TRANSACTIONS ACT§ 27.
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exercised "reasonable care." In fact, such act does not even meet the subjective standard
of car~ [culpa levis in conoreto] for the safekeeping of the private key. If the key was left

I

I

!

near a computer used by his roommates, sufficient "reasonable care" has not been taken
to avoid unauthorized use of his private key. If the online merchant can prove that the
signatory failed to exercise the "reasonable care" required by law, the signatory will be
liable for his failure to comply with the law.

I

I

'·

~
I

I

3.4.9 Expert Witness

IJ

Where a signatory was tricked into signing, he has to prove that someone
deceived him into signing a document in the mistaken belief that it was the intended
contract. Otherwise, liability cannot be avoided. For example, to prove whether a hacker

t-:·.
I' .

f.,,

t:

(~ ·

had broken into the signatory's hard drive and stolen his private key, he must satisfy the
court with evidence that it was possible for a hacker to break into his hard drive by using

...

~!

~:
.,_
"' <

'

a virus or by downloading a program without the signatory's conscious knowledge. The

f·
signatory may also prove through verification technology that the system was not
working properly. This usually requires the assistance of compu~er experts812 since it
relates to very technical matters which are much more sophisticated than traditional
forgery. Thus, an expert witness may be summoned to give testimony on his behalf.

A. United States

Rule 702 ofFederal Rule of Evidence governs the use of expert witnesses. It
states that "if scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
812

MICHAEL J. SAKS & RICHARD VAN DUIZEND, THE USE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN LITIGATION

8(1983).
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fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an

r

'

expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the
form of opinion or otherwise, if:
( 1) The testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data,
(2) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and
(3) The witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the
case."stJ

,,
Subject to Rule 702, if the expert's testimony is merely helpful for the jury to
understand the case, especially where the case involves technical issues, the requirement

..
k:

for introducing an expert witness's testimony is sufficiently satisfied. Expert testimony
I

must meet two requirements for admissibility. The expert witness must be qualified; that
is to say, he must have knowledge or skill in a particular area that makes his testimony
more useful and informative than an ordinary witness. The opinion of an expert witness
may be based on a number of sources of information, which includes his education,
experience, such as the expert's first-hand knowledge, or the expert's observation of prior
witnesses and other evidence at the trial itself.

814

An expert's help will provide the jury

with comprehensive information to reach a verdict more easily than without his
assistance.
The second requirement is that the expert's testimony must be specialized and of
the essence of an issue in a case. The expert witness must prove the creditability of the

813

FED. R. EVID. 702.

814

JOHN A. TARANTINO, STRATEGIC USE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 23(1988). See also JON R.
WALTZ & ROGERS C. PARK, EVIDENCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 799 (9th ed. 1999). At common

law, the expert's opinion had to be based on person knowledge or on facts that were in evidence.
Thus, his opinion could not be based on inadmissible hearsay.
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processes and theories to the judge and jury.
credentials to the jury and judge.

815

The expert must also present his

816

In this technical case, the requirements for an expert testimony are satisfied
because there is a need for an expert to testify on the nature and attributes of digital
signature technology. Ifthe defects of a digital technology or the possibilities ofbreaking
into a security system are essential facts of the case, they must be subject to examination
and analysis by a competent expert. 817
Since this case is about identification techniques different from forensic methods,
the computer expert has to show the court how digital technology can identify the
signatory accurately by the use of public key systems. A court is not obligated to adopt
the conclusion reached by an expert witness. The court may weigh all relevant evidence
and thereafter make a fmaljudgment.

818

B. Thailand

§129 of the Civil Procedure Code of Thailand provides that "the court, when it
thinks fit or upon the application of any party, shall order the appointment of an expert as
provided in §99."819 §99 states that ''where the court is of opinion that the inspection of a
person, thing, or place by the court, or the appointment of experts by the court as
815

MATSON, supra note 809, at 186

816

DANIEL A. BRONSTEIN, LAW OF TilE EXPERT WITNESS 65(1993).

817

/d. at 64.

818

A testimony made by an expert witness may be objected if the expert's opinion is based upon
facts that are not in evidence. See JON R. WALTZ & ROGERS C. PARK, EVIDENCE: CASES AND
MATERIALS 798(9th ed. 1999).
819

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE§ 129.
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provided by§ 129, 130 is necessary, the court shall have the power either when it thinks
fit at any stage ofthe trial, or upon the application of a party subject to the provisions of
820

§87, 88, to issue an order for such inspection or appointment of such experts."

Courts have the discretionary power to appoint an expert, but usually in a case
relating to technological issues, the court always grants a request of the parties to appoint
an expert by mutual agreement. The court may also appoint an expert listed in the court
register. 821 Such an appointment cannot be made against the expert's will according to
§129 paragraph 1. If a court appoints an expert whose name is listed in the court register,
both parties may summon such person to give testimony on their behalf.
The qualification of an expert witness according to §98 of the Civil Procedure

I •

~.! ...

..

Code states that:

r

f,.

"[a]ny party may cite as a witness on his behalf any person having expert
knowledge in art, science, work of skill, trade or practical work, or in foreign law
and whose opinion may be of value in settling points in issue, irrespective of
whether such witness is engaged in that particular occupation or not." 822

.

I,

p

To qualify as an expert, a witness must possess special knowledge in art, science,
or work of skill. His or her opinion may be useful in settling points at issue or may assist
the court with useful knowledge in sophisticated matters, such as those regarding
technological matters.
The signatory may file an ex parte application to the court to appoint a computer
expert witness or a person with expert knowledge on digital and verification technology
to testify on the characteristics of the technology and possible malfunctioning of the

°CIVJL PROCEDURE CODE § 99.

82

An expert may be listed in the court register as a technology expertise, or signature examiner.
See PORNPHET WJCHITCHONLACHAJ. LAW OF EVIDENCE 262(4th ed.1999).
CIVJL PROCEDURE CODE

"
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821

822

I

§ 98.
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verification process as well as other issues pertaining to technical error. Any computer
expert appointed by the court may be challenged, and has to be sworn in prior to giving

I·

any testimony.
According to §130 of the Civil Procedure Code, "an expert may give his [or her]
opinion either orally or in writing as may be required by the Court."

823

If the court is

dissatisfied with the written opinion of an expert or if any party applies by motion, the
court may demand a supplementary written opinion from the expert, summon him or her
to appear in court to give oral explanation, or appoint other experts. This provision allows
the expert to give opinion in writing, but he or she may be called to testify before the
court if the court is still dissatisfied with his or her opinion. If the opinion is unclear or

..•·
~·

favors any party with prejudice, the court may appoint other experts to investigate this
issue.
To assess the evidentiary value of a testimony by an expert witness, the court has
to determine whether such expert witness has testified professionally and free from any
prejudice. If the court is of the opinion that the expert is a .disinterested witness and his
testimony is based on his professional know ledge, such testimony will be convincing. 824
If the expert witnesses' statements contradict each other, the court has the discretion to
accept the testimony of that expert witness, whom it believes to be the most skillful and
knowledgeable. 825

823

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE

§ 130.

824

PRANEETPOLKANG, supra

825

!d. at 96.

note 733, at 95.
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If the defendant offers an eyewitness testimony, the court may need to weigh the
evidentiary value between the eyewitness and the expert witness. More often than not, the
court gives the eyewitness more credibility than the testimony of the expert in the event
of a conflict, because an eyewitness is a primary source of facts which are based on his
perception, not on an opinion. 826 According to the Supreme Court Decision No.
437/1947 (B.E. 2490), in a case of conflict on the credibility ofthe testimony of an expert
witness and an eyewitness, the court has to accept the eyewitness.
The Supreme Court also ruled in the Supreme Court Decision No.
359/1931 (B.E.2474) that the court could give more evidentiary value to the eyewitness
than to the expert witness, although the expert witness testified that an examination of the

; ...

defendant's fingerprint and the fingerprint in the loan agreement revealed that they were
likely identical.

3.4.1 0 Presumptions

.....
-. .,

A. United States
The E-Sign Act does not contain presumptions regarding digitally signed
transactions. 827 If there is a specific provision regarding a presumption, the party to

826

The court may, however, determine that the testimony of an expert witness is more credible if
such testimony is based on academic principle. See SOPHON RATANAKORN, LAW OF EVIDENCE
386(1993).
827

Other states, such as Utah and Illinois, impose a preswnption regarding digitally signed
message. See Utah Code Ann.§ 46-3-406 (1996).
In adjudicating a dispute involving a digital signature, a court of this state shall presume that:
(1) a certificate digitally signed by a licensed certification authority and either published in a
recognized repository or made available by the issuing certification authority or by the subscriber
listed in the certificate is issued by the certification authority which digitally signed it and is
accepted by the subscriber listed in it;
(2) the information listed in a valid certificate, as defined in Section 46-3-103. and
confirmed by a licensed certification authority issuing the certificate is accurate;
(3) if a digital signature is verified by the public key listed in a valid certificate issued by a

245

whom the presumption applies is relieved form the burden of making a prima facie case;
the burden ofprooflies the other party. Under the U.C.C. 1-201(31), "presumption"
means a fact accepted by the court as true unless and until proven to the contrary. 828
F.R.E. Rule 301 states that
"[I]n all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of
Congress or by these rule, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is
directed the burden of going forward with evidence is rebut or meet the
presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of
the risk of non-persuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on
whom it was originally cast." 829
A court may accept something as being true and primary in certain situations. A
party who contends the injustice of such a presumption may introduce evidence to rebut
the presumption. Presumptions can be divided into conclusive presumptions and
rebuttable presumptions. An example of the former is that in common law a child of7

licensed certification authority:
(a) that the digital signature is the digital signature of the subscriber listed in that certificate;
(b) that the digital signature was affixed by the signer with the intention of signing the
message; and
(c) the recipient of that digital signature has no knowledge or notice that the signer:
(i) breached a duty as a subscriber; or
(ii) does not rightfully hold the private key used to affix the digital signature; and
(4) a digital signature was created before it was time stamped by a disinterested person
utilizing a trustworthy system. See also Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act § 10-120
( 1998) which provides that (a) in resolving a civil dispute involving a secure electronic record, it
shall be rebuttably presumed that the electronic record has not been altered since the specific
point in time to which the secure status relates; (b) in resolving a civil dispute involving a
secure electronic signature, it shall be rebuttably presumed that the secure electronic signature
is the signature of the person to whom it correlates; (c) the effect of presumptions provided in
this Section is to place on the party challenging the integrity of a secure electronic record or
challenging the genuineness of a secure electronic signature. both the burden of going forward
with evidence to rebut the presumption and the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the
nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence; (d) in the absence of a
secure electronic record or a secure electronic signature, nothing in this Act shall change
existing rules regarding legal or evidentiary rules regarding the burden of proving the authenticity
and integrity of an electronic record or an electronic signature.
828

u.c.c. § 1-201(31).

829

FED. R. EVID. 301.
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years old is conclusively presumed to be incapable of committing a crime. 830 The latter
presumption is that from seven to fourteen years of age incapacity of criminality may be
rebuttable.

831

No one can rebut this conclusive presumption by presenting the court with any
evidence seeking to prove a child under 7 years as having been able to commit murder or
any crime, even though in fact that child has killed someone or demonstrated the capacity
to do so. The law still conclusively presumes that the child is innocent. For a child
between 7 and 14 years old, evidence may be adduced to demonstrate guilty mind and
criminal culpability. If the court is of the opinion that the child had the capacity to
commit the criminal offence, such child be found guilty.
The same rule also applies in civil cases where the law stipulates rebuttable
presumptions. As presumption rules in the United States and Thailand are based on the
same principles, the next section jointly analyzes their application.

B. Thailand

§84(2) of the Civil Procedure Code ofThailand states ''where there is a
presumption in law favorable to a party, such party shall be required to prove only that
the conditions entitling him [or her] to avail himself [or herself] of the presumption have
been fulfilled." 832 Under theE-Transactions Act, §25 states that "any electronic

830
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Id.
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174 (2d ed. 1987).

transaction made in accordance with such security procedure as prescribed in the Royal
Decree shall be presumed to have been made using a reliable method. "

833

The E-Transactions Act leaves the conditions of security procedure to be later
determined in a Royal Decree. 834 If a Royal Decree provides that an online transaction
signed by a digital signature is presumed to be reliable, the court will assume the
reliability of any online transaction signed by the digital signature technology. The party
who claims that he or she applied a digital signature will not need to adduce evidence to
prove the reliability of the technology. The party who wishes to rebut such a presumption
bears the burden of proving the contrary.
The presumption of reliability creates both advantages and disadvantages to
online users and merchants. The advantage is that this endorsement of digital signatures
make them more acceptable than other electronic signatures. Merchants will be more
willing to accept digitally signed transactions than transactions signed electronically by
other electronic signatures.

833

E-TRANSACTIONSACT

§ 25.

834

See E-TRANSACTIONS ACT § 16( 1) provides that ''the addressee is entitled to regard a data
message as being that of the originator and to act on that assumption with respect to that data
message if:
(1) the addressee has properly ascertained whether the data message was that of the originator in
accordance with the procedure previously agreed with the originator; or
(2) the data message as received by the addressee resulted from the action of a person who used a
method which is used by the originator to identify data messages as his own and to which such
person gained access through the relationship between such person and the originator or a person
having the authority to act on behalf of the originator ... " Thus, if the parties agree to use the
digital signature as a means to verify identity and to authenticate the integrity of online
transactions, the digitally signed transaction may be deemed as being that of the signatory if the
relying party has proceed with necessary verification process. See also CHAIWAT
WONGWATANASAN ET AL., EXPLANATION OF THE ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT, B.E. 2544
72-73(2002). This provision is aimed at providing a rebuttal presumption of the authorship of the

message. The liability of the signatory must be decided on the principal of identity verification and
negligence.
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In the enforcement of a digitally signed online transaction which the law
presumes to be reliable, the merchant enjoys great benefits under the Civil Procedure
Code §84(2) which states that "a party whom the law presumes a fact favorable to him
need only prove that the condition entitling him [or her] to avail himself [or herself] of
the presumption has been fulfilled." 835 The merchant only has to prove that the signatory
did sign an online transaction by his or her private key certified by a certification
authority. The merchants need not prove the reliability of the verification technology.
The satisfaction of these conditions is sufficient to prove a prima facie case against a
defendant. This will save merchants substantial time and costs of the legal proceedings
since an online merchant need not hire a computer expert to testify the reliability of
digital signatures.
;:- ·

The merchant is thus in a better position than the user who bears a greater burden
of proof. Users of digital signature technology are usually in a weaker financial position
than online merchants. This difference favors not only businesses that sell digital

-.
•'

signature programs, but also online merchants who will spend less in proving the

I

reliability of digital signature technology. It will discourage a signatory from using digital
signatures since it places signatories in very difficult situations such as onerous financial
burdens and the burden of proving certain issues like the unreliability of digital signatures.

·I

• I

I

3.4.11 Suggestions
A presumption of reliability may be appropriate for solving the electronic
signature problem. A Royal Decree can provide the necessary security requirements. It

835

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE

§ 84(2).
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can impose a burden of proof of reliability upon the parties who are technological service
providers, online merchants, certification authorities, and financial institutions rather than
consumers. 836 If such party is a plaintiff and files a claim against a signatory, the plaintiff
is usually in a better financial position and has stronger bargaining power. Royal Decrees
may shift the burden of proof on to the plaintiff as regards the reliability of digital
signature technology and establish a prima facie case against the alleged signatory.
Shifting the burden of proof of reliability also shifts the burden of cost of
retaining a computer expert witness to give testimony in legal proceedings. Technological
service providers can minimize such costs by passing along those expenses to consumers

;'

in service fees. 837 In this way no single consumer has to pay substantial sums of money
for a computer expert to attest reliability of technology.

I,

3.5 Conclusion
An electronic signature, especially a digital signature, may now be more familiar
~r..· ·_

to Thai people with the coming into force of a new law governing electronic transactions
and signatures as from April3, 2002. The Electronic Transactions Act, B.E. 2544(2001)
adopted a principle of technology neutrality in compliance with international standards. It
recognized all kinds of electronic signatures from simply typing one's name at the end of
an e-mail to sophisticated digital signatures. This Act also prescribed the requirements

836

See Visit Sripibol, Information Technology Law in the Aspect of Consumer Protection,
Intellectual Property and International Trade Court Forum: Special Issue 284, 289(2000). There is
a need for presumption that is favorable to consumers.
837

Pomcbai Wiwatpattarakul, Electronic Commerce and Information Technology under Thai
Laws and its Affect to Banking Industry, 28 THAMMASAT LAW JOURNAL 708, 725(1998).
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necessary for a reliable electronic signature so as to maintain security in electronic
commerce.
Although the E-Transactions Act is a technologically neutral piece of legislation,
it does not define ''processes", such as secret sharing838 , unlike theE-Sign Act, which
defines electronic signatures. The applicability of theE-Sign Act is also broader.
The scope of the E-Transactions Act covers mainly civil and commercial
activities; the E-Sign Act governs only commercial transactions, not personal matters.
For this reason, application of the E-Transactions Act seems to be much more
complicated since some civil acts are significant or may be related to the rights pertaining

rr·

I

,.,

I·

to personal status or family rights. As transactions exempted from the E-Transactions Act

..! .

are not clearly stipulated, a Royal Decree is needed to establish which civil and
commercial transactions are outside the scope of the E-Transactions Act.

In civil trials, the E-Transactions Act mandates courts not to deny the legal effect
of a signature on the sole ground that it is in electronic form. Enforceability of electronic
r~:_

signatures may be denied if the court has reasons to believe that such electronic
signatures are not reliable. Parties to online transactions should apply a highly secure
electronic signature, such as a digital signature to ensure that the court gives the greatest
possible evidential weight in the event of a dispute arising.
The use of digital signature technology may be promoted by a presumption of
reliability. The law must impose the duty of proving reliability of the digital signature
technology on the party who has the greatest bargaining power, such as a business
corporation, rather than on an individual. Current law requires a party against whom the
838

Such process may qualify as an electronic signature if it can establish a link between the person
and the electronic document for the purpose of identifying the signatory and indicate his approval.
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presumption is imposed to rebut such a presumption or otherwise suffer from its
consequences, and this often places an individual under onerous financial burdens as well
as the burden of proving the unreliability of such technology.
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CHAPTER4
THE CONCEPT OF RISKS, AND LIABILITIES OF PARTIES
INVOLVED IN DIGITALLY SIGNED TRANSACTIONS

The use of technology not only creates a number of advantages, but also entails
risks and liabilities. No technology is ever absolutely perfect. Each technology has its
unique benefits as well as its flaws. Individuals who apply the technology must realize
·'

not only the advantages, but also their shortcomings. The development of electronic

It_.. ..

commerce rests on trust in the identity of the transacting parties and the security of

I

transmission and content of their communication. 839

~·.

·~

Parties to online transactions often consider security as an option, without
realising that it may sometimes be required by law. 840 The law does not require

839

Theodore Sedgwick Barassi, The Cybernotary: Public Key Registration and Certification and
Authentication of International Legal Transactions, American Bar Association, available at
http://www.abanet.org/scitecb/ec/cn/cybernote.htrnl (last visited Nov.1, 2002).
840

0

Thomas J. Smedinghoff, Securing Trust 1 (Feb. 1, 2002), at
http://sprint.ziffdavis.com/ecommerce l.htrnl (last visited Nov. 1, 2002). For instance, the Federal
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2) requires healthcare
providers to deploy security measures to ensure confidentiality and the integrity ofhealthcare
information. Failure to comply with the regulation will result in penalties, including fines and
possible imprisonment. In addition, under some laws in the United States, such as under the 1999
lllinois Electronic Commerce Security Act and the 1999 New York Electronic Signatures and
Records Act and some laws of other countries such as the 1998 Singapore Electronic Transactions
Act and the 2000 Hong Kong Electronic Transactions Ordinance, electronic signatures are
enforceable in certain cases only if proper security measures are applied. For example, New York
Electronic Signatures and Records Act§ 540.4 (1999) provides that the signature that meets the
criteria shall have the same validity and effect as the use of a signature affixed by hand. The
signature has to be unique to the person using it, capable of verification, created using creation
data under the sole control of the signatory, and associated with the electronic document in such a
manner that authenticates the attachment of the signature to particular data and the integrity of the
data transmitted. Thailand has adopted the Model Law on Electronic Signatures, approved by the
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businesses to utilize specific security measures to transact with online users. Businesses
implement transaction security measures in order to gain market share and to engender
trust in online users. 841 Without proper security measures, businesses may be exposed to
the risks of conducting transactions with impostors. Security policies are a crucial step in
providing consumer protection from fraud. 842 Thus, security will be the key to creating
trust between parties conducting online business transactions. 843
Authentication technologies have developed dramatically from simple passwords
to highly complex biometrics techniques used for verifying individuals' identities and the
authenticity of electronic documents. The application of digital signatures minimizes
impersonation, message tampering and document alteration. 844 Some risks, however,
remain inevitable features of the use of new technology.
Liabilities of parties who apply authentication technologies are uncertain in some
jurisdictions where statutes do not impose specific duties or liabilities on the parties
involved. In the United States, the Federal E-Sign Act provides broad recognition for
electronic signatures, but leaves the questions of duties and liabilities to the court in

United Nations in 2001. Under the Thai Electronic Transactions Act (2001), the enforceability of
electronic signatures is based on their level of reliability.
841

See LAW AND THE INTERNET : A FRAMEWORK FOR ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 57( Lilian
Edwards & Charlotte Waelde eds., 2000). A lack of consumer confidence is a major obstacle
impeding the growth of e-commerce. The main risks which consumers encounter when they shop
through the Internet are, for instance, that someone may use a consumer's credit card to make
fraudulent purchases for which the consumer will be held accountable, and that the merchants will
not perform their side of the contract or perform it defectively, and consumers fear being left
without remedy or with a remedy that is difficult to enforce.

0

842

TOM ARNOLD ET AL., INTERNET IDENTITY THEFT: A TRAGEDY FOR VICTIMS 10(2000).

843

Smedinghoff, supra note 840, at 2.

844

John Cooper, Legal Focus Digital Signatures and Electronic Trading 1(May 15, 2001), at
http://www.justis.com/news/jc 010515.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2002).
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deciding a dispute based on existing laws. Some states, such as Utah, have a
comprehensive digital signature law which imposes duties and liabilities on both
signatories and certification authorities. Parties who fail to comply with duties imposed
by law will be held accountable for damages occurred.
Thailand's legislative assembly passed a law on electronic transactions, the
Electronic Transactions Act, B.E. 2544(2001), which recognizes all electronic signatures
qualified under the definition. The E-Transactions Act, based on the Model Law on
Electronic Signatures, imposes duties on signatories, relying parties and certification
authorities. Failure to comply with such duties may establish a cause of action for parties

I .

who sustain loss.
Thi~

r·...

chapter will identify the parties involved in digitally signed transactions, the

risks associated with the use of digital signature technology and the duties and liabilities
of the parties involved in the open PKI model.

4.1 Parties Involved in Digitally Signed Transactions

1:·

I

A transaction using an electronic signature requires at least two parties, the
signatory of an electronic signature and the recipient. Without a trusted third party, the
recipient has to verify the authenticity of the electronic signature by other means such as
by requiring a telephone confirmation. Thus a recipient generally prefers the
involvement of a third party, which altogether makes up the three parties to an electronic
transaction:

lj
,[
I

( 1) A signatory or subscriber;
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(2) A trusted third party or a certification authority or a certification service

I,
I

provider;
(3) A relying party (recipient).

4.1.1 Signatories or Subscribers

I

i

A signatory under the Model Law of Electronic Signatures is a person who holds
signature creation data and acts either in his own capacity or on behalf of the person it
represents. 845 The Thai E-Transactions Act defines the signatory in a similar fashion to
the Model Law. TheE-Sign Act does not stipulate a definition for a signatory. 846

ri ..
0

A signatory under the E-Transactions Act means "a person that holds signature

..

i
'

creation data and creates the electronic signature on his behalf or on behalf of other
person." 847 A signatory of a digital signature is a person who possesses a digital
signature creation data which he or she has exclusive control over the use of such
signature creation data. The word signatory refers not only to natural persons, but also
includes other entities whether corporate or other legal persons 848 which allow or assign a

845

UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES art. 2(d) {2001 ).

846

See California Digital Signature Regulations (1998) § 22003 (a)(1)(K) provides that
"subscriber" means a person who: is the subject listed in a certificate; accepts the certificate; and
holds a private key which corresponds to a public key listed in that certificate. See also Utah Code
Ann.§ 46-3-103 (32){1996) provides that "signer" means a person who creates a digital signature
for a message.§ 46-3-103 (33)(1996) stipulates that "subscnber" means a person who: (a) is the
subject listed in a certificate; (b) accepts the certificate; and (c) holds a private key which
corresponds to a public key listed in that certificate. See also lllinois Electronic Commerce
Security Act§ 1-105 (1998) provides that "subscriber" means a person who is the subject named
or otherwise identified in a certificate, who controls a private key that corresponds to the public
key listed in that certificate, and who is the person to whom digitally signed messages verified by
reference to such certificate are to be attnbuted.
847

E-TRANSACTIONS Acr § 4.

848

UNCITRAL Working Group on Electronic Commerce, supra note 322, at 35.siv
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natural person to act on its behalf. For instance, a signatory can be an individual or a
company acting through a natural person who applies the digital signature in the name of
a company and binds the company as a principal under the law of agency.

4.1.2 Trusted Third Parties, Certification Authorities and Certification
Service Providers
A trusted third party, acting as an identity verifier, is technically known as a
certification authority. Consistent with the Model Law on Electronic Signatures, the

,...

Model Law defines a certification service provider as a certification authority. Therefore,

I( ··

a certification authority or a certification service provider may be considered as a person

ll.
I

I"
·J "

who issues certificates and may provide other services related to electronic signatures. 849
Neither theE-Sign Act nor theE-Transactions Act provides a definition for a

1, .....

.I :: ·
"

I

• •

certification authority or a certification service provider. The term certification service
provider or certification authority can be interpreted by reference to the definition
provided in the Model Law.850 Thus, a certification service provider includes all entities
which provide certification services in both commercial 851 and non-commercial contexts.
I

However, by the exclusion of entities which issue certificates for internal purposes, the

I·

I

Model Law mainly focuses on commercial use. 852

849

UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES art. 2( e) (2001 ).

850

See California Digital Signature Regulations (1998) § 22003 (a)(1)(E) provides "Certification
Authority" means a person or entity that issues a certificate, or in the case of certain certification
processes, certifies amendments to an existing certificate. See also Utah Code Ann.§ 46-3-103
(4)(1996) provides that "Certification Authority" means a person who issues a certificate. See also
Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act§ 1-105 (1998) provides that "Certification Authority"
means a person who authorizes and causes the issuance of a certificate.
851

UNCITRAL Working Group on Electronic Commerce, supra note 322, at 36.

852

Id.
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A certification authority or certification service provider offers the services of the
facilitation of secure transactions with regard to integrity, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation between online business trading partners. 853 The certification authority
confirms the credentials of online transactions by certifying a digital signature applied by
signatories. 854 The certification authority encrypts the certificate with its private key and
sends the signed certificate to the signatory. If anyone wishes to communicate with the
signatory, that person may request the signed certificate from the signatory and apply the
signatory's public key creation data contained in the certificate to decrypt the message. 855
Certificates issued by certification authorities now exist for the authentication of
Websites (site certificates), individuals (personal certificates) and software companies
(software publisher certificates). 856 The basic function of a certificate is to match the
public key with a particular signatory. 857 In the United States, Verisign is the pioneer in
carrying out online authentication services. Verisign provides three classes of digital
certificates. Class 1 certificates can be used to verify the source of an e-mail. A Class 2
certificate verifies the user's identity based on a commercial·credit database. A Class 3
certificate notarizes documents. 858 At present, there are other companies which offer
digital certification services such as Norte/, Cylink, and Certco

859

•

853

Ian Taylor, Licensing of Trusted Third Parties for the Provision ofEncryption Services, at 9,
available at http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14/dti.html (March, 1997).
854

COMPUTER SECURITY HANDBOOK 16.12(Arthur E. Hutt et al. eds., John Wiley & Sons 3d
ed.1995).
0

855

EFRAIM TURBAN ET AL., ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: A MANAGERIAL PERSPECTIVE 399(1999).

856

/d. at 399.

857

Tara C. Hogan, Technology Now That the Floodgates Have Been Opened, Why Haven't Banks
Rushed Into the Certification Authority Business?, 4 N.C. BANKING lNST. 417, 424(2000).
858

TURBAN ET AL., supra note 855, at 399.
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In Thailand, the Information Center Company and Thai Telephone Organization

r··

jointly established the first root certification authority called the Thai Digital ID

Corporation in the year 2000. 860 The Thai Digital ID Corporation certifies a certification
authority which provides digital certification services for its subscribers. Thai Digital ID

Corp issued the first certificate to the PCC Digital ID, the first commercial certification
authority which provides the digital certification services of issuing digital certificates to
subscribers in conjunction with electronic payments. 861
The root certification authority in Thailand provides a high level of trust for
subscribers in the open model PKI because both the commercial service provider and the
signatory of a digital signature are identified. The Root Certification Authority, the Thai

Digital ID Corp certifies that a commercial certification authority such as the PCC
Digital ID really exists in an online environment and provides online certification
services for online users. This way, online users can trust that the PCC Digital ID is not a
fraudulent company.
Since the PCC Digital ID verifies an online user·applying for a digital certificate
to be used for online transactions, such as for online payments? the other parties to online
transactions can trust the concluded transaction because they have contacted with verified
users and certification authority.

859

GEORGE B. DELTA& JEFFREY H. MATSUURA, LAWOFTIIElNTERNET 9-134(1997).

860

Thai Digital ID Root Certificate Authority (2001), available at
http://www.thaidigitalid.com/abouttdid th.html.(last visited Nov. 1, 2002).
861

/d.
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To enhance the creditability of digital certificates issued by one certification
authority, cross-certification technologl62may be used to verify such digital certificates
in order to enhance the relying parties' confidence in the information contained in the
digital certificates. If certification authority A issues a digital certificate in the name of
John, certification authority A may request certification authority B verify the fact that the
digital certificate was accurately issued by A by using the A's public key. Certification
authority B would then digitally sign the certificate to assure both the authenticity of the
digital certificate and its contents. 863 This provides proof that certification authority B did
indeed checked the authenticity of the digital certificate. Another advantage of crosscertification is that compromise of A's private key cannot bring down the whole PKI. 864
IfB issued a certificate to a compromised user, A simply revokes the certificate,
eliminating the compromised certification authority from its system. 865
A certification authority may establish a subordinate entity, called a Local
Registration Authority (LRA), to act as a connector between remote users and the
certification authority. 866 The certification authority and local registration office

862

Rutrell Yasin, Vendors Adding To PKI Interoperability, available at
http://www.intemetweek.com/newsO 199/newsO 12299-S.htm( 1999).
863

Hogan, supra note 857, at 424.

864
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William T. Polk and Nelson E. Hastings, Bridge Certification Authorities: Connecting BlB
Public Key Infrastructures, at 6, available at http://csrc.nist.gov/pki/documents/B2B-article.pdf
(n.d.).
865

/d.

866

Digital Signature and Confidentiality Certificate Policies For the Government of Canada
Public Key Infrastructure 7 (April 1999), available at http://www.cio-dpi.gc.ca/pkiicp/guidedocs/cert-policy/cp-pc e.pdf(last visited Nov. 1, 2002).
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collaborates to produce a single certificate. 867 The local registration authority performs
the primary function of identity verification and registration of users for certificates and
keys. 868 It is useful for the certification authority to have a local registration authority for
it makes face-to-face identification requirements possible since the subscribers are able to
personally appear before the authority offices located nearby.

In addition to providing online certificates, a certification authority may also offer
a key recovery or key escrow service. The key recovery or key escrow system requires
either a trusted certification authority or a trusted third party to maintain secure a copy of
a private key. 869 Such services provide for the recovery of private key creation data in
the event that the signatory forgets his key or the private key creation data has been
destroyed by any reason.

870

4.1.3 Relying Parties
The definition of a relying party under the Model Law is a person who acts in
reliance of a certificate or an electronic signature. 871 The Thai E-Transactions Act
directly adopted such a definition. 872 The E-Sign Act, however, does not define a relying
party in the same way as the Model Law and the E-Transactions Act. Thus, a relying
867

Ben Laurie, Seven and a Half Non-Risk ofPKI, available at http://www .apachessl.org/7 .5things.tx.t (last visited Nov. 13, 2002).

868

Digital Signature and Confidentiality Certificate Policies For the Government of Canada
Public Key Infrastructure, supra note 685, at 7.
869

IAN LLOYD, LEGAL AsPECTS OF TilE lNFORMATION SOCIETY 253(2000).

870

ld.

871

UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES, art. 2(f) (2001 ).
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872

E-TRANSACTIONS ACT § 4 defines ''relying party" as a person that may act on the basis of a
certificate or an electronic signature.
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party can be a person who relies on a certificate or an electronic signature. Relying
parties are presumed to have acted in good faith by relying on either an electronic
signature or information contained in a certificate. 873

I.

4.2 Risks of Parties Involved in Digitally Signed Transactions
4.2.1 Trust
PKI is a cryptographic key and certificate delivery system that allows strangers to
exchange secure communication. 874 PKI may also provide confidentiality services for

,._

online communicators. The key element of creating trust to online users depends on not

I

~

~

l

only the technology used to support digital signatures, but also the conducts of the parties
involved. To be judged trustworthy, PKI must ensure the following features:
(a) Correspondence of the signatory's public key to the signatory's private key;
(b) Integrity of the signatory's public key;
(c) Validity of the encrypted technology;
(d) Trustworthiness of the Authority who created the key pair and maintained the
public key;
(e) Inter-operability ofthe encryption system applied with other systems. 875

873

UNCITRAL Working Group on Electronic Commerce, supra note 322, at 36. See Utah Code
Ann. § 46-3-103 (26)(1996) defines "recipient'' means a person who receives or has a digital
signature and is in a position to rely on it.
874

CA IT Security Guidance, Model GOC PKI CA: Information Technology Security Guidance
Document, at 2, available at http://www.cio-dpi.gc.ca/pki-icp/guidedocs/model security e.pdf
(last visited Nov. 14, 2002).
875

ISTEV, Legal and Regulatory Issues for the European Trusted Services Infrastructures- ETS, at
21, available at http:llwww.infosociety.grlpoliciesldigitalldocsllrfets.doc (June 1997).
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The most significant issue in digitally signed transactions and the use ofPKI is
whether a digitally signed transaction and certificate can be relied upon. The issue of
trust covers how any interested person can rely on a trusted third party, commonly known
as a certification authority, who plays a key role in issuing an identity verification
certificate. 876 The certificate is a signed statement by the certification authority which
effectively vouches that the person or entity who owns the public or private key pair
whose name is shown on the certificate is in fact the rightful owner.

877

The certification

authority also vouches other information related to the owner of the key pair. 878 To trust
the certificate, it is important that the certification authority conducts an acceptable
standard in the verification of the information stated in the certificate.
The question of trust in certification authorities depends not only on the identity

[...

~.~.

of the certification service provider, but also on governmental policy. On the one hand, it

;.::
,.-

~-

is appropriate for the government to run this business

879

due to its availability of

resources and funding. On the other hand, business and industry may not trust an
authoritarian certification authority run by the government for such governments may
enact rules in their favor. 880 Private entities, such as financial institutions, are also well

876

Carl Ellison & Bruce Schneier, Ten Risks ofPKI: What you are not Being Told About Public
Key Infrastructure, 16 COMPUTER SECURITY J. 1, 1(2000), available at
http://www.counterpane.com/pki-risks.pdf.
877

Netscape Certificate Server 1.0 Evaluation Guide, available at
htto://www.netscape.com/certificate/vl.O/evalguide/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2002).
878
879

Id
JOHNSTON AND HANDA,

supra note 35, at 99.
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Brad Biddle, Public Key Infrastructures and & Quot; Digital Signature& Quot; Legislation, at
http://www.magnet.state.ma.us/itdllegallbiddle l.htrnl ( 1997).
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positioned to run certification businesses881 because financial institutions such as banks
have already screened customers who opened accounts with them. Banks may issue
certificates for their customers upon their request on the condition that verification
requirements have been fulfilled. This includes the process of verifying all legal
information contained in the certificate.
A certification authority should be subject to licensing requirements. This is to
ensure that the certification authority has a command of the technical knowledge and
expertise to perform secure electronic notarizations by the deployment of trusted systems
and encryption technology. 882
In Malaysia it is not clear whether the licensing requirements for running a

. .:..
,J;. '.

certification service are truly mandatory. Article 4(3) of the Malaysian legislation
requires

any certification authority confirming the validity of a digital signature in

;r.':o..
~;; .

.r.t

rt:,.

,.J~:6.

Malaysia to be licensed by the Controller of Certificate Authorities, on pain of criminal
,.

.

prosecution.

881

883

Article 13 stipulates that a digital signature will not be denied legal effect

DELTA & MATSUURA, supra note 859, at 9-133.
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Dina Athanasopoulos-Arvanitakis and Marilynn J. Dye, A Proposed Code of Professional
Responsibility for Certification Authorities, 17 J. MARsHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1003, 1008
(1999). Under the 1996 Utah Digital Signature Act, § 46-3-201 provides that a certification
authority may act as an unlicensed certification authority .... In California, the California Secretary
of State is empowered to maintain an "Approved List of Certificate Authorities" authorized to
issue certificates for digitally signed communication with public entities in California. See
California Digital Signature Regulations (1998) § 22003 (a)(6). Under Singapore Electronic
Transactions Act (1998), a business of providing online verification is not subject to mandatory
licensing.
883

Internet Law and Policy Forum-Working Groups and Publications, Survey ofInternational
Electronic & Digital Initiatives, available at htt.p://www.ilpf.org/groups/survey.htm (last visited
Nov. 13, 2002). See Malaysia Digital Signature Act 1997 § 4 provides that:
(1) No person shall carry on or operate, or hold himself out as carrying on or operating, as a
certification authority unless that person holds a valid license issued under this Act.
(2) A person who contravenes subsection (1) commits an offence and shall, on conviction, be
liable to a fine not exceeding five hundred thousand ringgit or to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding ten years or to both, and in the case of a continuing offence shall in addition be liable to
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simply because it was confirmed by an unlicensed certification authority.

884

An

unlicensed certification authority may exist under the Malaysian legislation, but failure to
obtain a licensing may subject that certification authority to criminal liability. The
Singapore Electronic Transactions Bill also does not require a certification authority to be
licensed.
The Thai E-Transactions Act does not stipulate restrictions on who can be a
certification authority. A government agency, such as NECTEC, or a private corporation,
may run a certification service on the condition that such agency or corporation meets the

..
....

requirements imposed by law. 885 TheE-Transactions Act gives anyone the right to carry
out a business of providing services related to electronic transactions. An online
verification service is currently not subject to licensing requirements.
The E-Transactions Act allows the government to proclaim by Royal Decree a
requirement that certain types of business of providing services related to electronic
transactions be subject to prior notification, registration or license on the condition that it
,. ~

-!,.' I

is necessary for maintaining financial and commercial security or for strengthening the
reliability and credibility in the data message system or for preventing loss to the

a daily fine not exceeding five thousand ringgit for each day the offence continues to be
committed.
884

/d. See also§ 13 of Malaysia Digital Signature Act (1997) provides that" (1) The liability limits
specified in Chapter 8 of Part N shall not apply to unlicensed certification authorities.
(2) Part V shall not apply in relation to a digital signature which cannot be verified by a certificate
issued by a licensed certification authority.
(3) In any other case, unless the parties expressly provide otherwise by contract between
themselves, the licensing requirements under this Act shall not affect the effectiveness,
enforceability or any digital signature."
885

See KRisANA CHANGKLOM, REsEARCH: DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW (DRAFT) 71(1997). It is
appropriate for a State agency to run online certification services because of its credibility and
security.
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public. 886 The certification authority must develop a training plan and training material
for its personnel in order to give support to consumers who may need assistance in the
use of the digital signature technology.

887

A certification authority should be subject to licensing requirements because it is
necessary not only to maintain the security of online commercial transactions, but also to
strengthen their reliability and creditability and to protect the consumers. Online users
need to be assured that the certification authority possesses certain attributes, such as
trustworthiness, technical ability, financial stability, confidentiality of operations and
legal accountability for its actions. 888
A certification authority can ensure trust to all parties by strictly following its own
Certificate Practice Statement, or CPS in terms of processes in verifying identity of a

.

:;

signatory. However, most CPS contain disclaimers and limitation of liabilities which
dissuade prospective parties from applying or relying on digital certificates issued by

•j
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such certification authority.
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E-TRANSACTIONS ACT § 32 provides that a person has the right to carry out a business of
providing services related to electronic transactions, but in the case where it is necessary for
maintaining financial and commercial security or for strengthening the reliability and credibility in
data message system or for preventing loss to public, there shall be issued a Royal Decree
requiring that the operation of a particular business of providing services related to that operation
of a particular business of providing services related to electronic transactions be subject to prior
notification, registration or license.
887

Francois Marinier, 25 Steps to the SuccessfUl Implementation ofa Corporate Public Key
Infrastructure, available at httP://www.pkilaw.com/25step.htm. (last visited Nov. 14, 2002).
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Taylor, supra note 853, at 9.
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4.2.2 Risks of Relying on Unauthorized Digitally Signed Signatures
Guarding a private signing key is one of the most crucial issues in any
Certification Authority-based system. 889 A private signing key may be used without
authorization if a signatory does not maintain certain access control mechanisms for the

°

protection of the private key. 89 For instance, if the signatory stores his or her private key
on a conventional computer, the signatory must guard the private key with passwords or
other authentication methods in order to verify the signatory's identity. Viruses and other
malignant programs may also attack the private key creation data. 891
Even though a private key is protected by the use of passwords, the degree of
security depends on how hard it is for a hacker to uncover such passwords. Such

.,.

..

I •

~.

passwords should not be too easily guessed and the signatory should not use common
words as the potential of using a dictionary program to hack such passwords is enormous.

If a private key is kept on a smart card where a microchip is used to store a private key
creation data, such smart card must possess attack-resistance attributes. 892

889

Ellison & Schneier, supra note 876, at 2.

890

See I.C. PALMER & G.A. POTIER, COMPUTER SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT 101(1999). The
private key must always be protected by full password control. See also WARWICK FORD AND
MICHAEL S. BAUM, SECURE ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: BUILDING THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF
DIGITAL SIGNATURE AND ENCRYPTION 129 {2000). To enhance the level of security, biometric
technologies may be used to control access to the private signing key.
891

Ellison & Schneier, supra note 876, at 2. See also WARWICK FORD AND MICHAELS. BAUM,
SECURE ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: BUILDING THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF DIGITAL SIGNATURE AND
ENCRYPTION 122 (2000). Passwords may be subject to various attacks, such as external disclosure,
guessing, communication eavesdropping, replay, and host compromise.
892
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From a technical perspective, digital signatures are unbreakable and it is
impossible for a hacker to forge a signature.

893

In addition, digital signatures are not

reproducible. 894 This makes it impossible for a forger to copy a digitally signed digital
signature from one document and then paste onto another document. Repudiation of a
digitally signed transaction is thereby rendered impossible. The weakest point of the
digital signature lies in a compromise of the private key. Where this occurs there may be
no discemable distinction between an authorized and unauthorized digitally signed
transaction. The relying party cannot tell whether or not the signed message is genuine.
Digital signatures are a tool for securing online transactions. This does not mean
that such tool assures absolute security. A digital signature technology based on
cryptosystems may be broken through a cryptanalytic attack. 895 The hacker may attack
the algorithm or the key. In an attack on the algorithm, the cryptanalyst relies on the
nature of the algorithm to try to deduce plaintext from cyphertext or to deduce the key. 896
The cryptanalyst may attack the key by trying every plausible key on a piece of
cyphertext until one works to decrypt it into plaintext. 897 This attack is called a brute-

893

/d. See also DANIEL MINOLI & EMMA MINOLI, WEB COMMERCE TECHNOLOGY
HANDBOOK, SECURE ELECTRONIC TRANSACTION, INTERNET EDI, DIGITAL
SIGNATURES 218(1997). A digital signature can only be created by someone who has
knowledge of the private key. To verify the digital signature, it requires knowledge of the public
key of the signatory. Other persons can only verify the digital signature, but cannot forge it.
894

Bruce Schneier, Crypto-Gram, available at
http://www.commons.somewhere.com/rre/2000/RRE.hacking.digital.sign.html(2000).
895

SMEDINGHOFF, supra note 144, at 502.

896

/d.

897

/d. See also JAMES MARTIN, SECURI1Y, ACCURACY, AND PRIVICY IN COMPUTER SYSTEMS 209210(1973). To minimize the attack on the key, the key for deciphering must be sufficiently long
and changed frequently and the key must be only employed once.
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force attack. 898 For instance, a French student succeeded in cracking encrypted
commercial transactions that Netscape's World Wide Web browser protected by a 40bytes key. He spent eight days deploying 120 computer workstations and approximately
$10,000 worth of computing power. 899
Relying parties may sustain risks if they rely on unauthorized digitally signed
transactions or forged certificates. For example, reliance on an unauthorized digitally
signed order can create substantial loss when the relying party has already shipped
merchandise to a designated destination. The relying party may be left with expenses
such as shipping, and insurance premiums which has been incurred by unwittingly
relying on a counterfeit certificate.

,_

Where the certification authority's private key is compromised or revealed,
certificates based on such key can be forged.

90

° For example, in March 2001, there was a

breach of Microsoft's two digital certificates. 901 The vulnerability of using a digital
certificate may dissuade online users from trusting digital certificates issued by
untrustworthy digital notarization service providers. Human trust is a factor when using
digital certificates and there is a risk of a compromise. 902 A digital time stamping service
may be used in conjunction with a digital certificate to provide irrefutable proof of the

898

/d.

899

/d.

900

Hal Abelson et al., The Risks ofKey Recovery, Key Escrow, & Trusted Third Party and
Encrption 14(1998), available at http://www.cdt.org/crypto/risks98/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2002).
901

Microsoft Security Breach Underscores the Risks ofDigital Certificates, available at
http://www .surety.comlhome/pr-msdigitalsig.html (200 1).
902

/d.
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validity of the document. Thus, digitally signed transactions with digital timestamps can
be legally binding regardless of the status of the digital certificate used to sign it. 903
In order to maintain the trustworthiness of digital signatures, some states in the
United States, such as Utah904 and Washington905 , provide that the signatory is
responsible for a digitally signed transaction whenever a certification authority certifies
and approves the signatory's private key. This imposes a great burden on a signatory
because the law doesn't care who used such private key or what virus did the signing. 906
In Thailand, the E-Transactions Act does not provide for either a presumption of
validity of the digitally signed transaction or non-repudiation provisions. It leaves full
discretion to courts to decide whether the digitally signed transaction was truly made by
the signatory and whether the digital signature is reliable. The Act leaves leeway for a
signatory to deny any unauthorized digitally signed transaction on the condition that the

1 ·••

903

!d.

~·.··

904

See Utah Code Ann. 46-3-406(3)(1996) stipulates "if a digital signature is verified by the
public key listed in a valid certificate issued by a licensed certification authority:
(a) that the digital signature is the digital signature of the subscnber listed in that certificate;
(b) that the digital signature was affixed by the signer with the intention of signing the
message; and
(c) the recipient of that digital signature has no knowledge or notice that the signer:
(i) breached a duty as a subscriber; or
(ii) does not rightfully hold the private key used to affix the digital signature; .... "
905

See Washington Electronic Authentication Act§ 19.34.350 (3)(1997) which provides that "if a
digital signature is verified by the public key listed in a valid certificate issued by a licensed
certification authority:
(a) That digital signature is the digital signature of the subscriber listed in that certificate;
(b) That digital signature was affixed by that subscriber with the intention of signing the
message;
(c) The message associated with the digital signature has not been altered since the signature
was affixed; and
(d) The recipient of that digital signature has no knowledge or notice that the signer:
(i) Breached a duty as a subscriber; or
(ii) Does not rightfully hold the private key used to affix the digital signature."
906

Ellison & Schneier, supra note 876 at 2.
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signatory maintained a reasonable standard of care in protecting his or her private key,

I·

otherwise the signatory may be held responsible for such signing.

4.2.3 Possible Offences Concerning Digital Signatures

I•

Most defects in the use of digital signature technology do not arise from the
technology itself, but from the person who uses it. One of many possible causes of
inefficiency in digital technology is the conduct of the signatories, relying parties, and
certification authorities, as well as attacks by a third party.
A signatory usually prefers a simple and easy means of accessing his or her

~:

private key. For instance, the signatory may prefer a Single Sign-On in order to access a
i:-' •.

private key creation data since he or she can access to the signing key all day without the
need to re-sign-on. 907 This makes access convenient but it can make the digital signature
technology unreliable. After the signatory has signed on, if he or she leaves the computer
unattended for whatever reason, third parties are offered the opportunity to use the private

.......
1',.

;t ..
•'

.

l2.; , I
key without the signatory's knowledge. Single Sign-On is not appropriate for digital
signature technology because requiring a signatory to identify himself or herself before
each time before signing an electronic document ensures that each signing is authorized
by the private key holder. 908
A certification service provider that does not employ a high level of security
technology in maintaining online certificates may give an opportunity to an impostor to
access to such certificate lists and add a phony certificate onto the list. This could make a
907

!d. at 7.

908

To eliminate repudiation issues, it is necessary that a signatory should verify himself or herself
every time before affixing a digital signature to an electronic document.
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relying party falsely believe that a person whose name appeared on the certificate list is
really the person with whom he or she is contacting.
Before relying on digitally signed transactions, relying parties must inspect the
Certificate Revocation Lists in order to make sure that a certificate issued by the
certification authority has not been revoked. Failure to do so may be construed as
negligence if in fact the certificate has become compromised or the certificate certifying
the identity of a signatory is no longer valid and may result in a substantial loss to the
I•

relying party.
The acts of a third party, such as an impostor or a hacker, can be considered as
offences to the use of digital signatures. The acts of stealing private key creation data
may cause private key holders to sustain losses. Thefts can be instigated by means of

,f.·..·
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copying a private signing key creation data, stealing a smart card which contains a private
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key or hacking the signatory's computer hard-drive. These are potential offences which a
signatory must take reasonable precautions.
A hacker may use a brute force attack to intrude or gain access to a private key as
if he were an authorized private key holder. This act needs a very advanced technology in
order to break the cryptographic technology. It may also be possible in the near future for
hackers to use highly advanced technologies to break codes or gain passwords in order to
use private key creation data.
Other problems regarding the use of digital signatures is that the signatory may be
forced into signing an electronic documents against his or her will, or the signatory may

I

L
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be intellectually susceptible and manipulated into signing an electronic document against
his or her interest. 909

4.3 Duties and Liabilities of Subscribers or Signatories
There are fundamentally two different types of the PKI: the open PKI model and
the closed PKI model. 910 In the open PKI model, the parties involved do not have any
pre-existing contractual relationship. The certification authority vouches the personal

..

identity of a stranger, called the subscriber911 , and creates its own requirements for
confirming the unique identity of its subscribers. 912 Any qualified subscriber may obtain
a certificate from the certification authority. A relying party may then access the online
certificate list publicly provided by the certification authority.

In the closed PKI model, there is a pre-existing relationship between the
certification authority and the subscriber, for example, a corporation and its employees,

'if •
trading partners, or a bank and its consumers. 913 The certification authority in the closed

.• I f

~;..

909

National Notary Association, A Position On Digital Signature Laws And Notarization, at 5,
available at hm>://www.nationalnotary.org/Digitalsignature.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2002).

910

Susan- Jacqueline Butler H, Part I: Panel Report: Panel IV: Certification, Authentication, and
Electronic Signatures, 17 ARIZ. J.lNT'L& COMP. LAW 149, 152(2000).
911

I d. See also Michael S. Baum, Technology Neutrality and Secure Electronic Commerce: Rule
Making in the Age of" Equivalence", available at
hm>://www.verisign.com/re.pository/techneutralityv1 1.doc 36(last visited Nov. 8, 2002). An open
PKI may be known as "Non-privity PKI'' in which all relevant relying parties are not privy to the
contract with the certification authority. Current law and regulations may apply to their legal
relationship.
912

Id.

913

Id.
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system vouches for some specific characteristics of a subscriber.

914

The issued certificate

links a public key to special attributes or privileges such as employment status, access
right and membership. 915 The contract between the parties clearly defines the rights and
responsibilities. 916 Thus, only individuals who have prior relationships may apply for
such certificates917
J

The study of the liability of parties involved in the use of the PKI very much

,J,

depends on the nature of the PKI model. This study focuses on the open PKI model
where the duties and liabilities of parties involved are not clearly defined by pre-existing
agreements. The law in general and e-commerce laws govern this model. Certain aspects
of the relationship between a certification authority and a prospective subscriber may be
stated in a certification practice statement (CPS). The certification authority has to verify
the identity of a subscriber and whether he or she meets the certificate issuance
requirement before issuing a certification for that subscriber.
The duties imposed on a signatory vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The
Model Law on Electronic Signatures provides a minimal code of conduct for the parties

914

/d. See also Michael S. Baum, Technology Neutrality and Secure Electronic Commerce: Rule
Making in the Age of" Equivalence", available at
http://www.verisign.com/re.positorvltechneutralityvl l.doc 35(last visited Nov. 8, 2002).
"Closed" systems can be defined as ''Pre-existing privity PKI" in which all relevant parties rely on
contracts without requiring specific legislation to govern their legal relationship. The parties may
have a direct contractual relationship with the certification authority prior to the issuance or use of
certificates. Under this model, users, by contract, are barred from transmitting a message to
anyone outside the group. This prohibition sometimes also includes receiving messages from
outside the group.
915

/d.

916

/d.

917

/d.
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involved in the use of electronic and digital signatures. 918 Thailand directly adopted this
rule of conduct and incorporated it into the E-Transactions Act. In the United States, the
E-Sign Act does not impose a duty of care on a signatory. However, some states which
enacted digital signature statutes incorporated the duty of care requirement of
•

•

stgnatones.

919

4.3.1 Overview of the Principle of Duty of Care
Negligence is, at present, the most significant basis of tort liability in the United
States. 920 In order to safeguard the general welfare of the people against infringements by
others, individuals are required to comply with society standards of conduct. Such

~. :

:-- ··

standards generally require an individual to exercise adequate care when acting in such a
way as may affect others, and a failure to meet such a standard of care would as a
consequence result in a liability. Standard of care is often described as a certain average

r,·:
•..
'.j ···

918

UNCITRAL Working Group on Electronic Commerce, supra note 322, at 46.

919

See Utah Code Ann.§ 46-3-305 (1996) provides that (1) by accepting a certificate issued by a
licensed certification authority, the subscnber identified in the certificate "assumes a duty to
exercise reasonable care" to retain control of the private key and prevent its disclosure to any
person not authorized to create the subscnber's digital signature. (2) A private key is the personal
property of the subscnber who rightfully holds it. (3) If a certification authority holds the private
key corresponding to a public key listed in a certificate which it has issued, the certification
authority holds the private key as a fiduciary of the subscriber named in the certificate, and may
use that private key only with the subscriber's prior, written approval, unless the subscnber
expressly grants the private key to the certification authority and expressly permits the
certification authority to hold the private key according to other terms. See also California
Government Code§ 16.5. The signatory is required to retain control of the private key. The person
who holds the key pair, or the subscriber identified in the certificate, "assumes a duty to exercise
reasonable care" to retain control of the private key and prevent its disclosure to any person... . See
also Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act§ 10-125(1) and (2) (1998) which provides that
"(1) the person generating or creating the signature device must do so in a trustworthy manner; (2)
the signer and all other persons that rightfully have access to such signature device must exercise
reasonable care to retain control and maintain the secrecy of the signature device, and to protect it
from any unauthorized access, disclosure, or use, during the period when reliance on a signature
created by such device is reasonable ... "
920

JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. &RICHARDN. PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS 319(3d. ed.l988).
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of conduct that in the light of all the circumstances does not create unreasonable risks to
others.

I

921

The law of negligence shares its origin with the law ofbattery under the writs
system developed in England in the centuries following the Norman Conquest. 922 Prior to
the nineteenth century, the term negligence was used to describe a breach of any legal
obligation or referred to an inadvertent or indifferent commission of other torts. 923 In the
nineteenth century, about the year 1825, most scholars developed the proposition that a
person who caused harm to another should be held answerable for that harm on the basis
of negligence as an independent basis ofliability. 924 This was consistent with early

~·-.

Anglo-Saxon Law and the Mediaeval Common Law. 925

i.. .
..
--.

I·

A negligent act is one which breaches a duty to exercise care and diligence owed

flo"I"'
I
t~r

t···

to another person under common law or statute. 926 In order to bring an action for
negligence in a court of law, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant was

I' r .
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r.··

tl:.

u:;-;

921

PAGE KEETON & ROBERT E. KEETON, CASES AND MATERlALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 208(2d
ed. 1977). See also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN ET AL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 121(4th
ed.1984).
922

HENDERSON & PEARSON, supra note 920, at 320.

923

WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 139(4th ed.1971 ).

924

/d.

925

HENDERSON & PEARSON, supra note 920, at 320.

r

926

FRANCIS M. BURDICK, THE LAW OF TORT: A CONCISE TREATIES ON THE CIVIL LIABILITY AT
COMMON LAW AND UNDER MODERN STATUTES FOR ACTIONABLE WRONGS TO PERSON AND
PROPERTY 477(1913). See also Boston & M. Ry. v. Sargeant 72 N.H. 455, 57 At. 688 (1904). See
also KENNETH SMITH & DENIS J. KEENAN, ENGLISH LAW 348(6th ed. 1979). A person is not liable
for every injury which results from his carelessness unless a duty of care is required. See also
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN ET AL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 73 (4th ed.1984). The negligence
concept applied to the nonfeasance of individuals charged either by contract or statute with a duty
of care.
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blameworthy. 927 In other words, the plaintiff has to establish that the defendant was under
an obligation or a duty of care prescribed by law under the circumstances and such a
defendant has violated such obligation or duty to exercise due care and caution. 928
. Duty of care is a concept which apparently originated in Roman law and was later

ad~pted by English law in the law of bailment. 929 American law also adopted the
principle of duty of care where it has continued to exist and is applicable to all areas of
activities. 930 The duty of care in case of bailment is ordinary care, i.e. the bailee will be
held answerable for loss if he failed to exercise ordinary care in protecting property in his
custody. Whether a duty of care exists or not is a question of law for a judge to decide,

I:"·

I'·

I

but the question whether the defendant was in breach of that duty is a question of fact to
be decided by the jury.

r, .
! .......

931
I

t:·' .
['·
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927

MARC A. FRANKLIN, GILBERT LAW SUMMARIES: TORTS 40(19th ed. 1991). See also JAMES A.
HENDERSON, JR. & RICHARD N. PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS 321(3d. ed.1988). The courts took
a position that the defendant cannot be imposed liability for negligence unless the actor was guilty
of some fault or neglect. See also WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 142(4th
ed.1971). The man who fires a gun, the automobile driver whose tire blows out, the boy on bicycle
who frightens a horse, the man who instinctively and reasonably seizes another to save himself
from falling, are liable for the damage done only if they have been at fault. The plaintiff bears the
burden of proof of such fault.
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928

RICHARD A. EPSTEIN ET AL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 119(4th ed.1984). See also
FRANCIS M. BURDICK, THE LAW OF TORT : A CONCISE TREATIES ON THE CNIL LIABILITY AT
COMMON LAW AND UNDER MODERN STATUTES FOR ACTIONABLE WRONGS TO PERSON AND
PROPERTY477 (1913). According to Sweeny v. Old Col., etc., Ry., 10 Allen (92 Mass.) 368
(1865), the court held that the defendant's act of inducing the plaintiff to cross the tracks made
defendant owe a duty of care to the plaintiff. For this reason, the defendant will be held
answerable to the plaintiff for failing to exercise proper care and caution. See also MARC A.
FRANKLIN, GILBERT LAW SUMMARIES: TORTS 40(19th ed. 1991). Statutes or case laws may
impose some special duties upon the defendant which may be in addition to, or in place of, the
duty of due care.
929

EDWARD J. KIONKA, TORTS IN A NUTSHELL: INJURIES TO PERSONS AND PROPERTY 113(1977).

930

!d.

'·

931

KENNETH SMITH & DENIS J. KEENAN, ENGLISH LAW 347(6th ed. 1979). See also Powell v.
Vracin, 150 Cal. App. 2d. 454,310 P.2d 27(1957). What is reasonable under particular
circumstances is a question for the jury to decide.
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To hold the defendant liable under the tort of negligence, a court must be satisfied
in the light of the evidence that the defendant has failed to take due care932 in acts or
omissions which the defendant can reasonably foresee as causing damage to another
person. 933 Such acts or omissions must reasonably cause the injury. The mere possibility
of injury is inadequate to hold the defendant liable for his act. Liability would only be
incurred if it could be indicated that injury would result on the balance of probabilities of
such an act. If the occurrence is so unusual, extraordinary or improbable, the actor cannot
be held liable for a failure to anticipate the danger of any such reasonably unexpected

'·

occurrence. 934 The test offorseeability states that damage is foreseeable if a situation
exists where the likelihood of harm would cause a reasonably prudent person to guard
against it. 935 In other words, an ordinary prudent man confronted by such a probability of
danger arising would take precautions to guard against it. It follows that anyone who
failed to act as such would be held responsible on grounds of negligence. 936
Ordinary care relates to two concepts: the first being the care exercised by others
under similar or identical circumstances; while the second concept refers to the care

932

See CLARENCE MORRIS, MORRIS ON TORTS 111(1953). Ordinary care is a synonym for "due
care".
933

SMITH & KEENAN, supra note 931, at 347. Each person must take a proper precaution to avoid
acts or omissions that the person can reasonably foresight would be likely to injure other persons
who are closely and directly affected by his act.
934

WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AT., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 147(7th ed.1982).

935

!d. at 148. See also GulfRefining Co. v. William, 183 Miss. 723, 185 So. 234 (1938). The
court noted that "the test of foreseeablity is not the balance of probabilities, but the existence, in
the situation in hand, of some real likelihood of some damage and the likelihood is of such
appreciable weight and moment as to induce or which reasonably should induce, action to avoid it
on the part of a person of a reasonably prudent mind."
936

!d. at 149.
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which an average person should take. 937 In other words, ordinary care is the level of care
which an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under the same circumstances and
such care must be proportional to the danger and peril reasonably to be appreciated by
such a person. 938 Reasonability depends upon a great variety of moral, social and
economic factors. 939 The test for standard of care must be an external and objective
standard940 because of differences in individuals' intelligence, capability, and conduct.
The overriding rationale in support of applying an objective standard is the protection of
innocent victims from the defendant who might otherwise be exonerated for what he
might consider as being best under the circumstances, but that may be unjust for the
injured party.

4.3.2 The Reasonable Man
The reasonable man is a hypothetical person941 created by the courts in order to
determine whether the defendant has satisfied the standard of care required by law. The

.:., .
t

.~ ..c.·J~

reasonable man of ordinary prudence is termed as a reasonable man, or a prudent man, or
937

See MORRIS, supra note 932, at 111. Due care is defined as average conduct which people
usually act properly.
938

PROSSERET AT., supra note 934, at 172. See also Hill v. City of Glenwood, 124 Iowa 479, 100
N. W. 522 (1904).
939

KEETON & KEETON, supra note 921, at 208.

940

SMITH & KEENAN, supra note 931, at 348. The test is objective not subjective. To determine
whether the defendant met objective standard, the court will put a hypothetical reasonable man in
the defendant's position and decide whether the reasonable man would have foreseen that his act
probably causes damages.
941

PROSSER, supra note 923, at 150. See also A. P. Herbert, Misleading Cases in the Common
Law, 1930, 12-16: "The reasonable man is an ideal, a standard, the embodiment of all those
qualities which we demand of the good citizen. He is one who invariably looks where he is going
and is careful to examine the immediate foreground before he executes a leap or a bound. He is
one who never mounts a moving omnibus and does not alight from any car while the train is in
motion . . ."
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a man of average prudence, or a man of ordinary sense who exercises ordinary care and
skill. 942 The standard of care required by law is the standard of care which a hypothetical
person would exercise under similar or identical circumstances. 943
Greer, L. J. has described the reasonable man as the man on the street944 or the
man on the Clapham omnibus

945

or the man who takes the magazines at home. The

reasonable man test states that a person's conduct must be consistent with the conduct of
the reasonable man of ordinary prudence under the circumstances.

946

Reasonable

prudence requires the implementation of adequate efforts to appreciate risks and to
dampen those risks whenever feasible as well as the diligent search for safer alternatives
or procedures. 947

,,
I
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Case law states that each person owes a duty to act as the reasonable person
would under the same or similar circumstances. 948 The level of due care or ordinary care
depends on the circumstances of the case. 949 Generally, a person is bound to exercise the
kind and degree of care exercised by prudent and cautious men. In the case of an

942

/d.

943

/d.

944

PROSSER ET AT., supra note 934, at 160. See also Hall v. Brooklands Club, 1 K.B. 205, 224
(1933).
945

See SMITH & KEENAN, supra note 931, at 349. The reasonable man is the average prudent man
who has average standard of care.
946

MORRIS, supra note 932, at 110. The reasonably prudent man is the average man.

947
0

/d. See also JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & RICHARD N. PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS 323(3d.
ed.1988). If one departs from the standard of the reasonable prudent man, he is found guilty of
negligence.
948

Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292 (1850); Rest. 2d. § 283. This case became the leading
precedent which lays down the rules for proving negligence in accidental injury.
949

See HENDERSON & PEARSON, supra note 920, at 325.
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emergency, the degree of care may be increased by referring to the conduct of a person of
ordinary prudence and caution in the same situation. 950 The reasonable man standard, a
uniform standard ofbehavio~ 51 , is a rule oflaw. 952 The parties may not alter this standard
by private agreement. Any standard set by private agreement which alters the standard of
care prescribed by law would be rendered unenforceable. 953 The fact that the defendant
has acted in accordance with applicable statute governing the conduct is not conclusive
evidence that the defendant is not negligent as it is still necessary for the court to apply
the standard of due care to the defendant's conduct. 954
The test of reasonable man must be an external and objective standard unrelated
to the defendant's belief or judgment. 955 The best judgment of the defendant is irrelevant
and the court would still apply the reasonable man standard which requires that the
defendant should observe the same degree of caution as a person of ordinary prudence.
Although the defendant may have acted subjectively in good faith, he could still be held

950

!d. at 325-326. The court in Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292(1850) noted that the use of
extraordinary care means an increased degree of care and diligehce which the reasonable man
would use in particular case, such as emergency and a person of ordinary care and prudence would
use under similar circumstances to guard against danger.
951

PROSSER, supra note 923, at 149. The whole theory of negligence presupposes some uniform
standard of behavior.
952

FRANKLIN, supra note 927, at 42.

953

MORRIS, supra note 932, at 119. See also Fonda v. St. Paul Cit. R., 71 Minn. 438, 74 N.W.
166,70 Am. St. Rep. 341 (1898).

954

FRANKLIN, supra note 927, at 43. See also Clinkscales v. Carver, 22 Cal. 2d 72 (1943). See
also KENNETH SMITH& DENIS J. KEENAN, ENGLISH LAW 353(6th ed. 1979). If a statute imposes a
particular duty of care upon a person, the plaintiff must show the court that the defendant owed
such duty to the plaintiff personally and breach of a statutory duty creates a cause of action for
negligence.
955

PROSSER, supra note 923, at 150. The standard of reasonable conduct is an objective standard.
Thus, the fact that the defendant did the best he knew how does not release him from liability.
See also WILLIAM L. PROSSER ETAT., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 158-160(7th ed.1982).
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answerable for his conduct if such a conduct was not consistent with that of the

I,

'·

reasonable man of ordinary prudence. 956
The conduct of the reasonable man depends on the circumstances confronted.957

In each case, the judge or trier of facts has to take the circumstances into consideration
and at the same time determine whether the conduct of the defendant was in accordance
with the conduct of a reasonable man who would have acted under the circumstances.
Circumstances which may be taken into account may include the location of the parties,
the conditions of traffic and the activities undertaken by the parties. 958 A person with
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FRANKLIN, supra note 927, at 41. See also Vaughan v. Menlove, Common Pleas, 1837, 3 Bing.,
N .C., 468, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (1837). Patterson, J., noted that the jury should be directed to
consider the defendant had acted bona fide to the best of his judgment and if he had, he ought not
to be responsible for the misfortune of not possessing the highest order of intelligence. He applied
subjective test to this case. Tindal, C. J., in Vaughan v. Menlove, was of the opinion that "instead,
therefore, of saying that liability for negligence should be coextensive with the judgment of each
individual, which would be as variable as the length of the foot of each individual, we ought rather
to adhere to the rule, which requires in all cases a regard to caution such as a man of ordinary
prudence would observe." The author, however, disagrees with the former opinion and noted that
the standard for a reasonable prudent man must be an objective standard in order to apply this
principle without having regard to the actor's bona fide if such belief was indeed unreasonable.
See also Low v. Park Price Co., 95 Idaho 91,503 P. 2d 291 (1972). The court held that whether
the garage owner could afford to hire a night watchman is immaterial to the question of whether
ordinary care requires a night watchman, but the cost of the suggested precaution would be
relevant in determining whether the reasonable man would employ it. In this case, the court did
not care about the defendant's affordability in hiring a night watchman (subjectively), but the
court applied the standard of the reasonable man would have acted in the defendant's place. The
standard of the reasonable man remains applicable in all cases.
957
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PROSSER, supra note 923, at 151.

958

FRANKLIN, supra note 927, at 42. In trial with a jury, the jury compares the defendant with a
reasonable man who is under the similar circumstances and considers whether or not the defendant
acted as the reasonable man would have acted. Evidence of custom or proof of compliance with
custom is not conclusive. The court still applies the reasonable man standard and determines
whether the defendant acted as would be expected from the reasonable man would have so acted
under the same or similar circumstances. See also Texas & Pacific Railway v. Behymer, 189 U.S.
478 (1903); Rest. 2d § 295A. See also CLARENCE MORRIS, MORRIS ON TORTS 110(1953). In order
for the court to admit business custom as a measure of what the reasonably prudent man does,
custom must not be obviously unreasonable. See also WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS 152(4th ed.1971). If the actor does as everyone else has done, it may be inferred
that he has conformed to the community's standard of reasonable behavior.
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disability must act reasonably in the light of the knowledge of his infirmity. 959 The
standard of the reasonable man remains applicable to him. He must take the precautions
which the ordinary reasonable man would take if he were physically disabled. 960
The degree of care may vary from situation to situation but the standard of the
reasonable man remains applicable to all cases. 961 There are three factors which may
taken into account when determining whether or not a higher decree of care should be
imposed: the likelihood that a conduct will injure others, the seriousness of the injury and
the burden imposed if the risk is to be avoided. 962 The proportion of the level of care
required and the threats posed will also be considered. When the actor has engaged in a
more dangerous activity, a higher level of care is required. 963 Such examples where there
are foreseeable substantial risks of injury are activities involving chemicals964 or
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explosive materials. The majority of courts have also ruled that a higher or the greatest
level of duty of due care is required under some circumstances such as the transport of
passengers by a common carrier.

965
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In addition, a person who supervises a special
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959

PROSSER, supra note 923, at 151. A blind, or deaf, or lame, cannot be required to do as a
normal person because he cannot meet physical standards. The court has to create a hypothetical
person who has the same physical disability as the actor and determine whether the actor
conformed with the ideal person would have done in the similar circumstances or not. If not, the
actor, although he is blind, or deaf, or lame, may be held responsible for the damage.
960

!d. at 152.

961

See Triestram v. Way, 281 N.W. 420 (Mich. 1938).

962

PROSSER ET AT., supra note 934, at 156. The likelihood of danger to human life should be
outweighed the costs of measures for protection.

963

FRANKLIN, supra note 927, at 41.

964

/d.

:

965

KlONKA, supra note 929, at 112. Common carriers, including operators of airplanes, ships,
buses, railroads, taxicabs, subways, sky trains, elevators, escalators, and amusement devices, are
required to exercise the highest degree of care consistent with the mode of conveyance used and
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activity which requires extraordinary skill may be charged with a higher standard of care,
such as surgeons, barristers, driving instructors or accountants. 966

4.3.3 Standard of Care Applicable to Minors and Professionals
Adults are generally subject to the reasonable man standard as mentioned in the
preceding section. Minors967 , on the other hand, cannot be held to the same standard as
adults because of the apparent differences in skills, ability and experience. 968 In addition,
they may not be able to appreciate the same risks or form a reasonable judgment969 as

I

may be expected from adults. Because of their inherent incapacity and state of immaturity,

1',::· l

a special standard, therefore, has been established for them. 970 They are held only to
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exercise the degree of care and discretion as is reasonably to be expected from children of
the same age, intelligence and experience. 971 Nevertheless, the standard of care of a

the practical operation of its business. See also MARc A . FRANKLIN, GILBERT LAw SUMMARIES :
TORTS 42(19th ed. 1991). See also Widmyer v. Southeast Skyways, Inc., 584 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1978).
966

•.;.:
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See SMITH & KEENAN, supra note 931, at 350.

967

See PROSSER, supra note 923, at 155-156. Limitation for minor's age has been set according to
the rules of the criminal law and from the Bible. A minor who is below the age of seven is
conclusively held to be incapable of any negligence; between seven and fourteen he is presumed
to be incapable, but other evidence may be adduced to prove his capacity; from fourteen to
twenty-one he is presumed to be capable, unless his incapacity is proven. However, the great
majority of the courts have rejected any such minor's age limitation and ruled that the children
under the age of seven can be capable of some negligent conduct. See also Eckhardt v. Hanson.
196 Minn. 270, 264 N. w. 776. (1936). The author is of the opinion that the court may apply the
rule for minor's age limitation with regard to the particular case in which the minor engages
ordinary activities.
968

!d. at 155.

969

!d.

970

!d.
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0

971

/d. See also WILLIAM L. PROSSERET AT., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 174(7th ed.l982).
The regular standard of care for a child is that "it is a duty of a child to exercise the same care that
a reasonably careful child of the same age, intelligence, maturity, training and experience would
exercise under the same or similar circumstances. The court in Robinson v. Lindsay, 92 Wash. 2d
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minor must not be purely subjective because if the conduct of the minor was
unreasonable in the light of his peers' capacity, he may still be held answerable for his
action.

972

The courts have developed a generally accepted rule that holds minors responsible
for damages arising from inherently dangerous activities such as driving a car, riding a
motorcycle operating a powerful machine without regard to their age. 973 The rationale in
support of this notion is that the court focuses on the dangers which the hazardous
activities engaged by the minor poses to the public. The court thus applies the adult

'

~

standard of care to such cases.

If the minor engages in online commerce activities, such as signing electronic
signatures, including digital signatures, the minor may not have any legal obligation due
'.f

to his incapacity. The minor, however, is still subject to the standard of reasonable care as
would be expected from other adults who apply digital signatures to online transactions.
Minors are required to take proper steps in guarding their signing creation data. They
may not deny this responsibility on the ground of their minority status.

410, 598 P.2d 392 (1979), ruled that "the care or caution required is according to the capacity of
the child, and this is to be determined by the age of the child. A child, therefore, is held
responsible only to the exercise of such degree of care and discretion as is reasonably to be
expected from children of his age."
972

PROSSER, supra note 923, at 155. See also Studer v. Southern Pac. Co., 121 Cal. 400, 53 P. 942
(1898).
973

See EPSTEIN ET AL, supra note 928, at 128. If a minor assumes responsibility for the operation
of so potentially dangerous instruments as an automobile, he should assume responsibility for its
careful and safe operation in the light of adult standards. See also WILLIAM L. PROSSER,
HANDBOOKOFTIIELAWOFTORTS 157(4th ed.1971). See also WILLIAM L. PROSSERET AT., CASES
AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 176-178(7th ed.1982). The child should be held to an adult standard of
care when the activities that a child engages in is inherently dangerous. Examples of activities
which the court applies an adult standard are: riding a motorboat; playing golf; riding motorcycle;
riding motor scooter; and using a gun.
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Professionals, such as lawyers, doctors, accountants974 , are persons who possess a
knowledge, skill or intelligence which the law requires the exercise of a higher standard
than persons without specific skills and trainings. Professional negligence is at present
referred to as malpractice. Professionals are judged by an objective standard, i.e. they
must have the skill and knowledge commonly possessed by members of the profession
who are in good standing and will be held liable for damages which result from an
absence of those skills and training.

975

Not only are professionals required to exercise

reasonable care in the light of their special ability and knowledge, but they are also
required to possess a minimum standard of knowledge and ability, a departure of which
would so obviously constitute negligence that even a layman knows it to be a departure
from a proper standard. 976

4.3.4 Degrees of Care and Negligence

,·,. ..
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The standard of care varies with circumstances and must be commensurate with
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the risk confronted by the actor. Hence, the greater the risk; the higher the degree of care
is required. 977 The notion of degrees of care was derived from Roman law in 1704 by
Chief Justice Holt in his judgment in a bailment case. 978

974

Examples of professionals include dentists, pharmacists, psychiatrists, attorneys, architects,
engineers, accountants, abstracters of title, X-ray operators, and optometrists.
975

PROSSER, supra note 923, at 162. See also WILLIAM L. PROSSERET AT., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS 186-187(7th ed.1982). The courts have long recognized that one

who
engages in a business, occupation, or profession must exercise the requisite degree of learning,
skill, and ability of that calling with reasonable and ordinary care. See also Heath v. Swift Wings,
Inc., 40 N.C. App. 158, 252 S.E.2d 526(1979).
976

!d. at 161.

977

!d. at 180. See also Meredith v. Reed, 26 Ind. 334 (1866). The court ruled that only ordinary
care is required in keeping a male horse, but more care is needed in keeping a female horse. Thus,
the greater the hazard, the greater the care required.

286

There are basically three schools ofthought with respect to degree of care. The
first school of thought classifies degrees of care into a three-level classification of care:
slight; ordinary; and great. 979 The failure to use great care establishes a slight negligence.
The failure to use ordinary care constitutes ordinary negligence and the failure to use
slight care is a gross negligence. This notion has been widely accepted and recognized,
particularly in the field ofbailment. 980 It has also been applied to cases of auto accidents
that the court may not hold the driver answerable to a gratuitous passenger for injuries
unless the driver's gross negligence has been proved. 981 In the late nineteenth century,
this doctrine has been extensively applied to all negligence cases in the State of lllinois
and Kansas. However, owing to a number of confusions which arise from its application,
the doctrine was subsequently abolished in those jurisdictions.982
Slight negligence is the absence of great care which persons of extraordinary
prudence and foresight normally exercise. 983 In other words, it is a failure to exercise
great care. A common carrier for passengers is an example of a person whom the law

978

!d. at 181. See also Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909 ( 1704), 92 Eng. Rep. 107. See also
EDWARD J. KIONKA, TORTS IN ANUTSHELL: INJURIES TO PERSONS AND PROPERIT 113(1977). In
the case between Preston v. Prather, 137 U.S. 604 (1891 ), the court, nonetheless, stated this
doctrine in a defined way as " where gross negligence of a bailee was said to be merely failure to
exercise such ordinary care as the bailor would use for his own goods." However, a substantial
minority of the American courts has rejected this principle.
979

BURDICK, supra note 926, at 479. See also WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AT., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS 204(7th ed.1982).
980

PROSSER, supra note 923, at 181.

981

!d. at 182.

982

See KlONKA, supra note 929, at 114. See also WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF TilE LAW
OF TORTS 182(4th ed.1971). See also WILLIAM L. PROSSERET AT., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TORTS 204(7th ed.1982).
983

,

PROSSER, supra note 923, at 183.
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requires the exercise of great care. 984 Other examples include the owner of dangerous
animals or a person who uses deadly materials985 such as guns or explosives986 who are
also subject to the standard of great care. Failing such a standard, such persons will be
held liable for slight negligence. This degree of care also applies to owners of businesses
who are required to exercise a higher degree of care to their customers who could be
harmed by their business activities987 , such in the business of providing bungy jumping
and mountain climbing services.
Gross negligence is a failure to even exercise the level of care of a careless
I

person. 988 Gross negligence is commonly understood by the ordinary person as involving
an extreme departure from ordinary standards of conduct. 989 It is, sometimes, treated as
synonymous with recklessness. 990 The court has interpreted gross negligence as requiring
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willful misconduct or recklessness. The court applies an objective standard in order to
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determine whether such an act is done without even slight care. However, the court
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stated that gross negligence is not equal to a reckless disregard of consequences. It is
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984

PROSSER, supra note 923, at 180. Common carriers, who provide transporting services to
public, must use great precaution to protect passengers and this care is described as "the utmost
caution characteristic of very careful prudent men, or the highest possible care consistent with the
nature of the undertaking."
985

KEETON & KEETON, supra note 921, at 211. According to the case ofMondt v. Ehrenwerth,
251 Ill. App. 266, although the court held that the benzine, in the small quantity so cold, could not
be considered an imminently dangerous article. On the other hand, if the actor engages with
benzine in a large quantity such as by transporting it to another location, it could be considered
that transporting benzine in such a large quantity is imminently dangerous and he is required to
exercise the highest degree of care.
986

See BURDICK, supra note 926, at 481.

987

!d. at 482.

988

PROSSER,

supra note 923, at 183.

989

See PROSSER ET AT., supra note 934, at 204.

990

/d. at 205.
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more than ordinary inadvertence or inattention but less than conscious indifference to
consequences. 991 An example of gross negligence could be stated in the case of a
bailment for hire. The bailee is required to exercise slight care in guarding property in his
custody. If the property is damaged, the bailor has to prove in a tort litigation that the
bailee did not perform "slight care" in guarding it. 992 Thus, the bailee in a gratuitous
bailment is required to exercise less caution. 993
Ordinary negligence is a failure to exercise ordinary care after discovering an
ordinary risk or danger. 994 A person who performs common activities in daily life is
bound to exercise ordinary care. The landowner who impliedly invites persons upon his
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premises is bound to take reasonable care and prudence.

995

Another example of an
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activity which requires ordinary care is the supply of water to public. The court in Grace

f\o-; 1
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& Co. v. City of Los Angels996 noted that the city, like individuals, is required to take

,,:~ '-·

only reasonable precautions in providing water and inspecting the water lines.
The second school of thought notes that there are two degrees of care. The first
degree is the care ordinarily exercised by a specialist, and the latter is the care ordinarily

991

KIONKA, supra note 929, at 115.

992

See BURDICK, supra note 926, at 481. See also Wll..LIAM L. PROSSER ET AT., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS 205(7th ed.1982). The same degree of care applies in the bailment case
whether the bailee is a banker, or a common carrier. See also Giblin v. McMullen, L. R. 2 P. C.
317,337,38 L. J.P. C. 25 (1868). Another example of gross negligence is in the case ofbare
licensee. The licensee has to exercise slight care or diligence.
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993

PROSSER, supra note 923, at 181. See also Smith v. Poor Hand Maids of Jesus Christ, 193 Wis.
63, 213 N. W. 667 (1927).
994

!d. at 185.

995

See BURDICK, supra note 926, at 482.

996

Grace & Co. v. City of Los Angels, 168 F. Supp. 344 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
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exercised by a non-specialist in the same matter. 997 A breach of duty of the former degree
of care is determined as "ordinary negligence" while a breach of duty in a latter kind of
care is termed "slight negligence". 998
The third school of thought refused to classify degrees of care into classes and
took the position that there were no degrees of care or negligence. 999 This approach notes
that negligence is, in all cases, the absence of due care.

1000

The question whether the actor

was in breach of duty of due care is a question of fact for the jury to be judged whether
such actor has taken the proper degree of care by considering what a reasonable and
prudent person would have acted under the same circumstances. 1001 Various writers, such
as Baron Rolfe and courts have criticized the notion of degrees of care and of negligence

~
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' ,

because they are vague and impractical while at the same time many courts have
endorsed and recognized three degrees of care and negligence. 1002 The prevailing notion
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is that there is no degree of care or negligence as a matter of law, but different standards

997

BURDICK, supra note 926, at 479.

998

ld. See also WHARTON, NEGLIGENCE (2d. ed) § 636.

999

!d. See also WilliAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 181(4th ed.l971).
Although the courts used different terms to indicate a special standard, most of the cases were
decided on the basis of the conduct of the reasonable man of ordinary prudence under the
circumstances, and the greater danger, or the greater responsibility, is merely one of the
circumstances, demanding only an increased amount of care.
I

1000

,.
I

!d.

1001

..

ld. See also Wilson v. Brett, 11 M. & W. 115, 12 L. J. Ex. 264 (1843). According to Rolfe, B.,
he noted that there is no difference between negligence and gross negligence .
1002

ld. at 480. See also WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 182(4th ed.l971).
This notion stated that the degree of negligence lacked of clarity and practicability which adds
only difficulty and uncertain standards. See a/so RICHARD A. EPSTEIN ET AI., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS 125 (4th ed.l984). Baron Rofle stated Wilson v. Brett, 11 M. & W. 113,
152 Eng. Rep. 737 (1843) that "gross negligence" was the same thing as ordinary negligence with
the addition of a vituperative epithet.
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of care apply to each case as a matter of fact. 1003 However, the notion of degrees of care
has been adopted in a number of statutes, such as those governing the laws of
bailment100\ criminal negligence 1005, contributory negligence cases or automobile
passengers.
Under the Thai legal system, the law of negligence adopted the definition of
negligence in section 59 paragraph four of the Criminal Code as "an unintentional act
which is done without exercising such care as might be expected from a person under
such condition and circumstances, and that person could exercise such care but did not do
so suf:ficiently." 1006 Although the law does not clearly classify duty of care and
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negligence into degrees, the court is vested with full discretion to judge the act of a
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person on the basis of the standards of a reasonable man1007 who is under identical
conditions and circumstances, similar to the third school of thought. 1008

1003

PROSSER, supra note 923, at 182.

1004

See Cal. Civ. Code 1931. § 1846, 1928; S.D. Comp. Laws 1929 § 991, 1019.

1005

See Wis. Stats. § 340.26.

1006

CRIMINAL CODE § 59 paragraph four.

1007

KlA.TKAJORN WATJANASAWAT, THE EXPLAINATION OF CRIMINAL LAW I 241(7th ed. 2001).
According to William, the author of the Textbook of Criminal Law, he stated in page 43 that "test
of negligence in terms of the reasonable man is called an objective standard, because it does not
depend upon a finding of what passed in the defendant's mind."
1008

0

According to the Supreme Court Leading Case No. 769/1967 (B.E. 2501), the defendant, a 28year-old female driver, was driving alone around 9.00 pm. While she was waiting for a green
traffic light, a criminal got in her car and threatened her with a grenade to drive. The defendant
panicked and ran through a red light unintentionally. The court noted that under the circumstances
the accident was not the result of her negligence because the reasonable person in the same
situation as the defendant would not have exercised more care than the defendant. The court thus
ruled that the defendant, who was without intention or willfulness, could not be held guilty of
negligence and responsible for the damage. The court applied the reasonable man standard in this
case by regarding both external and internal factors before deciding whether the defendant is
negligent without classifying the degrees of care. The defendant was required to use ordinary care
as might be expected from the ordinarily prudent person under similar circumstances.
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The court will have due regard to the inherent characteristics of the actor, such as
his age, gender and maturity. In addition, the court will determine the external factors,
such as whether the occurrence happened in the day or night or during a rainy day. 1009 If
the actor engages in dangerous activities, the court will apply a standard of care as might
be expected from the reasonable person undertaking such activities under the same
circumstances and if the court is of the opinion that the actor did not exercise such a
standard of care, the court will find the actor guilty of negligence.
The author is prone to agree with the classification of degrees of care because of

~.

l::l

the varying standards of care applicable to each set of facts. The author, however,
disagrees with the gradation of varying degrees of negligence since it only serves to add

.....
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to confusion. No matter how much care a person is bound to exercise, if there was an
absence of the required level of care, the result of such a failure would constitute
negligence and the court would be vested with full discretion to award an amount of
damages after a consideration of the severity of the act. In general, individuals are, by
law, required to use due care to avoid omissions and commissions which would be a

~J:ii '
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foreseeable danger to others as would be expected from a ordin~ly prudent man in the
circumstances. If the actor exercises less degree of care, he may be held responsible for
his failure to exercise greater care.
Moreover, under particular circumstances, if the actor engages in inherently
hazardous activities or transporting passengers, he is bound to exercise a higher or the
highest degree of care in dealing with such activities or passengers. A failure to exercise
the highest degree of care is a ground for a claim in negligence for an injury in a court of

1009

SAK SANONGCHAT, LAW OF TORTS

'

~D

13(3d ed.1989).

292
I

I

r
!.
i.

r

law and the court may rule in favor of the injured party if it is of the opinion that such a
defendant exercised less care than what a reasonable man in similar circumstances would
have used. Although the classification of degrees of care is confusing and often difficult
to draw a line, it is necessary to apply the level of care appropriate for each situation in
order to determine the severity of the defendant's act and the court is vested with the
discretionary power to provide remedies to the plaintiffs according to the circumstances
and the gravity of the wrongful act.

4.3.5 Application of the Standard of Care -in case of Digital Signatures
J
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The use of digital signatures requires technical knowledge but it does not mean
that the application of digital signatures requires professional skills. A layman who has

,.-, ..

received instructions on how to apply a digital signature would be able to use digital
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signatures properly. A signatory and relying party would need to learn how to apply and
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verify digital signatures. To ensure the highest degree of trust, it is necessary for the
signatory, a key person in the use of digital signature, to take proper precautions in

a;
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~

safeguarding private creation data against unauthorized use, theft, loss or compromise.
Digital signature technology is not an inherently dangerous technology, therefore, the
person involved in the application of digital signature is only required to possess due
care. 1010 Due care is ordinary care as would be expected from the reasonably prudent man
under the same condition and circumstances.

1010

See UNCITRALMODELLAWONELECTRONIC SIGNATURES art. 8(l)(a) (2001). "Where
signature creation data can be used to create a signature that has legal effect, each signatory shall:
exercise reasonable care to avoid unauthorized use of its signature creation data ... " See also Utah
Code Ann.§ 46-3-305 (1996) provides that (1) by accepting a certificate issued by a licensed
certification authority, the subscriber identified in the certificate "assumes a duty to exercise
reasonable care" to retain control of the private key and prevent its disclosure to any person not
authorized to create the subscriber's digital signature. See also California Government Code §

•,
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The test of ordinary care applicable to the signatory is an objective standard and
the honest belief or best judgment of the signatory in keeping the private key secure is
immaterial. The objective test is applied in order that relying parties and certification
authorities can be adequately protected from the conduct of the signatory which is lower
than the standard of the reasonable man in the same situation in safeguarding the private
signing key against theft, loss or compromise. The imposition of protective measures on
private creation data is indispensable. Leaving the private key unprotected or unattended,
may amount to negligence.

An example of an unreasonable conduct includes the act of writing a secret code
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on the reverse side of a smart card when the private signing key is stored in a smart card

~ I··

(',

with pass phrase protection. In spite of the signatory's honest belief that sufficient care
has been exercised in order to avoid other persons from gaining access to his private key,
the act of writing the code on the back side of the smart card or jotting down a password
and leaving it in the vicinity of the smart card is unreasonable in the circumstances and
;.-..

may amount to negligence because the reasonable man who is bound to keep a secret
code would not have written the code down.
Where the signatory is under a duty to report to persons who might rely on the
digital signature that the private key has been lost, damaged, compromised or unduly

16.5. The signatory is required to retain control of the private key. The person who holds the key
pair, or the subscnber identified in the certificate, "assumes a duty to exercise reasonable care" to
retain control of the private key and prevent its disclosure to any person. . .. See also Illinois
Electronic Commerce Security Act§ 10-125(1) and (2) (1998) which provides that "(1) the person
generating or creating the signature device must do so in a trustworthy manner; (2) the signer and
all other persons that rightfully have access to such signature device must exercise reasonable care
to retain control and maintain the secrecy of the signature device, and to protect it from any
unauthorized access, disclosure, or use, during the period when reliance on a signature created by
such device is reasonable . . ." See also E-TRANSACTIONS ACT § 27 ( 1) "In the case where signature
creation data can be used to create a signature that has legal effect, each signatory shall: (1)
exercise reasonable care to avoid unauthorized use ofhis signature creation data ...."
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disclosed, or that there is a substantial risk that the private key may have been lost,
damaged, compromised, or unduly disclosed, he is obliged to report such circumstances
as soon as he knows or should have known about the circumstances.

1011

Otherwise, he

will be held responsible to any relying party for damages. Whether he knows of the
circumstances is the question of fact to be decided by a trier of fact or the jury. The court
or the trier of fact needs to determine this question in the light of evidence.
The test of knowledge with respect to the reasonable man is based on an objective
standard. The actor is required to know as the reasonable man would have known in the
actor's place. Knowledge has been defined as a belief in the existence of a fact, which
• :f

coincides with the truth.

1012

Depending upon the circumstances, the actor must pay
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attention to his surroundings which a reasonable man would consider necessary and he
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must use such senses as he has to discover what is readily apparent.

1013

The actor may be
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said to be negligent if he failed to look, or to observe what is visible when he does
look. 1014 Any normal individual is assumed to know about the traits of common animals,
the normal habit and capacity of human beings, the danger involved in explosive

lOll See Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act§ 20-110. "Except as otherwise provided by
another applicable rule of law, if the private key corresponding to the public key listed in a valid
certificate is lost, stolen, accessible to an unauthorized person, or otherwise compromised during
the operational period of the certificate, a subscriber ·who has learned of the compromise must
promptly request the issuing certification authority to revoke the certificate ...." See also ETRANSACTIONS AcT § 27 (2) "Without delay, notify any person that may reasonably be expected
to act on the basis of the electronic signature or to provide services in support of the electronic
signature when: (a) the signatory knows or should have known that the signature creation data has
been lost, damaged, compromised, unduly disclosed or known in a manner inconsistent with their
purpose; (b) the signatory knows from the circumstances that there occurs a substantial risk that
the signature creation data may have been lost, damaged, compromised, unduly disclosed or
known in a manner inconsistent with their purpose ...."
1012

PROSSER,

supra note 923, at 157.

1013

ld.

1014

Id. The actor is required to see only where a reasonable man would do so.
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materials, inflammable liquids, electricity, moving machinery, slippery surfaces, firearms,
including the fact that an automobile is hard to control in deep sand and that worn tires
will blow out. 1015 Since there is a minimum standard of knowledge that bases upon what
is common to the community, the actor cannot be excused from liability when he denies
knowledge of risk. 1016
According to the case of Splunge v. Shoney's, Inc., 73 FEP 259 (11th Cir.), the
court addressed the issue regarding whether or not the company should have known the
occurrence of sexual harassment. If it was found that the company should have known
that such an event would occur, the plaintiff would not be required to file an internal
complaint of harassment. According to the fact of this case, a woman was sexually
harassed by all middle-ranking supervisors with whom she worked. Although the
company has a sexual harassment policy, such a policy was not published. In the light of
evidence, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeal, ruled that the hostile environment in this case
was so pervasive and managers at the restaurant were so inextricably intertwined in this
environment that higher management could be deemed by a jury to have constructive
knowledge. 1017 The court thus held that the employee was not required to file an internal
complaint of harassment because the employer "should have known" harassment was
occurring. The court did not apply a subjective test to the company's knowledge and the

lOIS

/d. at 159.

1016

/d. at 160. See also WILLIAM L. PROSSERET AT., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 163(7th
ed.1982). The reasonable person will not forget what he knows and the forgetfulness does not
excuse negligence. However, lapse of time or other similar factors make it reasonable to forget
and the actor may be excused from negligence.
1017

Employer found liable where it "should have known" sexual harassment occurring, available
at http://www.fairmeasures.com/whatsnew/archive/summer97/new04.html (last visited July 10,
2003).
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court did not care whether or not the employer had actual knowledge of the fact that the
sexual harassment has been occurring in the company. The court, on the other hands,
applied an objective standard by assuming that if the company had exercised ordinary
care or diligence, the company would have had constructive knowledge of the harassment.
The objective standard applies to the concept of knowledge or what should be
known in reporting the situation of substantial risk with respect to digital signatures. The
court determines whether or not the signatory knows about the situation by comparing
with what the reasonable man would have known under similar circumstances. If the
private signing creation data is stored in portable formats, such as a smart card, the

lr.l
.4.· r

reasonable man with ordinary prudence would have exercised proper care in inspecting

'_.,· '

.I.

his private key and would have known that the device which contains his private key

.~.j :

:'." !

:11 •

creation data has been lost or stolen. If the smart card has been misplaced, lost or stolen,
the signatory may be held negligent for not reporting the event of key lost or theft if he
failed to know or should have known the fact as an ordinary person of reasonable
prudence would. In other words, the signatory was not aware of things reasonably
ascertainable upon inspection. Therefore, the conduct of a signatory who regularly uses
his private key stored in the smart card but fails to inspect whether such key is still in his
possession amounts to negligence.
Where the private signing creation data has been stored in a hard drive or smart
card with additional password protection, such drive or card may have been copied or
hacked. The use of additional protection measures to prevent anyone from unauthorized
access is a reasonable conduct that might be expected from the reasonable man in
protecting his private key data. There is still, however, a possibility of such protection
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being breached. The author is of the opinion that where the law requires the signatory to
report situations where he knows or has reason to know or should have known about
circumstances which might indicate high technological theft, an objective standard
should be imposed on the signatory based on the knowledge of the reasonable person
who is in the same situation.
The rationale in support of the external standard of knowledge in the notion of
imposing a duty to report on the signatory is aimed at providing a protection to third
parties from relying on unauthorized digital signatures. The application of a subjective
standard to the signatory's actual knowledge may create a substantial risk to the relying
parties in the event where the signatory unreasonably failed to know of such

:::1.

circumstances. Although it places a great burden upon the signatory, the court will not

"9 -

hold the signatory liable if he has satisfied the standard of knowledge. From the author's

~ t;
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perspective, the requirement of knowledge of high tech theft or compromise of the
private key or a substantial risk involving the private key is based on an objective
standard. The court has to take the conduct of the signatory and of the reasonable man
under similar circumstances into consideration. 1018 The signatory is bound to know
certain facts as might be expected from the reasonable man who is in the signatory's
position. If the signatory is a computer expertise, he may know better than the person
who is not. If a signatory is only a lay user, he may not be able to know that his signature
creation data has been copied or hacked since the hacker has used high technology in

1018

EPSTEIN ET AI.., supra note 928, at 131. Epstein proposed the notion of double standard of
conduct, namely, an external standard for a defendant's negligence, and a subjective standard for
contributory negligence. However, his thesis is rejected, the result of the case is usually in favor
of the plaintiffs because the application of the legal standard is left to the juries who tend to
compensate the jury party.
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cracking the protection measures. In this case, the signatory may not be found negligent if
the court is of the opinion that he has performed due care in acknowledging the
occurrence of the unauthorized use, access, compromise of the private key as the
reasonable lay user would have acknowledged, and the failure to be alerted of the
circumstances is not so obvious that other reasonable signatories would have known in
the circumstances (objectively). 1019
Due to the highly technical nature of cyber stealing or hacking, the act of copying
or hacking private key stored in the signatory's hard drive may not be so obviously

~. 0

noticed or tracked as a traditional theft or intrusion. The lay signatory may be unable to

..... . .

realize whether his private key has been copied or hacked. Nevertheless, the computer

1!'1 'I
!t l ·~
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expert or a person with computer skills would be able to investigate such a breach. The
hypothetical person who is in the lay signatory's places would not have known about it.

~-.ru

~1

u.::.

It can be concluded that the signatory who exercises due care to knowledge of hacking
will not be held answerable for not knowing such risk which is not apparent him.
There is no direct case regarding the duty to report about the loss, compromise or
theft of the private key, but such a proposition can be inferred from the following case.
The court in Montgomery v. National Convoy & Trucking Co. 1020 ruled that the
defendant who failed to warn approaching vehicles of the condition existing at a point

'I

'

where it would be effective was subject to liability. The court, in addition, noted that due
to the ice on the highway, the defendant knew or should have known ''the slippery
condition" and the defendant failed to provide a warning sign at the crest of the hill where
1019

PROSSER, supra note 923, at 160. Meeting the minimum standard of knowledge, the
individual will not be held to knowledge of risks which are not known or apparent to him.
1020

Montgomery v. National Convoy & Trucking Co., 186 S.C. 167, 195 S.E. 247 (1937).
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it would be effective to warn approaching car before the car passed the crested of the hill
and prevented the injury. Such failure not only amounted to negligence, but also to
will:fulness. 1021 The court applied standard of reasonable man upon the defendant because
the failure to provide a warning at a proper place would cause injuries to other users of
the highway. The court stated that the defendant, as an ordinary person who is a driver,
knew or should have known where the sign should be posted in order to warn other
approaching vehicles about condition existing.

:.I

To draw an analogy between the duty to report key lost or compromise and the
above case, the signatory is bound to notify others relying parties as the defendant who

.'
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was obliged to warn the users of the highway. The court noted that providing a warning

~-~

'·

n

j:
~ L•

sign at the scene of accident was inadequate in the circumstances because an ordinarily

1 ;')
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prudent person could not see the sign before reaching the crest of the hill. This was
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common knowledge which ordinary drivers knew or should have known.

JJ~

The risk of high tech invasion or theft may be reasonably foreseeable for any
computer users, however, the fact that the private signing creation data was copied or
cracked by a high tech hacker may not be known to the signatory because high tech theft
does not leave any track and the private signing creation data remains in the possession of
the signatory even though the hacker has already acquired a copy of it. It is not common
knowledge which ordinarily prudent users would have known. If the signatory's hard
drive which stored the private key creation data has been infected or attacked by viruses
or intruded by hacker without the signatory's actual knowledge, it is reasonable to
assume that the signatory, as an ordinarily prudent user, would not have known about it.

1021

EPSTEIN ET AL,

supra note 928, at 376.
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It is unfair to say that the signatory knows of something which he does not know. It is not

similar to the case that "I didn't know the Edsel I sold you had no engine" since that is
something that someone selling a car reasonably should know.

1022

It may be possible for the replying parties to argue that the signatory who kept

I
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the private key in the computer's hard drive should have installed an anti-virus program
in order to detect any intruders. The failure to have such program would not be
conclusive evidence for the court to hold the signatory negligent. The relying party,
I

nonetheless, may adduce further evidence indicating the fact that the signatory
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subsequently detected that his hard drive has been infected by viruses or hacked by a

~(')

hacker and failed to notify such events to the relying parties. Although he subjectively
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and reasonably believes that his private key is secure under the password protection, there
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r:;

are still reasonable grounds to believe that a breach of security measures may have
occurred. The signatory is thus bound to notify such events in despite of his reasonable
belief. If he fails to do so, he may be held responsible for his omission because, in the
light of evidence, there is an obvious fact that the signatory should have known about the
risks.to23

In conclusion, the standard of the reasonable man remains applicable in the use of
digital signatures. A signatory is obliged to exercise due care as would be expected from

'I

'f'

the reasonable man who is in the same circumstances to avoid unauthorized use, access,

I

I

I
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1022

The Consumer Fraud Act, available at
http://public.findlaw.com/consumer/newcontent/conswnerlaw/chp15 e.html {last visited July 10,
2003). The law will not allow parties who should have known something through the reasonable
exercise of their senses and intelligence to fail to use them.

''

1023

See Gobrecht v. Beckwith, 82 N.H. 415, 420, 135 A. 20,22 {1926). "Where a duty to use care
is imposed and where knowledge is necessary to careful conduct, voluntary ignorance is
equivalent to negligence."
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theft or compromise of his private signature creation data. The signatory is also required
to know apparent risks that the reasonable man would have known under a similar
situation. High tech theft, however, is not an obviously apparent occurrence and the
reasonable man would not know about it. In the light of evidence, the signatory,
nevertheless, may be held answerable for not notifying the relying parties of any
substantial risk that the private signing creation data may have been copied or hacked, if
in fact, it has been proven that the signatory had actually acquired such a knowledge.

J\. lJnitedStates

The common law of contracts and statutes may establish a duty for a signatory o
a digital signature. Without a contractual relationship, the duties and liabilities of
signatories are based on common law duty of care. J\ breach of the duty of care may
cause the signatory to be held responsible for his or her failure to exercise reasonable ca

in protecting or guarding the private key creation data.
The E-Sign J\ct governs the use of digital signatures, but the E-Sign J\ct does nc
specifically impose duties on signatories of digital signatures to maintain a certain level
of care to guard signature creation data, thus Common Law rule of standard of care
applies. Courts have interpreted the standard of care for non-professionals as "the
behavior of ordinary reasonably prudent person!' 1024 If the signatory breaches this
standard of care, he will be liable for resulting damages. The reasonably prudent person
not required to have any special training or education, but he must exercise normally
recognized standards ofbehavior.

1024

UNCITRAL Working Group on Electronic Commerce, supra note 322, at 47.
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Signatories who apply for certificates for subsequent use, commonly known as
subscribers, are obligated to:
(1) Make truthful representations in applying for a certificate;

(2) Review and accept a certificate before using it;
(3) Make certain representation upon acceptance of the certificate;
(4) Control and keep confidential the corresponding private key;

I I
I,
I

I
I

(5) Promptly revoke the certificate upon compromise of the corresponding private
1_,

key.1o2s
Parties to online transactions may establish the duties of the person who applies
digital signatures as stated in the previous paragraph or the signatory may agree to accept
a higher level of care to maintain the private key or other related duties. For example, the
parties may agree that the signatory must exercise a minimum level of care to retain the
confidentiality of the private signing key creation data at all time. The signatory assumes
a duty to take reasonable precautions to prevent the private key's loss, disclosure,
modification, or unauthorized use. 1026 Subscribers need to be educated on how to keep
private keys secure. 1027
Breach of such a duty is a cause of action for breach of contract. A court may fmd
that the signatory is in breach of his or her duty if their conduct does not meet the

1025

I

'

See ADAMS & LLOYD, supra note 229, at 193.

1026

Internet Law and Policy Forum-Working Groups and Publications, The Role of Certification
Authorities in Consumer Transactions, available at http://www.ilpf.org/groups/calexec.htm (last
visited Nov. 1, 2002). See Utah Code Ann.§ 46-3-305 (1996) provides that (1) by accepting a
certificate issued by a licensed certification authority, the subscriber identified in the certificate
"assumes a duty to exercise reasonable care to retain control of the private key and prevent its
disclosure to any person not authorized to create the subscriber's digital signature"
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1027

See ADAMS & LLOYD, supra note 229, at 193.
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standard of care stated in the contract. The contract should clearly state the events that
constitute a serious breach of security so that the subscriber fully understands his or her
obligations. 1028 The contract between the subscriber and the certification authority should
include what constitutes key compromise or under which circumstances the individual
subscriber should suspect that his or her private key has been compromised. 1029
Traditionally, a person is not legally responsible for forgeries or other
unauthorized signatures.

1030

In online transactions, signatories of digital signatures will

I I
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generally be responsible for documents signed with their digital signatures, even if the
signer acted without authority. For example, the Utah Act imposes a specific duty on the

'I

~.3

I
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signatory to take reasonable steps to protect the private signing key from unauthorized
use. 1031 This Act imposes a burden on the secret key holder. If signatories of private
signing keys lose or disclose their keys, they must notify the certification authorities
about the key compromise as soon as possible. If the signatory has lost the private key
creation data and has not notified the certification authorities, they remain potentially
liable for all transactions that the relying parties transacted in reliance of the certificate.
The Utah Act shifts the risk of fraud to users of digital ~ignatures. Thus, if a user
negligently loses his private key and failed to notify the situation to certification
authorities, they would be liable for any resulting damages. 1032

1028

ld.

1o29

Id.

.,•.

1030

LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ON-LINE BUSINESS: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: SUPPLEMENT N0.1
66l{Dennis Campbell et al. eds., Sweet & Maxwell1999).
1031

See Utah Code Ann. § 46-3-305 (1996).

1032

ld.
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Certification authorities and relying parties may sue signatories on grounds of tort
of fraudulent misrepresentation, or fraud. A prospective plaintiff in the fraudulent
misrepresentation case must state the elements of the fraudulent misrepresentation as

...
.

I

follows:
(1) The defendant represented or failed to disclose material facts or condition
with knowledge that such material facts are incorrect or made with reckless
disregard for the truth;
I
'I

(2) The defendant intentionally induce another party to rely on the
misrepresentation;
(3) The deceived party had justifiably relied on the misrepresentation;
(4) The relying party suffered damages as a result of that reliance;
(5) There is a casual connection between the misrepresentation and the injury
suffered. 1033
The signatory commits a tort of :fraudulent misrepresentation103\ if he or she uses
a fake identification document, such as a phony state-issued identification card, in
applying for a digital certificate. The use of the fake ID is to induce the certification

,J
I

·I.I

,,

authority to rely on the identification card and issue the certificate in the name of the
I

I.
'1

•,

1033

ROGER LEROY MILLER & GAYLORD A. JENTZ, MANAGEMENT AND E- COMMERCE: THE
ONLINE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 81(2002).
1034

REsTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TORTS§ 526 provides "a misrepresentation is fraudulent if the
maker
(a) knows or believes that the matter is not as he represents it to be;
(b) does not have the confidence in the accuracy of his representation that he states or implies; or
(c) knows that he does not have the basis of his presentation that he states or implies."
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signatory. The certification authority must reasonably rely on the fake identification card
and suffer damages as a result of such reliance. 1035
The fact that the signatory impersonated the certificate authority to believe that he
or she is someone else is a material fact in the issuing of digital certificates. Any person
who suffers from the signatory's action may bring a claim against the signatory on this
ground. A successful plaintiff is also entitled to seek punitive damages. 1036

,,.
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.,

,,
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A relying party who sues the signatory for breach of duty of care must prove that

I'

I'

the signatory owed a duty of care to the relying party. A relying party would usually

,,
I ~

include a large class of all possible recipients of electronic communications from the
subscriber. 1037 It is very difficult to determine that the subscriber owes a duty of care to a
particular relying party at the time of the subscriber's negligent act or omission. 1038 This
may mean that the subscriber does not own a duty of care to any particular relying
party.

1039

On the other hand, if the subscriber was used to communicating with the

relying party or the relying party regularly received electronic communications from the

1035

SeeROBERTP. BIGELOW& SUSAN H. NYCUM, YOURCOMPUTERANDTIIELAW 132133(1975). The defendant is considered to commit a tort of misrepresentation ifhe or she

intentionally and negligently represents to the plaintiff material statements of a past or present fact
which are false. Because of this act, the plaintiff reasonably relies on it and suffers damages.
There is normally no duty to present or disclose an authentic identification document to the
certification authority, but in positions of trust, the duty to speak may be present. Thus, in this
case, the subscriber has a duty to speak the truth of his identity. Presenting the fake ID is
considered an intentional misrepresentation.
1036

SOMA, supra note 28, at 99.

1037

NATIONAL ELECTRONIC AUTHENTICATION COUNCIL (NEAC), supra note 45, at 15.

1038

/d. at 15.

1039

/d.
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subscriber, there would be sufficient relationship between them giving rise to a duty of
care.1o4o

B. Thailand
In Thailand, the parties may also form a contract which stipulates the specific
duties and liabilities of each party before they conduct an online transaction in the same
way as the parties in the United States. If there is a contract, each party has to conform to

I
I,

.I
the agreed duties. In the open PKI model, however, the parties may not have the
, Ill

opportunity to reach such an agreement. It is not clear whether an act of a relying party
who simply verifies the validity of a digital certificate can constitute consent to enter into
a contract with the certification authority. It is important to note that the E-Transactions
Act governs relationships between each party involved in the use of digital signatures,
unless such legal duties have been modified by the parties' agreement.
The E-Transactions Act directly adopts the minimum code of conduct stipulated
in the Model Law on Electronic Signatures. §27 ofthe E-Transactions Act is the key
section that imposes duties upon a signatory using a signature creation data, such as a
private signing key, to create a digital signature. The application of§ 27 and the Article 8
'

~I

of the Model Law will be jointly analyzed.

'l·
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1040

!d. See also LANCE ROSE, NET LAW: YOUR RIGHTS IN THE ONLINE WORLD 123(1995). One is

t'

not required to guarantee the safety of others. If the signatory has taken reasonable measures to
prevent injury to the relying party and the relying party is injured anyway, the signatory is not
negligent.

f
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(1) Duty of Reasonable Care
Article 8 of the Model Law on Electronic Signatures stipulates that: ''where
signature creation data can be used to create a signature that has legal effect, each
signatory shall exercise reasonable care to avoid unauthorized use of its signature

t'

creation data." 1041 The Thai E-Transactions Act§ 27 similarly provides that "each
signatory must exercise reasonable care to avoid unauthorized use of signature creation
data."1o42

This is a basic duty imposed on both individuals and legal entities that use
electronic signatures, including digital signatures. 1043 §27 of the E-Transactions Act
requires the signatory to take reasonable security measures to prevent anyone from using
his or her signature creation data without his or her authorization. Although the ETransactions Act does not state that the signatory of a digital signature must maintain the
confidentiality of a private key, it can be assumed that §27(1) requiring the signatory to
take reasonable care to avoid unauthorized use of his signature creation data includes this
duty. §27 applies to any kind of electronic signatures that a signatory needs to keep his
or her creation data confidential, including biometric signatures.
For a digital signature, a signatory has to exercise reasonable care to maintain his
or her private key in a safe place and with some protection. The signatory is obligated to

•I
•I

1041

UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES

art. 8 (2001 ).

1042

See Singapore Electronic Transactions Act ( 1998). § 39( 1) provides that 1) by accepting a
certificate issued by a certification authority, the subscnber identified in the certificate "assumes a
duty to exercise reasonable care to retain control of the private key corresponding to the public key
listed in such certificate and prevent its disclosure to a person not authorized to create the
subscriber's digital signature."
1043

See CHAIWAT WONGWATANASAN ET AL., EXPLANATION OF THE ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS
ACT, B.E. 2544 120(2002). The parties may otherwise agree to exercise higher level of care to
guard the signature creation data.
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take reasonable care to keep the private key under his or her exclusive control. The
signatory cannot give up possession of the private key without exercising strong security
precautions 1044 The test of reasonable care should be objective, not subjective standards.
To decide whether a signatory has exercised reasonable care, a court has to take into
consideration all facts concerning the signatory and the surrounding circumstances.
Verification by digital signatures itself can merely determine that the private key
corresponding to the public key was used to sign the transaction.
able to verify the identity of the actual signatory of the message.

1045

1046

This process is not
The person who

/I
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signed the message may be the real signatory or an impostor. This is why it is essential
that a private key holder is required to maintain the private key confidential at all times.
The signatory may store the private key signing creation data on a floppy disk, a
magnetic-strip card, or a smart card, but such devices should be passwords or pass-phrase
protected. 1047
A new model of laptop computer provides that a signatory has to insert a smart
card in order to verify authorization for access to the laptop. If the code entered and the
data contained on the smart card does not match, access will be denied. Analogous to this
situation, a signatory who uses a smart card in order to initiate the signing key must
safeguard the password either by not writing any code on the back of a smart card or any
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1044

Graham Greenleaf & Roger Clarke, Privacy Implication of Digital Signatures, at 4, available
at http://www .anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/DigSig.html ( 1997).
1045

Merrill, supra note 81, at 4.

1046

/d.

1047

SMEDINGHOFF, supra note 144, at 499.
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place where anyone can see it. 1048 If the private key holder loses control ofhis or her
private key, any person can use his or her private key to sign an electronic document in
the name of the signatory as if he were the signatory. Not only must individuals who

I

i

•'

apply a digital signature exercise reasonable care in preventing the unauthorized use of
the private key, but they must also keep the private key secret.
The signatory of the digital signature must continue to take reasonable care to

I

·I
I

I

I,

safeguard his or her private key even though the certificate issued in association with the

I
'I

key pair has been suspended. If the certificate has been revoked and the private key is
actually destroyed, the signatory is no longer required to protect the private signing
key.to49

(2) Duty to Inform Keys Loss
Article 8(b) of the Model Law requires that a signatory, without undue
delay, notify any person that may reasonably be expected by the signatory to rely
on or to provide services in support of the electronic signature if:
(i)

The signatory knows that the signature creati~n data have been
compromised; or

(ii)

The circumstances known to the signatory give rise to a substantial risk
that the signature creation data may have been compromised. 1050

1048

To enhance the level of security, a smart card contained the private key creation data may be
used in conjunction with passwords or biometric authentication technologies, such as a fingerprint,
palm print, voice recognition, or retinal scan.
1049

Certification Practice Statement, at 22, available at
http://www.sos.state.mn.uslbusinessldigital/cps2.html(1998).
1050

UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES
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art. 8(b) (200 1).
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The E-Sign Act does not make any provisions for this duty.

1051

On the other hand,

the E-Transactions Act adopted the code of conduct stipulated in the Model Law and
further added some situations whereby a signatory is required to inform any person who
may reasonably be expected to rely on the basis of the electronic signature. §27(2)(a) of
the E-Transactions Act requires a signatory, without delay, to notify any person when the
signatory knows or should have known that the signature creation data has been lost,
damaged, compromised, unduly disclosed or known in a manner inconsistent with their
purpose. 1052 §27(2)(b) also places a duty on a signatory who knows from the

I

~

circumstances that a substantial risk exists that the signature creation data may have been
lost, damaged, compromised, unduly disclosed or known in a manner inconsistent with
their purposes 1053 , to communicate this information so as not to place other parties at risk.
Under §27(a) and (b), the tests ofknowledge is an objective standard. The law
states that whenever ''the signatory knows or should have known" that the signature
creation data has been lost, damaged, compromised, or disclosed, it is the duty of the
signatory to inform any person who the signatory thinks that he or she may reasonable
rely on his electronic signature. This depends on the technology being used. A relying
party may include a person who might seek to rely on the signature and any other

1051

See Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act§ 10-125(3) (1998) which provides that "in the
event that the signer, or any other person that rightfully has access to such signature device, knows
or has reason to know that the secrecy or control of any such signature device has been
compromised, such person must make a reasonable effort to promptly notify all persons that such
person might foreseeably be damaged as a result of such compromise, or where an appropriate
publication mechanism is available (which, for State agencies, may include the
official newspaper designated pursuant to Section 4 of the illinois Purchasing Act where
appropriate), to publish notice of the compromise and a disavowal of any signatures created
thereafter."

r

I

1052

E-TRANSACTIONS ACT§ 27 (2)(a).

1053

E-TRANSACTIONS ACT § 27(2)(b).
I
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interested person. 1054 In case of digital signatures, the law also requires that the signatory
inform certification service providers and certificate revocation providers as well.

·'

If private key creation data is stored in a smart card with additional password
I,

protection has been stolen or lost, the signatory must immediately notify the certification
service provider and anyone whom the signatory have contacted in order to provide them
,·

an updated information on the status of a private key. Even though the private key
creation data is protected by a pass phrase, it may be hacked or decoded.
Another situation where the signatory is required to notify any relying party is
when a private key creation data has been destroyed or copied. This situation may occur
if the private key holder stores his private key in his or her computer hard-drive which
has been attacked by viruses. In some cases, the signatory may need to re-format the hard
drive and lose all information contained in the hard-drive, including the private key
creation data. Although the signatory can use an anti-virus program to delete the viruses,
it may not be certain that such private key creation data still functions. The signatory
should notify the certification service provider of this situation in order to allow the
provider to revoke or suspend a certification for a certain period of time.
According to §27(b), a signatory must notify the certification authority and
anyone who may reasonably rely on the digital signature if the signatory knows from the
circumstances that there is a substantial risk that the private key creation data may have
been lost, damaged, compromised, or disclosed. Relying persons can include businesstrading partners, any interested person, the current certification authority, and the person

1054

UNCITRAL Working Group on Electronic Commerce, supra note 322, at 46.
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who might offer services supporting that digital signature. 1055 The law also imposes a
duty on the signatory to notify all relying parties, including the certification authority,
where there is a substantial risk that key loss, damage or compromise may have occurred.
If a private key holder stores his private key in a hard-drive that is subsequently
damaged, and sends the computer to a computer expert for repair, even though the private
key creation data is protected by a password, it is possible that an untrustworthy
computer expert may decode the passwords and use them for his own purposes. If such
data is not protected by security measures, it might take a criminal a few second to

I

1m

execute a complete copy of the private signing key creation data with a single
keystroke. 1056 Thus, if the signatory knows that such computer expert is not trustworthy,
based on his records or from other consumers, the signatory has to notify the certification
authority and any relying party due to the substantial risk that the signature creation data
may have been compromised or disclosed without the signatory's knowledge.

(3) Duty to Maintain Accuracy of Certificates ·
In accordance with Article 8 (c) of the Model Law, ''where a certificate is used to

support the electronic signature, the signatory must exercise reasonable care to ensure the
accuracy and completeness of all material representations made by the signatory which
are relevant to the certificate throughout its life-cycle, or which is to be included in the
certificate." 1057

1055

Renaud Sorieul, The UNCITRAL 's Model Law on Electronic Signatures 5(2001), available at
http://droit-intemet-200 l.univ-parisl.fr/pdf/ve/Sorieul ve.pdf.
1056

Bruce Schneier, Electronic Commerce: The Future ofFraud, at
http://www.countemane.com/crypto-gram-98ll.html (Nov. 15, 1998).
1057

UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES art. 8(c) (200 1).
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§27(3) of theE-Transactions Act similarly states that ''where a certificate is issued
to support the electronic signature, the signatory is required to exercise reasonable care to
ensure the accuracy and completeness of all material representations made by the
signatory that are relevant to the certificate throughout its life cycle or that are specified
in the certificate."

1058

§27(3) imposes a duty on the signatory to take reasonable care in maintaining the
accuracy and completeness of material representations made by the signatory. Since any
party may rely on all material information contained in the digital certificate, it is
appropriate that the law imposes this duty on the signatory who makes representations to
the certification authority. This standard of reasonable care is an objective standard.
The life cycle of the certificate covers the period starting with the application for
the certificate or the creation of the certificate and ending with the expiry or revocation of
the certificate. 1059 During this period, the signatory must periodically check his or her
own certificate to ensure that material information contained in the certificate or his or
her representation is accurate and updated. If the signatory has changed his name or last
name or there is any change in his or her financial status which is of the essence, the
signatory must notify this change to the certification authority to update or change the
outdated information.
§27 of the E-Transactions Act is not a mandatory provision. Parties to a contract

°

may agree to apply a different standard. 106 For example, the parties may agree that the

1058

E-TRANSACTIONS ACT§ 27(3).

1059

UNCITRAL Working Group on Electronic Commerce, supra note 322, at 46.

1060

WONGWATANASAN ET AL., supra note 44, at 120.
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signatory must exercise a higher or lower standard of care than the standard of reasonable
care imposed by law.

(4) Tort Liability of a Signatory
The most significant issue in the use of digital signature technology is the
compromise or improper use of a private key by an impostor to deceive a relying
party. 1061 The fault in this issue lies with the signatory, who has the sole and exclusive
control of the private signing key. 1062 Legal liabilities of signatories under Thai
jurisdiction are based on the principle of tortious acts.
The law of tort dates back to the Ayuttaya era where tort liability was based on
fault. 1063 The wrongdoer may have c~mmitted fault willfully or negligently. §74 of
Suphamagkut 1022 (B.E. 1565) provides that if a foreign ship harboured in the Kingdom
of Thailand is damaged by storm, or an act of god, the owner is not entitled to claim any
damage. 1064 A personal damage claim to a ship or other properties in the Ayuttaya era had
to state a cause of action based on fault. If fault could not- be proven, the owner of such
property could not claim monetary compensation. The purpose of tort law was not to
punish with criminal liability, but to hold a person who had committed a wrongful act
responsible for damages. 1065

1061

Thomas J. Smedinghoff, Certification Authority Liability Analysis 25(Feb. 1998), at
http://www.bakemet.com/ecommerce
1062
1063

/d.
PHOT PurSAPAKOM, TORTS

111(1987).

1064 Id.
1065

JEED SETIIABUTE, LAW OF TORTS 107(1975).
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§420 of the Thai Civil and Commercial Code provides that "a person who,
willfully or negligently, unlawfully injures the life, body, health, liberty, property or any
right of another person, is said to commit a wrongful act and is bound to make
compensation ." The Thai legislative body adopted section 420 from the Civil Code of
Germany § 823.1066
Subject to this principle, the act constituting a tort action consists of 4 elements:
(1) A person acts against the law;
(2) Either willfully or negligently;
(3) His or her act constitutes damages to life, body, health, liberty, property or
any right of another person; and
(4) His or her act causes damages.
The term a person means both natural and legal persons. Natural persons include
minors, incapable persons, insane persons 1067 or other persons whose legal capacity may
be limited by law, such as insolvents. The act must be conscious. It is not an act under
§420 if a person unconsciously acts either because of physical disorder or insanity.
The term an act includes positive and negative acts. A positive act is an act by
which something was done to another person, but a negative act is a failure to perform a
legal or contractual obligation.
If no law imposes a duty upon a person to act, failure to act as such does not
create liability. According to Supreme Court Decision Case No. 1172/1949(B.E 2492),

1066

PUIT BOONYAP AN, LAW OF TORTS 5(8th ed.l998).

1067

/d.
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where the law does not impose a duty upon a person to perform a specific act, a person
who failed to do so is not subject to liability.

1068

The act must be unlawful. The law may expressly state that some acts are per se
unlawful. If no law clearly states the act to be unlawful, a person who acts without
authority to do so can be said to have acted unlawfully.1069 If a person has legal or
contractual authority to act, or consent of another, the person has not committed a
wrongful act. 1070 Thus, the principle of tort liability is based on breach of a duty 1071 and
unlawful conduct. If an act was lawful, there could be no tort liability

t

There must be a wilful or negligent act. A wilful act means that the person
realizes that damages that may occur from his or her act. An honest mistake is not a
wilful act. The Civil and Commercial Act does not, however, stipulate the meaning of
negligence.

I

'
J

The former Criminal Code provided that an act committed through negligence is
the unintentional commission of an offence where the offender acted:
(1) Without exercising reasonable care;
(2) Without exercising professional standard of care, if the person is in a
profession, such as doctors, lawyers, accountants, etc.; and

'·

1068

Although the law does not impose a duty upon a signatory or subscnber to present an authentic
identification document, in this situation, the court may rule that in order to maintain trust and
security in society, the subscriber is obligated to speak the truth by presenting an authentic ID
document. See ROBERTP. BIGELOW & SUSAN H. NYCUM, YOUR COMPUTER AND TilE LAW
135(1975).
1069

PRAJAK PUTIHISOMBAT, TORTS AND MANAGEMENT OF AFFAIRS WITHOUT MANDATE 4(1991 ).

1070 Jd.
1071

BoONYAPAN,

supra note 1066, at 15.
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(3) With or without an intention to violate a law or regulation or legal order. 1072

..

The term negligence under the current Criminal Code is an act of a person who
has acted without wilful intent but without exercising such care as might be expected
from a person under such condition and circumstances, and the person could exercise
such care, but did not do so sufficiently.

1073

Negligence is conscious act

1074

but taken

I

without sufficient care.
An omission may not constitute a wrongful act. 1075 Failure to act may incur a

I
liability if there was a duty to act in order to prevent harm to another. The Supreme Court

I·
t

ruled in Supreme Court Decision No. 1630/1963 (B.E.2506), Mr. Montree v. The Thai

Railway Department, that the Railway and Highway Act imposed a duty on the defendant
to provide a barrier to prevent cars from crossing the railroad track when a train passes

I

through the street. The defendant did not provide such a barrier. Because of this failure,

'- ·

the plaintiff whose car was destroyed by the train was entitled to damages.

'

The Supreme Court also stated that the commission of a tort may include either an
action or an omission when the law prescribes a duty to.act. The defendant failed to
comply with the legal duty because the defendant's officer was asleep. Thus, the
omission to act constituted negligence liability.
A duty to prevent harm to another includes a duty to prevent harm from occurring
while maintenance works are being carried out on the roads. 1076 Warning signs and

1072

1073

1074

1075

1076

PUTSAPAKOM,

supra note 1063, at 124.

CRIMINAL CODE
PUTSAPAKOM,

§ 59 paragraph 4.

supra note 1063, at121.

Jd.
PUTSAPAKOM,

supra note 1063, at 21.
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barricades must be provided. An omission to act where the law provides a duty to do so
to prevent harm is negligence and also creates liability.

1077

Another example is where the law does not impose a duty of identity verification
upon banks. Thus banks that fail to verify the identity of a person who obtains money
from them are not liable. 1078 However, as only legitimate depositors have the right to
withdraw their deposits from the banks, if the bank returns the deposit to someone else
who has not been authorized, the bank remains liable in the deposited sum to the
legitimate account owner.

~-

However, as the bank may take time to investigate before it re-credits the amount
back to the account, in the case where the bank failed to verify the identity of the person
who withdrew money from the deposit account, the bank's omission might incur a loss
on the depositor, such as the depositor is prevented from using the sum of money for
making timely investments causing loss of profits. In this case, the court may hold the
bank accountable for its failure to verify identity upon withdrawal, since such an
omission amounted to a negligent act. Moreover, since other banks adopt the practice of
verifying the identity of a withdrawer, such practice might be expected from all banks.
Contracts between parties or former relationship between the parties can create a
duty between them in addition to that established by codified law. In Supreme Court

Decision No. 865/1965 (B.E. 2508) Mr. Saetong Saeong v. Farmer Bank Corp., a

1077

SETHABUTE,

supra note 1065, at 130.

1078

Id. If the banks return the deposit to the legitimate depositor without verifying his or her
identity, the banks are not in breach of laws or regulations. If the banks returned the deposit to
someone else without verifying his or her identity, the banks may be subject to negligent liability
because the banks have failed to act reasonably as might be expected from other banks under such
conditions and circumstances.
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contract between the parties imposed a duty upon a defendant to return a bounced check
to the consumer. The defendant failed to return the bounced check to the plaintiff and did
not notify the plaintiff of the cancellation of deposit of the bounced check. The defendant
admitted that it was the duty of the defendant to return the bounced check to the plaintiff,
but the defendant failed to do so and lost that check.
Because of this, the plaintiff suffered loss from not being able to sue the drawer of

..

that check in time due to the claim being barred by the one-year limitation period. The
Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff that the defendant failed to perform a duty
owed under the contract. Thus, the defendant was required to compensate the plaintiff for
his loss.
A law may specifically impose a certain level of care upon a person in certain
situations, or on a person who has particular skills such as professionals. 1079 To determine
whether a defendant has met the applicable standard of care, courts have to compare such
care as may be expected from a hypothetical person under the same condition and
circumstances. If this hypothetical person in the same condition and circumstances would
have acted as the defendant did, the court will likely find that he has exercised sufficient
care.
To make a comparison, it is important to compare the defendant with a person of
the same age, gender and physique. The hypothetical person must be in the same
condition and situation. If a defendant possesses a particular skill or profession, he will be

1079

BOONYAPAN,

supra note 1066, at 10.
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held to the commonly accepted standards of those with his skill or in his profession. 1080

L(.
l

'

'

The court also has to take all relevant circumstances into consideration.

.,.

The plaintiff is entitled to recover only legal damages. Legal damages means such
damages which can be sought or recovered in the form of monetary compensation or
other means as provided by law 1081 • Any right of another person must arise out of a law
supporting that right.

1082

In Supreme Court Decision No. 882/1961 (B.E.2504), the court

r
'

explained that there must be Thai laws recognizing and protecting any right stated in
§420 of the Civil and Commercial Code. If a right is recognized under the law of another
country, the recognition of such right is not valid under Thai law.
Thai courts will hold the defendant liable in tort if the act of the defendant is a
direct and proximate cause of the harm. 1083 If the actor knows or foresees the effect ofhis
act(s), the consequences fall within the scope ofhis liability. 1084 §438 allows the court to
use discretion to determine the manner and the extent of compensation according to the
circumstances and the gravity of the wrongful act. The court may give compensation in
the form of restitution of the property that the injured person has been wrongfully

l"
deprived or its value as well as other damages.

1085

The court may reduce damages if the

plaintiffhas contributed to the negligence.

Ir
1080

1081

1082

1083

1084

PUTSAPAKOM,

supra note 1063, at16.

SAK.SANONGCHAT, LAW OF TORTS
PU1TIIISOMBAT,
PUTSAPAKOM,

41(3d ed.1989).

supra note 1069, at 7.

supra note 1063, at 235.

ld.

1085

C. C. C. § 438 provides "the court shall determine the manner and the extent of compensation
according to the circumstances and the gravity of the wrongful act. Compensation may include
restitution of the property of which the injured person has been wrongfully deprived or its value as
well as damages to be granted for any injury caused."
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To hold a signatory liable for his or her wrongful act, there must be evidence
indicating that the signatory has somehow acted against the law, which caused damage to
relying parties or certification authorities. For instance, theE-Transactions Act, § 27(1)
imposes upon a signatory of an electronic signature a duty to exercise reasonable care in
preventing the unauthorized use of signature creation data. The law creates a duty to act,
and the duty is breached with the failure to act accordingly.
Under Thai law of torts, any person who suffers from an act of such a wrongdoer
may file a claim against him in a court oflaw. Both a certification service provider and
any relying party may sue the signatory if his or her act caused them damages. The
critical issue is whether the E-Transactions Act creates a duty upon a signatory to protect
third persons who may reasonably rely on the signature creation data. The purpose of
imposing a duty upon a signatory is to place a duty on him or her to keep the signature
creation data secure, and to prevent anyone other than the signatory or his or her
authorized agent from accessing it. If anyone can access to the signature creation data,
such data may used for illicit purposes. Thus, it may be inferred that the E-Transactions
Act provides this duty in order to protect third persons who may suffer damages through
reliance on an electronic signature.
§422 of the Civil and Commercial Act provides that "if damage results from an
infringement of a statutory provision intended for the protection of others, the person who
so infringes is presumed to be at fault." If a person intentionally, unintentionally or
negligently infringes a provision enacted to prevent harm to others, 1086 that person will

1086

PIJITBOONYAPAN, LAW OF TORTS: PRESUMPTION OF FAULT 8(1990). § 27 of theETransactions Act, which imposes a duty of care upon a signatory, may be regarded as a technical
statutory provision intended for the protection of others, such as a relying party, the signatory who
is in breach of such duty is presumed to be at fault. The relying party will gain benefits from this
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need to prove that he or she has acted reasonably or he or she should not be held
responsible for damages for other reasons.

1087

The presumption of fault is not a

conclusive presumption. 1088 The person who is presumed to be at fault can rebut this
presumption.
Thus, a prospective plaintiff must prove to the court that the defendant's act
violated the plaintiffs legal right. For instance, according to theE-Transactions Act§
27(2), a signatory has a duty to inform the certification authority, including any relying
party about a key compromise. The E-Transactions Act imposes a duty upon the
signatory and gives right to the certification authority and other relying parties to be
notified. If the signatory fails to do so and the certification authority and relying parties
suffered loss, the court may hold the signatory accountable for such loss.
TheE-Transactions Act section 27(1) provides duties on any person using
signature creation data to exercise reasonable care to avoid unauthorized use of his or her
signature creation data. This applies only where signature creation data can be used to
create a signature that has legal effect. For example, an owner of a private signing key
must protect his or her private signing key from undue disclosure to anyone. A person
who uses his or her biometrics to create an electronic signature, such as finger or palm

provision by adducing evidence demonstrating the failure to comply with such duty. The
signatory need to adduce evidence in order to convince the court that he or she did not act
negligently, otherwise the court will rule in favor of the relying party. See also Civil Procedure
Act§ 84(2) which provides that" where there is a presumption in law favorable to a party, such
party shall be required to prove only that the conditions entitling him to avail himself of the
presumption have been fulfilled."
1087

See Visit Sripibol, lnfonnation Technology Law in the Aspect of Consumer Protection,
Intellectual Property and International Trade Court Forum: Special Issue 284, 287(2000). TheETransactions Act can be regard as technical law because it is related to various technical concepts
that are difficult to understand by ordinary person.
1088

BOONYAPAN,

supra note 1066, at27.
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prints, retinas, voice prints, must take reasonable precautions in preventing anyone from
duplicating this biometric information.
This section is not intended to govern certain electronic signatures where creation
data are not required for their creation, such as a typed name at the end of an e-mail. The
person typing his or her name at the end of e-mail must do so in good faith. §5 of the
Civil and Commercial Code of Thailand provides that "every person must, in the exercise
ofhis rights and in the performance ofhis obligations, act in good faith ... Thus, if a
signatory types his or her name at the end of e-mail in bad faith and causes damages to
another person, a court may hold the signatory responsible for his or her act.
§27(2) of the E-Transactions Act imposes a duty on the signatory to, without
delay, notify any person that may reasonably be expected to act on the basis of the
electronic signature when the signatory knows or should have known that the signature
creation data has been lost, damaged, compromised, unduly disclosed or known in a
manner inconsistent with their purpose. This section is intended to protect anyone who
may reasonably be expected to rely on an electronic signature. If there is no immediate
notification of the change in status of signature creation data,

o~ers

may reasonably rely

on such electronically signed documents.
If the signatory fails to act in accordance with section 27(2), the signatory is said
to have committed a wrongful act and is bound to pay compensation to anyone who
sustained loss from his or her failure. For example, if a private key holder lost his or her
smart card where signature creation data is stored and did not inform persons whom the
signatory was used to contacting of such loss, such omissions would be considered as a
wrongful act since the law requires the signatory to make an immediate notification as
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soon as he knows of the loss of the private signing key data. The severity of this wrongful
act depends on whether such signatory failed to act intentionally or negligently.
The test for this scenario must be an objective standard. Users who realize that
they have lost crucial information like signature creation data must act positively and
rapidly in notifying anyone who they think may reasonably rely on his or her digital
signature. If the private key holder does not know of the private key loss, there would be
no wilful or negligent failure to act in accordance with section 27(2)(a).
§27(2)(b) was enacted to prevent a signatory from denying responsibility. This
section requires the signatory to report the situation to the certification authorities
immediately upon learning of a substantial risk that the signature creation data may have
been lost, damaged, compromised, unduly disclosed or made known in a manner
inconsistent with its purposes. If the signatory uses a private data key daily and keeps
such key in a smart card kept in a wallet, and the wallet has not been found for a few days,
and there is a substantial risk that his wallet may have been stolen, under these
circumstances, the signatory is bound by section 27(2)(b) to give notice to anyone who
may reasonably rely on his digital signature. The law does not prescribe a specific form
for the notification. The signatory may make phone calls, send e-mails or fax such notice.
Failure to comply with this section can be in itself a wrongful act.
§27(3) applies to cases where a certificate has been issued for an electronic
signature. This section governs the use of digital certificates in conjunction with digital
signatures. The law requires a user using a digital signature to exercise reasonable care
not only to avoid unauthorized use of the private signing key, but also to ensure the
accuracy and completeness of all material representations relevant to the certificate. It is
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necessary to note that the information contained in the certificate cannot be updated once
the certificate has been issued1089and relying parties may incorrectly rely on the outdated
information. To protect the consumer, theE-Transactions Act§ 27(3) requires the
signatory to take reasonable precautions to examine the correctness of the information
stated in the certificate. The signatory may need to update his or her information
periodically. If the signatory fails to exercise reasonable care in ensuring the accuracy of
I.

data in the certificate, he or she would be made liable for this failure.
The period to which these duties apply starts from when the certificate was first
applied, to its date of expiration. After the certificate has expired, the signatory has no
further duty to maintain the accuracy of such certificate, unless he or she applies for a
renewal of the certificate.

4.4 Limitation of Liabilities
In Thailand, there is no law which limits the liability of the signatory of a digital
signature. Thus, the exposure of the signatory under the Thai law is broader than in the
United States under some circumstances. In the United States, under the Federal Reserve
Regulations Reg E and Reg Z governing A TM devices and credit cards, if a signatory
signs a digital signature in association with the use of credit card, the liability of the
credit card holder is limited to $50 regardless how much loss is incurred to the

1089

Jane Kaufman Winn, The Hedgehog and the Fox: Distinguishing Public and Private Sector
Approaches to Managing Risk for Internet Transactions 10(2000), available at
http://www .smu.edul-j winnlhedgehogfox.htm (last updated May 21, 2001 ).
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cardholder's bank.1090 So if the consumer has behaved reasonably, the consumer's
liability will be limited to a small amount of damages. 1091

4.5 Duties and Roles of Certification Authorities
1\. llnited States

The E-Sign Act does not make any provisions regarding a certification authority's
duties and liabilities. 1092 The certification authority's usual responsibilities are as follows:
I

•·

I

I

'
1090

Merrill, supra note 81. See also Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E) 12 C.F. R. § 205.6
which stipulates that: a) Conditions for liability. A consumer may be held liable, within the
limitations described in paragraph (b) of this section, for an unauthorized electronic fund transfer
involving the consumer's account only if the financial institution has provided the disclosures
required by§ 205 .7(b)(1), (2), and (3). If the unauthorized transfer involved an access device, it
must be an accepted access device and the financial institution must have provided a means to
identify the consumer to whom it was issued.
(b) Limitations on amount of liability. A consumer's liability for an unauthorized electronic fund
transfer or a series of related unauthorized transfers shall be determined as follows:
( 1) Timely notice given. If the consumer notifies the financial institution within two business
days after learning of the loss or theft of the access device, the consumer's liability shall not
exceed the lesser of $50 or the amount of unauthorized transfers that occur before notice to the
financial institution.
(2) Timely notice not given If the consumer fails to notify the fmancial institution within two
business days after learning of the loss or theft of the access device, the consumer's liability shall
not exceed the lesser of $500 or the sum of:
(i) $50 or the amount of unauthorized transfers that occur within the two business days,
whichever is less; and
(ii) The amount of unauthorized transfers that occur after the close of two business days and
before notice to the institution, provided the institution establishes that these transfers would not
have occurred had the consumer notified the institution within that two-day period. See also Truth
in Lending Act (Regulation Z) 12 C.F.R. § 226.12 (b) which provides: liability of cardholder for
unauthorized use of a credit card shall not exceed the lesser of $50 or the amount of money,
property, labor, or services obtained by the unauthorized use before notification to the card issuer
under paragraph (b)(3) of this section .... "
1091

Internet Law and Policy Forum-Working Groups and Publications, supra note 734.

1092

In some states, there are some laws governing certification authorities. For example, the 1996
Utah Code Ann.§ 46-3-301 imposes general requirements for certification authority as follows:
"( 1) A licensed certification authority or subscriber shall use only a trustworthy system:
(a) to issue, suspend, or revoke a certificate;
(b) to publish or give notice of the issuance, suspension, or revocation ofa certificate; and
(c) to create a private key.
(2) A licensed certification authority shall disclose any material certification practice
statement, and any fact material to either the reliability of a certificate which it has issued or its
ability to perform its services. A certification authority may require a signed, written, and
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(1) to use a trustworthy system;
(2) to disclose its practices and procedures;
(3) to properly identify a prospective applicant for a certificate;
(4) to publish issued certificates in a repository;
(5) to suspend and/or revoke certificate;
(6) to make warranties to the certificate applicant upon issuance of the certificate;
(7) to make warranties to person using the certificate to verify digitally signed
messages. 1093
Further analysis of the duties of certification authorities will be discussed in detail
together with the duties of the certification authorities in Thailand.

B. Thailand
Article 9 of the Model Law on Electronic Signatures provides a code of minimum
acceptable levels of conduct for certification service providers. However, the Model Law
does not provide for the civil liabilities for failure to follow such code of conduct, which
is left to the domestic applicable law. Thailand directly adopted Article 9 of the Model
Law, 1094 so their applications will be jointly analyzed.

reasonably specific inquiry from an identified person, and payment of reasonable compensation, as
conditions precedent to effecting a disclosure required in this subsection."
1093

ADAMS & LLOYD,

supra note 229, at 194.

1094

Article 9 of the Model Law on Electronic Signatures stipulates that" (1) where a certification
service provider provides services to support an electronic signature that may be used for legal
effect as a signature, that certification service provider shall:
(a) act in accordance with representations made by it with respect to its policies and practices;
(b) exercise reasonable care to ensure the accuracy and completeness of all material
representations made by it that are relevant to the certificate throughout its life-cycle, or
which are included in the certificate;
(c) provide reasonably accessible means which enable a relying party to ascertain from the
certificate:
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The E-Transactions Act, § 28 1095 imposes a number of duties on certification

~.

service providers to:
(1) Act in accordance with the policies and practices it has represented 1096;
A certification authority is entitled to establish its own policies and practices. The
certification authority may issue a certification practice statement (CPS), a document
written by the certification authority that describes the procedures the certification
authority will follow in issuing and revoking certificates. 1097 It may include other
procedures for examining the identity of the prospective subscriber or other activities
I

I'

related to the business of providing online certification. A CPS may include details of the
security of its system. 1098

(i)
(ii)

the identity of the certification service provider;
that the signature creation data were valid at or before the time when the
certificate was issued;
(d) provides reasonably accessible means which enable a relying party to ascertain, where
relevant, from the certificate or otherwise:
(i)
the method used to identify the signatory;
(ii)
any limitation on the purpose or value for which the signature creation data or
the certificate may be used;
(iii)
that the signature creation data are valid and have not been compromised;
(iv)
any limitation on the scope or extent of liability stipulated by the certification
service provider;
(v)
whether means exist for the signatory to give notice ... ;
(vi)
whether a timely revocation service is offered .... "
1095

E-TRANSACTIONS ACT § 28 is a code of minimum acceptable levels of conduct for
certification service providers. It is necessary to establish a professional body to guarantee the lay
public's reliance and maintain standards. Any certification service provider that falls short of the
standards must be subject to sanctions. This provides additional remedies for consumers who
suffer damages from the act of certification service providers. See RICHARD MORGAN, COMPUTER
CONTRACTS 119(1979).
1096

E-TRANSACTIONS ACT § 28(1). See also Washington Electronic Authentication Act
§ 19.34.200(2). See also Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act § 15-305.
1097

Winn, supra note 1089, at 11.

1098

SMEDINGHOFF, supra note 144, at 49.
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If a certification service provider establishes and represents policies and practices
to signatories, relying parties or any interested person, the certification service provider is
obligated to perform processes of identity verification. Although the E-Transactions Act
does not require a formal personal appearance which enhances the confirmation value of
certificates issued by certification authorities 1099, a certification authority may contain
this formal requirement in the certification practice statement.
The E-Transactions Act does not require a specific process for establishing a
subscriber's identity. The certification authority may establish the subscriber's identity by
requiring personal appearance or relying on a third party, such as a notary. 1100 If the
certification authority made a representation to prospective subscribers, relying parties
and other interested person that before issuing a certificate to a signatory, the certification
authority has verified the identity of the signatory by examining legal identification
documents in association with a personal appearance, the certification authority's failure
to follow this policy and representation may amount to a responsibility for any resulting
damage. Policies and practices may also provide for other processes in certificate
management, including certificate issuance and revocation.
(2) The certification service provider must exercise reasonable care to ensure the
accuracy and completeness of all material representations made by it that are relevant to
the certificate throughout its life cycle or that are specified in the certificate 1101 ;

1099

Robert Kossick, The Internet in Latin America: New Opportunities, Developments, &
Challenges, 16 AM. U. INT'LL. REv. 1309, 1319(2001). Brazil's draft law stipulates specific

provisions requiring formal solicitations and a personal appearance before the certification
authority issues certificates.
liOO SMEDINGHOFF,

supra note 144, at 49.

no! E-TRANSACTIONS ACT§ 28(2). See also Utah Code Ann.§ 46-3-303 (1996) imposes
warranties and obligations of certification authority upon issuance of a certificate. For example, §
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A digital certificate is an electronic document attached to a digitally signed
message. Anyone can verify the authenticity and integrity of a certificate issued by the

I.

.
I

I

certification authority by verifying the certification authority's digital signature using the
certification authority's public key. 1102 To ensure that the public key of the certification
authority really belongs to the certification authority, a higher-level certification authority
may act as a certification authority which verifies the public key of the lower-level
certification authority.

1103

The E-Transactions Act requires a certification service provider to periodically

I

I

examine the accuracy and completeness of essential information represented to all parties

!
!·.

involved in order to prevent any interested person from relying on inaccurate information.
The essential information must be relevant to the certificate. If such information is
immaterial or irrelevant to the certificate, the certification authority has no duty to
maintain the accuracy and completeness of such immaterial information.
The E-Transactions Act does not identify the criteria for a qualified certificate or
material information. According to the EU Directive, a certificate has to contain the
following information in order to qualify: 1104
(A)

An indication that the certificate has been issued as a qualified certificate;

(B)

The identification of the certification service provider and the State in
which it is established;

46-3-303(1) (1996) stipulates that "a licensed certification authority warrants to the subscriber
named in the certificate that the certificate contains no information known to the certification
authority to be false .... "
1102

SMEDINGHOFF,

supra note 144, at 48.

1103

/d.

1104

LLOYD, supra note 869, at 25.
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(C)

The name of the signatory or a pseudonym which is identified as such;

(D)

Provisions for a specific attribute of the signatory to be included, if
relevant, depending on the purpose for which the signature creation data
under the control of the signatory corresponds; an indication of the
beginning and end of the period of validity of the certificate;

(E)

The identity code of the c~rtificate;

(F)

The advanced electronic signature of the certification service provider
issuing it;

(G)

Limitations on the scope of use of the certificate if applicable;

(H)

Limitations on the value of transactions for which the certificate can be
used, if applicable. 1105

The EU Directive provides a comprehensive criteria for qualified certificates and
protects any relying party who reasonably relied on the information contained in the
qualified certificates. 1106 The question of whether such information is material and
relevant to the certificate may arise out of this criteria because the Directive sets forth
that all material and crucial information be contained in the certificate.
Thai courts may interpret the following information as material facts: the issuer of
the certificate; public key creation data; name of a signatory; a statement confirming that
the certification authority has examined the identity of the signatory; limitations on scope,
extent, and purpose for the use of the certificate; the date of expiration of the certificate;

1105

EU Directive Ann. I (1999).

1106

Susanna Frederick Fischer, A Comparative Look at Recent Global Electronic Signature
Legislation, 7 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 229, 236(2001).
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disclaimers; and limitations of liabilities. 11 07 Even though the certificate does not meet
the qualified certificate criteria, the Thai courts may hold the certification authority liable
',.

for damages for harm caused to anyone who may have reasonably relied on the accuracy
of information stated in the certificate. If the certification authority shows that it has
adequately performed reasonable care to maintain accuracy; the court may decide that the
certification authority has not acted negligently.
(3) The certification authority must provide means for a relying party to ascertain
from the certificate all the following material representations:
(a) The identity of the certification service provider;

(b) That the signatory identified in the certificate had control of the
signature creation data at the time when the certificate was issued;
(c) That the signature creation data was valid at or before the time when
the certificate was issued. 1108
A digital certificate is valuable not only for giving meaningful evidence of
identity, but also for providing online transaction services. 1109 TheE-Transactions Act
imposes a duty on certification service providers to make available any means for
reasonable access that allows any relying party and interested person to verify all
essential representations. These include the identity of the certification service provider,

1107

See WARWICK FORD AND MICHAEL S. BAUM, SECURE ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: BUILDING THE
INFRASTRUCTURE OF DIGITAL SIGNATURE AND ENCRYPTION 214-215(2d ed. 2000).
1108

E-TRANSACTIONS AcT 28(3). See also Carl M. Ellison, Establishing Identity without
Certification Authorities, at 4, available at http://www.world.std.com/-cme/usenix.htrnl (July 22-

25, 1996).
1109

Carl M. Ellison, Establishing Identity without Certification Authorities, at 4, available at
http://www.world.std.com/-cme/usenix.htrnl (July 22-25, 1996).
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proof of sole and exclusive control of creation data at the time when the certification
authority issued a certificate to a signatory and the validity of signature creation data.
This requirement implies that a certificate must contain such material information.
Failure to provide and maintain the accuracy of these essential representations may make
a certification service provider liable for loss arising from such failure.
Any means for reasonable access means that a certification service provider must
provide information to the public which can be used to access a certificate list. If a
certificate list or a certificate revocation list has been published electronically on the
Internet, the certification authority must publish or announce the address of such website.
The law does not bar the certification authority from using any means of maintaining
security. The certification authority may use a pass phrase, password or other
identification process to screen or record the identity of persons who access the certificate
list, but denial of access is prohibited since the law required certificates lists to be
publicly available.
If a certification authority applies an encryption to protect a certificate list and
certificate revocation list from unauthorized modification, a decryption key or a code
must be available to all interested persons in order for them to gain access to such lists.
The E-Transactions Act does not require a certification authority to verify the legal
capacity of anyone applying for a signature key pair. The E-Transactions Act only
requires the certification authority to ensure that its representation regarding the identity
of the signatory are accurate and accessible. Anyone who relies on a certificate bears the
risk that the signatory has no legal capacity to transact online transactions or his legal
capacity is limited by law, such as in the case of a bankrupt.
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Thus, it is essential that the certification authority should verify not only the
identity of the signatory, but also legal capacity of the signatory who applied for a
signature key pair. 1110 A certification authority may incorporate this legal capacity
verification requirement in the Certification Practice Statement to encourage confidence

in the signatory. The law may also be amended to require the certification authority to
process legal capacity verification in order to provide protection of the consumer who
may reasonably rely on the certificate.
(4)

The certification authority is required to provide reasonable means of

access to enable a relying party to ascertain the following from the certificate or
otherwise:
(a) The method used to identify the signatory;

(b) Any limitation on the purpose and value for which the signature

r.

creation data or the certificate may be used;
I

(c) That the signature creation data are valid and have not been lost,

'.
'

l .

damaged, compromised, unduly disclosed or known in a manner

I

I.
I

inconsistent with their purposes;
(d) Any limitation on the scope or extent of liability stipulated by the
certification service provider;

•''

(e) Availability of the means for the signatory to give notice in the event
of the circumstances under section 27(2);

I,

(f) Availability of a service for the timely revocation of a certificate. 1111

.. ·'
1110

ISTEV, supra note 875, at 24.

1111

E-TRANSACTIONS AcT 28(4). See also Utah Code Ann. §46-3-309 allows a licensed
certification authority to specify a recommended reliance limit in a certificate.

335

•

I

,·t.'
I'

lr"

The E-Transactions Act requires a certificate service provider to allow any relying
party to have access and ascertain the essential information stated in §28(4)(a)-(f). The
certificate service provider may incorporate these representations in the certificate or
state them in practice policy statements. The law requires that the method used to identify
the signature be disclosed. The certification authority may establish its own identification
process to verify the signatory. For example, the certification authority may verify
identity of the signatory by examining his or her identification cards, such as a state ID
card with picture, a passport, a driver license or any other legal documents that can
identify the signatory, including a birth certificate or a change of name certificate. The
certification authority may also require a physical inspection.
The E-Transactions Act also requires the certification service provider to inform
users of any limitations on the use of the certificate. The certification authority may issue
a number of classes of certificates, each for a different purpose. A signatory and a
certification authority may also intend to use such certificate only for a particular purpose,
such as for fund transfers or securities transactions. The law requires the certification
authority to state any limitations on the use of such certificate, including any limitation of
value for which the signature creation data or the certificate may be used. Without
stating any limitation of purposes and value, any relying party may rely on such
certificate for any kind of transaction and for an unlimited value.
§ 28 (4)(c) also imposes a duty on a certification service provider to make
available a representation contained in a certificate or otherwise that the signature
creation data is valid and has not been lost, damaged, compromised, unduly disclosed or
known in a manner inconsistent with their purposes. This implies that a certification
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authority must ensure any relying party that the signature creation data is valid and has

I'

not been lost. If the relying party relies on this statement incorporated in the certificate,
the certification authority may not later deny the validity of the signature creation data
even though such signature creation data may have in fact been lost or compromised.
The E-Transactions Act § 28(4)(d) allows the certification service provider to
establish the scope and extent of its liability limitation. However, a limitation may or
may not be valid under the existing law governing such limitation.

1112

§373 of the·Civil

and Commercial Code of Thailand provides that "an agreement made in advance

I•
'i
I

exonerating a debtor from his own fraud or gross negligence is void." The certification
authority may limit or exonerate its liability only if such liability is not based on fraud or
gross negligence. If a certification authority committed fraud or gross negligence, the

''•
,.

certification authority cannot avail itself from the liability.

If the contract between a signatory and a certification authority states that the
signatory may not make a claim for damages if the certification authority has committed
fraud or gross negligence, the contract is invalid. The law allows the certification
authority to limit its liability for the issue of valid certificate, but not for issuing illegal
certificates. 1113
The limitation must be clear and conspicuous in order to allow any relying party
to have notice of such limitations. Thai courts may find an agreement between a

<r'
I

certification authority and a subscriber or a relying party unfair if the there is an
1112

See DARAPORN TH1RAWAT, CONTRACT LAW: NEW STATUS OF CURRENT CONTRACT AND
UNFAIR CONTRACT TERMS 35(1995). Unconscionability makes contracts unenforceable. An
agreement which is excessively one-side, or an agreement containing terms that are unreasonably
favorable to one party where the other party had little bargaining power or no meaningful choice is
unconscionable.
1113

Internet Law and Policy Forum-Working Groups and Publications, supra note 1026.

I

337

I'

unconscionable conduct. An example of unconscionable conduct is when one party to a
transaction is at a special disadvantage in dealing with the other party because of illness,
ignorance, inexperience, impaired faculties, financial need or other circumstances
affecting his ability to conserve his own interests, and the other party takes advantage of
the opportunity thus placed in his hand. 1114
Currently, the E-Transactions Act does not require a certification authority to be
licensed. An unlicensed certification authority is entitled to limit it potential liability. This

I.

is different from Singapore 1115 and Malaysia1116 where the law specifically permit only
licensed certification authorities to state liability limitations in the certificates that they
issue. 1117
The E-Transactions Act requires a certification service provider to provide means

r.

for the signatory to give notice when the signatory knows that his or her signature
creation data have been lost or compromised. Such means of giving notice include phone
calls, electronic mails, fax messages, Electronic Data Interchange or other electronic
means. The certification authority must take reasonable care to examine the identity of a

1114

NATIONAL ELECTRONIC AliTHENTICATION COUNCIL (NEAC), supra note 45, 30.

1115

See Singapore Electronic Transactions Act§ 44 (1998) which provides that "(1) A licensed
certification authority shall, in issuing a certificate to a subscriber, specify a recommended
reliance limit in the certificate. (2) The licensed certification authority may specify different limits
in different certificates as it considers fit."

I

!'

I

1116

See Malaysia Digital Signature Act§ 60 (1997) which provides that" (1) A licensed
certification authority shall, in issuing a certificate to a subscriber, specify a recommended
reliance limit in the certificate.
(2) The licensed certification authority may specify different limits in different certificates as it
considers fit."
1117

Internet Law and Policy Furum-Working Groups and Publications, Survey of State Electronic
& Digital Legislative Initiatives, at 16, available at http://www.ilpf.org/groups/digrep.htm (last
visited Nov. 1, 2002).
I
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person who informs them of such events. Failure to reasonably examine the identity of an
authorized person may put a certification authority at risk of liability for negligence.
The E-Transactions Act requires that the certification service provider to provide
for timely revocation of certificates. The certificate service provider may inform
consumers of its policy and practices statements that the certification authority will
revoke or suspend a certificate as soon as it receives notice from an authorized person.
The certification authority may suspend the certificate at once then take a reasonable
amount of time for investigation. If the certification authority is certain of the event, the
certification authority can revoke such certificate.
(5)

In the case where the service under 4(e) is offered, the certification service

provider must provide a means for a signatory to give notice as specified in section 27(2)
I,

and, in the case where the service under (4)(f) is offered, the certification service provider

I•

I

must ensure that such service can generate a timely revocation of a certificate.
(6)

Utilize trustworthy systems procedures and human resources in

lo

·'I '

.,

performing its services.
The E-Transactions Act requires a certification service provider to deploy
trustworthy systems procedures. This means such system must posses a certain degree of
security attributes and reliability. In addition to utilizing trustworthy systems, the
certification authority must employ trusted human resources in providing its services. The
certification authority must deploy hardware, software and procedures that are reasonably

'rI

secure from intrusion and misuse. 1118 The hardware and software must provide a
reasonable level of reliability, availability and accuracy. 1119

1118

SMEDINGHOFF, supra note 144, at 51. See Utah Code Ann.§ 46-3-103 (38) (1996) defines
"trustworthy system" as computer hardware and software which:

339

't

§29 ofthe E-Transactions Act imposes the requirements ofthe trustworthiness of
systems, procedures and human resources as follows:
(1)

Financial status, human resources and existing assets;

This provision does not clearly state a minimum operating capital requirement for
the certification authority, but it can be assumed that the certification authority must have
a good to excellent financial status. A corporation that is about to go bankrupt may not be
able to run a certification service business since its financial status is not good enough to
ensure confidence in all interested persons, especially the signatories and relying parties.
Certification service providers must employ employees with good records of
honesty. Failure to recruit honest people may deter trust in the certification authority.
Finally, the value of assets is the key factor which influences an interested person's trust
in the financial capacity of the certification authority. This is because if there is a need for
the certification authority to compensate for losses, such existing assets may be used to
pay off the losses.
(2)

Quality of hardware and software systems;

The certification service provider must utilize high quality hardware and software
systems. The systems must be able to resist and prevent intruders or hackers, from

(a) are reasonably secure from intrusion and misuse;
(b) provide a reasonable level of availability, reliability, and correct operation; and
(c) are reasonably suited to performing their intended functions.§ 46-3-301 requires a
licensed certification authority to use only a trustworthy system. See also Illinois Electronic
Commerce Security Act (1998) § 1-105 provides that "trustworthy manner" means through the use
of computer hardware, software, and procedures that, in the context in which they are used: (a)
can be shown to be reasonably resistant to penetration, compromise, and misuse; (b) provide a
reasonable level of reliability and correct operation; (c) are reasonably suited to performing their
intended functions or serving their intended purposes; (d) comply with applicable agreements
between the parties, if any; and (e) adhere to generally accepted security procedures. § 15-301
imposes a certification authority to maintain its operation and its services in a trustworthy manner.
1119 !d.

340

'

'

invading the systems. The certification service provider must deploy a high level of
security measure to protect consumers' personal data from unauthorized access and abu:
(3)

Procedures for issuing certificates, applications for certificates and
retention of records in relation to the provision of the service;

(4)

Availability of information on signatories identified in certificates and
potential relying parties;

(5)

A declaration by an accreditation body or a root certification service
provider regarding compliance with or existence of the factors mentione'
in (1)-(5);

(6)

Any other factor prescribed by the Commission.

A certification authority that meets all requirements for trustworthiness stated

u

§29 of the E-Transactions Act is likely to be trusted by the online community at large.
There should also be an external auditor to examine the trustworthiness of the
certification authority and provide assurance to online consumers.
The E-Transactions Act does not provide that the certification authority must
exercise proper means of protecting the private encryption keys of the clients. In the
interests of consumer protection, the certification authority must take reasonable care t
maintain the confidentiality of the private encryption keys of its clients at all tilnes wh
they are in its possession. 1120 A Royal Decree should impose this duty upon the
certification authority in order to give right to the consumer to bring a claim against th
certification authority in the case of unauthorized disclosure of the private key. Even
though a signatory or client of the certification authority may sue the certification
authority on the grounds of deliberate tort of disclosure, it may be difficult for the
1120

Taylor, supra note 853, at 16.
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consumer to prove that the certification authority owes this duty to the signatory since the

I.
r

E-Transactions Act is not clear on this issue.
In order to protect consumers, the government could formulate a model for
certification practice statements. Such certification practice statements may state that the
certification authority would only disclose a private signing key creation data upon the
production of a court warrant. Thus, the disclosure of a private key creation data on other
I

grounds would make the certification authority liable for failure to act in accordance with

1..

i

the policies and practices represented by it under §28 ofthe E-Transactions Act.
Not only should the government protect consumers by creating standard
certification practice statements, but the government should also lay down a duty for

i·
I

r

certification authorities to maintain the confidentiality of the personal data collected from
signatories and allow the certification authorities to use such data only insofar as it is
essential for the purposes of issuing and maintaining the certificate in order to avoid the
abuse and exploitation of signatories' personal data.

1121

Since the E-Transactions Act does not provide any requirement that the
certification authority maintain a record of the certificates they issued. The government

'

I:
I

may proclaim a Royal Decree to include such a requirement, which could also include
records of the signatories' personal data, to be available for future reference. 1122 In the era
I

of online commerce, the method of guarding electronic records is tremendously

l

1121

Report ofE-Commerce Strategies for Development: the Basic Elements ofan Enabling
Environment forE-Commerce, U.N. Commission on Enterprise, Business Facilitation and
Development, Agenda Item 3, at 17, 1D/B/COM.3/EM.15/2 (2002).
1122

Under the Utah Code, the law allows the division to lay down reasonable requirements for
record keeping. See Utah Code Ann.§ 46-3-104 provides that ''the division shall make rules as
required by this chapter and in furtherance of its purposes, including rules: (e) specifying
reasonable requirements for record keeping by licensed certification authorities .... "
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significant. Every piece of electronic record may be later used as evidence in the courts.

It is necessary to note that the law should require the certification authority to perform the
duty of maintaining records of digital certificate for a minimum period of time as a
potential evidence to the public.
The E-Transactions Act does not clearly state which events require certification
authorities to suspend or revoke the certificate. The signatory may request suspension or
revocation at any time, with or without cause. The certification authority, even without
the signatory's consent, should have the authority to suspend or revoke the certificate in
some situations. 1123 For instance, if an interested person informs a certification authority
that the signatory is insane or otherwise incapacitated, or bankrupt, the certification

I
(

authority should suspend or revoke the signatory's certificate in order to protect
consumers from relying on the signatory's certificate.
It is also unclear when the suspension or revocation of a certificate takes effect.
The E-Transactions Act does not address this issue. The suspension or revocation of the
certificate should become effective when executed by the certification authority1124 to
protect both the signatory and any relying party. If the signatory requests the certification
authority to revoke or suspend the certificate, the certification authority may and should
take a reasonable period of time to verify the identity of the signatory. 1125 It is important

Ir

,,I
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1123

ISTEV, supra note 875, at 29.

1124

ld. at 29.

I
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1125

Under the Utah Code, a license certification authority must revoke the certificate within one
business day (24 hours). See Utah Code Ann.§ 46-3-307(2). The Washington Electronic
Authentication Act (1997) § 19.34.260(2) also requires a licensed certification authority to revoke
a certificate within one business day.
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both for the signatory and relying party to be protected if the signatory has requested
revocation of his or her certificate.
If the certification authority has failed to suspend or revoke a certificate, it may be
held liable to a signatory or relying party who had sustained loss from the certification
authority's action. In such cases, the signatory should be protected from any legal action
by the relying party since the signatory has completed his or her duty to inform the
certification authority. The signatory will not be held liable to the relying party who
relied on a certificate that should have been suspended or revoked.

4.6 Tort Liability of Certification Authorities
A. United States
The E-Sign Act does not provide for the liability of certification authorities.
Liabilities of certification authorities vary from state to state. The characteristics of
certification service providers are key factors in determining legal liabilities of
certification authorities. Certification authorities exist to provide information in the form
of certificates. 1126 Their main service is to provide confirmation of online identity by
issuing a digital certificate verifying the identity of a private signing key holder. 1127

An online certification service will be treated as a service governed by common

rI
I

:,
'I

law.

1128

A certification authority's performance takes the form of a digital communication

,,j,
ii
j

t
1126

t

Smedinghoff, supra note 1061, at 28.

1127

A certification authority may provide ancillary services, for instance, creating key pairs as
requested by a signatory. A certification authority may provide software upon request as well. See
also CHAIWATWONGWATANASANET AL., EXPLANATION OF THE ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS
ACT, B.E. 2544 134(2002). This paper, however, will discuss the liability of a certification
authority on the basis of tort liability, excluding a product liability.
1128

Internet Law and Policy Forum-Working Groups and Publications, supra note 1026.
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that is relied upon by a third party, such as a person who communicates with a certificate
holder. If the certification authority negligently performed a service and the information
communicated was erroneous, the court may hold the certification authority accountable

. neg1'tgence. 1129
for Its

If information stated in the certificate was inaccurate either by the wilful
misconduct of the certification authority or its failure to exercise reasonable care in
determining its accuracy, a relying party may bring a claim against the certification
authority for negligent misrepresentation. 1130 The plaintiff needs to prove that the
defendant owed him a duty of care. He must present the court with some evidence
indicating that the defendant has breached that duty and caused the plaintiffharm. 1131 If

I'

so, the court may find that the certification authority's actions constituted negligence or
negligent misrepresentation. Liability of certification authority is thus based on common
law liability and statutory liability.

(A). Common Law Liability
I. Foreseeability States

Some states focus on the principle of foreseeability when deciding which
plaintiffs are entitled to bring a claim against the certification authority on the grounds of
negligent misrepresentation. 1132 Only a person who could have foreseeably relied on or

'I

1129

JAY M. FEINMAN, PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES 46(2000).

1130

Smedinghoff, supra note 1061, at 28.

1131
1132

'I
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I

II

GEMIGNANI,

supra note 715, at 314.

CHRIS REED, INTERNET LAW:

TEXT AND MATERIALS 141(2000).
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have been injured by the representations of a certification authority, may bring a claim
against the certification authority.

1133

For instance, it is foreseeable that a business partner of the signatory would rely
on the certificate. Thus, any business trading party who reasonably relied on the
certificate may sue the certification authority if the latter had acted negligently in
maintaining the information contained in the certificate. Certification authorities should
be liable to innocent persons whose good names are misappropriated in a certificate,
because it is foreseeable that such person will be harmed.

1134

II. Restatement States
The majority of courts have followed the definition of negligent misrepresentation
as stated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts §552:
"One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any
other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information
for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for
pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if
he fails to exercise reasonable care in obtaining or communicating the
information." 1135
The elements of misrepresentation are as follows:
(1)

The defendant supplies information in the course ofits business or in a
transaction in which it has a pecuniary interest;

(2)

The information is false;

1133

JOSEPH W. GLANNON, THE LAW OF TORTS: EXAMPLFS AND EXPLANATIONS 75(1998). This is
because a certain relying party who regularly conducts business with the subscnoer may be at risk
of unreliable certificates. Thus, such risk may be foreseeable.
1134

A.Michael Froomkin, The Essential Role of Trusted Third Parties in Electronic Commerce, 75
OREGON L. REv. 49, 98 (1996).
1135

REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORT§ 552(1)(1997).
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(3)

The defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in obtaining or
communicating the information;

(4)

The plaintiff suffers pecuniary loss caused by its reliance on the
information;

(5)

The plaintiffs reliance is justifiable;

(6)

The plaintiff is the person or is within the group for whom the
defendant intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient
of the information intends to supply it;

(7)

The plaintiff relies on the information in a transaction that the
defendant intends to influence or knows that the recipient so intends, or
in a substantially similar transaction.1136

Most states recognize the principle of negligent misrepresentation in their
common law. 1137 Certification authorities must be aware that the potential class of
persons who will rely on the certificate is large. 1138 These prospective plaintiffs are
1:

limited to persons whose benefit and guidance to whom the author knows the recipient
intends to supply the statement. 1139 The prospective class of pex:sons includes all users of
electronic commerce, all users of e-mails or the World Wide Web. 1140
Every recipient of a certificate who suffers detriment because of the certification
authority's negligence is considered a potential plaintiff within the scope of the
1136

FEINMAN, supra note 1129, at 68.

1137

Smedinghoff, supra note 1061, at 29.

1138

REED, supra note 1132, at 142.

1139

Froomkin, supra note 1134, at 108.

1:

1140

REED, supra note 1132, at 142.

I

347

I

,_

'•

''

Restatement (Second) §552 1141 because he or she sustained loss through reliance upon a
negligent misrepresentation in a transaction that the certification authority intends the
information to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially
similar transaction. 1142 Thus, according to this principle, any suppliers of information,
such as certificate service providers, are required to use reasonable care in representing
information to others, including signatories, relying parties, and other interested persons
involved in the use of digital signature technology.
Certification authorities must validate facts contained in certificates. Failure to
exercise reasonable care to verify accuracy of the representations stated in the certificate
creates liability for loss incurred by negligent misrepresentation. The scope of liability of
certification authorities is unfairly large because courts can hold them accountable for
negligence when anyone suffers loss from relying on the information stated in the digital
certificate. 1143

III. Privity States
A minority of states such as New York, allow recovery for the relying party if
they are privy to the certification authority. 1144 The courts may fmd a special relationship
between parties by determining the parties' prior or continuous relationship and the

1141

Id.

1142

Froomkin, supra note 1134, at 100.

1143

/d.

1144

REED,

supra note 1132, at 142.
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special knowledge of the defendant with respect to the technology they were dealing
with. 1145 It may not be possible for all relying parties to win recovery in these states.
Certification authorities are aware that the purpose of a certificate is to provide
trust to anyone who deals with the certificate owner. The purpose in acquiring the
certificate is to produce it to third parties who will rely on it. 1146 The certification
authority may not claim that the third parties who rationally rely on the certificate are
beyond the certification authority's knowledge. All relying parties in this context are
foreseeable.
The liability of certification authorities is not based on the principle of warrantor
of information 1147, but on negligence. 1148 This means that if a certification authority fails
to exercise reasonable care in obtaining or communicating information, the certification
authority will be held responsibility for its own faults. 1149 The standard of care is a key
element in determining the certification authority's liability.
The certification authority may be held accountable under negligence principle if
the plaintiff can prove all elements of negligence. 1150At common law, to prove the
certification authority liable for negligence, the plaintiff must show that:

1145

PETER BROWN & WAYNE E. WEBB, JR.,

18m ANNuAL INSTITUTE ON COMPUTER LAW

1057(1998).
1146

REED, supra note 1132, at 143.

1147

Smedinghoff, supra note 1061, at 29.

1148

See HENRY J. STEINER, MORAL ARGUMENT AND SOCIAL VISION IN TiiE COURT: A STUDY OF
TORT ACCIDENT LAw 18{ 1987). "Negligence" means the conduct of a party that fails to satisfy a
socially required minimum of care as the care to be expected of a reasonable person in the
circumstances.
1149

/d.

1150

BENJAMIN WRIGHT & JANEK. WINN, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, 17-12(3d ed.

1998 supp. 1999).
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(1) The law imposes a duty on the certification authority;
(2) The certification authority breached this duty by failing to meet the legallyrecognized level of conduct, such as the standard of care;

,.

(3) The certification authority's breach either directly or indirectly caused the
plaintiff to suffer loss, including rights and property;
(4) The plaintiff must suffer damages as a result of the act(s) of the certification
authority. 1151
Which level of standard of care will apply to the conduct of certification
authorities is a problem. The E-Transactions Act provides that certification authorities
must exercise a reasonable standard of care. The E-Sign Act does not state a level of care
that will apply to certification authorities. It is therefore proposed that the standard of
care of certification authorities should be a reasonable standard, consistent with the
standard of care stipulated in the Model Law on Electronic Signatures. 1152
At common law, courts do not impose an absolute duty on individuals to prevent
harm to other persons. 1153 Courts created the duty of care principle to protect anyone who
could possibly be harmed by the conduct of another. This principle requires a person to
attain a duty of care in relation to another if he ought reasonably to have foreseen that his
action or omission would cause harm to the other. 1154 Courts impose liability only for
.,
1151

Smedinghoff, supra note 1061, at 29.

1152

See the Model Law on Electronic Signatures art. 9 ( 1)(b) provides that "a certification service
provider shall exercise reasonable care to ensure accuracy and completeness of all material
representations made by it ... " The standard of care of a certification authority is a reasonable
standard.
1153

4
11S

MANDELL,

supra note 406, at 205.

COMPUTER LAW 61(Chris Reeded., Blackstone 1990).
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foreseeable injuries to foreseeable persons whom the defendant should have taken
reasonable care to avoid causing damages. 1155 A person who owes a duty of care must
exercise a certain level standard of care.
Common law generally requires a person to exercise reasonable care in all
activities. 1156 In a service contract, a person undertaking to perform work is charged with
the common law duty to exercise reasonable care and skill in the performance of the
work. 1157 A court will presume upon a defendant a certain amount of special skill and
knowledge if the defendant holds himself out as possessing a certain type of skill. 1158
The duty of care includes the duty to anticipate danger that is reasonably foreseeable. 1159
To judge whether a person has taken reasonable care in doing something, his or
her conduct will be compared with the conduct of a person of ordinary prudence. If an
ordinary prudent person would have behaved in the same manner under similar
circumstances

1160

,

the person in question has attained the standard of reasonable care.

Certification authorities are not always subject to licensing requirements. There is

m 5 MANDELL, supra not 406, at 205.
m 6 Smedinghoff, supra note 1061, at 30.
1157

BROWN & WEBB, supra note 1145, at 1061; see Trans CambeanAirways. Inc. v. Lockhead
Aircraft Service International. Inc., 14 A.D.2d 749, 200 N.Y.S.2d 485(1st Dept 1961).
1158

PROFESSIONAL NEGliGENCE 4 (Thomas G. Roady, Jr., and William R. Andersen eds., 1960).
See also LESLIE EDWARDS & RACHEL BARNES, PROFESSIONAL SERVICES AGREEMENTS 27(2000).
At common law, the standard of care is imposed upon a professional to carry out its services with
reasonable skill and care. To meet this standard, the profession has to exercise certain level of care
as might be expected from the ordinary skilled and competent practitioner in the relevant
profession.
1159

RICHARD D. WILLIAMS & BRUCE T. SMYlli, COMPUTER AND INTERNET LIABILITY:
STRATEGIES, CLAIMS AND DEFENSES 7-12(2d ed.2000).
1160

MANDELL, supra note 406, at 207.
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therefore a need for a professional body whose standard could serve as the basis for a
legal standard of careY

61

It is not easy to identify whether the certification authority has met the standard of
care. The level of care that the certification authority must perform may vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Certification authorities provide identity verification and
document authentication functions that are similar to those of a Notary Public. 1162 Thus,
the standard of care of certification authorities could be implied as being the same as that
for a Notary Public.
Historically, the office of Notary Public was founded in the Roman Empire.1163

,.

Since the art of writing was not prevalent during Roman times, the Notary Public as a
literate and trusted public official performed the duty of drafting and maintaining legal
documents such as contracts and wills for public records. 1164 A person who could not
read or write could use a metal or clay disk engraved with a distinctive design as his
signature. 1165 The Notary Public normally applied a hot wax at the end of the document
1166
The special form
and impressed a seal on it to make such document legal and official.

of sealed writing was recognized by both individuals and courts to serve as a legally

1161

Froomkin, supra note 1134, at 91.

1162

John P. Tomaszewski, Emerging Technologies and the Law: Comment: the Pandora's Box of
Cyberspace: State Regulation ofDigital Signatures and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 33
GoNZ. L. REV. 417, 433(1997/1998).
1163

Michael L. Closen & R Jason Richards, Notaries Public- Lost in Cyberspace, or Key Business
Professionals of the Future, 15 J. MARsHALLJ. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 703, 716(1997).
1164

/d.

1165

/d.

1166 /d.
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binding contract.

1167

The concept of a Notary Public has thereafter been adopted in many

countries, such as the United Kingdom, France, Spain, and the United States.
In the United States, Notary Publics are authorized by state governments, and

perform the functions of establishing the identity of persons brought before them. 1168 The
reason why a signer must appear before the Notary public is that it enables the Notary
Public not only to identify the signer, but also to observe the signer's willingness. 1169
Without a Notary Public, businesses and courts would be unable to ascertain whether the
signature is authentic or fake, 1170 or taking the time to do so would unnecessarily take up

A Notary Public attests and acknowledges that a signer indeed signed his or her
signature on an official document such as an affidavit or deed or other legal
documents.

1171

A third party can reasonably rely on the notarization as indicating that the

person who signed the document is who he or she claims to be. 1172 The Notary Public
must take proper measures to verify the signer's identity through some generally reliable
means and validate the signature.

1173

The standard of care of a notary public is objective

1167

!d.

1168

Smedinghoff, supra note 1061, at 31.

1169

National Notary Association, supra note 909, at 1.

°Clasen & Richards, supra note 1163, at 703.
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Barassi, supra note 839.

1172

David L. Gripman, Electronic Document Certification: A Primer on the Technology Behind
Digital Signature, 17 J. MARsHALL!. COMPliTER& INFO. L. 769,771 (1999).
1173

Barassi, supra note 839.
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reasonable prudence

1174

,

which means that a notary must act as a reasonable notary would

act under similar circumstances. 1175
A Notary Public has to exercise reasonable care in determining the identity of the
person signing the document beyond any reasonable doubt, either through personal
knowledge of the signer's identity, the sworn vouching of personally known credible
witness or reliable legal identification documents. 1176 Verifying a signer's identity makes
a Notary Public the guarantor of identity.

1177

If the Notary Public has not acted

consistently with the standards of verifying the signer's identity, the Notary Public may
be held liable for its acts. If the notary exercises reasonable care in verifying the signer's
identity, the notary cannot be held liable. 1178
Failure to take reasonable care in verifying an identity includes certifying a
signature without actually witnessing the signing, or without examining the proper
identification documents, or failing to ask a person if they are who they were represented
as. 1179 The concept of notary may be applied to online commerce since the cyber notary
functions as a security gateway for users of the electronic commercial superhighway. 1180

I·
1174

Closen & Richards, supra note 1163, at 722.

1115

/d.

1176

National Notary Association, supra note 909, at 3.

1177

Smedinghoff, supra note 1061, at 32.

1178

John C. Anderson & Michael L. Closen, Document Authentication in Electronic Commerce:
The Misleading Notary Public Analog for the Digital Signature Certification, 17 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPliTER& INFO. L. 833,871 (1999).
1179

Smedinghoff, supra note 1061, at 32.

1180
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The use of cyber notary creates confidence and trust for everyone conducting online
commerce.
The level of standard of care for certification authorities should be to exercise
reasonable precaution in determining the identity of the signatory at the same level as a
Notary Public. In order for the plaintiff to win a case against a certification authority, the
plaintiff must prove that the certification authority has not met the reasonably prudent
person test. Some jurisdictions which have enacted Digital Signature Law may impose a
specific standard of care upon the certification authority. 1181
To hold a certification authority liable for its conduct, the certification authority
must owe a duty to the injured person. Courts commonly find that a duty is owed to three
prospective plaintiffs: 1182
(1)

The certification authority is liable to persons who the certification authority
foresees will rely on the false representation;

(2)

The certification authority is liable to persons who the certification authority
intends to supply the information or knows that the prospective recipient
intends to supply;

(3)

The certification authority is liable to persons who the certification authority
has contracted with.
The Restatement standard establishes rules that make a negligent certification

authority liable only to persons to whom they have provided benefit and guidance. 1183

1181

See Utah Code Ann. 46-3-302 requires a licensed certification authority to examine the
information in the certificate after due diligence.
1182

Smedinghoff, supra note 1061, at 42.

1183

/d. at 43.
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Certification authority liability may be compared with Notary Public liability because of
similarities in the functions they perform. Both statutory and case law provide that
Notaries must be held liable for any damage caused by their official conduct. 1184 Official

'

I.

misconduct includes any wrongful act in the performance of a duty, such as unauthorized,
unlawful, abusive, negligent, reckless or injurious acts. 1185
A Notary Public owes a duty of care to any person, including third parties and
interested person, who rely on a representation or statement made by the Notary Public.
Any person who acts on the basis of a notary's statement may bring a claim in negligence
against the notary for wilful or reckless breaches of this duty of care. 1186
Certification authorities may also be liable for negligent misrepresentations made
to any person who suffered losses due to reliance on such representations. For instance,

if the certification authority failed to establish an accurate listing or revoke a certificate
listing, any person who relies on such listing may have a claim based on either wilful or
negligent conduct. 1187 The difference between misrepresentation and negligent acts is
that misrepresentation requires a third party to rely on the certification authority's
misrepresentation, while the negligent acts do not require any third party reliance. 1188 To

1184

Id.

118s

Id.

1186

Id.

1187

See MOLONE, TORTS IN A NUTSHELL 235(1979). A relying party is entitled to recover such
damages because the relying party is a member of the class of persons whom the certification
authority owed a duty of reasonable care.
1188

FEINMAN,

supra note 1129, at 48.
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win a misrepresentation claim, a prospective plaintiff must satisfy the reliance
requirement by presenting evidence of a demonstrable act of specific reliance. 1189
There has not yet been any direct cases concerning breach of duty of care by a
certification authority. In 1993, the lllinois Appellate Court decided the issue of duty of
care of information service providers. In Rosenstein v. Standard & Poors Corp, the court
ruled that the defendant owed a duty of care as an information supplier to persons whom
it knew would reasonably rely on the information made by it. 1190
The general principle oftort states that economic loss is not recoverable. 1191 In the
United States, economic loss principle bars any prospective plaintiff from recovering
compensation if a tort claim in negligence 1192 has been solely made to recover economic
losses. 1193 If a plaintiff suffered only pecuniary damages and does not sustain physical
damages, the economic loss doctrine applies. 1194 This economic loss doctrine grants
compensation only for personal injury or property damages, not for pure economic
losses. 1195 The application of the economic loss doctrine varies from state to state. Some
states apply this doctrine to claims based on services and negligent misrepresentation.

1189

/d.

1190

Rosenstein v. Standard & Poor's Com., 636 N.E. 2d 665, 669-70{111. App.Ct. 1 Dist 1993). See
also MOLONE, TORTS IN ANUTSHELL235(1979).
1191

FEINMAN, supra note 1129, at 49. See MOLONE, TORTS IN ANtrrSHELL 227(1979). A person
who acts negligently may be liable to other persons not only for direct damages but also some
consequential damages. For instance, the operator of a truck who drove negligently and knocked a
power line down may be held liable to the power company not only for the cost of replacing the
pole but for the loss of revenue sustained due to its inability to deliver power to its customers.
1192 /d.
1193

WILLIAMS & SMYTII, supra note 1159, at 7-16.

1194

PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE 45(Thomas G. Roady, Jr., and William R. Andersen eds., 1960).

1195

Smedinghoff, supra note 1061, at 58.
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Some states, such as Illinois, apply this doctrine as an exception and generally permit a
plaintiff to bring a claim based on pure economic loss. 1196
The principle of economic loss has been developed by case law. In 1965, the
California Supreme Court ruled in Seely v. White Motor Corp

1197

that a plaintiff is not

entitled to seek recovery based on a tort of negligence action for a truck that had only
malfunctioning brakes and did not cause personal or property damages to anyone. In this
case, the truck only needed repairs after the brake failed to function. The plaintiff sued
the defendant for economic loss. The court ruled in favor of the defendant that the
plaintiff was not entitled to recover for economic loss. Courts in other jurisdictions
similarly have ruled that purchasers of goods may not obtain recoveries for purely
economic damages in negligence from manufactures. 1198
The United Supreme Court also adopted this economic loss doctrine in deciding a
case which involved a defective product. In East River Steamship v. Transamerica
Delaval, Inc, 1199 it was held that the manufacturer had no duty under tort theories of
negligence or product liability to avoid causing pure economic loss. 1200 A buyer bringing
a claim against the computer dealer for a failure of the disk drive system may not recover
pure economic loss in a claim in negligence. Since the buyer did not experience damages
to other property or personal injury, the court applied the economic loss doctrine to this

1196 Id.
1197

Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 150(Cal.1965).

1198

WilLIAMS & SMYTII, supra note 1159, at 7-17.

1199

East River Steamship Corn. v. Transmerica Delaval. Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2295, 2304(1986).

1200

Smedinghoff, supra note 1061, at 59.
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case. 1201 Thus, the only losses recoverable were the cost of repair or replacement or the
decrease in the value of the goods contracted for.

1202

This doctrine does not apply in the

case of intentional fraud. Courts may award exemplary or punitive damages to plaintiffs
who had successfully proven that the defendant committed fraud.

1203

Certification authorities are potentially liable for economic loss only in
jurisdictions where the court applies the economic loss doctrine as exceptions. For
example, lllinois permits a plaintiff to seek recovery of economic loss where the plaintiff
sustained personal injury or property damage if such damages were the result of an
intentional false misrepresentation or caused by the negligent misrepresentation of a
person who is in the business of supplying information for the guidance of others.
Certification authorities may limit the recovery of the signatory or relying parties
by applying disclaimers and limitations of liability clauses. As a result, the signatory or
relying party may then prefer to bring a tort-based action to courts due to the tendency of
an award for a greater amount of damages than in a contractual claim. 1204 A negligence
claim is also more preferable for the relying parties who are not privy to the contract.
Bringing an action in negligence against the certification authority is also more likely to

,.

be successful. 1205

1201

BROWN & WEBB,

1202

GUIDE TO COMPliTER LAW 28,503(Christine

1203

WILLIAMS & SMYTH,

1204

VERGARI &

1205

SOMA,

supra note 1145, at1060.
A. Graf et al. eds.,2001).

supra note 1159, at 7-8.

SHUE, supra note 407, at 203.

supra note 28, at 101.
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Certification authorities may be able to limit or disclaim tortious liability. The

I

court in Liberty Finance Management Corp. v. Beneficial Data Processing Corp., 1206
upheld the tort liability disclaimers. The defendant in this case made serious errors in the
conversion of consumer data from one format to another. 1207 The error caused the
plaintiff to sustain damages arising from computer breakdowns. The agreement between
the parties disclaimed the defendant's liability for negligence. The court ruled that the
plaintiff could not claim for damages because of the limitation stated in the agreement.
The plaintiff argued that such a disclaimer was unconscionable, but the argument failed.
Disclaimers of liabilities contained in a contract do not affect the viability of a
claim based on intentional misrepresentation. 1208 Disclaimers of liability for intentional
misrepresentation are contrary to public policy. 1209 For example, Minnesota law
prohibits parties from including contractual immunity against his or her own fraud. 1210
The courts also do not allow certification authorities to raise a contractual limitation of
liability to avoid taking responsibility if the signatory or relying party can prove that the
I'

certification authority committed intentional misrepresentation.

1211

Plaintiffs are also

entitled to seek recovery for economic loss under this cause of action. 1212

1206

Liberty Finance Management Corp. v. Beneficial Data Processing Corp., 670 S.W.2d 40 (Mo.
Ct. App.1984).
1207

WRIGHT & WINN, supra note 1150, at 17-16.

1208

VERGARI & SHUE, supra note 407, at 204.

1209

WRIGHT & WINN, supra note 1150, at 17-16.

1210

GEMIGNANI, supra 715, at 361.

1211

VERGARI & SHUE, supra note 407, at 205.

1212

WRIGHT & WINN, supra note 1150, at 17-14.
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In Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp 1213 there were issues regarding
misrepresentation and disclaimers. The plaintiff, an auto company, had agreed to buy an
automated accounting system designed to perform inventory control functions from the
defendant by relying on the broad representations made by the defendant. 1214 The
defendant represented that the proposed system would constitute an effective and
efficient tool for the total system. After the purchase, the plaintiff found out that the
system never worked very well and needed repairs over a period of every three years. 1215
The court ruled that the defendant was liable for its misrepresentation that the
system would be capable of providing the company with effective inventory control. 1216
The court stated that a general disclaimer clause did not provide a defence against a
buyer's action based on its reliance on the false representation. 1217

(B). Statutory Liability
In 1995 Utah became the first state to pass a Digital Signature Act (the Utah Act)
based on a research done by the Information Security-Committee of the American Bar
Association's Section of Science and Technology. 1218 Washington 1219 and Minnesota1220

1213

Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Com .. 298 F. Supp. 115(D. Minn. 1969).

1214

VERGARI & SHUE, supra note 407, at 207.

121S

!d.

1216 !d.
1211 !d.

1218

Brad Biddle, A Short History ofDigital Signature and Electronic Signature Legislation,
available at http://www.bradbiddle.com/history.html(Aug. 26, 2001).
1219

The State of Washington enacted the Electronic Authentication Act in 1997.

1220

The Minnesota Electronic Authentication Act was enacted in 1997.
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have followed the Utah Digital Signature model and enacted their own digital signature
laws since 1998. Subject to the Utah Act, a certification service provider may obtain a
license to conduct online identity verification. Even though obtaining a licensing is not a
prerequisite for a business to conduct online authentication services, the Utah Act treats a
licensed certification authority with favorable provisions on limitations ofliability. 1221
The Utah Act grants certain protections not only for licensed certification authorities, but

I

I·

also for persons relying on the digital signature. 1222 The Utah Act requires a licensed
certification authority to perform specific duties and obligations in issuing and revoking
certificates. 1223
According to the Utah Act, the certification authority may issue a certificate only
after it has confirmed that:

1221

Biddle, supra note 880. See Utah Code Ann.§ 46-3-201(5)(b) (1996) provides that ''the
liability limits of§ 46-3-309 apply to the certification authorities licensed or authorized by that
governmental entity in the same manner as they apply to licensed certification authorities of this
state."
1222

JOHNSTON AND HANDA, supra note 35, at 107. See Utha Code Ann.§ 46-3-309(1996). This
section provides presumptions in adjudicating disputes as follows: ( 1) a certificate digitally signed
by a licensed certification authority and either published in a recognized repository or made
available by the issuing certification authority or by the subscriber listed in the certificate is issued
by the certification authority which digitally signed it and is accepted by the subscriber listed in it;
(2) the information listed in a valid certificate, as defined in Section 46-3-103, and confirmed
by a licensed certification authority issuing the certificate is accurate;
(3) if a digital signature is verified by the public key listed in a valid certificate issued by a
licensed certification authority:
(a) that the digital signature is the digital signature of the subscriber listed in that certificate;
(b) that the digital signature was affixed by the signer with the intention of signing the
message; and
(c) the recipient of that digital signature has no knowledge or notice that the signer:
(i) breached a duty as a subscnber; or
(ii) does not rightfully hold the private key used to affiX the digital signature; and
(4) a digital signature was created before it was time stamped by a disinterested person
utilizing a trustworthy system.
1223

Smedinghoff, supra note 1061, at 36.
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1)

The prospective subscriber is the person to be listed in the certificate to

lo

be issued;
2)

If the prospective subscriber is acting through one or more agents, the
subscriber authorized the agent or agents to have custody of the
subscriber's private key and to request issuance of a certificate listing
the corresponding public key;

3)

I'

The information in the certificate to be issued is accurate after due
diligence;

4)

The prospective subscriber rightfully holds the private key responding
to the public key to be listed in the certificate;

5)

The prospective subscriber holds a private key capable of creating a
digital signature; and

6)

The public key to be listed in the certificate can be used to verify a
digital signature affixed by the private key held by the prospective
subscriber. 1224

The Utah Act specifically requires certification authorities to confirm the identity
of prospective subscribers before issuing certificates. Certification authorities must
carefully examine and maintain the accuracy of the information stated in the certificate.
This prevents reliance on incorrect data. Certification authorities must also be certain that
the prospective subscriber legally possesses the private key corresponding to the public
key. Finally, certification authorities must allow any interested person to use the public
key listed in the certificate to verify a digital signature affixed by the private key of the

1224

Utah Code Ann. § 46-3-302 (1996).

~.
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prospective subscriber. If a certification authority fails to examine the correspondence of
the private and public key, they may be liable for damages arising from the failure.
The Utah Act imposes upon licensed certification authorities a duty to verify not
only the identity of a prospective subscriber, but also the validity of both private and
public keys that will be used to generate and verify digital signatures. Without proper
inspection, this can give an impostor an opportunity to deceive relying parties by
applying for a certificate in the name of another person. Certification authorities should
apply a face-to-face identification process in order to ascertain the subscriber's true
identity. Certification authorities may also require the prospective subscriber to present a
valid United States passport, a state-issued driver's license or other government-issued
identification cards.

1225

The requirement for correspondent testing process enables relying parties to trust
key pairs that will be used to generate and authenticate digital signatures. This increases
the degree of trust amongst the parties involved in the use of digital signature technology.
The Utah Act provides requirements for revoking certificates, in addition to the
requirements for issuing certificates. Licensed certification authorities have to confirm
that the person requesting revocation is the subscriber himself, or is an agent of that
subscriber with authority to request the revocation. 1226 After receiving a request for
revocation, licensed certification authorities may revoke a certificate only if they are

1225

Certification Practice Statement, at 16, available at
htto://www.sos.state.mn.us/business/digitallej>s2.html (1998). According to this Certification
Practice Statements, it was issued in support of Licensed CA Certificates and Minnesota
government Employee Certificate. This Certification Practice Statement states that the method of
identity verification is based on the face-to-face identification.
1226

Utah Code Ann.§ 46-3-307 (1996).
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certain that the person making the call or request is really the signatory or his or her agent.
Certification authorities may suspend a certificate for a brief period of time in order to
scrutinize the identity of the person making the request and ascertain whether or not he or
she is an authorized person.
Certification authorities may reach the subscriber by their contact number to
verify that he or she really made the request. The certification authority may make the
verification by asking a personal secret or the subscriber's mother's maiden name which
the subscriber provided when applying for the certificate. If the subscriber is able to
answer the secret question, the identity is verified. But if the certification authority cannot
confirm whether the person making the request is the signatory or authorized person, the
certification authority may refuse to revoke the certificate. The Utah Act requires that the
process for verifying the subscriber must be done within one business day.

1227

Under

Washington law, the caller can ask for a four-day suspension, but the certification
authority can only suspend the certificate if they are certain the caller really is the
signatory. 1228

1227

CHISSICK & KELMAN, supra note 455, at 166. See Utah Code Ann. § 46-3-307(2) (1996)
requires a licensed certification authority to confirm a request for revocation and revoke a
certificate within one business day. § 46-3-307(6)(b) (1996), however, allows a licensed
certification to have two business days to revoke a certificate after the subscriber requests
revocation in writing.
1228

ld. See also Washington Electronic Authentication Act§ 19.34.250 provides that "the licensed
certification authority that issued a certificate that is not a transactional certificate must suspend
the certificate for a period not to exceed five business days:
(a) Upon request by a person whom the certification authority reasonably believes to be: (i) The
subscriber named in the certificate; (ii) a person duly authorized to act for that subscnber; or (iii) a
person acting on behalf of the unavailable subscriber; or... " See also § 19.34.260(1997) provides
that ( 1) A licensed certification authority must revoke a certificate that it issued but which is not a
transactional certificate, after:
(a) Receiving a request for revocation by the subscriber named in the certificate; and
(b) Confirming that the person requesting revocation is the subscriber, or is an agent of the
subscriber with authority to request the revocation.
(2) A licensed certification authority must confirm a request for revocation and "revoke a
certificate within one business day after receiving both a subscnber's written request" and
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If failure to revoke a certificate is based on negligent conduct of an officer of a
certification authority, the signatory or subscriber may bring a claim against the
certification authority for damages. The certification authority voluntarily obtaining a
license from Utah enjoys specific provisions on limitations ofliability. 1229 For example,
the Utah Act protects licensed certification authorities from liability arising from reliance
of a forged digital signature. The Utah Act provides a 'safe harbor' for licensed
certification authorities by providing that the certification authority will not be liable in
excess of the recommended reliance limit for either a loss caused by reliance on a
misrepresentation in the certificate or for failure to comply with the Act's guidance for
issuing certificates. 1230 The maximum amount of damages may not exceed the ceiling
stated in the certificate.
If reliance on a digital signature is not reasonable under the circumstances, the
relying party of that digital signature assumes the risk that digital signature is forged. 1231
However, the Utah Act does not prevent relying parties who suffered from reliance on
flawed information from claiming damages for lost profits or for pain and suffering. 1232

evidence reasonably sufficient to confirm the identity and any agency of the person requesting the
revocation.
1229

Utah Code Ann.§ 46-3-309(2)(a) (1996) provides that "unless a licensed certification
authority waives application of this subsection, a licensed certification authority is:
(a) not liable for any loss caused by reliance on a false or forged digital signature of a
subscriber, if, with respect to the false or forged digital signature, the certification authority
complied with all material requirements of this chapter .. ."
1230

Utah Code Ann.§ 46-3-309(1) (1996) provides that ''by specifying a recommended reliance
limit in a certificate, the issuing certification authority and the accepting subscnller recommend
that persons rely on the certificate only to the extent that the total amount at risk does not exceed
the recommended reliance limit."
1231

Internet Law and Policy Forum-Working Groups and Publications, supra note 1026.

1232

Utah Code Ann. § 46-3-309(2)(c) (1996).
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Finally, the Utah Act also provides that licensed certification authorities shall have no
liability for indirect or consequentiallosses. 1233

B. Thailand
Certification authorities may be held accountable on the basis of a statutory
liability. A certificate issued by a certification authority is a representation by the
authority as to identity ofthe owner ofthe public key. 1234 Online verification service
providers are liable for damage caused to any legal or natural person who reasonably
relied on the certificate unless the online verification service provider proves that he has
not acted negligently.

1235

There are three parties who may potentially have claims against certification
service providers for damages. 1236 The first is the subscriber or a signatory whose identity
the certification authority has verified and confirmed in a certificate. The second party is
a relying party who acted on the basis of certificates issued by the provider. Relying
parties include both businesses and consumers. 1237 The third party is a victim of a
fraudulent certificate 1238 where a person uses a false name to apply for a certificate, but

1233

Utah Code Ann.§ 46-3-309(2)(c) (1996). The Utah Act provides that the licensed certification
authority will be liable for direct, compensatory damages in any action to recover a loss due to
reliance on the certificate which damages do not include: (i) punitive or exemplary damages; (ii)
damages for lost profits, savings, or opportunity; or (iii} damages for pain or suffering.
1234

Jacob & Overend, supra note 620, at 10.

1235

UNCTAD, E-Commerce and DevelopmentReport 2001, at 117, available at
http://rO.unctad.org/ecommerce (last visited Nov. 16, 2002).
1236

Smedinghoff, supra note 1061, at 22.

1237 Id.

1238

Id.
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the certification authority failed to make proper identity verifications before issuing such
a certificate.
A prospective plaintiff may file a claim against a certification authority in contract
or tort. In the closed PK.I model, if there is a contract between the potential plaintiff and
the certification authority, the plaintiff may claim that the certification authority is in
breach of that contract. 1239 On the other hand, in the open PK.I model, if there is no
contract between the certification authority and a relying party, the latter may bring a
tortous claim against the certification authority based on the certification authority's
negligence in ascertaining the accuracy of the information in the certificate.

1240

The nature of the relationship between relying parties and certification authorities
may not be based on an agreement. This is because the certification authority and relying
parties may not have had any direct communication. Thus, there was no opportunity for
any offer and acceptance between them. Technically, the relying party will receive the
digital certificate from the signatory, then the relying party will check the certificate
signed by the issuing certification authority with a third party certification authority.
Finally if they trust the certificate, they will enter into a deal with the signatory. Issuing
certification authorities cannot form contracts with relying parties because the process of
checking the validity of the certificate is based on the third party certification authority or
the third party online repository. 1241

1239

REED, supra note 1132, at 137.

1240

1241

!d. at 137.

!d.
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If the relying party examines the certificate directly with the certification
authority by inspecting the Certificate List or Certificate Revocation List, the certification
authority may have an opportunity to contract with the relying party. Therefore, it might
be possible for the courts to infer a contract from such communication.

1242

The

certification authority may incorporate a unilateral offer in the online agreement as a precondition for accessing the services, which is accepted by undertaking the terms of the
offer. By checking and relying on the certificate, the relying party agrees to the terms
stated in the online agreement.

1243

The relying party may also respond to this agreement with a manifestation of
consent to be bound according to the terms by hitting the 'accept button' or clicking an "I
accept" icon. Courts may not uphold this method if they believe that the agreed terms are
unfair and create an onerous burden on the relying party. The terms are also subject to
consumer protection laws.
Legal liability of certification authorities is based on the principle of wrongful act
as stated in section 420 of the Civil and Commercial Code of Thailand. The principle of
wrongful act based on negligence is defined as the failure to act with a sufficient degree
of care as might be expected from a person under such condition and circumstances. 1244
As a result of the failure, the other person suffers damages. 1245 Certification authorities
may be held liable for wrongful acts when they fail to act in accordance with the policies
1242

/d.

1243

/d. at 138.

1244

CRIMINAL CODE § 59 paragraph four.

1245

C.C.C § 420 says a person who, willfully or negligently, unlawfully injuries the life, body,
health, liberty, property, or any right of another person, is said to commit a wrongful act and is
bound to make compensation therefor.
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and practices provided in the E-Transactions Act §28(1 ). If a certification authority acted
unlawfully, either wilfully or negligently and causes damages to any right or property of
another person, such certification authority has committed a wrongful act as enunciated
in §420 of the Civil and Commercial Code.
Certification authorities are obligated to perform due diligence to verify the
identity of their clients 1246 although theE-Transactions Act does not clearly impose this
duty. The certification authority may argue that the law did not impose such duty to avail
itself of liability. The rationale for holding liable the certification authority who failed to
perform a verification process is that the certification authority should have performed
such verification process as might be practically expected from a certification authority.

If certification authorities erroneously issue certificates to impostors because they failed
to examine the identification documents of an applicant who applied for a certificate, this
may be considered as a negligent issuance of a digital certificate. 1247
Problems arise when certification authorities examine identification documents,
such as state ID cards, passports, or driving license, which appear to be real on the face,
but are in fact forged. In such cases, the certification authority has not committed
negligence in examining the identification documents of the applicant. However, if the
officer of the certification authority is unable to spot obviously forged identification
documents, this would clearly amount to negligence.
1246

PKI Basics Digital Signatures and Public Key Infrastructure (PKJ) 1OJ, at
http://www.digsigtrust.com/support/pki basics.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2002).
1247

Sineenart Kiatkungwalklai, Professional Tort Liability 70-71(1989)(unpublished Master of
Law thesis, Chulalongkom University)(on flle with the Chulalongkom University Library). To
consider professional tort liability, the court must have regard to the nature, status and
circumstances of the conduct. If the professional has acted in good faith, but made error judgment,
he or she may not be held accountable. Thus, if the person runs a business of verification without
examining identification documents of a subscnber, it may be said that he or she acted negligently.
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Certification authorities may, in addition, be held accountable for negligence if
the certification authorities failed to employ trustworthy systems procedures and human
resources in performing its services as enunciated in§ 28(6) of theE-Transactions Act
and§ 420 of the Civil and Commercial Code of Thailand. The law does not clearly define
what constitutes trustworthy systems. To satisfy the requirements for trustworthy
systems, the certification authority has to deploy computer hardware and software which
are reasonably secure from intrusion and misuse and which can provide a reasonable
level of availability, reliability and accuracy.

1248

A certification authority which utilizes

an inferior computer hardware and software1249 to protect sensitive information from
intrusion by a hacker, may be held liable for negligence for failure to comply with
industry standard where a more secured encryption technology must be applied.
The court may consider industry standards by regarding the technical security
control applied by most online certification service providers. As in Thailand the online
certification authority industry has not yet developed its own security standard, the court
may consider security standard maintained by other online certification service
providers. 1250

1248

Utah Code 46-3-103 provides a definition of trustworthy system as computer hardware and
software which: (a) are reasonable secure from intrusion and misuse; (b) provide a reasonable
level of availability, reliability, and correct operation; (c) are reasonable suited to performing their
intended functions. See also Wichai Tunyapanich, Problems on Consumer Redress under the
Consumer Protection Act B.E. 2522 66-67(1996)(unpublished Master of Laws thesis,
Chulalongkom University)(on file with the Chulalongkom University Library). To assist the
consumers in proving a certification authority's fault, the court may apply security standards
developed by International Standard Organization or Internet Engineering Task Force {IETF) in
order to determine whether or not the certification authority has complied with minimum-security
standards widely recognized by other certification service providers.
1249

In Korea, a secure and trustworthy electronic signature algorithm must be 2048 bit or more. In
New Zealand, key pairs must be 1024 bits and CA's key must be 1024 bit or 2048 bits RSA.

°For example, an online certification service provider in New Zealand must provide key pairs
with 1024 bits for subscribers and the CA 's key must be 1024 bit or 2048 bit RSA. A root CA in
125
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Where certification authorities breach their own policies and practices stated in
the policy and practice statement, liability for wrongful acts may follow. If this policy
and practice statement is incorporated in a contract between the signatory and the
certification authority, the signatory, as a party to contract, may sue the certification
authority for breach of contract.
Qualified signatories may bring claims against certification authorities who deny
a certificate. If the signatory meets the criteria but the certification authority rejects or
delays the issue of a certificate either on the ground that the certification authority made a
mistake, or the facilities are not available by design or accident, or the certification
authority has willfully denied or delayed the issuance, the signatory may have a claim
against the certification authority. 1251 Failure to issue or delay in the issuing of
certificates is an act injuring the property rights of another person according to §420 of
the Civil and Commercial Code of Thailand. Signatories may need to use the certificate
for transacting online business. Denial or delay may cause the signatories to lose business
opportunities.
If a signatory is not qualified according to the policies and practices set forth in
the certification practice statement, certification authorities may deny them a certificate.
Relying parties may not bring a contractual claim against a certification authority
since relying parties have no contractual relationship with certification authorities. 1252

Korea is obligated to store private keys with double encryption in storage with sealing, access
authority confirmation. See also KRlsANA CHANGKLOM, REsEARCH: DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW
(DRAFf) 81(1997).
1251

Smedinghoff, supra note 1061, at 23.

1252

/d.
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Privity of contract entails that only parties to a contract sue or be sued for a breach. A
third party may not attempt to state a claim on a contractual relationship.
Relying parties may only base claims against certification authorities on the

I"

I
I

ground that the certification authority failed to comply with its own policies, such as
issuing an erroneous certificate to an impostor either by negligence or as part of a
conspiracy. If the certification authority erroneously issued a certificate to an impostor,
relying parties who electronically transact online business with the impostor in reliance of
such erroneous certificate may sustain substantial loss as a result of having shipped
merchandise, transferred funds, granted loans or commenced transactions. 1253 Thus, a
party who has relied on fraudulent certificates which had been issued without properly
examining the identity of the signatory may have a claim against the certification
authority.
Failure to suspend or revoke a digital certificate may allow an impostor to enter
into another transaction with the relying party. 1254 If a certification authority
unreasonably delays revocation or suspension of a certificate after a signatory has
notified it of some circumstances that might make a certificate unreliable, the
certification authority may be liable to both the signatory and the defrauded party who
suffered damages in reliance.
If the court is of the opinion that the certification authority has committed
negligence, the court is vested with a power to determine the manner and the extent of

,.'
1253

ld. at 24.

1254 !d.
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compensation according to the circumstances and the gravity of the wrongful act.

1255

In

assessing the loss, the court may take the following factors into account :
(a) the cost of obtaining the certificate;

(b) the nature of the information being certified;
(c) the existence and extent of any limitation on the purpose for which the
certificate may be used;
(d) the existence of any statement limiting the scope or extent ofthe liability of
the certification service provider; and
(e) any contributory conduct by the relying party. 1256
After considering all factors, the court may award compensation to relying parties

i'·
r

according to the circumstances and the gravity of the negligent act made by the

I

certification authority. Under certain circumstances, if it thinks fit, the court may award
I·

punitive damages to the relying party. According to the Thai Supreme Court Decision
Case No.64/2501 (B.E. 1958), the plaintiff alleged an unlawful use of plaintiffs company
name by the defendant. The Supreme Court noted that the defendant had no right to use
plaintiffs company name, which caused damages to the plaintiffs company. The court
also noted that the defendant intentionally used the plaintiffs company name although
the defendant was given prior warnings. The court, therefore, awarded the plaintiff
50,000 baht (approximately 1,200$) in damages. In this case, illegal use of other's

1

m C.C.C. 438 stipulates that the Court shall determine the manner and the extent of
compensation according to the circumstances and the gravity of the wrongful act.
Compensation may include restitution of the property of which the injured person has been
wrongfully deprived or its value as well as damages to be granted for any injury caused.
1256

UNCITRAL Working Group on Electronic Commerce, Electronic Signatures: Draft Guide to
Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures, 38th Sess., at 11, U.N
Doc.A/CN.9/WG.IV/WP.88 (2001).
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person company name was a wrongful act but to determine the amount of damages
incurred was not at all easy. The court thus awarded damages in an amount it deemed as
reasonable. Yet, the sum of damages in the case was relatively large even though the
plaintiff could not prove exactly how much he had lost. Such damages are considered as
punitive damages.

1257

Nonetheless, the court has full discretion to award compensation as enunciated in
§ 438 of the Civil and Commercial Code. A recent negligence case decided by the Court
of First Instance indicated that the court may not award punitive damages where in such
case the plaintiff claimed punitive damages in an amount of 25 million bath.

1258

In this

case, the plaintiff, an American tourist, alleged that a public bus operated by Mr.Utai
Promnus knocked him down while walking across a zebra crossing.

1259

The plaintiff

suffered physical injury and had to retire from work. The plaintiff claimed compensation
for damages in a grand total of 177,823,720 baht, but the court eventually awarded
1,683,217.89 baht in damages and 1,103,171.88 bath for medical expenses
(approximately $25,65 5 .16) without awarding any punitive damages. 1260
It may be concluded that the court is vested with full power to award damages to

the relying party based on the circumstances and the gravity of the wrongful act. The
court may also award economic loss in negligence case if the relying party proves that the

1257
1258

PHOTPUTSAPAKOM, TORTS

534(1987).

Awarding an American tourist 2.7 million bath in damages, THAl RATH, Feb. 1, 2003, at

http://www.thairath.com/thairathl/2546/page 1/feb/01/p 1_7 .asp
1259 /d.
1260 /d.

1,.
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negligent act of the certification authority causes the relying party to sustain economic
loss.
The E-Transactions Act gives certification service providers the right to confine
the scope and extent of the use of a certificate as well as the value of transactions for
which the certificate shall be valid. 1261 This cap on liability of certification authorities is
limited to the amount stated in the digital certificate.
In conclusion, it is important to understand that relying parties may bring a claim

if:
(1)

a certification authority has acted negligently in ascertaining the
accuracy of information in the certificate;

(2)

a certification authority expressly assumes its liability by stating in the
certification practice statement or Certification Policy Statement. 1262

The certification authorities' liability should not extend beyond the reliance limit
stated in the certificate. 1263 Courts may dismiss a case if the certification authority can
prove that it has acted reasonably and their processes were reasonable under the
circumstances. 1264

1261
1262
1263
1264

UNCTAD,

supra note 1235, at 117.

REED, supra note 1132, at 139.
UNCTAD,

supra note 1235, at 117.

Jacob & Overend, supra note 620, at 10.
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4.7 Management of Risks
Certification authorities may manage risk exposures under the terms of a contract.
The contract between a certification authority and a signatory may set forth terms of
warranty disclaimers, liability limitations and indemnification provisions. 1265 One
commercial certification authority, Verisign, has allocated risks to both certificate
subjects and relying parties by incorporating these terms and limitations in certification
practice statements. 1266
Prospective subscribers may agree to be bound by the terms set forth in the
certification practice statement before obtaining a certificate. The problem lies in how the
certification authority can bind the relying parties to these terms. Verisign's web page
informs relying third parties that the act of verifying a certificate or checking a certificate
revocation list indicates an intent to be bound to the terms of the certification practice
statement. 1267 Even though the United States courts recognize a shrink-wrap or clickthrough-contract, it has not yet been established whether this unilateral contract imposed
by the certification authority will be enforceable. If the terms set forth in the certification
practice statement place onerous burdens on relying third parti~s, the court may find it
void for unconscionability.

1265

Biddle, supra note 880.

I:

1266 /d.
1267

/d.
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4.8 Duties of Relying Parties
A. United States
The E-Sign Act does not provide duties upon relying parties as the Thai ETransactions Act does. Relying parties are likely to be responsible for at least four things:
(1) verification of digital signatures from originating subscribers;
(2) knowledge of the rules associated with digital signature acceptance;
(3) record-keeping to held resolve any disputes that may arise in the future; and
(4) understanding what to do when things go wrong, and/ or when something
occurs that requires the intervention or action of the relying party. 1268
Parties who rely on digitally signed messages must actually verify the digital
signature and validate it against the current Certificate Revocation List maintained by an
online repository. 1269 If relying parties fail to verify the validity of certificates and digital
signatures, they assume the risk of forged digital signatures and their remedies may be
limited.

1270

Express contracts between certification authorities and relying parties who use
online verification services, or contracts between signatories and specific relying parties
may also establish duties of relying parties.

1268

ADAMS & LLOYD, supra note 229, at 194.

1269

PKI Basics Digital Signatures and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) 1OJ, supra note 1246.

1270

SMEDINGHOFF, supra note 144, at 53. See Utah Code Ann.§ 46-3-402(1996) provides
that "unless otherwise provided by law or contract, the recipient of a digital signature assumes the
risk that a digital signature is forged, if reliance on the digital signature is not reasonable under the
circumstances. If the recipient determines not to rely on a digital signature pursuant to this
section, the recipient shall promptly notify the signer of its determination not to rely on the digital
signature.
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Signatories may agree with any potential relying parties that the relying parties
must validate the digitally signed transaction by examining the attached digital certificate

I·

and the signatory's public key. The relying parties include any interested persons who the
signatory thinks may reasonably rely on the digital signature. If the signatory is a
business corporation and usually purchases gannents from a manufacturer, the
manufacturer is a relying party whom the signatory may require to authenticate every
message signed with digital signatures. If the relying parties fail to verify the validity of
the digital signature either willfully or negligently, they may be in breach of the contract.
Certification authorities may require relying parties to agree to be bound by the
terms of certification practice statements and to waive any claim against the certification
authority.

1271

The waiver may include disclaimers stating limitation ofliability other than

the certification authority's failure to follow the terms of its own certification practice
statement as a condition of accessing the certificate revocation list. 1272
Relying parties who ignore expiration dates on certificates may have no claim
against certification authorities because the expiration of the certificate cancels any
representation. 1273 If parties suffered in reliance on expired certificates, they may be
barred from seeking recovery from the certification authority because courts will find that
the reliance on an expired certificate was unreasonable.
Certification authorities may limit their liability by imposing a reliance limit.
Reliance limits warn that certificates issued by the certification authority should not be

1271

Winn, supra note 1089, at 11.

1272 /d.
1273

SMEDINGHOFF,

supra note 144, at 52.
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relied upon for transactions in excess of a specific dollar amount.

1274

If relying parties

know or fail to notice a reliance limit and still enter into an online transaction which
exceeds the limit, they may not be able to recover any loss from the certification authority
because their reliance was not reasonable.

1275

Relying parties cannot recover amounts in excess of the reliance limit, but
certification authorities may not deny compensating relying parties for the amount within
such a limitation. Even though failure to heed the reliance limit was unreasonable, relying
parties can still seek recovery for damages within the scope of the limit. 1276

B. Thailand
The Model Law on Electronic Signatures stipulates a minimum code of conduct
of relying parties in Article 11.

1277

The basic principle is that relying parties have to bear

the legal consequences of their failure to follow this Article. TheE-Transactions Act
directly adopted this code of conduct for relying parties as stated in §30. §30 provides
that a relying party shall:
(1) take reasonable steps to verify the reliability of an electronic signature;

1274

/d.

1275

/d.

1276

Reliance on electronically signed messages without regarding the reliance limit may leave
relying parties open to claims of contributory negligence.
1277

UNCITRALMODELLAW ON ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES art. 11 (2001) provides that a relying
party shall bear the legal consequences of its failure to :
( 1) take reasonable steps to verify the reliability of an electronic signature;
(2) in the case where an electronic signature is supported by a certificate, take reasonable steps to:
(a) verify the validity, suspension or revocation of the certificate; and
(b) observe any limitation with respect to the certificate.
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(2) in the case where an electronic signature is supported by a certificate, take
reasonable steps to:
(a) verify the validity, suspension or revocation of the certificate; and

(b) observe any limitation with respect to the certificate.
The E-Transactions Act, §30(1) imposes a legal duty on relying parties who rely
on both simple and advanced or secure electronic or digital signatures. §4 of theETransactions Act defines relying parties as persons who may act on the basis of a
certificate or an electronic signature. Under the circumstances, relying parties may
include persons who may or may not have a contractual relationship with signatories or
certification service providers, including persons who engage in online transactions by
relying on digital certificates 1278 Relying parties may also include signatories and
certification service providers, since in some cases they may rely on certificates issued by
other certification authorities.
§30 requires relying parties to authenticate the reliability of electronic signatures
before relying on them. This means that relying parties cannot trust electronic signatures
before properly verifying their reliability. This section does not intend to deal with the
issue of the validity of electronic signatures, but it deals with the question of when it is
reasonable for a relying party to rely on electronically signed documents. 1279
The E-Transactions Act requires relying parties to take reasonable steps to
validate the reliability of electronic signatures through readily accessible means. 1280
These include telephone calls to the person whose name appears on an electronic
1278

UNCITRAL Working Group on Electronic Commerce, supra note 322, at 51.

1279

/d.

1280

!d.
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document in order to confirm his or her electronic signature, or contacting such person by

I
I,

fax, or sending a message to him or her to verify his or her electronic signature. For
digital signatures, relying parties must run hash programs on digitally signed messages
and compare whether the hash results attached to the signed message is the same as the
one tested by the relying party.
To determine whether reliance has been reasonable, the key factors are:
(1)

the facts which the relying party knew or of which the relying party

..'·
I'

had notice, including all facts listed on the certificate or incorporated

~

I
in it by reference,

t. ·

(2)

the value or importance of the digitally signed message, if known,

(3)

the course of dealing between the relying party and the subscriber and
the available indicia of reliability or unreliability apart from the digital
signature,

(4)

usage of trade, particular trade conducted by trustworthy systems or
other computer-based means.

1281

Reliance on electronically signed messages without proper means of verifying the
identity of signatories may leave relying parties open to claims of contributory negligence.
§30(2) of theE-Transactions Act governs electronic signatures when they are
supported by certificates. Certificates generally support the use of digital signatures.
Relying parties who receive digitally signed messages not only have to take sound steps
1,'

to examine whether such digitally signed messages were tampered with, but also to verify
the validity; lack of suspension or revocation of the certificate; and take notice of any

,,

limitations stated in the certificate.
1281

Jd. at 50.
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This duty ensures that relying parties may not deny knowledge that the certificate
was invalid, suspended, or revoked because the law imposes a duty to verify such
information before relying on a certificate. Relying parties may not refuse to accept
limitations incorporated in certificates, because the law also requires them to take steps to
make themselves aware of such limitations.
This section places a burden on consumers who rely on electronic signatures.
Clearly, there is a need for consumer protection in this area oflaw.

4.9 Conclusion
The use of technology creates not only advantages, but also liabilities for
individuals who use such technology. Digital signatures, widely accepted as efficient
electronic identifiers, provide unique online transaction security by verifying signers'
identities, transaction authenticity and non-repudiation. The application of digital
signatures will successfully fulfill the need for transaction security as long as each party
complies with the minimum codes of conduct regarding the use of digital signatures.
The weakest link in the application of digital signatures lies in the compromise of
private signing keys. Relying parties may not be able to distinguish between a properly
authorized digitally signed transaction and one which is not. Thus, it is reasonable that
the burden of care rests with signatories who maintain the secret keys in their possession.

In the open PKI model, the duties of parties involved in the use of digital
signatures depend on existing laws governing the electronic transactions. In the United
States, the E-Sign Act does not specifically impose a burden of care upon signatories. In
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states where comprehensive digital signature laws have not been enacted, the common
law duty of care governs the signatory's conduct.
In contrast, in Thailand, the E-Transactions Act specifically imposes a duty of

reasonable care upon signatories. Signatories are subject to requirements of reasonable
care to prevent unauthorized use of their private signing key. Signatories are also subject
to notification and maintaining certificate accuracy requirements. Breaches of these
duties both in the United States and Thailand will subject signatories to liability for
negligence.
The E-Sign Act leaves the duties of certification authorities to be governed by
common laws and specific statutes. Certification authorities are subject to certain duties if
they are located in a state in which a comprehensive digital signature law is in effect,
such as Utah. Breaches of those duties will subject certification authorities to liability for
negligence and misrepresentation under the common law.
In Thailand, the E-Transactions Act establishes certain duties for certification

authorities. Failure to conform with such duties subjects certification authorities to
statutory liabilities based on tort principles. Thus, certification authorities in both the
United States and Thailand are likely to be held accountable for breaches of duty of care

in tort.
Duties are not imposed on relying parties in the United States, but in Thailand
they are required to take reasonable steps to verify reliability of digital signatures. Thai
courts may find that relying parties have committed contributory negligence if they have
failed to perform such duties.
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CHAPTERS
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Conclusions
Internet technology has been increasingly used for borderless commerce as well
as for global communications. The technology has also had a profound effect on global
electronic commerce in goods and services 1282by providing online businesses with many
benefits, such as reducing the size of staffs, providing secure means for conducting long
distance transactions, increasing promptness in contacting consumers, and improving

I

I.

overall cost-effectiveness. Since online purchasers seldom have an opportunity to meet
and see online merchants in person, consumers are rightfully concerned with security and
fraud potential when purchasing merchandise over the Internet. 1283
Some websites selling online products do not provide adequate means for
consumers to contact them. Some provide only e-mail addresses, without disclosing their
office location and telephone numbers. This creates understandable uncertainty for online
j

consumers. Even though the websites list a head office location and means to reach them,
consumers may not be certain that they are the persons who they claim to be. Persons

1282

Y AMAN AKDENlZ ET AL., THE INTERNET, LAW AND SOCIETY 349(2000).

1283

TURBAN ET AL.,

supra note 855, at 367.
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negotiating business deals via videoconference also need to authenticate the identity of
the other parties, unless they have previously dealt with him or her.

1284

The issue of how to verify Internet websites can be resolved by the use of trusted
third parties perfonning verification services and issuing digital certificates for
commercial websites. Trusted third parties, widely known as certification authorities, also
issue digital certificates for individuals who have met the qualifications set forth in the
authorities' certification practice statements or policies. Any website that discloses a
digital certificate to online consumers can be trusted in terms of its existence. Identities of
individuals who possess digital certificates may be trusted because a certification
authority has verified his or her identity at the time of issuance of the certificate. To
increase level of security, widely poplar commercial auction website eBay, for example,
assures online consumer confidence by employing third party verification of participant
identity. 1285
The following is an example of the security certificate issued by VeriSign.

I

I.

1284

/d. at 371.

1285

DELTA & MATSUURA,

supra note 859, at 11-76.
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VcriSign Secure Site

TN Sign ol TIIIOI

on ... Not'

WWW.DIRECTCASE.COM is a
VeriSign Secure Site
Security remains the primary concern of on-line consumers. The VertSign Secure Site
Program allows you to leam more about web sites you visit before you submit any
confidential lnfonnatlon. Please verify that the information below Is consistent with the
site you are visiting.
WWW.DIRECTCASE.C

Status

Valid
06-DEC-01 -17-DE ..
Country=US
State .. Wyoming
Locality = Jackson
Organization • RHINOS KIN, INC.
Organlmtlonai Unit= web Operations
Common Name= www.directcaM.com

Validity Period

SeMiriD

I

Information

I

OM~-------------------------4

Name

~--------------------------~

If the lnforrnallon Is conec1. you may submH 18!1sillve data (e.g.• c:radlt can:! numbenl) to this site with
the asaurance that

• This site has a VeriSign Secure Server 10.
• VeriSign has wrtlied the organizational name and that RHINOSKIN, INC. haslhe proof of
rtght to use h.
• This site legitimately runs under the auspices of RHINOSKJN, INC ..
• Alllnfonnallon sent to this she, If In an SSL session, Is enayptad, prolactlng against
di8closure to thltd parties.
To ensure that this Is a legitimate VeriSign Secure Site, make sura that
I. The original URL of the site you are Visiting cornes from WWW.OIRECTCASE.COM.
2. The URLofthls page is htlpa:lldlgltalld.verislgn.com.
3. The atatus of the Server 10 Is Vallcl.

https://digitaljd.vcrisign.com/cgi-bin/Xquery.exe7femplate=authCertBylssuer&fonn_tile=.Jfdf/auth~!BIItdlf6lii!MJI

Figure 10 Security Certificate, Source: http://digitalid.verisign.com
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According to Taylor Nelson Sofres Interactive1286, future online shopping rates
will continue to soar. Online shopping continues to be more popular in the United States
than elsewhere because American consumers value its convenience. 1287 Online commerce
can satisfy consumers' needs in terms of information and price comparison. However,
transaction security seems to be the main impediment to the growth of online commerce
in certain countries such as Thailand. The percentage of Internet users who plan to shop
online within the next six months in Thailand has only grown by one percent. 1288 This
indicates that Thai consumers are not confident in conducting online purchases and prefer
to shop at conventional discount stores or supermarkets.
To promote consumer confidence in transaction security, businesses need to
'·

provide them with technologies to provide sufficient levels of security. Application of
improved security technology will help slow the growth of high-tech fraud. 1289 The
application of digital signature technology provides high levels of security in terms of the
identity of parties involved in online commerce. Although digital signature techniques
using encryptions may be not appropriate for low-value transactions 1290, they may be
worthwhile for high-value business-to-business or business-to-consumer transactions.
Ideally, digital signature technology makes forgery and repudiation so difficult as
to be impractical and provides means of detecting modifications and other forms of
1286

Taylor Nelson Sofres Interactive is one of the world's leading market information groups
providing continuous and custom research and market analysis in over 50 countries.
1287

£-Commerce: Security Issues, THANSETIHAKIT, July 4-6, 2002, at 44.

1288 !d.
1289

Andrew J. Sherman, The Legal and Strategic Aspects of£-Commerce Series, available at
http://www.mdhitech.org/News/articles/34.html(2001).
1290

HENRY H. PERRITT,

JR., LAW AND TilE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY 562(2d ed. 2000).
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tampering with the content of digitally signed transactions. 1291 Digital signature
technology provides advantages to both sides. Digital certificates assure online shoppers
that the online merchants with whom they are considering doing business in fact exist and
that they are who they claim to be. Similarly, online merchants can also be certain that
persons who place orders are really who they claim to be, and that the order cannot be
repudiated once it has been digitally signed. Authenticated digital signatures provide
stronger evidence of the source and integrity of a message than an electronic replica of a
physical handwritten signature affixed on hard copy output. 1292 Digital signature
technology is not an absolute answer to all problems, but it provides today's most secure,
practical solution. 1293
Both the E-Sign Act and Thai E-Transactions Act prohibit courts from denying
legal effect of electronic signatures purely on the ground that they are in electronic form.
Both Acts recognize digital signatures. Courts may, however, deny the legal effect of any
electronic signature on the grounds of unreliability. The legal effect of a digital signature
may also be attacked on the ground of forgery. 1294
Although the E-Sign Act and Thai E-Transactions Act have addressed some legal
issues regarding validity, certain issues concerning burden of proof of reliability and
mechanisms for consumer protection still remain insufficiently addressed. This chapter
presents the following recommendations.
1291

!d.

1292

!d. at 582.

1293

Angel, supra note 91, at 3.

1294

Electronic Signature Law Enacted, available at
http://www.asnuna.com/Newsroom/Legal/Leg Sum 00/leg sum OO.htm (last visited Nov. 2,
2002}.
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5.2Recommendations
5.2.1 Mechanisms for Consumer Protection
A. Caps on Consumer Liability
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is the key United States agency dealing
with online consumer protection concems. 1295 One key concern is the exposure of
consumer liability in the case of misuse of technology or fraud committed by third parties.
Fraud and forgery are effective defences to online agreements.

1296

Signatories may

defend themselves by claiming that the transactions were electronically signed without
authority, or by a person who lacked capacity.

1297

Consumers who apply or use digital signatures may sometimes lack the necessary
1 ..

technical knowledge and expertise, or_they may be deceived into digitally signing
something they did not intend to sign. Even though digital signatures are unique and
encrypted, it is possible for hackers to steal the algorithms and forge a signature. 1298

1295

STANLEY MORGANSTERN, LEGAL PROTECTION FOR THE CONSUMER l(2d ed. 1978).

1296

Richard L. Brown, The £-Signature Act-A Brief Overview, available at
http://www.ecsi.net/updates/news_00049.html (last modified Oct. 25, 2001).
1297

Maureen Dorney, Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, available at
http://www.gcwf.com/articles/interest/interest 36.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2002). See also
EOGHAN CASEY, DIGITAL EVIDENCE AND COMPUTER CRIME: FORENSIC SCIENCE,
COMPUTERS AND TilE INTERNET 199(200 1). The signatory may adduce digital evidence as
"alibi." The key pieces of information in an alibi are time and location. When an individual uses a
computer or connects to the Internet, the time and location is often noted, generating digital
evidence that can be used to support or refute an ahbi. Thus, the signatory may adduce this digital
evidence (detailed logs of activities) to convince the court that he was not using the computer or
signing that transaction.
1298

Mike France, Snares of the £-Signatures Act, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/ebizJ010ll!:;p0180.htm (2001).
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Signatories who store their private keys in hard drives, even if enforced by additional
password protection are vulnerable to brute force attacks.

1299

It is not as easy to prove that someone has fraudulently misused a digital signature
as it is to prove forgery in a handwritten signature.

1300

To prevent false claims of private

key losses, and to strengthen the efficiency of digital signature technology, signatories
bear the risk of liability if they lose their key and fail to give proper notice.

1301

A forgery of a traditional signature is null and void under the Thai Civil and
Commercial Code. 1302 With electronic signatures, a forged electronic signature is also
invalid, but the law, such as the Thai E-Transactions Act has imposed a duty of care upon
I!

r

l

1299

Jane Kaufman Winn & Carl Ellison, Regulating the Use ofElectronic Authentication
Procedures by US Consumers in the Global Electronic Market, at 6, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/icpw/comm.ents/revwin-1.btm (Mar. 26, 1999).
1300

France, supra note 1298. See Utah Code Ann.§ 46-3-103(12) provides that "forge a digital
signature" means either:
(a) to create a digital signature without the authorization of the rightful bolder of the private
key; or
(b) to create a digital signature verifiable by a certificate listing as subscnber a person who
either:
(i) does not exist; or
(ii) does not hold the private key corresponding to the public key listed in the
certificate. See also THOMAS P. VARTANIAN ET AL., 21ST CENTuRY: MONEY, BANKING &
COMMERCE 460(1998). Unlike a forged paper check can be identified and examined by
handwriting experts, an unauthorized electronic check will be digitally identical to one validly
issued by the signatory.
1301

PERRlTT, supra note 1290, at 592.

1302

For example, C.C.C. § 1008 says that "where a signature on a bill is forge or placed thereon
without the authority of the person whose signature it purports to be, the forged or unauthorized
signature is wholly inoperative ...." See U.C.C. Article 3 provides, in relevant part: any
authorized signature is wholly inoperative as that of the person whose name is signed unless he
ratifies it or is precluded from denying it; but it operates as the signature of the unauthorized
signer in favor of any person who in good faith pays the instrument or take it for value.

li
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a signatory.

1303

If a signatory has breached his or her duty of care, he or she will be held

accountable for his or her action.
Relying parties are also consumers in digitally signed transactions. The ETransactions Act imposes a duty upon relying parties to take reasonable care in verifying
the reliability of electronic signatures.

1304

Relying parties who fail to authenticate digital

signatures bear the risk ofloss even where such failure resulted from a failure in the
online certification authority's computer system. Therefore it is also reasonable for
relying parties to have protection in this situation.

1305

The long history of consumer protection legislation makes it reasonable that the
•'

liability of customers should be limited even in situations where they have not acted
reasonably. 1306 The question whether consumers have acted reasonably or not is a
question of law. Laws should not place the risk of fraud or error losses from online
transactions on customers, but on the providers and online merchants who profit from the
use of technology. 1307 Laws that shift the risk of fraud or error losses to consumers create
a moral hazard and will produce economically inefficient outcomes. 1308

1303

E-TRANSACTIONS AcT§ 27(1) provides that "each signatory shall exercise reasonable care to
avoid unauthorized use of his signature creation data."
1304

E-TRANSACTIONS ACT§ 30(1).

1305

PERRITT, supra note 1290, at 590.

1306

1ntemet Law and Policy Forum-Working Groups and Publications, supra note 1026.

,r

1307

PAUL D. SHAW, MANAGING LEGAL AND SECURITY RISKS IN COMPUTING AND
COMMUNICATIONS 118(1998).
1308

Winn & Ellison, supra note 1299, at 2.
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It is fair to place on consumers the risks that they can realistically be expected to

control, but with some limitations.

1309

Establishing caps on liability for consumers who

apply digital signature technology in cases of technology misuse is a reasonable
protective measure. Technology misuse includes a fraudulent misuse by third parties or
signatories. If everyone involved in the digitally signed transaction has acted reasonably,
the risk of fraud and loss should be placed on digital signature service providers and
online merchants who create and maintain the use of digital signature technology syst~m,
in order to encourage them to improve the system. 1310
All other risks allocated to more sophisticated parties, such as online merchants,
and digital signature technology providers can be compensated by insurance. Allocating
liability for unauthorized use of digital signatures to online certification service providers
and merchants will promote further investment to develop and maintain the security of
the system. 1311
For credit cards and debit cards, the liability of cardholders is limited to $50 in
case of lost or stolen cards according to Regulations Z and E. 1312 Those rules mandate

1309

!d. at 6.

1310

See Winn & Ellison, supra note 1299, at 2.

1311

!d.

1312

See Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z) 12 C.F.R. § 226.12 (b) provides: liability of
cardholder for unauthorized use of a credit card shall not exceed the lesser of $50 or the amount of
money, property, labor, or services obtained by the unauthorized use before notification to the card
issuer under paragraph (b)(3) of this section ... ." See also Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation
E) 12 C.F. R. § 205.6 stipulates: a) Conditions for liability. A consumer may be held liable, within
the limitations described in paragraph (b) of this section, for an unauthorized electronic fund
transfer involving the consumer's account only if the financial institution has provided the
disclosures required by§ 205.7(b)(l), (2), and (3). If the unauthorized transfer involved an access
device, it must be an accepted access device and the financial institution must have provided a
means to identify the consumer to whom it was issued.
(b) Limitations on amount of liability. A consumer's liability for an unauthorized electronic fund
transfer or a series of related unauthorized transfers shall be determined as follows:
(1) Timely notice given If the consumer notifies the financial institution within two business

I·
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that no customer can be held accountable for the unauthorized use of their credit cards or
for unauthorized electronic fund transfers unless they accepted the credit card and or
access device such as an A TM card or debit card, and the rules concerning liability for
unauthorized were disclosed. 1313 Regulation Z protects cardholders from all liability in
excess of $50 for failure to safeguard the credit card, while Regulation E provides a
progressive limit starting from $50 to $500.

1314

The use of credit cards may be abused in

some situations and statutes still protect the cardholders.
Currently, neither the E-Sign Act nor the Thai E-Transactions Act addresses the
issue of limitations on liability for consumers who apply electronic signatures. Digital
I·

signature technology may be misused either by negligence of signatories or by hackers.

r
r.

Consumers should not be bound by unauthorized use of online authentication procedures
unless, after full disclosure of the risks involved, the consumer has agreed to be
bound. 1315 Although the consumer has agreed to be accountable for an unauthorized use,
(

such liability exposure must be limited.

days after learning of the loss or theft of the access device, the consumer's liability shall not
exceed the lesser of $50 or the amount of unauthorized transfers that occur before notice to the
financial institution.
(2) Timely notice not given. If the consumer fails to notify the financial institution within two
business days after learning of the loss or theft of the access device, the consumer's liability shall
not exceed the lesser of$500 or the sum of:
(i) $50 or the amount of unauthorized transfers that occur within the two business days,
whichever is less; and
(ii) The amount of unauthorized transfers that occur after the close of two business days and
before notice to the institution, provided the institution establishes that these transfers would not
have occurred had the consumer notified the institution within that two-day period.
1313

Winn & Ellison, supra note 1299, at 9.

1314

/d. at 12. See also 12 C.F.R. § 226.12 (b) and 12 C.F. R. § 205.6

131S

/d. at 2.
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The limitations of digitally signed transactions should be the same amounts as for
credit cards. The risk of loss due to fraud should be placed on the shoulders of online
merchants and technology providers in order to provide incentives for investment in the
improvement of the technologies.

1316

It is appropriate for online merchants to insure their

businesses against risk of fraud. Thus, insurance coverage against risk of technology
misuse should be provided.
Another type of insurance coverage may be additionally provided for consumers
who are signatories to insure against risks of liability arising from a legal or contractual
obligation to exercise reasonable care to protect their private signing keys from being
disclosed. Under this coverage, the policy should protect the signatories from liability for
damages arising out of the use of the digital signatures. This helps the signatories bear the
risks of liability. Ifthe signatories are sued on the ground ofbreach of their duties which
created losses to relying parties, the insurance company can compensate such loss.
Under some circumstances, however, although the signatories have not acted in
violation of any duty of care, a third person, such as a hacker may have obtained the
private signing key by high-tech theft, and has created loss to an individual who
reasonably relied on the digitally signed documents in the name of the signatories. The
principle of no-fault should be applied in order to compensate the individual who has
reasonably acted on the basis of such digital signatures. 1317 The insurance company has to
compensate for the loss even though the signatories are not legally liable for such loss.

1316 /d.

at 2.

1317

EMMETI J. VAUGHAN & THERESEM. VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTAI.SOFRISKANDINSURANCE543544(8th ed. 1999). Under this no-fault system, a relying party does not need to prove that the
signatory is at fault. If the relying party suffers damages from relying on the forged or
unauthorized digital signature, he would seek recovery for his losses from the signatory's insurer.
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With a mechanism to cap their liability and to insure against liability and
technology misuse, consumers will feel more confident in applying digital signatures and
they will become more widely accepted. Consumers will know that even if there is any
misuse of technology they will be protected.

B. Consumer Consent
In the United States, the E-Sign Act governs only transactions in which the parties
have agreed to conduct business with each other through electronic means. 1318 A major
concern in the area of consumer protection is that companies would make crucial
information available to their consumers only through the Internet. 1319 There are concerns
that consumers might consent to future electronic transactions which they may not have

I

t"

the technological capability of receiving, reading or retaining.

1320

It is essential for

Congress to incorporate consumer protection provisions requiring consumer consent in
the E-Sign Act. Subject to the Act, consumers must explicitly agree to the use of all
electronic contracts and records prior to the initiation of any transaction that involves an
electronic signature or results in an electronic record as the official copy of the
transaction. 1321

1318

Anthony M. Bailon, From Wax Seals to Hypertext: Electronic Signatures, Contract
Formation, and a New Mode/for Consumer Protection in Internet Transactions, 50 EMORY L. J.

I•

905, 926(2001).
1319

Robert MacMillan, E-Sign Law Appears To Work Fine So Far- Govt. Study, available at
http://www.newsbytes.com/news/01/167338.btml(2001).
1320

The Dynamics of Consumer Protection in Light ofUETA and E-Sign, at 4, available at
http://www.consumerlaw.org/initiatives/e commerce/dynamics of consprotection.shtml (last
visited Nov. 2, 2002).
1321

E-Sign § 101 (c)(1)(A).
·,

396

The E-Sign Act should shield consumers from technological abuse from the
business sector due to the difference in bargaining power. Requirements for technological
access are also incorporated in the E-Sign Act so that consumers are notified if the
business has upgraded or changed any software to access and retain the electronic
records.

1322

The requirement for consumer consent not only protects customers who lack

capacity to access to electronic records, but also ensures that they will in fact receive such
electronic communications.

1323

Consumers, by definition are "individuals who obtain through transactions,
products, or services which are used primarily for personal, family, or household
purposes, and also means the legal representatives of such individuals." 1324 Consumers
can be any natural persons who purchase goods or services via commercial Internet
websites and other electronic means for their own use, not for resale. This protection is
intended to cover only private consumers, not business or corporate consumers. 1325
Congress also integrated the principle of party autonomy provisions in the E-Sign
Act. According to the Act, no consumer can be forced to enter into online contracts or
online transactions without their clear and conspicuous consent. 1326 Such consent must be
made prior to the commencement of any transactions that involve electronic signatures,

1322

E-Sign § 10 1(C)(D) provides that "if a change in the hardware or software requirements
needed to access or retain electronic records creates a material risk that the consumer will not be
able to access or retain a subsequent electronic record that was subject of the consent, the person
providing the electronic record must provide the consumer with a statement of (I) the revised
hardware and software requirements for access to and retention of the electronic records ... "
1323

The Dynamics of Consumer Protection in Light ofUETA and E-Sign, supra note 1320, at 4.

1324

E-Sign § 106(1).

1325

WILLIAMS & SMYTH, supra note 1159, at 8-9.

1326

E-Sign § 101(c)(B).
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including digital signatures. 1327 The Act provides that consent be granted or confirmed
electronically, excluding voice messages. This means that the consumer must be engaged
in electronic communications prior to an electronic delivery of required notices. 1328
Clicking an "I agree" icon or click-checking an unchecked box indicates assent. 1329
Where laws require information be provided to consumers in writing, 1330
consumer consent is required. Businesses intending to correspond with consumers
through electronic means must have consumer consent before transmitting electronic
notices to consumers; otherwise they are in violation of the consumer protection
provision. If the law does not require businesses to provide electronic notices or
information to consumers (such as Amazon.com selling books online) they are not
subject to the requirements.1331

I '

1327

E-Sign § 101(c)(A).

1328

Gail Hillebrand, E-Sign Study-Comment P004102, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/b<a>/workshops/esign/comments/consumersunion.pdf (last visited Nov. 2,
2002).
1329

Ryan J. Casamiquela, Contractual Assent and Enforceability in Cyberspace, 17 BERKELEY
TEcH. L. J. 475, 479(2002). According to Caspi v. Microsoft Network LLC, 732 A.2d 528(N.J.
App. Div. 1999), the court upheld clickwrap license when user was prompted by vendor to view
license and had opportunity to click either "I agree" or "I don't agree".
1330

Electronic Signature Law Enacted, available at
http://www.asmma.com/Newsroom/Legal/Leg Sum 00/leg sum OO.htm (last visited Nov. 2,
2002). See also RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY: RIGHTS, LICENSES,
LIABILITIES, 2001 CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT N0.1 14-21 (3d ed.2001). The E-SignAct
endorses the consumer protection laws by requiring the information regarding disclosures or
notices be made available to a consumer in writing.
1331

Jonathan Stem, Briefing Paper on the Electronic Signatures in Global and National
Commerce Act, at 4, at

http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bcltlpubslannrev/exmplrs/bp/jsbp.PDF (Sep. 18, 2000).
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Requirements for affirmative consent by conswners ensure that no business can
force any conswners to accept required notices in electronic form against their will.

1332

To protect conswners effectively, theE-Sign Act requires specific electronic consent
processes that reasonably demonstrate the capacity of the conswner involved to access to
the Internet or related electronic docwnents 1333 in the form of e-mail or in HTML format
on a web site. 1334 Electronic consent may be demonstrated by means of clicking through
procedure that permits a conswner to enter into an online transaction only after
acknowledging his or her consent. 1335 This requirement ensures that conswners in the
online marketplace are properly protected at the same level as in the conventional paperbased world. 1336
The E-Sign Act unambiguously states that consumers are entitled to be informed
of their rights to use conventional approaches for receiving notices or mailings, as well as
rninirnwn technical requirements necessary to receive electronic notices. 1337 E-mails
attached with files sent to consumers may not be in formats that consumers' computers

1332

Jay Inslee, What Features ofan E-Sign Bill Will Most Effectively Impact E-Commerce: E-Sign
Bill Must Include Protections for Consumers, at 2, available at
http://www.rollcall.com/pages/pb/00/03/pb27h.html(Mar. 27, 2000).

t'

1333

Consumer Union, The Need to Protect Consumers-Especially Low-Income Consumers-from
UETA, available at http://www.consumersunion.org/fmance/uetawc20l.htm{ Feb. 1, 2001).
1334

Louis F. Rosenthal, Statement Before the House Financial Service Subcommittee on Domestic
Monetary Policy, Technology and Economic Growth, at
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/banklhba73743.000/hba73743 O.htm (June 28, 2001).
1335

Robert J. Marchant, Electronic Commerce Under the Federal E-sign Legislation, 74
Wisconsin Lawyer, (Jul. 2001), available at
http://www. wisbar.org/wislawmag/200 1/07/marchant.html.Oast visited Nov. 2, 2002).
1336

Rosenthal, supra note 1334, at 3.

1337

Brown, supra note 1296.
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can read. 1338 Because of incompatibilities in technology in use, this may lead consumers
to lose their rights to be notified. Thus, there should be requirements that notice
transmitted to the consumer be in readable format intelligible to the consumer. 1339
The E-Sign Act gives rights to consumers not only to terminate their consent to

I

f,

receive electronic notices at anytime, but also to continue receiving paper-based notices
as well. 1340 Businesses cannot require consumers to accept or sign their signatures
electronically. If the consumers prefer to have their transactions on paper, the business
may not force them to accept electronic transactions. If the consumer is unable to open,
retain and print an electronic record because it is not in the format in which he or she
agreed to receive it, the electronic record will not satisfy the delivery requirements under
theE-Sign Act. 1341 If consumers are mistaken about the capacity of their computers to
receive, retain or print electronic records, they are entitled to withdraw their consent to
receive such electronic documents. 1342
Consumer consent provisions under the E-Sign Act apply to online transactions
regardless of the amount or value of a particular transaction. 1343 Consent requirements
apply only to electronic records that are provided or made available to consumers, not to

1338

Consumer Union, supra note 1333.

1339

!d.

1340

Brown, supra note 1296.

1341

Inslee, supra note 1332, at 2.

t342

Id.

1343

Marchant, supra note 1335, at 2.
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electronic records that are obtained from them. 1344 The consumer need not consent to the
electronic recording of agreements that they electronically signed and transmitted to
businesses unless the online transactions they have to receive electronic confirmations in
order to make the transaction valid. 1345

'·

Businesses are seeking to amend consumer protection provisions because they
place the burdens on businesses. 1346 For example, Visa recently stated that the
Demonstration Requirement is unnecessary since it underestimates the capacity of
consumers to operate in cyberspace. 1347 The more the consumer needs to do to conduct a
transaction, the possibility that they will finish through that process is greatly

I

L

decreased. 1348 Consumer protection provisions have worked out in the marketplace. 1349 It

,~

appears reasonable not to amend or repeal provisions for consumer protection since their
benefits outweigh the burdens ofbusinesses conducting online commerce, according to
the California Department of Consumer Affairs.

1350

It is interesting to note that the E-Sign Act does not address mechanisms for

enforcement ifbusinesses failed to obtain consumer consent. There should be sanctions
1344

Robert A. Wittie and JaneK. Winn, Electronic Records and Signatures under the Federal ESign Legislation and the UETA, 54 The Business Lawyer 293, 299 (2000), available at
http://faculty.smu.edu/jwinn/ESIGN-UETA.htm( last visited Nov. 2, 2002).
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Patrick Tlnbodeau, Business Seeking Changes to E-Sign Act: Say Strict Requirements May Irk
Consumers, available at http://www .itworld.com/Man/2681/CWDO 10402ST059147 I (Apr. 2,
2001).
1347

Russell W. Schrader, Re: E-Sign Study-Comment P004102 (Mar. 15, 2001).
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Thibodeau, supra note 1346.
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MacMillan, supra note 1319.
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Kathleen Hamilton, Re: E-Sign Study Comment P004102, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/esign/comments/cca.htm(Mar. 9, 2001 ).
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imposed upon the businesses that fail to obtain consumer consent where the law requires
I

them to do so. For instance, if businesses commit violations regarding consent, there

I.

should be sanctions that result in the invalidity and unenforceability 1351 ofthe notice or
information that has been transmitted electronically. Most businesses will not enforce
such electronic messages against consumers or take advantage of the validity provisions.
On the other hand, the E-Sign Act provides protection to consumers where their consent

has not been given. The E-Sign Act, however, recognizes the legal effectiveness, validity,
or enforceability of any contract executed by consumers even though the business has
failed to obtain electronic consent or confirmation of consent by that consumer.

1352

To comply with the consumer consent provisions under the E-Sign Act,

I.

certification service providers may need to use both online and off-line processes to
contact its clients during the certificate issuance process. 1353 They may ask applicants to
provide their e-mail address at the time they apply for digital certificates. This
enrollment can be done online through websites and offline via paper-based application
forms.
The use of the e-mail address serves dual purposes, viz., the identification and
authentication of applicants. 1354 Before processing digital certificates, certificate service
providers will transmit a message to the e-mail address given by the client. If the

1351

Michael E. Arruda & Irian A. Shestakova, US Enacts E-Sign: The Electronic Signatures in
Global and National Commerce Act, available at http://www.cla.org/usenacts.pdf(last visited
Nov. 2, 2002).
1352

E-Sign § 101(c )(1)(3).
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Thomas J. Greco, theE-Sign Act in General, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/esign/comments/dstc.hbn (Mar. 27, 2001 ).
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messages bounce back, the certificate service providers may decline to issue the
certificate 1355 or may contact its client by traditional means to confirm the accuracy of the
e-mail address. In order to prove that the client has capacity to conduct transactions in a
manner that reasonably demonstrates his or her ability to access online information,
certification service provides may send out paper-based activation codes to the client by
first class mail. 1356 Demonstration of capacity to access online information on the website
is established when the applicant enters his or her activation code.

1357

According to Economic and Statistics Administration & National
Telecommunications and Information Administration, the percentage of Americans who
have no access to the Internet in their home or elsewhere is over 55%. 1358 Only 41.5 of all
U.S. users can access the Internet from their home. 8% of Americans rely on public
access and the percentage of elderly and poor who do not have access to the Internet is
much higher. There is a need for additional consumer protection, such as electronic
delivery assurance. In order to provide stronger protection to consumers, the notices
transmitted to a consumer should be considered received only when the notice itself is
opened, acknowledged, or automatically acknowledged by a flag that indicates the
recipient has opened it. 1359
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U.S Department of Commerce, Economic and Statistics Administration & National
Telecommunications and Information Administration, "Falling Through the Net: Toward Digital
Inclusion" A Report on Americans' Access to Technology Tools, October 2000. Figure II-13.
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The Dynamics of Consumer Protection in Light ofUETA and E-Sign, supra note 1320, at 8.
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In Thailand, the percentage of Thais who have access to the Internet is relatively
low. Almost Thais rely on traditional means of communication, such as mails, telegrams,
and faxes. Although the E-Transactions Act is more comprehensive than the E-Sign Act
in terms of specific duties imposed upon parties involved in online transactions, it does
not address mechanisms for protection of consumers as the E-Sign Act does.
The Thai E-Transactions Act does not incorporate affirmative consumer consent

r.

provisions. This will allow unscrupulous businesses to take advantage of relatively
unsophisticated consumers by encouraging them to consent to receive electronic
documents even though these are beyond that consumers' needs or ability to use. For
example, businesses may incorporate terms that allow them to send information to
consumers who provide their e-mail address. Having an e-mail address does not mean
that the consumer has the ability to access and use electronic records.
Lack of provisions regarding prior consent puts the consumer in danger without
means of protection. Consumers may not wish to enter into electronic contracts because
they distrust the transactions, or they do not have confidence in the use of electronic
media. But some websites may not allow consumers to conduct transactions with them
through conventional paper means. This means consumers may not get notification if

r
I

they cannot access the Internet. Thus, requirements for prior consent are indispensable if

'·

businesses wish to provide electronic documents to consumers.

C. Paper Back Up
Although the E-Sign Act and E-Transactions Act allow certain transactions to be
made electronically, there is the potential risk of alteration and modification because the

404

,I

E-Sign Act does not require that the process of electronically signing the records itself
would prevent alteration ofthat record. 1360 Even though most transactions are
electronically stored, back up on paper is vital for online commerce since any alteration
of paper-based documents is more easily noticed than on electronic records.1361 When
electronic records may have been exposed to modifications which have left no trace,
without proper detection technology it will be hard to prove that the consumers agreed.
Some vendors may encourage consumers to agree to receive copies of concluded
contracts in electronic form. Proof of agreement may be files attached to e-mails, or a
showing that the cost of the product was discounted because the consumer chose to
receive an electronic copy. Vendors may also provide computers for consumers to
electronically sign electronic contracts at the vendor's office, and inform the consumer
·that they will receive a copy of the signed contract in a paper form later. This provides
opportunities for vendors to alter electronic records after signatures have been affixed. 1362
Without an accurate, secure means of detecting changes, fraud and the potential for
alteration or modification of the agreement are potential sources of exposure for

r

consumers.

I.
This issue can be resolved by requiring that in transactions where the seller
j.

provides the electronic equipment, the consumer must be given a written, non-electronic
copy of the contract. If the consumer wishes to receive notices electronically in the future,
they may consent to do so on the condition that the consent must be made or confirmed

I'
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The National Consumer Law Center, Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce
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on electronic equipment not provided by the seller. 1363 To protect consumers and provide
!

primary evidence of their transactions, consumers should be entitled to have a paper back
up from the businesses for a nominal fee. The danger here is that the fee might provide a
disincentive for consumers to obtain paper back up. This paper back up requirement not
only provides consumers with solid record for their consummated transactions, but also
proof of non-alteration as laid out in the contents and terms set forth in the agreement.

D. Right of Access to Readable and Non-Repudiable Electronic
Documents
The E-Sign Act has as strong a provision for electronic record integrity as in the
Thai E-Transactions Act. Record keeping processes are a key concern in consumer
protection. When online merchants attempt to prove the integrity of electronic
documents, courts may deny legal effect to electronic record on the grounds that they are
not in an accurately reproducible form capable of use for later reference. Both Acts
require that records of online transactions be capable of being retained and accurately
reproduced for subsequently reference regardless of whether the parties actually retained
it.l364
There must be measures to protect consumers and provide them with access to the
records by any means provided by the businesses. The problem that needs to be
addressed is how consumers can be assured that the electronic document is the one that
they signed or agreed with. Although businesses are by law mandated to maintain and
1363

Margot Saunders & Gail Hillebrand, E-Sign and UETA: What Should States Do Now?,
available at http://www.consumerlaw.org/e-sign.html.(n.d.)
1364

MICHAEL D. SCOTI, SCOTI ON COMPliTER LAW 7-132(2d ed. 2002).
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store electronic records in a retrievable form and without modification

1365

Neither Act

specifies which or what kind of technology be used to maintain record integrity.
To comply with the requirements, records must be preserved in locked formats
that cannot be modified, such as Portable Document Format (.pdf- an Adobe
Corporation trademarked but freely available format able to be used on nearly all recent
computer systems) to prevent innocent or deliberate alteration whenever the document is
read. 1366 To prevent changes or repudiation and to protect consumers, they should be
able to request the businesses to provide electronic records that were stored or kept in
non-alterable form. To provide preventive measures, the consumer should be able to
request businesses to digitally sign document because digital signatures are able to detect
modifications after signature. This is the best solution for both modification prevention
and non-repudiation.

E. Disclosure
The best and most common means of consumer protection is to educate
consumers about the legal effects of the use of electronic signature technology, and to
warn them against signing electronic documents without fully understanding that they
have legally binding force. Without knowing how to use proper technology consumers
may end up being bound to online contracts without intending to. Since many consumers
lack legal and technological awareness, they may not know that their actions, such as
typing their names at the end of an e-mail message, clicking a check box, or leaving a

1365

Inslee, supra note 1332.

1366

The National Consumer Law Center, supra note 1360, at 5.
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voice message, can bind them. There is a need for disclosure about the risk of being
legally bound.
Neither the E-Sign Act nor the E-Transactions Act requires businesses to disclose
information indicating that clicking an agreement button constitutes consumer acceptance.
The disclosure notifies consumers that a binding contract will be formed if they
t

intentionally click on the "I agree" icon.

1367

Disclosure encourages consumers to read the

terms carefully and be alert before taking steps that bind them to electronic transactions.

It is necessary that mandatory disclosure be among the duties placed upon
businesses in consumer transactions. Such notification must be presented in a clear and
conspicuous manner. 1368 This will ensure that consumers signing electronic messages by
clicking "I agree" buttons or typing their names in blanks have been given necessary
notice prior to doing so.

F. Burden of Proof
Neither theE-Sign Act nor E-Transactions Act addresses the issue of the burden
of proof in cases of lost, stolen, unauthorized use of, or technical failure of applications of
electronic signatures. A typed name at the end of e-mails, one simple form of electronic
signatures, is easily forged. The application of a more secure electronic signature, such as
a digital signature, is preferable in order to lessen or eliminate risks. 1369

1367

Bailon, supra note 1318, at 935.

1368

/d. at 932.

1369

GRAHAM J H SMITII, INTERNET LAW AND REGULATION 462(3d ed.2002)
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For repudiation of traditional handwritten signatures, persons who assert forgery
as a defense must present some proof that the signature is not authentic. 1370 Holders of
signed documents are not required to prove the signature's authenticity because they have
the right to rely upon the presumption of authenticity. 1371 Proof of forgery in a physical
signature is not difficult because fake signatures may be compared with authentic ones.
On the other hand, proving forgery in digital signatures is much more difficult, such that
a computer expert witness is usually needed.
For credit card systems, Congress passed the Fair Credit Billing Act that provides
consumers with high protection in the event of unauthorized use of credit cards, fraud,
theft or system failure by transferring risk ofloss to the industry creating and maintaining
the credit card system. 1372 In Thailand, the use of credit card is not as stringently
regulated as in the United States. Even though the Consumer Protection Committee has
declared that the credit card business is a regulated business, only terms in the credit card
agreements are highly regulated by the Committee. For instance, the credit card issuers
cannot force consumers to pay for any transaction that occurs after the consumer has
notified the issuers to temporarily suspend the credit card, unles~ the credit card issuers
can prove that the credit card holder in fact made such transaction. 1373 It is clear that any
transaction made after the notification may not be enforced against the credit card holder.
But for transactions that occurred before the notification, even if they were unauthorized,

1370

The National Consumer Law Center, supra note 1360, at 11.

1371

!d. at 12
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the credit card holder is still responsible unless he or she can prove that the signature is
forged.
The use of digital signatures is similar to the use of credit cards since credit cards
are electronic devices binding holders of credit cards to a promise to pay. 1374 Digital
signatures are in effect electronically generated promises to pay that can bind the
owner. 1375 Because of the technological characteristics, unauthorized use and misuse of a
I
I'

digital signatures is likely feasible. Thus, the consumers will bear great burdens if the
rules for traditional handwritten signatures apply to the issue of proof in unauthorized use
of electronically signed transactions.

In transactions between consumers and technology service providers, the burden
of proof of reliability of digital signature technology should be placed on the technology
service providers. The law should place a burden of proof of unauthorized use of digital
signature on the merchant in merchant to consumer transaction. 1376 This will force the
electromc commerce industry to create systems for using and accepting electronic
signatures that limit losses from fraud, mistake, theft and system breakdown. 1377
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The National Consumer Law Center, supra note 1360, at 12.

137S

/d.

1376

House Subcommittee Questions Preemption Language in Electronic Signatures Bill, Tech Law
Journal, available at http://www.techlawiournal.com/internet/19991002.htm (last visited Nov. 2,
2002).
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G. Self-Education
Education is the most effective form of consumer protection. 1378 The government
has to alert consumers to possible online fraudulent activities, the significance of privacy
in the information age, and other critical consumer protection issues. 1379 Dissemination of
information regarding legal effect of consumers' actions is also a key strategy to prevent
consumers from entering into online contract without sufficient knowledge. The
government has to educate consumers on how they can protect themselves from fraud
and how to be smart and careful online shoppers.
Government has to produce publications in electronic and non-electronic forms to
provide consumers with consumer protection information. Publications include consumer
alert websites, online and paper-based newsletters. Government has to provide
·guidelines to online marketers on how to assure that fundamental principles for consumer
protection apply in Internet commerce as well as in traditional commerce. 1380 A wide
variety of approaches should be used to disseminate principles of consumer protection to
business and industry. These approaches include guidelines, brochures, speeches at
industry and academic meetings and conferences. 1381

H. Minimum Standards of Privacy
On the issue of personal data protection, government has to lay out minimum
privacy standards in order to protect consumers who provide personal data for
1378

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION STAFF, A REPORT OF THE FTC's FIRST FIVE YEARS
PROTECTING CONSUMERS ONLINE 16 (1999), available at http://www.ftc.gov
1379

/d.

1380

/d. at 18.

1381

/d.
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certification service providers to issue digital certificates. Such personal data should be
protected and may not be used without authorization or consent from consumers. The
certification service providers are not allowed to use such data for other purposes than to
verify the identity of consumers who applied for a digital certificate.

I. Accreditation System for Electronic Signature Service Providers
The Royal Thai government has to form an accreditation system to form a single
standard for electronic signature service providers to be accredited. Electronic signature
service providers must meet standards imposed by the government, such as for
trustworthiness, as provided in § 29 of the Thai E-Transactions Act. Consumers will be
confident when they conduct transactions with accredited electronic signature service
providers because their systems, policies, and practices have been certified as meeting
satisfactory standards.

J. Unfair Terms in Certificate Practice Statements
In open PKI environments, persons who apply for online digital certificates may
be required by online authentication service providers to accept or agree with terms set
forth in service agreements. Online subscribers and consumers will only be able to take
or leave the terms without having any capacity to negotiate 1382 because of the inequality
of bargaining power between the parties. 1383 In order to prevent certification service
providers from issuing certificate practice statements unfairly favorable to themselves,
1382

DARAPORNTHIRAWAT, CONTRACT LAW: NEW STATUS OF CURRENT CONTRACT AND UNFAIR
CONTRACT TERMS 35(1995).
1383

BRIAN W. HARVEY, THE LAW OF CONSUMER PROTECTION AND FAIR TRADING

1982).
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the Thai government has to lay down standard clauses that certification authorities will be
obligated to state in their certificate practice statements. This will include events such as
where certification authorities may be entitled to limit their liability, as well as situations
where they may not limit liability. Enacting specific laws to deal with this issue can be
an effective means of consumer protection.

1384

In Thailand, when the Consumer Protection Committee regards terms set forth in
certification service agreements as unfair, it may require certification authorities to repeal
or exclude those terms. To determine the unfairness of terms, the Consumer Protection
Committee may define terms that are contrary to the requirement of good faith as unfair.
The Committee may also judge terms incorporated in service agreements as unfair if such

''

terms cause significant imbalances in the parties' rights, obligations, provide unfair
·advantages 1385 , or are harmful to consumers. 1386 Other examples ofunfair contract terms
are exclusionary, limited liability, arbitrary unilateral termination clauses. 1387 With the
exclusion of such unfair terms, online consumers will be better protected.

5.2.2

Electronic Notarization

Unlike the E-Sign Act, the E-Transactions Act does not address the issue of
electronic notarization. E-Sign Act §101 (g) provides
"[I]f a statute, regulation, or other rule of law requires a signature
or record relating to a transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce to be notarized, acknowledged, verified, or made under oath,

1384

THIRAWAT,

supra note 1382, at 35.

1385
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that requirement is satisfied if the electronic signature of the person
authorized to perform those acts, together with all other information
required to be included by other applicable statute, regulation, or rule of
law, is attached to or logically associated with the signature or record."
The E-Sign Act allows electronic signatures to be notarized, acknowledged, and
verified by affixing the electronic signature of persons authorized to do so for the basic
information normally required by state laws, such as names, date of commission
expiration. 1388 In Thailand, the Civil and Commercial Code, §9, requires persons affixing
fingerprints, crosses, and other such marks to paper documents, to be certified by the
signatures oftwo witnesses. After enactment ofthe E-Transactions Act, the use oftyped
names, fingerprints, crosses and other such marks are equivalent to traditional
handwritten signatures and there is no need for certification.

In some cases, where the identity of a signatory of an electronic signature is
determined to be material, such as in transactions where witnesses are needed, electronic
or digital signatures may be notarized, acknowledged, and verified by affixing another
electronic or digital signature of witnesses. The notary's signature and stamp provide
concrete means of locating witnesses. 1389 Certification authorities and trusted third parties
are able to authenticate legally significant transactions in order to increase confidence in
the integrity and authenticity of the transactions. 1390 Even though the E-Transactions Act

1388

Arruda & Shestakova, supra note 1351.

1389

PERRITT, supra note 1290, at 588.

1390

See CHAIWAT WONGWATANASAN ET AL., EXPLANATION OF THE ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS
ACT, B.E. 2544 136(2002). The Singapore Evidence Act (Chapter 97) § 35 provides that ''where
computer output is tendered in evidence for any purpose whatsoever, such output shall be
admissible if it is relevant or otherwise admissible according to ... any other written law, and it is ...
produced in an approved process ... " The law also provides presumptions of accuracy and
reliability by specifying that "output certified by a designated authority as produced in accordance
with an approved process will be presumed to be accurate and reliable."
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does not address this issue specifically, the concept of signature verification may be
applied in order to provide proof of signing electronic documents.

5.2.3 Online Alternative Dispute Resolution
To encourage consumers to conduct online transactions, one strategy is to make
them feel confident that if there is any dispute, they will have access to a resolution
mechanism. 1391 Online disputes are defined as any dispute that arises in the course of
electronic commerce, including disagreements over the rights of domain names, qualities
of goods traded through the Intemet1392, unauthorized orders, and mistaken identity. If
disputes arise from online consumer transactions conducted between online merchants
and consumers, there should be alternative means of out-of-court dispute settlements,
because filing legal actions can be complicated, costly and time-consuming. It is
imperative that the government initiate primary remedies in the form of effective out-ofcourt systems for dispute settlement1393 in order to prevent otherwise resolvable issues
from unnecessarily taking up court system time.
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) refers to approaches for determining and
settling disputes that do not involve the traditional judicial system. Possibilities include

1391

Federal Trade Commission, Summary ofPublic Workshop: Alternative Dispute Resolution fo
Consumer Transactions in the Borderless Online Marketplace, at 1, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/altdisresolution/sununary.htm (June 6-7, 2000).
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MILLER & JENTZ, supra note 1033, at 60.
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LLOYD, supra note 869, at 279. According to Electronic Commerce Directive, Article 17
provides that "member states must ensure that, in the event of disagreement between an
Information Society service provider and its recipient, their legislation allows the effective use of
out-of-court schemes for dispute settlement, including appropriate electronic means."
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negotiation, mediation and arbitration. 1394 Mediation is a dispute mechanism where
neutral mediators are appointed. 1395 This is effective in some cases because the appointed

i·

mediator will assist and encourage the parties in reaching a mutually satisfactory
settlement. 1396 Mediators play vital roles in providing advice and clarifying issues in
order for the parties to achieve plausible and fair compromises.

1397

The mediation process is based on mutual consent, which may be withdrawn or
abandoned at any time. 1398 Even though the mediation process itself does not legally bind

,.
I

I

the parties, it is considered to be a highly successful means of settling disputes, with an
estimated settlement rate of 90 per cent.

I

1399

Government and private sectors have to cooperate in developing fair and effective
alternative dispute resolutions for online consumer transactions in order to encourage
online parties to attempt some forms of dispute settlement mechanisms prior to trial.
Dispute mechanism alternatives must be disclosed to online consumers in order for them
I.'.

'
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RAY AUGUST, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND READINGS 93 (1993).
Mediation involves the use of a third party who transmits and interprets the proposals of the
principal parties. When mediators provide a channel of communication only, they are offering
their "good offices."
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BAINBRIDGE, supra note 545, at 186. See also 13th Annual Fullbright Symposium on
International Legal Problems, Milena Petrovic : Mediation and Conciliation, Golden Gate
University (2003). Benefits of mediation are: fast settlement; safe environment for negotiation;
flexibility and informality; privacy and confidentiality.
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to know where and how to file their claims. Establishing alternative dispute resolution
possibilities, nevertheless, does not prevent consumers from pursuing legal remedies. 1400
Due to online environment characteristics, traditional alternative dispute
mechanisms may not be appropriate for settling all online disputes. Innovative online
dispute mechanisms have been created. Unlike traditional court proceedings, online
alternative dispute resolution provides better solutions for parties located in different or

lr

distant jurisdictions. 1401 Taking part in online alternative dispute resolution can be simple,
quicker, less complicated and less expensive than lawsuits in a court oflaw. 1402 The
government and private sector should develop various types of online dispute resolution
in order to facilitate a variety of possibilities for online dispute resolution, such as online

1-'

mediation and online arbitration.

Online Mediators, eResolution, and Square Trade are examples of online
alternative dispute resolution providers developing online complaint forms and providing
online mediator to reconcile disputes between parties. 1403 Others, such as CyberSettle,

ClicknSett/e, CyberSolve, and Settlement Now have developed systems for negotiating
and settling monetary disputes. 1404 Online Disputes.org provides settlement dispute

1400

According to 15 U.S.C § 2310(a)(3)(1982) (Magnuson Moss Act), if a warrantor establishes
an informal dispute settlement procedures, that procedure must be used by the consumer prior to
commencing any legal remedy and the consumer may not bring a law suit unless it initially resorts
to the informal procedure.
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Federal Trade Commission, supra note 1391, at 2.
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!d. See also Mediation: How the Online Mediation Process Works, available at
http://www.onlineresolution.com/om-how.cfm (last visited Mar. 25, 2003).
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services based on automated rules. !courthouse, an online jury trial system, allows parties
to choose a jury to try their case in an entirely virtual courtroom.

1405

The issue of substantive rules to be used in deciding online disputes is still
controversial, but online alternative dispute mechanisms are helping to identify and
develop rules that may eventually serve as codes of conduct for parties conducting online
business battling over jurisdiction issues. 1406 Online alternative dispute resolution
providers may apply different rules in resolving the disputes as long as they are fair and
effective. 1407 These rules may include the development of a system of precedents. 1408 For
example, in the domain name dispute context, online alternative dispute resolution
providers have decided over 400 cases, and new cases are now often based on
precedent. 1409 Thus, the determination of disputes regarding the use of digital signatures
in terms of consumer protection could also rely on a system of precedent.
Online alternative dispute resolution means handling online disputes in a costeffective manner because complaints can be filed by e-mail. 1410 Online alternative dispute
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Federal Trade Commission, supra note 1391, at 5.
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Mn..LER& JENTZ, supra note 1033, at 61.
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See Mediation: How the Online Mediation Process Works, available at
http://www.onlineresolution.com/om-how.cfm (last visited Mar. 25, 2003).
There are the standards of mediation practice jointly defined by the American Bar Association
(ABA), Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution (SPIDR) and the American Arbitration
Association (AAA) and are generally applicable to the mediation oflegal disputes. See also Model
Standards ofPractice for Mediators, available at http://www.mediate.com/articles/snidrstds.cfm
(Aug. 1998). The standards of mediation practice recognizes the principle of"self-determination."
A mediator shall recognize that mediation is based on the principle of self-determination by the
parties, therefore the parties may mutually agree to specify a particular law to be applied by the
mediator.
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resolution also assures consumers that companies are who they say they are. 1411 These
online alternative dispute mechanisms may be appropriate for resolving small-to-medium
sized liability claims 1412 since filing civil actions may not be cost-effective solutions.
Application of online alternative dispute resolution lessens the tension level between the
parties.I413
Apportionment of costs for settling online disputes should depend on which party
filing an online complaint had the position of bargaining power. 1414 Fees for addressing
business-to-consumer disputes should be minimal in order to encourage consumers to
seek these remedies since traditional court system is more costly. For disputes involving
business-to-business transactions, both parties should bear the cost equally. For instance,

Online Disputes.org and Online Mediators have provided dispute settlement services to
·consumers for free, but charge a set fee for businesses. 1415 Online dispute resolution
seems to be more practical in settling disputes on the Internet because everything can be
done electronically, services are available around the clock, and fees are lower or
nominal. 1416 Online dispute resolution has not yet been widely accepted. 1417 Satisfaction
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Id.
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Mn..LER& JENTZ, supra note 1033, at 69.
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Federal Trade Commission, supra note 1391, at 5.

1414

Id. at 6.
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depends on the cooperation of both parties and there is no way to enforce it if one party
refuses to comply with the settlement agreement. 1418
Another way of resolving online disputes includes credit card charge backs,
escrow arrangements, complaint bulletin boards 1419 and special governmental online
consumer protection agencies. The credit card charge back system seems to be highly
practical 1420and the most attractive means for dispute settlement between online
purchasers and merchants. Since most online transactions are paid by credit cards, the
credit card charge back scheme is the best solution to resolve consumer's dispute when
online merchants have charged consumers, but failed to deliver the ordered product or
perform their obligations.

,.

In the United States, a credit card charge back mechanism is one form of

alternative dispute resolution that works efficiently for online consumers. Credit card
issuers are required to conduct investigations when cardholders file claims of billing
errors, according to the Fair Credit Billing Act.

1421

Disputes in billing statements include

non-acceptance of goods or services in compliance with the agreement consummated at
the time of a transaction. 1422 This protection is provided only for consumers, not
businesses.

,,,

I

In the event of non-acceptance or non-delivery, the Fair Credit Billing Act also

requires card issuers to determine whether such goods or services were actually mailed
1418

/d.

1419

PERRITT, supra note 1290, at 826.

I.

1420 /d.
1421

/d.
f.'

1422/d.
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and delivered. 1423 The consumer needs to be alert when receiving monthly credit card
statements. If they find any suspicious transactions, they must contact the card issuers
and protest the charges either by phones or letters, and there is a limit on how long they
can wait before they are prevented from doing so. This form of dispute resolution is
provided without cost so that the merchant and the consumer can reach a compromise.
This mechanism provides dual advantages. First, it provides a primary remedy for online
consumers. Secondly, dishonest online merchants will be excluded from the credit card
network. 1424
In Thailand, credit card charge back measures are based on the Consumer
Protection Law. The Consumer Protection Act, B.E.2522 (1979) came into force on 4th
May 1979

1425

and was amended in 1998 by adding provisions on the establishment of the

.~ ..'

'·

Consumer Protection Board, consisting of the Prime Minister as Chairman. 1426 The Board
is vested with powers to consider complaints from consumers who suffer hardship or
injury resulting from the conduct ofbusinesses. 1427 It has a duty to disseminate
information to public and educate consumers about necessary consumer protection

.,
lo

measures.
The Committee, which is subject to the Thai Consumer Protection Act of 1979,
and is appointed by the Board, may review contractual terms set forth in sales or service

1423

12 C.F.R. 226.13 (e)

1424

PERRITI, supra note 1290, at 828.

1425

The Consumer Protection Act 1979 ofThailand, at
http://www.ciroap.org/apcVcountries/thailand.overview.html (n.d.).
1426 !d.
1427 !d.
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contracts where the law or custom requires evidence in writing.

1428

The Committee is

empowered to declare that such businesses be regulated in areas of contractual
matters. 1429 All terms stipulated in contracts provided by these controlled business are
subject to change or modification. The Committee may order businesses to incorporate
terms that are necessary for consumer protection and exclude any unreasonably
disadvantageous terms to the consumers.

1430

The Consumer Protection Act defmes

consumers as buyers or persons obtaining services from businesses or who are offered or
invited by business to buy a product or obtain services, including any lawful product
users or service users with or without consideration. 1431 The concept of consumer
protection is granted to only private consumers, not for members of the business sector.

•.·

.

In Thailand, there are no specific laws regulating the use of credit cards as in the
'·

United States. The Committee has declared that credit card businesses whose terms of
contractual agreement are regulated. According to the Royal Decree Promulgating the
Protection of Consumer via Contracts B.E. 2542 (1999), credit card issuers are obligated

I.

to provide prior notice in writing to their consumers if there is any change in any term of
credit card agreements, including interest rates, late fees, fees, other service charges. 1432
The proclamation also requires credit card issuers to include that in the event of an
unauthorized use of credit card, liability for unauthorized transactions will be
1428

THE CONSUMER PROTECTION AcT § 35 his. provides that "where a contract of goods or
services by law or custom required to be in writing, the Committee may provide that such business
be controlled business."
1429

The Consumer Protection Act 1979 ofThailand, at
http://www.ciroap.org/apcl/countries/thailand.overview.htm1
1430

THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 35 ter.

1431

THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT§ 4.

1432

ARTRUKSA,

supra note 1373, at 68.
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immediately suspended pending resolution. If the consumers have paid for those

(~
I

transactions, the credit card issuers have to credit the funds back to the cardholders
immediately, unless the issuers can prove that those transactions were in fact made by the
cardholders.
The current credit card charge back mechanism in Thailand is not as strong as in
f

the United States because there are no specific laws which impose a duty upon card

,.
issuers to conduct investigations as the United States Fair Credit Billing Act does. It is
thus necessary for the Thai government to provide the credit card charge back mechanism
[._,

in order to protect online consumes by imposing a duty upon card issuers to conduct
investigations in the event of non-acceptance or non-delivery. Protection of consumers
by controlling credit card agreements may provide them a better level of protection since

I·~
I,·
1.. :

· they will at least have some protection. In online disputes between online merchants and
consumers, the consumers will be able to report such unauthorized transactions to the
credit card issuers who, according to the credit card agreements, are not entitled to
demand the consumers pay those reported unauthorized transactions. Credit card issuers
have to credit the charges back to the cardholders' accounts right away. This measure
provides a primary remedy for online consumers and they will not need to use other legal
remedies unless the disputes have become more complicated.

I,

I'.
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Since sanctions and penalties for non-conformance with such proclamations are
not strong or severe enough, businesses may simply choose to ignore Royal Decrees. The
Thai Consumer Protection Act, §57 provides that the business that has failed to
incorporate such required terms in the credit card agreement may be fined up to 100,000
~

Baht, or imprisoned up to 1 year, or both. The penalty for failure to comply with this

· ..
1:'
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proclamation has to be much stronger, perhaps by doubling the amount of fines.
Sanctions other than imprisonment should be imposed. For instance, business licenses
could be suspended, or other means of injunctive protection may be used to force
businesses to strictly comply with the proclamations and follow consumer protection
policies. With strong sanctions, consumers will be adequately protected in the online
environment.
Another mechanism for resolving an online dispute regarding the reliability of
electronic signatures, including digital signatures, is to establish an autonomous agency
that performs a function of determining whether an electronic signature satisfies the
requirements of reliability imposed in section 26 of the Thai E-Transactions Act. A Royal

••I,
I

Decree may provide that a particular State agency is competent to determine the
reliability of electronic signatures. 1433 It is extremely useful to have this agency perform
a primary investigation and determination of the reliability features of electronic
signatures when the parties are in dispute on the reliability of electronic signatures. They
may be able to settle the dispute before bringing a claim to a court oflaw if the agency is
of the opinion that such signed electronic signatures are not trustworthy and unreliable.
The party intending to enforce the signed agreement may withdraw his or her claim. This

·.

will lessen the number of cases to be adjudicated by means of judicial system in which

I.

the legal processes are sophisticated and time-consuming.
On the contrary, ifthe agency is of the opinion that a signed electronic signature
is trustworthy and reliable, the party against whom the enforcement is sought may
comply with the agreement and settle the dispute with enforcing party. If a settlement
1433

UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES art. 7 (200 1) provides that any person,
organ or authority, whether public or private, specified by the enacting State as competent, may
determine which electronic signatures satisfy the provisions of article 6 of this Law.
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could not be reached, the enforcing party may institute an action before the courts. To
adjudicate the case, courts may summon a competent officer who determined the
trustworthiness and reliability of the electronic signature to testify on behalf of the
agency before the court. Any party in legal proceedings may adduce a statement of
determination issued by the agency to support his or her claim. The courts may adjudicate
the case regarding the trustworthiness of the signed electronic signature appeared in the
electronic document by relying upon the opinion of the agency because such agency does
not have any interest in the dispute or, in the case where the courts think fit, the courts
may also summon a computer expertise to testify against the opinion of the agency.
Establishing this agency provides several benefits to both online parties and

:,
•I.
I

courts. A small claim may be settled before being brought to a court of law. Online
· parties, in addition, can be assured that in the case of disagreement as to the reliability of
electronic signatures, the issue can be primarily investigated and determined by a
competent and trustworthy State agency.

I
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UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC
SIGNATURES
2001

,.'I

(Excerpt from the report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law on the work of its thirty-fourth session, held at Vienna, from 25 June to 13 July
2001. The text of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures was
adopted on 5 July 2001 [Note: the final version of the Guide to Enactment of the
Model Law will be published during the second semester of the year 2001])

Annex II
UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures (2001)
;·

Article 1
Sphere of application
This Law applies where electronic signatures are used in the context* of
commercial** activities. It does not override any rule of law intended for the
protection of consumers.

i.·
~

• The Commission suggests the following text for States that might wish to extend the
applicability of this Law :
"This Law applies where electronic signatures are used, except in the following
situations: [... )."
•• The term "commercial" should be given a wide interpretation so as to cover matters arising from
all relationships of a commercial nature, whether contractual or not. Relationships of a
commercial nature include, but arc not limited, to the following transactions: any trade
transaction for the supply or exchange of goods or services; distribution agreement; commercial
representation or agency; factoring; leasing; construction of works; consulting; engineering;
licensing; investment; financing; banking; insurance; exploitation agreement or concession;
joint venture and other forms of industrial or business cooperation; carriage of goods or
passengers by air, sea, rail or road.

Article 2
Definitions
For the purposes of this Law:
(a) "Electronic signature" means data in electronic form in, affixed to or
logically associated with, a data message, which may be used to identify the
signatory in relation to the data message and to indicate the signatory's approval of
the information contained in the data message;
(b) "Certificate" means a data message or other record confirming the link
between a signatory and signature creation data;

(c) "Data message" means information generated, sent, received or stored by
electronic, optical or similar means including, but not limited to, electronic data
interchange (ED I), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy;

I,

I
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(d) "Signatory" means a person that holds signature creation data and acts
either on its own behalf or on behalf of the person it represents;
(e) "Certification service provider" means a person that issues certificates
and may provide other services related to electronic signatures;
(f) "Relying party" means a person that may act on the basis of a certificate
or an electronic signature.

Article 3
Equal treatment of signature technologies

Nothing in this Law, except article 5, shall be applied so as to exclude, restrict
or deprive of legal effect any method of creating an electronic signature that
satisfies the requirements referred to in article 6, paragraph 1, or otherwise meets
the requirements of applicable law.
Article 4
Interpretation

1. In the interpretation of this Law, regard is to be had to its international origin
and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good
faith.
2.
Questions concerning matters governed by this Law which are not expressly
settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on which this
Law is based.
Article 5
Variation by agreement

'
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The provisions of this Law may be derogated from or their effect may be
varied by agreement, unless that agreement would not be valid or effective under
applicable law.
Article 6
Compliance with a requirement for a signature

1. Where the law requires a signature of a person, that requirement is met in
relation to a data message if an electronic signature is used that is as reliable as was
appropriate for the purpose for which the data message was generated or
communicated, in the light of all the circumstances, including any relevant
agreement.
2. Paragraph 1 applies whether the requirement referred to therein is in the form
of an obligation or whether the law simply provides consequences for the absence of
a signature.
3. An electronic signature is considered to be reliable for the purpose of
satisfying the requirement referred to in paragraph 1 if:
(a) The signature creation data are, within the context in which they are
used, linked to the signatory and to no other person;

I.
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(b) The signature creation data were, at the time of signing, under the control
of the signatory and of no other person;

(c) Any alteration to the electronic signature, made after the time of signing,
is detectable; and

I

I.

(d) Where a purpose of the legal requirement for a signature is to provide
assurance as to the integrity of the information to which it relates, any alteration
made to that information after the time of signing is detectable.
4.

Paragraph 3 does not limit the ability of any person:

(a) To establish in any other way, for the purpose of satisfying the
requirement referred to in paragraph 1, the reliability of an electronic signature; or
(b)

5.

To adduce evidence of the non-reliability of an electronic signature.

The provisions of this article do not apply to the following:[ ... ].

Article 7
Satisfaction of article 6

1.
[Any person, organ or authority, whether public or private, specified by the
enacting State as competent] may determine which electronic signatures satisfy the
provisions of article 6 ofthis Law.
2.
Any determination made under paragraph 1 shall be consistent with recognized
international standards.
3. Nothing in this article affects the operation of the rules ofprivate international
law.

r:
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Article 8
Conduct of the signatory

.,

'

I.
Where signature creation data can be used to create a signature that has legal
effect, each signatory shall:
(a) Exercise reasonable care to avoid unauthorized use of its signature
creation data;
(b) Without undue delay, utilize means made available by the certification
service provider pursuant to article 9 of this Law, or otherwise use reasonable
efforts, to notify any person that may reasonably be expected by. the signatory to
rely on or to provide services in support of the electronic signature if:

(i) The signatory knows that the signature creation data have been
compromised; or

I

t

(ii) The circumstances known to the signatory give rise to a substantial risk
that the signature creation data may have been compromised;
(c) Where a certificate is used to support the electronic signature, exercise
reasonable care to ensure the accuracy and completeness of all material
representations made by the signatory that are relevant to the certificate throughout
its life cycle or that are to be included in the certificate.

3

'

2. A signatory shall bear the legal consequences of its failure to satisfy the
requirements of paragraph 1.
Article 9
Conduct of the certification service provider
1. Where a certification service provider provides services to support an
electronic signature that may be used for legal effect as a signature, that certification
service provider shall:
(a) Act in accordance with representations made by it with respect to its
policies and practices;
(b) Exercise reasonable care to ensure the accuracy and completeness of all
material representations made by it that are relevant to the certificate throughout its
life cycle or that are included in the certificate;

(c) Provide reasonably accessible means that enable a relying party to
ascertain from the certificate:
(i)

The identity of the certification service provider;

(ii) That the signatory that is identified in the certificate had control of the
signature creation data at the time when the certificate was issued;
(iii) That signature creation data were valid at or before the time when the
certificate was issued;
(d) Provide reasonably accessible means that enable a relying party to
ascertain, where relevant, from the certificate or otherwise:
(i)

The method used to identify the signatory;

(ii) Any limitation on the purpose or value for which the signature creation
data or the certificate may be used;
(iii) That the signature creation data are valid and have not been
compromised;
(iv) Any limitation on the scope or extent of liability stipulated by the
certification service provider;

!."
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(v) Whether means exist for the signatory to give notice pursuant to article 8,
paragraph 1 (b), of this Law;
(vi) Whether a timely revocation service is offered;
(e) Where services under subparagraph (d) (v) are offered, provide a means
for a signatory to give notice pursuant to article 8, paragraph 1 (b), of this Law and,
where services under subparagraph (d) (vi) are offered, ensure the availability of a
timely revocation service;

'·r.
'·
r

(f) Utilize trustworthy systems, procedures and human resources in
performing its services.

2.
A certification service provider shall bear the legal consequences of its failure
to satisfy the requirements of paragraph 1.

'I·
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Article 10
Trustworthiness

For the purposes of article 9, paragraph 1 (f), of this Law in determining
whether, or to what extent, any systems, procedures and human resources utilized by
a certification service provider are trustworthy, regard may be had to the following
factors:
(a)

Financial and human resources, including existence of assets;

(b)

Quality of hardware and software systems;

(c) Procedures for JrOcessing of certificates and applications for certificates
and retention of records;
(d) Availability of information to signatories identified in certificates and to
potential relying parties;
(e)

Regularity and extent of audit by an independent body;

(f) The existence of a declaration by the State, an accreditation body or the
certification service provider regarding compliance with or existence of the
foregoing; or

(g)

Any other relevant factor.

j·

Article ll
Conduct of the relying party

A relying party shall bear the legal consequences of its failure:
(a) To take reasonable steps to verify the reliability of an electronic
signature;
or
(b) Where an electronic signature is supported by a certificate, to take
reasonable steps:

(i)

To verify the validity, suspension or revocation of the certificate; and

(ii)

To observe any limitation with respect to the certificate.

Article l2
Recognition of foreign certificates and electronic signatures

I.
In determining whether, or to what extent, a certificate or an electronic
signature is legally effective, no regard shall be had:
(a) To the geographic location where the certificate is issued or the
electronic signature created or used; or
(b)

I"

To the geographic location of the place of business of the issl.K:r or

signatory.
2.
A certificate issued outside the enacting State] shall have the same legal
effect in [the enacting State] as a certificate issued in [the enacting State] if it offers
a substantially equivalent level of reliability.

5
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3. An electronic signature created or used outside [the enacting State] shall have
the same legal effect in [the enacting State] as an electronic signature created or
used in [the enacting State] if it offers a substantially equivalent level of reliability.

'I

4.
In determining whether a certificate or an electronic signature offers a substantially equivalent level of reliability for the purposes of paragraph 2 or 3, regard shall
be had to recognized international standards and to any other relevant factors.
5.
Where, notwithstanding paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, parties agree, as between
themselves, to the use of certain types of electronic signatures or certificates, that
agreement shall be recognized as sufficient for the purposes of cross-border recognition, unless that agreement would not be valid or effective under applicable law.
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Mr. BLILEY, from the committee of conference,
submitted the following
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CONFERENCE REPORT
[To accompany S. 761)

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the
two Houses on the amendments of the House to the bill (8. 761),
to regulate interstate commerce by electronic means by permitting
and encouraging the continued expansion of electronic commerce
through the operation of free market forces, and other purposes,
having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses as follows:
That the Senate recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the House to the text of the bill and agree to the same with
an amendment as follows:
In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the House
amendment, insert the following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Electronic Signatures in Global
and National Commerce Act".

r
r

TITLE I-ELECTRONIC RECORDS AND
SIGNATURESINCOMMERCE
SEC. 101. GENERAL RULE OF VALIDITY.

(a) IN GENERAL.-Notwithstanding any statute, regulation, or
other rule of law (other than this title and title II), with respect to
any transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce-

'·
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(1) a signature, contract, or other record relating to such
transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form; and
(2) a contract relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because an
electronic signature or electronic record was used in its formation.
(b) PRESERVATION OF RIGHTS AND 0BLIGATIONS.-This title
does not(1) limit, alter, or otherwise affect any requirement imposed
by a statute, regulation, or rule of law relating to the rights and
obligations of persons under such statute, regulation, or rule of
law other than a requirement that contracts or other records be
written, signed, or in nonelectronic form; or
(2) require any person to agree to use or accept electronic
records or electronic signatures, other than a governmental
agency with respect to a record other than a contract to which
it is a party.
(c) CONSUMER DISCLOSURES.(1) CONSENT TO ELECTRONIC RECORDS.-Notwithstanding
subsection (a), if a statute, regulation, or other rule of law requires that information relating to a transaction or transactions
in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce be provided or
made available to a consumer in writing, the use of an electronic record to provide or make available (whichever is required) such information satisfies the requirement that such information be in writing if(A) the consumer has affirmatively consented to such
use and has not withdrawn such consent;
(B) the consumer, prior to consenting, is provided with
a clear and conspicuous statement(i) informing the consumer of
any right or option of the consumer to have the record provided or
made available on paper or in nonelectronic form, and
az; the right of the consumer to withdraw the consent
to have the record provided or made available in an
electronic form and of any conditions, consequences
(which may include termination of the parties' relationship), or fees in the event of such withdrawal;
(ii) informing the consumer of whether the consent
applies
only to the particular transaction which
gave rise to the obligation to provide the record, or az;
to identified categories of records that may be provided
or made available during the course of the parties' relationship;
(iii) describing the procedures the consumer must
use to withdraw consent as provided in clause (i) and
to update information needed to contact the consumer
electronically; and
(iv) informing the consumer (1) how, after the consent, the consumer may, upon request, obtain a paper
copy of an electronic record, and (11) whether any fee
will be charged for such copy;
(C) the consumer-

'·
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(i) prior to consenting, is~rovided with a statement of the hardware and so ware requirements for
access to and retention of the e ectronic records; and
(ii) consents electronically, or confirms his or her
consent electronically, in a manner that reasonably
demonstrates that the consumer can access information
in the electronic form that will be used to provide the
information that is the subject of the consent; and
(D) after the consent of a consumer in accordance with
subparagraph (A), if a change in the hardware or software
requirements needed to access or retain electronic records
creates a material risk that the consumer will not be able
to access or retain a subsequent electronic record that was
the subject of the consent, the person providing the electronic record(i) provides the consumer with a statement of (I)
the revised hardware and software requirements for access to and retention of the electronic records, and aiJ
the right to withdraw consent without the imposition of
any fees for such withdrawal and without the imposition of any condition or consequence that was not disclosed under subparagraph (B)(i); and
(ii) again complies with subparagraph (C).
(2) OTHER RIGHTS.(A) PRESERVATION OF CONSUMER PROTECTIONS.-Nothing in this title affects the content or timing of any disclosure or other record required to be provided or made available to any consumer under any statute, regulation, or
other rule of law.
(B) VERIFICATION OR ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.-!{ a law
that was enacted prior to this Act expressly requires a
record to be provided or made available by a specified
method that requires verification or acknowledgment of receipt, the record may be provided or made available electronically only if the method used provides verification or
acknowledgment of receipt (whichever is required). ·
(3) EFFECT OF FAILURE TO OBTAIN ELECTRONIC CONSENT OR
CONFIRMATION OF CONSENT.-The legal effectiveness, validity,
or enforceability of any contract executed 'by a consumer shall
not be denied solely because of the failure to obtain electronic
consent or confirmation of consent by that consumer in accordance with paragraph (l)(C)(ii).
(4) PROSPECTNE EFFECT.-Withdrawal of consent by a consumer shall not affect the legal effectiveness, validity, or enforceability of electronic records provided or made available to
that consumer in accordance with paragraph (1) prior to implementation of the consumer's withdrawal of consent. A consumer's withdrawal of consent shall be effective within a reasonable period of time after receipt of the withdrawal by the
provider of the record. Failure to comply with paragraph (l)(D)
may, at the election of the consumer, be treated as a withdrawal
of consent for purposes of this paragraph.
(5) PRIOR CONSENT.-This subsection does not apply to any
records that are provided or made available to a consumer who

1-
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has consented prior to the effective date of this title to receive
such records in electronic form as permitted by any statute, regulation, or other rule of law.
(6) ORAL COMMUNICATIONS.-An oral communication or a
recording of an oral communication shall not qualify as an
electronic record for purposes of this subsection except as otherwise provided under applicable law.
(d) RETENTION OF CONTRACTS AND RECORDS.(1) ACCURACY AND ACCESSIBILITY.-[{ a statute, regulation,
or other rule of law requires that a contract or other record relating to a transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce be retained, that requirement is met by retaining an electronic record of the information in the contract or other record
that(A) accurately reflects the information set forth in the
contract or other record; and
(B) remains accessible to all persons who are entitled
to access by statute, regulation, or rule of law, for the period required by such statute, regulation, or rule of law, in
a form that is capable of being accurately reproduced for
later reference, whether by transmission, printing, or otherwise.
(2) EXCEPTION.-A requirement to retain a contract or oth,er
record in accordance with paragraph (1) does not apply to any
information whose sole purpose is to enable the contract or
other record to be sent, communicated, or received.
(3) ORIGINALS.-!{ a statute, regulation, or other rule of law
requires a contract or other record relating to a transaction in
or affecting interstate or foreign commerce to be provided, available, or retained in its original form, or provides consequences
if the contract or other record is not provided, available, or retained in its original form, that statute, regulation, or rule of
law is satisfied by an electronic record that complies with paragraph (1).
(4) CHECKS.-!{ a statute, regulation, or other rule of law
requires the retention of a check, that requirement is satisfied
by retention of an electronic record of the information on the
front and back of the check in accordance with paragraph (1).
(e) ACCURACY AND ABILITY To RETAIN CONTRACTS AND OTHER
RECORDS.-Notwithstanding subsection (a), if a statute, regulation,
or other rule of law requires that a contract or other record relating
to a transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce be in
writing, the legal effect, validity, or enforceability of an electronic
record of such contract or other record may be denied if such electronic record is not in a form that is capable of being retained and
accurately reproduced for later reference by all parties or persons
who are entitled to retain the contract or other record.
(f) PROXIMITY.-Nothing in this title affects the proximity required by any statute, regulation, or other rule of law with respect
to any warning, notice, disclosure, or other record required to be
posted, displayed, or publicly affixed.
(g) NOTARIZATION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT.-!{ a statute, regulation, or other rule of law requires a signature or record relating to
a transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce to be noJune 8, 2000 (6:15 PM)
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tarized, acknowledged, verified, or made under oath, that requirement is satisfied if the electronic signature of the person authorized
to perform those acts, together with all other information required
to be included by other applicable statute, regulation, or rule of law,
is attached to or logically associated with the signature or record.
(h) ELECTRONIC AGENTS.-A contract or other record relating to
a transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce may not
be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because its
formation, creation, or delivery involved the action of one or more
electronic agents so long as the action of any such electronic agent
is legally attributable to the person to be bound.
(i) INSURANCE.-It is the specific intent of the Congress that this
title and title II apply to the business of insurance.
(j) INSURANCE AGENTS AND BROKERS.-An insurance agent or
broker acting under the direction of a party that enters into a contract by means of an electronic record or electronic signature may
not be held liable for any deficiency in the electronic procedures
agreed to by the parties under that contract if(1) the agent or broker has not engaged in negligent, reckless, or intentional tortious conduct;
(2) the agent or broker was not involved in the development
or establishment of such electronic procedures; and
(3) the agent or broker did not deviate from such procedures.
SEC. 102. EXEMPTION TO PREEMPTION.
(a) IN GENERAL.-A State statute, regulation, or other rule of
law may modify, limit, or supersede the provisions of section 101
with respect to State law only if such statute, regulation, or rule of
law(1) constitutes an enactment or adoption of the Uniform
Electronic Transactions Act as approved and recommended for
enactment in all the States by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1999, except that any exception to the scope of such Act enacted by a State under section
3(b)(4) of such Act shall be preempted to the extent such" exception is inconsistent with this title or title II, or would not be
permitted under paragraph {2)(A)(ii) of this subsection; or
(2)(A) specifies the alternative procedures or requirements
for the use or acceptance (or both) of electronic records or electronic signatures to establish the legal effect, validity, or enforceability of contracts or other records, if(i) such alternative procedures or requirements are consistent with this title and title ll; and
(ii) such alternative procedures or requirements do not
require, or accord greater legal status or effect to, the implementation or application of a specific technology or technical specification for performing the functions of creating,
storing, generating, receiving, communicating, or authenticating electronic records or electronic signatures; and
(B) if enacted or adopted after the date of the enactment of
this Act, makes specific reference to this Act.
{b) EXCEPTIONS FOR ACTIONS BY STATES AS MARKET PARTICIPANTS.-Subsection (a)(2)(A)(ii) shall not apply to the statutes, reguJune 8, 2000 (6:15PM)
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lations, or other rules of law governing procurement by any State,
or any agency or instrumentality thereof.
(c) PREVENTION OF CIRCUMVENTION.-Subsection (a) does not
permit a State to circumvent this title or title II through the imposition of nonelectronic delivery methods under section 8(b)(2) of the
Uniform Electronic Transactions Act.
SEC. 108. SPECIFIC EXCEPTIONS.

(a) EXCEPTED REQUIREMENTS.-The provisions of section 101
shall not apply to a contract or other record to the extent it is governed by(1) a statute, regulation, or other rule of law governing the
creation and execution of wills, codicils, or testamentary trusts;
(2) a State statute, regulation, or other rule of law governing adoption, divorce, or other matters of family law; or
(3) the Uniform Commercial Code, as in effect in any State,
other than sections 1-107 and 1-206 and Articles 2 and 2A.
(b) ADDITIONAL EXCEPTIONS.-The provisions of section 101
shall not apply to(1) court orders or notices, or official court documents (including briefs, pleadings, and other writings) required to be executed in connection with court proceedings;
(2) any notice of(A) the cancellation or termination of utility services
(including water, heat, and power);
(B) default, acceleration, repossession, foreclosure, or
eviction, or the right to cure, under a credit agreement secured by, or a rental agreement for, a primary residence of
an individual;
(C) the cancellation or termination of health insurance
or benefits or life insurance benefits (excluding annuities);
or
(D) recall of a product, or material failure of a product,
that risks endangering health or safety; or
(3) any document required to accompany any transportation or handling of hazardous materials, pesticides, or other
toxic or dangerous materials.
(c) REVIEW OF EXCEPTIONS.(1) EVALUATION REQUIRED.-The Secretary of Commerce,
acting through the Assistant Secretary for Communications and
Information, shall review the operation of the exceptions in subsections (a) and (b) to evaluate, over a period of 3 years, whether such exceptions continue to be necessary for the protection of
consumers. Within 3 years after the date of enactment of this
Act, the Assistant Secretary shall submit a report to the Congress on the results of such evaluation.
(2) DETERMINATIONS.-!{ a Federal regulatory agency, with
respect to matter within its jurisdiction, determines after notice
and an opportunity for public comment, and publishes a finding, that one or more such exceptions are no longer necessary
for the protection of consumers and eliminating such exceptions
will not increase the material risk of harm to consumers, such
agency ma,y extend the application of section 101 to the exceptions identified in such finding.
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SEC.

104. APPLICABILITY TO FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS.
(a) FILING AND ACCESS REQUIREMENTS.-Subject to subsection
(c)(2), nothing in this title limits or supersedes any requirement by
a Federal regulatory agency, self-regulatory organization, or State
regulatory agency that records be filed with such agency or organization in accordance with specified standards or formats.
(b) PRESERVATION OF EXISTING RULEMAKING AUTHORITY.(1) USE OF AUTHORITY TO INTERPRET.-Subject to paragraph (2) and subsection (c), a Federal regulatory agency or
State regulatory agency that is responsible for rulemaking
under any other statute may interpret section 101 with respect
to such statute through(A) the issuance of regulations pursuant to a statute; or
(B) to the extent such agency is authorized by statute
to issue orders or guidance, the issuance of orders or guidance of general applicability that are publicly available
and published (in the Federal Register in the case of an
order or guidance issued by a Federal regulatory agency).
This paragraph does not grant any Federal regulatory agency
or State regulatory agency authority to issue regulations, orders, or guidance pursuant to any statute that does not authorize such issuance.
(2) LIMITATIONS ON INTERPRETATION AUTHORITY.-Notwithstanding paragraph (1), a Federal regulatory agency shall not
adopt any regulation, order, or guidance described in paragraph (1), and a State regulatory agency is preempted by section 101 from adopting any regulation, order, or guidance described in paragraph (1), unless(A) such regulation, order, or guidance is consistent
with section 101;
(B) such regulation, order, or guidance does not add to
the requirements of such section; and
(C) such agency finds, in connection with the issuance
of such regulation, order, or guidance, that(i) there is a substantial justification for the regulation, order, or guidance;
(ii) the methods selected to carry out that
purpose(1) are substantially equivalent to the requirements imposed on records that are not electronic
records; and
(11) will not impose unreasonable costs on the
acceptance and use of electronic records; and
(iii) the methods selected to carry out that purpose
do not require, or accord greater legal status or effect
to, the implementation or application of a specific technology or technical specification for performing the
functions of creating, storing, generating, receiving,
communicating, or authenticating electronic records or
electronic signatures.
(3) PERFORMANCE STANDARDS.(A) ACCURACY, RECORD INTEGRITY, ACCESSIBIUTY.Notwithstanding paragraph (2)(C)(iii), a Federal regulatory
agency or State regulatory agency may interpret section
June 8, 2000 (6:15PM)
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101(d) to specify performance standards to assure accuracy,
record integrity, and accessibility of records that are required to be retained. Such performance standards may be
specified in a manner that imposes a requirement in violation of paragraph (2)(C)(iii) if the requirement (i) serves an
important governmental objective; and (ii) is substantially
related to the achievement of that objective. Nothing in this
paragraph shall be construed to grant any Federal regulatory agency or State regulatory agency authority to require use of a particular type of software or hardware in
order to comply with section 101(d).
(B) PAPER OR PRINTED FORM.-Notwithstanding subsection (c){1), a Federal regulatory agency or State regulatory agency may interpret section 101(d) to require retention of a record in a tangible printed or paper form if(i) there is a compelling governmental interest relating to law enforcement or national security for imposing such requirement; and
(ii) imposing such requirement is essential to attaining such interest.
(4) EXCEPTIONS FOR ACTIONS BY GOVERNMENT AS MARKET
PARTICIPANT.-Paragraph (2){C)(iii) shall not apply to the statutes, regulations, or other rules of law governing procurement
by the Federal or any State government, or any agency or instrumentality thereof.
(c) ADDITIONAL LIMITATIONS.(1) REIMPOSING PAPER PROHIBITED.-Nothing in subsection
(b) (other than paragraph (3)(B) thereof) shall be construed to
grant any Federal regulatory agency or State regulatory agency
authority to impose or reimpose any requirement that a record
be in a tangible printed or paper form.
(2) CONTINUING OBLIGATION UNDER GOVERNMENT PAPERWORK ELIMINATION ACT.-Nothing in subsection (a) or (b) relieves any Federal regulatory agency of its obligations under the
Government Paperwork Elimination Act (title XVII of Public
Law 105-277).
(d) AUTHORITY To EXEMPT FROM CONSENT PROVISION.(1) IN GENERAL.-A Federal regulatory agency may, with
respect to matter within its jurisdiction, by regulation or order
issued after notice and an opportunity for public comment, exempt without condition a specified category or type of record
from the requirements relating to consent in section 101(c) if
such exemption is necessary to eliminate a substantial burden
on electronic commerce and will not increase the material risk
of harm to consumers.
(2) PROSPECTUSES.-Within 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Securities and Exchange Commission shall
issue a regulation or order pursuant to paragraph (1) exempting from section 101(c) any records that are required to be provided in order to allow advertising, sales literature, or other information concerning a security issued by an investment company that is registered under the Investment Company Act of
1940, or concerning the issuer thereof, to be excluded from the
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definition of a prospectus under section 2(a)(10)(A) of the Securities Act of 1933.
(e) ELECTRONIC LETTERS OF AGENCY.-The Federal Communications Commission shall not hold any contract for telecommunications service or letter of agency for a preferred carrier change, that
otherwise complies with the Commission's rules, to be legally inef
fective, invalid, or unenforceable solely because an electronic record
or electronic signature was used in its formation or authorization.

f
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SEC. 105. STUDIES.

(a) DELNERY.-Within 12 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Commerce shall conduct an inquiry regarding the effectiveness of the delivery of electronic records
to consumers using electronic mail as compared with delivery of
written records via the United States Postal Service and private express mail services. The Secretary shall submit a report to the Congress regarding the results of such inquiry by the conclusion of such
12-month period.
(b) STUDY OF ELECTRONIC CONSENT.-Within 12 months after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Commerce and
the Federal Trade Commission shall submit a report to the Congress evaluating any benefits provided to consumers by the procedure required by section 101(c)(1)(C)(ii); any burdens imposed on
electronic commerce by that provision; whether the benefits outweigh
the burdens; whether the absence of the procedure required by section 101(c)(J)(C)(ii) would increase the incidence of fraud directed
against consumers; and suggesting any revisions to the provision
deemed appropriate by the Secretary and the Commission. In conducting this evaluation, the Secretary and the Commission shall solicit comment from the general public, consumer representatives,
and electronic commerce businesses.
SEC. 106. DEFINITIONS.

For purposes of this title:
(1) CONSUMER.-The term "consumer" means an individual
who obtains, through a transaction, products or services which
are used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes,
and also means the legal representative of such an individual.
(2) ELECTRONIC.-The term "electronic" means relating to
technology having electrical, digital, magnetic, wireless, optical,
electromagnetic, or similar capabilities.
(3) ELECTRONIC AGENT.-The term "electronic agent" means
a computer program or an electronic or other automated means
used independently to initiate an action or respond to electronic
records or performances in whole or in part without review or
action by an individual at the time of the action or response.
(4) ELECTRONIC RECORD.-The term "electronic record"
means a contract or other record created, generated, sent, communicated, received, or stored by electronic means.
(5) ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE.-The term "electronic signature" means an electronic sound, symbol, or process, attached to
or logically associated with a contract or other record and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record.
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(6) FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCY.-The term "Federal regulatory agency" means an agency, as that term is defined in section 552(/) of title 5, United States Code.
(7) INFORMATION.-The term "information" means data,
text, images, sounds, codes, computer programs, software, databases, or the like.
(8) PERSON.-The term "person" means an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, governmental agency, public corporation, or any other legal or commercial entity.
(9) RECORD.-The term "record" means information that is
inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.
(10) REQUIREMENT.-The term "requirement" includes a
prohibition.
(11) SELF-REGULATORY ORGANIZATION.-The term "self-regulatory organization" means an organization or entity that is
not a Federal regulatory agency or a State, but that is under
the supervision of a Federal regulatory agency and is authorized under Federal law to adopt and administer rules applicable to its members that are enforced by such organization or entity, by a Federal regulatory agency, or by another self-regulatory organization.
(12) STATE.-The term "State" includes the District of Columbia and the territories and possessions of the United States.
(13) TRANSACTION.-The term "transaction" means an action or set of actions relating to the conduct of business, consumer, or commercial affairs between two or more persons, including any of the following types of conduct:
(A) the sale, lease, exchange, licensing, or other disposition of (i) personal property, including goods and intangibles, (ii) services, and (iii) any combination thereof; and
(B) the sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition of any
interest in real property, or any combination thereof.
SEC. 107. EFFECTIVE DATE.

(a) IN GENERAL.-Except as provided in subsection (b), this title
shall be effective on October 1, 2000.
(b) EXCEPTIONS.(1) RECORD RETENTION.(A) IN GENERAL.~ubject to subparagraph (B), this
title shall be effective on March 1, 2001, with respect to a
requirement that a record be retained imposed by(i) a Federal statute, regulation, or other rule of
law, or
(ii) a State statute, regulation, or other rule of law
administered or promulgated by a State regulatory
agency.
(B) DELAYED EFFECT FOR PENDING RULEMAKINGS.-If
on March 1, 2001, a Federal regulatory agency or State regulatory agency has announced, proposed, or initiated, but
not completed, a rulemaking proceeding to prescribe a regulation under section 104(b)(3) with respect to a requirement
described in subparagraph (A), this title shall be effective
on June 1, 2001, with respect to such requirement.
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(2) CERTAIN GUARANTEED AND INSURED LOANS.-With regard to any transaction involving a loan guarantee or loan
guarantee commitment (as those terms are defined in section
502 of the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990), or involving a
program listed in the Federal Credit Supplement, Budget of the
United States, FY 2001, this title applies only to such transactions entered into, and to any loan or mortgage made, insured, or guaranteed by the United States Government thereunder, on and after one year after the date of enactment of this
Act.
(3) STUDENT LOANs.-With respect to any records that are
provided or made available to a consumer pursuant to an application for a loan, or a loan made, pursuant to title IV of the
Higher Education Act of 1965, section 101(c) of this Act shall
not apply until the earlier of(A) such time as the Secretary of Education publishes
revised promissory notes under section 432(m) of the Higher Education Act of 1965; or
(B) one year after the date of enactment of this Act.

TITLE II-TRANSFERABLE RECORDS
SEC. 201. TRANSFERABLE RECORDS.

(a) DEFINITIONS.-For purposes of this section:
(1) TRANSFERABLE RECORD.-The term "transferable
record" means an electronic record that(A) would be a note under Article 3 of the Uniform
Commercial Code if the electronic record were in writing;
(B) the issuer of the electronic record expressly has
agreed is a transferable record; and
(C) relates to a loan secured by real property.
A transferable record may be executed using an electronic signature.
(2) OTHER DEFINITIONS.-The terms "electronic record",
"electronic signature", and "person" have the same meanings
provided in section 106 of this Act.
(b) CONTROL.-A person has control of a transferable record if
a system employed for evidencing the transfer of interests in the
transferable record reliably establishes that person as the person to
which the transferable record was issued or transferred.
(c) CONDITIONS.-A system satisfies subsection (b), and a person
is deemed to have control of a transferable record, if the transferable
record is created, stored, and assigned in such a manner that(1) a single authoritative copy of the transferable record exists which is unique, identifiable, and, except as otherwise provided in paragraphs (4), (5), and (6), unalterable;
(2) the authoritative copy identifies the person asserting
control as(A) the person to which the transferable record was
issued; or
(B) if the authoritative copy indicates that the transferable record has been transferred, the person to which the
transferable record was most recently transferred;
June 8, 2000 (6:15PM)
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(3) the authoritative copy is communicated to and maintained by the person asserting control or its designated custodian;
(4) copies or revisions that add or change an identified assignee of the authoritative copy can be made only with the consent of the person asserting control;
(5) each copy of the authoritative copy and any copy of a
copy is readily identifiable as a copy that is not the authoritative copy; and
(6) any revision of the authoritative copy is readily identifiable as authorized or unauthorized.
(d) STATUS AS HOLDER.-Except as otherwise agreed, a person
having control of a transferable record is the holder, as defined in
section 1-201(20) of the Uniform Commercial Code, of the transferable record and has the same rights and defenses as a holder of an
equivalent record or writing under the Uniform Commercial Code,
including, if the applicable statutory requirements under section 3302(a), 9-308, or revised section 9-330 of the Uniform Commercial
Code are satisfied, the rights and defenses of a holder in due course
or a purchaser, respectively. Delivery, possession, and endorsement
are not required to obtain or exercise any of the rights under this
subsection.
(e) OBLIGOR RIGHTS.-Except as otherwise agreed, an obligor
under a transferable record has the same rights and defenses as an
equivalent obligor under equivalent records or writings under the
Uniform Commercial Code.
(/) PROOF OF CONTROL.-lf requested by a person against which
enforcement is sought, the person seeking to enforce the transferable
record shall provide reasonable proof that the person is in control
of the transferable record. Proof may include access to the authoritative copy of the transferable record and related business records
sufficient to review the terms of the transferable record and to establish the identity of the person having control of the transferable
record.
(g) UCC REFERENCES.-For purposes of this subsection, all references to the Uniform Commercial Code are to the Uniform Commercial Code as in effect in the jurisdiction the law of which governs the transferable record.
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SEC. 202. EFFECTIVE DATE.

This title shall be effective 90 days after the date of enactment
of this Act.

TITLE Ill-PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
SEC. 801. PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE USE OF ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES IN INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS.

(a) PROMOTION OF ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES.(1) REQUIRED ACTIONS.-The Secretary of Commerce shall
promote the acceptance and use, on an international basis, of
electronic signatures in accordance with the principles specified
in paragraph (2) and in a manner consistent with section 101
of this Act. The Secretary of Commerce shall take all actions
June 8, 2000 (6: 15 PM)
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necessary in a manner consistent with such principles to eliminate or reduce, to the maximum extent possible, the impediments to commerce in electronic signatures, for the purpose of
facilitating the development of interstate and foreign commerce.
(2) PRINCIPLES.-The principles specified in this paragraph
are the following:
(A) Remove paper-based obstacles to electronic transactions by adopting relevant principles from the Model Law
on Electronic Commerce adopted in 1996 by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law.
(B) Permit parties to a transaction to determine the appropriate authentication technologies and implementation
models for their transactions, with assurance that those
technologies and implementation models will be recognized
and enforced.
(C) Permit parties to a transaction to have the opportunity to prove in court or other proceedings that their authentication approaches and their transactions are valid.
(D) Take a nondiscriminatory approach to electronic
signatures and authentication methods from other jurisdictions.
(b) CONSULTATION.-ln conducting the activities required by
this section, the Secretary shall consult with users and providers of
electronic signature products and services and other interested persons.
(c) DEFINITIONS.-As used in this section, the terms "electronic
record" and "electronic signature" have the same meanings provided
in section 106 of this Act.

I
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TITLE IV-COMMISSION ON ONLINE
CHILD PROTECTION
SECTION 401. AUTHORITY TO ACCEPT GIFTS.

Section 1405 of the Child Online Protection Act (47 U.S.C. 231
note) is amended by inserting after subsection (g) the following new
subsection:
"(h) GIFTS, BEQUESTS, AND DEVISES.-The Commission may accept, use, and dispose of gifts, bequests, or devises of services or
property, both real (including the use of office space) and personal,
for the purpose of aiding or facilitating the work of the Commission.
Gifts or grants not used at the termination of the Commission shall
be returned to the donor or grantee.".
And the House agree to the same.
That the Senate recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the House to the title of the bill and agree to the same.
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B.E. 2544 (2001)
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(Translation)
ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT,

B.E. 2544 (2001)*

BHUMIBOLADULYADEJ, REX.

Given on the 2nd Day of December B.E. 2544.
Being the 561h Year ofthe Present Reign.
His Majesty King Bhumibol Adulyadej is graciously pleased to
proclaim that:
Whereas it is expedient to have a law on electronic transactions;
Whereas it is aware that this Act contains certain provisions
relating to the restriction of rights and liberties of the people, in respect of
which section 29 in conjunction with section 50 of the Constitution of the
Kingdom of Thailand so permit by virtue of the provisions of law;
Be it, therefore, enacted by the King, by and with the advice and
consent of the National Assembly, as follows.
Section 1.
B.E. 2544 (2001)".

This Act is called the "Electronic Transactions Act,

..
,.
I

Section 2.
This Act shall come into force after one hundred
twenty days as from the date of its publication in the Government Gazette. ••
Section 3. This Act shall apply to civil and commercial
transactions made by means of a data message, except fr ~ transactions
prescribed by a Royal Decree as being exempted from the em.;..e or partial
applicability of this Act.
The provisions of paragraph one do not prejudice any law or bylaw enacted for consumer protection.
Section 4.

In this Act:

* Translation by Dr. Pinai Nanakom, Faculty of Law, Thammasat University, in the

author's individual capacity. The author reserves full copyrights in this work and
authorises its use by NECTEC.
•• Published in the Government Gazette Vol. 118, Part 112a, dated 4th December
2001.
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"transaction" means any act related to a civil and commercial
activity or in the performance of the State affairs as prescribed in Chapter 4;
"electronics" means the application of an electron-based means,
an electrical means, an electromagnetic means or any other means of a similar
nature and shall include the application of an optical means, a magnetic means
or a device involving the application of the aforesaid means;
"electronic transaction" means a transaction in which an
electronic means is used in whole or in part;
"information" means an incident or fact, whether expressed in the
form of a letter, number, sound and image or any other form capable of
connotation by itself or through any means;
"data message" means information generated, sent, received,
stored or processed by an electronic means such as electronic data interchange,
electronic mail, telegramme, telex or facsimile;
"electronic signature" means letters, characters, numbers, sound
or any other symbols created in electronic form and affixed to a data message
for establishing the association of a particular person with the data message for
the purposes of identifying the signatory in relation to such data message and
indicating that such person has approved the information contained in the data
message;
"information system" means a system for processing with an aid
of an electronic device for generating, sending, receiving, storing or processing
data messages;

,.

.,

"electronic data interchange" means the dispatch or receipt of
information by an electronic means from computers to computers using an
agreed standard;
"originator" means a person who is a sender or generator of the
data message prior to its storage for transmission in accordance with the
method designated by such person, whether the data message is sent or
generated by such person or is sent or generated in the name of or on behalf of
such person, but does not include an intermediary with respect to that data
message;

I'

"addressee" means a person to whom the originator intends to
send the data message and who receives such data message, but does not
include an intermediary with respect to that data message;
"intermediary" means a person who, on behalf of another person,
sends, receives or stores a particular data message as well as provides other
services with respect to that data message;
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"certificate" means a data message or any other record
confirming the link between the signatory and signature creation data;
"signatory" means a person that holds signature creation data and
creates the electronic signature on his behalf or on behalf of other person;
"relying party" means a person that may act on the basis of a
certificate or an electronic signature;
"State agency" means a Ministry, Sub-ministry, Department,
other Government agency called by other name and ascribed the status of
Department, a provincial administration, a local administration and a State
enterprise established by an Act or a: Royal Decree and shall include a juristic
person, a group of persons or a person having the powers and duties to perform
State affairs in any matter whatsoever;
"Commission" means the Electronic Transactions Commission;
"Minister" means the Minister having charge and control of the
execution of this Act.
Section 5. The provisions of section 13 to section 24 and the
provisions of section 26 to section 31 may be otherwise agreed.

,•..
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Section 6. The Prime Minister shall have charge and control
of the execution of this Act.
CHAPTER I

Electronic Transactions

Section 7. Information shall not be denied legal effect and
enforceability solely on the ground that it is in the form of a data message.
Section 8. Subject to the provisions of section 9, in the case
where the law requires that any transaction be made in writing or evidenced by
writing or supported by a document which must be produced, if the information
is generated in the form of a data message which is accessible and usable for
subsequent reference without its meaning being altered, it shall be deemed that
such information is already made in writing, evidenced by writing or supported
by the produced document.
Section 9. In the case where a person is to enter a signature in
any writing, it shall be deemed that a data message bears a signature if:
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( 1) a method is used which is capable of identifying the signatory
and indicating that the signatory has approved the information contained in the
data message as being his own; and
(2) such method is as reliable as was appropriate for the purpose
for which the data message was generated or sent, having regard to surrounding
circumstances or an agreement between the parties.
Section 10. In the case where the law requires that any
information be presented or retained in its original form as an original
document, ifthe presentation or retention is made in the form of a data message
in accordance with the following rules, it shall be deemed as the presentation or
retention of the original document under the law:

(1) a reliable method is used with that data message for assuring
the integrity of the information from the time when it was generated in its fmal
form; and
(2) the information is capable of being subsequently displayed.
The consideration of the integrity of the information under (1)
shall be made by having regard to its completeness and absence of alteration,
apart from any additional endorsement or recordation or any change which may
arise in the normal course of communication, storage or display of the
information,_which does not affect the integrity of that information;
In determining the reliability of the method used for assuring the
integrity of the information under ( 1), regard shall be had to all the relevant
circumstances, including the purposes for which the information was
generated.
Section 11. The admissibility of a data message in evidence

shall not be denied in legal
message.

proce~ding_s

on the sole ground that it is a data

In assessing the evidential weight of a data message so as to
conclude whether and to what extent it is reliable, regard shall be had to the
reliability of the manner in which or the method by which the data message
was generated, stored or communicated, the manner in which or the method by
which the integrity of the information was maintained, and the manner in
which or the method by which its originator was identified or indicated and
also to all relevant circumstances.
Section 12. Subject to the provisions of section 10, in the case
where the law requires that any document or information be retained, if the
retention is made in the form of a data message in accordance with the
following rules, it shall be deemed as the retention of the document or
information as required by the law:
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( 1) such data message is accessible and usable for subsequent

reference without its meaning being altered;
(2) such data message is retained in the format in which it was
generated, sent or received or in a format which can display accurately the
i_nformation generated, sent or received; and
(3) the information, if any, which enables the identification of the
origin, source and destination of such data message including the date and time
when it was sent or received is retained.
The provisions of paragraph one shall not apply to the
information the sole purpose of which is to enable the data message to be sent
or received.
The State agency responsible for the retention of any document
or information may prescribe supplemental details with regard to the retention
of such document or information insofar as they are not contrary to or
inconsistent with the provisions of this section.

,.
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Section 13. An offer to make a contract and an acceptance may
be expressed in the form of a data message and the contract shall not be denied
legal effect on the sole ground that the offer or acceptance with respect to that
contract was made in the form of a data message.
Section 14. As between the originator and the addressee, a
declaration of will or notice may be in the form of a data message.

j.

Section 15. When any person sent a data message by any
means, it shall be deemed that the data message is that of such person.

As between the originator and the addressee, a ·data message is
deemed to be that of the originator if it was sent by:
(1) a person who had the authority to aCl c.J behalf of the
originator in respect of that data message; or
(2) an information system programmed, by the originator or a
person who had the authority to act on behalf of the originator, to operate
automatically.
Section 16. The addressee is entitled to regard a data message
as being that of the originator and to act on that assumption with respect to that
data message if:

(1) the addressee has properly ascertained whether the data
message was that of the originator in accordance with the procedure previously
agreed with the originator; or
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(2) the data message as received by the addressee resulted from
the action of a person who used a method which is used by the originator to
identify data messages as his own and to which such person gained access
through the relationship between such person and the originator or a person
having the authority to act on behalf of the originator;.
The provisions of paragraph one shall not apply if:
( 1) at that time, the addressee has received notice from the
originator that the data message as received by the addressee is not that of the
originator and, at the same time, the addressee had reasonable time to take
steps in verifying the facts to which the notice relates; or
(2) in a case under paragraph one (2), the addressee knew or
should have known, had the addressee exercised reasonable care or acted in
accordance with the agreed procedure, that the data message was not that of the
originator.
Section 17. In the case under section 15 or section 16 paragraph
one, as between the originator and the addressee, the addressee is entitled to
regard the data message as received as being what the originator intended to
send and to act on that assumption with respect to that data message, unless the
addressee knew or should have known, had the addressee exercised reasonable
care or acted in accordance with the agreed procedure, that the data message as
received had an error resulting from the transmission.
Section 18. The addressee is entitled to regard each set of data
message received as a separate data message and to act on that assumption with
respect to that set of data message unless such set of data message duplicates
another set of data message and the addressee knew or should have known, had
the addressee exercised reasonable care or acted in accordance with the agreed
procedure, that the data message was a duplicate data message ..
Section 19. In the case where an acknowledgement of receipt of
a data message is required, whether at the originator's request or as agreed with
the addressee before or at the time of sending the data message or by means of
that data message, the following rules shall apply:

(1) in the case where it has not been agreed by the originator that
the acknowledgement be given in a particular form or by a particular method,
the acknowledgement may be given by any communication by the addressee,
whether by an automated information system or by any other method, or by any
conduct of the addressee sufficient to indicate to the originator that the
addressee has received the data message;
(2) in the case where the originator has stated a condition that the
data message shall be regarded as having been sent only upon receipt of an
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acknowledgement by the addressee, it shall be deemed that the data message
has never been sent until the originator has received the acknowledgement;
(3) in the case where the originator has not stated such a
condition under (2) and the originator has not received the acknowledgement
within the specified or agreed time, or, if no time has been specified or agreed,
within a reasonable time, then:
(a) the originator may give notice to the addressee stating
that the originator has not received the acknowledgement and specifying a
reasonable time by which the acknowledgement must be made by the
addressee; and
(b) if the originator has not received the acknowledgement
within the time under (a), the originator may, upon notice having been given to
the addressee, treat the data message as having never been sent, or the
originator may exercise any other rights he may have.
Section 20. In the case where the originator receives the
acknowledgement from the addressee, it shall be presumed that the addressee
received the related data message, but this presumption does not imply that the
data message as received by the addressee corresponds to the data message as
sent by the originator.

'·

Section 21. fu the case where it is apparent in the
acknowledgement of receipt of the data message itself that the data message as
received by the addressee met technical requirements agreed upon by the
originator and the addressee or set forth in applicable standards, it shall be
presumed that the data message which was sent met all the technical
requirements.
Section 22. The dispatch of a data message is deemed to occur
when it er:ters an information system outside the control of the originator.
Section 23. The receipt of a data message is deemed to occur as
from the time when the data message enters an information system of the
addressee.

If the addressee has designated a particular information system
for the purpose of receiving data messages, it shall be deemed that receipt of a
data message occurs as from the time when the data message enters the
information system designated by the addressee. But, if the data message is
sent to other information system of the addressee that is not the information
system designated by the addressee, it shall be deemed that receipt of the data
message occurs as from the time when the data message is retrieved from that
information system.
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The provisions of this section shall apply notwithstanding that the
infmmation system of the addressee is located in a different place from the
place where the data message is deemed to be received by the addressee under
section 24.
Section 24. A data message shall be deemed to be dispatched at
the place of business of the originator and to be received at the place of
business of the addressee, as the case may be.
In the case where the originator or the addressee has more than
one place of business, reference shall be made, for the purpose of the place of
business under paragraph one, to the place of business which has the closest
relationship to the underlying transaction. But, if it cannot be determined which
place of business has the closest relationship to such transaction, the principal
place of business shall be treated as the place where such data message is
received or dispatched.
In the case where the place of business of the originator or the
addressee does not exist, his habitual residence shall be treated as the place of
dispatch or receipt of the data message.

The provisions of this section shall not apply to the dispatch and
receipt of a data message by telegramme and telex or by other means of
communication prescribed in the Royal Decree.

I'
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Section 25. Any electronic transaction made in accordance with
such security procedure as prescribed in the Royal Decree shall be presumed to
have been made using a reliable method.
CHAPTER II

Electronic Signatures
Section 26. An electronic signature that meets the following
features shall be deemed to be a reliable electronic signature:

(1) the signature creation data are, within the context in which
they are used, linked to the signatory and to no other person;
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(2) the signature creation data were, at the time of creating the
electronic signature, under the control of the signatory and of no other person;
(3) any alteration to the electronic signature, made as from the
time of its creation, is detectable; and

'·

(4) in the case where a purpose of the legal requirement for an
electronic signature is to provide assurance as to the integrity of the
I

!f.
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information, any alteration made to that information as from the time of signing
is detectable.
The provisions of paragraph one does not imply any limitation
that no other method exists for establishing the reliability of an electronic
signature or does not limit the adducing of any evidence of the non-reliability
of an electronic signature.
Section 27. In the case where signature creation data can be
used to create a signature that has legal effect, each signatory shall:

(1) exercise reasonable care to avoid unauthorized use of his
signature creation data;

..
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(2) Without delay, notify any person that may reasonably be
expected to act on the basis of the electronic signature or to provide services in
support of the electronic signature when:
(a) the signatory knows or should have known that the
signature creation data has been lost, damaged, compromised, unduly disclosed
or known in a manner inconsistent with their purpose
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(b) the signatory knows from the circumstances that there
occurs a substantial risk that the signature creation data may have been lost,
damaged, compromised, unduly disclosed or known in a manner inconsistent
with their purpose;
(3) in the case where a certificate is issued to support the
electronic signature, exercise reasonable care to ensure the accuracy and
completeness of all material representations made by the signatory that are
relevant to the certificate throughout its life cycle or that are specified in the
certificate.
Section 28. In the case where a certi:fieation service is provided
to support an electronic signature that may be 1.1.: d for legal effect as a
signature, the certification service provider shall:

(1) act in accordance with the policies and practices it has
represented;

I
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(2) exercise reasonable care to ensure the accuracy and
completeness of all material representations made by it that are relevant to the
certificate throughout its life cycle or that are specified in the certificate;
(3) provide means for reasonable access that enable a relying
party to ascertain from the certificate all the material representations, as
follows:
(a) the identity of the certification service provider;
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(b) that tht:: signatory that is identified in the l~ ertificate had
control of the signature creation data at the time when the certificate was
issued;
(c) that signature creation data were valid at or before the
time when the certificate was issued;
(4) provide reasonably accessible means that enable a relying
party to ascertain, the following, from the certificate or otherwise:
(a) the method used to identify the signatory;

I~

(b) any limitation on the purpose and value for which the
signature creation data or the certificate may be used;
(c) that the signature creation data are valid and have not
been lost, damaged, compromised, unduly disclosed or known in a manner
inconsistent with their purpose;
(d) any limitation on the scope or extent of liability
stipulated by the certification service provider;
(e) availability of the means for the signatory to give
notice in the event of the circumstances under section 27 (2);
(f) availability of a service for a timely revocation of a
certificate

..
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(5) in the case where the service under (4) (e) is offered, provide
a means for a signatory to give notice as specified in section 27 (2) and, in the
case where the service under (4) (f) is offered, ensure that such service can
generate a timely revocation of a certificate.
(6) utilise trustworthy systems procedures and human resources
in performing its services.

Section 29. In determining the trustworthiness of sys'l o:. r s,
procedures and human resources under section 28 (6), regard may be had to the
following factors:
(1) fmancial status, human resources and existing assets;
(2) quality ofhardware and software systems;
(3) procedures for issuing certificates, applications for certificates
and retention of records in relation to the provision of the service;
(4) availability of information in connection with signatories
identified in certificates and potential relying parties;
(5) regularity and extent of audit by an independent auditor;
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(6) a declaration by an accreditation body or a certification
service provider regarding compliance with or existence of the factors
mentioned in ( 1) to (5);
(7) any factor prescribed by the Commission.
Section 30. A relying party shall:

( 1) take reasonable steps to verify the reliability of an electronic
signature;
(2) in the case where an electronic signature is supported by a
certificate, take reasonable steps to:
(a) verify the validity, suspension or revocation of the
certificate; and
(b) observe any limitation with respect to the certificate.
Section 31. A certificate or an electronic signature shall be
deemed to be legally effective, irrespective of:

( 1) the location where the certificate is issued or the location
where the electronic signature is created or used; or
(2) the location of the place of business of the issuer of the
certificate or the signatory.
A certificate issued in a foreign country shall have the same legal
effect as a certificate issued domestically if a system that is used in issuing such
certificate is not of lower level of reliability than that under this Act.

An electronic signature created or used in a foreign country shall
have the same legal effect as an electronic signature created or used
domestically if a system that is used in creating or using such electronic
signature is not of lower level of reliability than that under this Act.
In determining whether a certificate or an electronic signature
offers reliability under paragraph two or paragraph three, regard shall also be
had to international standards and to other relevant factors.
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CHAPTER Ill
BUSINESSES OF PROVIDING SERVICES RELATED TO
ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS

Section 32. A person has the right to carry out a business of
providing services related to electronic transactions, but in the case where it is
necessary for maintaining financial and commercial security or for
strengthening the reliability and credibility in data message systems or for
preventing loss to the public, there shall be issued a Royal Decree requiring
that the operation of a particular business of providing services related to
electronic transactions be subject to prior notification, registration or licence.
In making the determination as to in which case a notification,
registration or licence under paragraph one shall be required, regard shall be
had to the appropriateness of the prevention of loss in accordance with the
magnitude of severity of impacts likely to occur in consequence of the
operation of that business.

For this purpose, any particular State agency may be designated
by such Royal Decree to be the responsible supervisory agency.
Prior to the recommendation of the issuance of the Royal Decree
under paragraph one, a public hearing shall be conducted as is appropriate and
the information to be derived therefrom shall be considered.
Section 33. In the case where a Royal Decree is issued
requiring that the operation of a business of providing services related to
electronic transactions in any particular case be subject to prior notification or
registration, the person wishing to operate such business must make the
notification to, or carry out registration with, the competent official as
prescribed in the Royal Dec;·ee prior to the commencement of the operation of
such business.
The rules and procedures for the notification or registration under
paragraph one shall be in accordance with the Royal Decree and the competent
official as prescribed in the Royal Decree shall, when the notification or the
registration has been made, issue a certificate of notification or a certificate of
registration as evidence of the notification or registration on the date of the
notification or registration, and the person making the notification or carrying
out the registration may operate that business as from the date of the
notification or registration accordingly. But, if the competent official as
prescribed in the Royal Decree subsequently discovers that the notification or
registration has been made in an incorrect or incomplete manner, the competent
official shall have the power to order the person having made the notification
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or having carried out the registration to rectify it and ensure correctness and
completeness within seven days as from the date such order is received.
In the operation of the business, the person having made the
notification or having carried out the registration under paragraph one shall
comply with the rules prescribed in the Royal Decree and the notifications
prescribed by the Commission.
If the person having made the notification or having carried out
the registration under paragraph one fails to rectify the defective notification or
registration to ensure correctness and completeness under paragraph two, or
violates or fails to comply with the rules for the operation of the business under
paragraph three, the Commission shall consider and order the imposition of an
administrative fme not exceeding one million Baht, having regard to the gravity
of the faulty conduct and, in the case where it thinks fit, the Commission may
issue an order requiring such person to take any action for the purpose of
proper and appropriate rectification.
The rules for the consideration and imposition of an
administrative fine shall be as prescribed by the Commission and if the person
upon whom the administrative fine is imposed fails to make its payment, the
provisions relating to the administrative execution under the law on
administrative procedure shall apply mutatis mutandis, and in the absence of
the execution of the order by an official, the Commission shall have the power
to institute an action before the Administrative Court for mandating payment of
the fine. In this instance, if the Administrative Court is of the opinion that the
order mandating the payment of the fme is lawful, the Administrative Court
shall have the power to try and adjudicate the case and ordering the seizure or
attachment of the property for sale by auction for the purpose of payment of the
fme.
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In the case where the person committing the offence under
paragraph four fails to make rectification in accolo'iance with the. order of the
Commission or repeats the offence, the Commissmn shall have the power to
issue an order prohibiting such person from further operating the business to
which the notification or the registration relates.

Section 34. In the case where a Royal Decree is issued
requmng that the operation of business of providing services related to
electronic transactions in any particular case be subject to prior licence, the
person wishing to operate such business shall file an application for a licence
with the competent official as prescribed in the Royal Decree.

The qualifications of the applicant for a licence, the rules and
procedures for the application, the issuance of a licence, the extension of a
licence, the surrender of a licence, the suspension or revocation of a licence
shall be as prescribed in the Royal Decree.
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In the operation of the business, the person to whom a licence is
granted under paragraph one shall comply with the rules prescribed in the
Royal Decree, the notifications prescribed by the Commission or conditions set
forth in the licence.
In the case where the person to whom the licence has been
granted violates or fails to comply with the rules for the operation of the
business of providing services related to electronic transactions under
paragraph three, the Commission shall consider and order the imposition of an
administrative fme not exceeding two million Baht, having regard to the
gravity of the faulty conduct and, in the case where it thinks fit, the
Commission may issue an order requiring such person to take any action for
the purpose of proper and appropriate rectification. In this instance, the
provisions of section 33 paragraph five shall apply mutatis mutandis.

If the person committing the offence under paragraph four fails to
make rectification in accordance with the order of the Commission or repeats
the offence, the Commission shall have the power to issue an order revoking
the licence.
CHAPTER IV
ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

Section 35. An application, permission, registration,
administrative order, payment, notification or the performance of any act under
the law with a State agency or by a State agency shall, if made in the form of a
data message in accordance with the rules and procedures prescribed by the
Royal Decree, fall under the application of this Act and shall be deemed to
have the same legal effect as the act performed in accordance with the rules and
procedures provided by the law on that particular matter. For this put"r.ose, the
Royal Decree may also require any act or ommission by the person c :. m ~emed
or require a State agency to issue rules prescribing details in certain cases.
In issuing the Royal Decree paragraph one, such Royal Decree
may require the person operating the business of providing services related to
electronic transactions to make notification, apply for registration or obtain a
licence, as the case may be, prior to the commencement of the operation of the
business. In this case, the provisions of Chapter 3 and the relevant penalties
shall apply mutatis mutandis.

CHAPTERV
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ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS COMMISSION

Section 36. There shall be the Electronic Transactions
Commission consisting of the Minister of Science, Technology and
Environment as Chairman and twelve members appointed by the Council of
Ministers from selected qualified persons, provided that two qualified persons
must be from each of the following field:
(1) fmance;
(2) electronic commerce;
(3) law;
(4) computing science;
(5) science or engineering;
(6) social science.
Provided that, in each field, one qualified person must be from
the private sector and the Director of the National Electronics and Computer
Technology Centre, National Science and Technology Development Agency
shall be a member and secretary.
The rules and procedure for the selection and the nomination of
suitable persons to the Council of Ministers for considering and appointing as
members of the Commission under paragraph one shall be in accordance with
the Rules prescribed by the Minister.
The secretary shall appoint not more than two assistant
secretaries.
Section 37. The Electronic Transactions Commission shall have
' C": powers and duties as follows:
( 1) to make recommendations to the Council of Ministers for the
purposes of laying down policies for the promotion and development of
electronic transactions as well as solving relevant problems and obstacles;
(2) to monitor the operation of businesses of providing services
related to electronic transactions;
(3) to make recommendations or give advice to the Minister for
the purpose of issuing Royal Decrees under this Act;
(4) to issue rules or notifications in connection with electronic
signatures in the execution of this Act or in the implementation of the Royal
Decree issued under this Act;
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(5) to perform any other activity in the execution of this Act or
other laws.
In the performance of an activity under this Act, a member of the
Commission shall be an official under the Penal Code.

Section 38. A qualified member shall hold office for a term of
three years.
The outgoing member may be re-appointed but may not serve for
more than two consecutive terms.

Section 39. In addition to the vacation of office upon the
expiration of the term under section 38, a qualified member vacates office
upon:
(1) death;
(2) resignation;
(3) being removed by the Council of Ministers on the ground of
misbehaviour, neglect of or dishonesty in the performance of duties, or lack of
competence;
(4) being an incompetent or quasi-incompetent person;
(5) having been imprisoned by a final judgment to a term of
imprisonment, except for an offence committed through negligence or a petty
offence.

Section 40. In the case where the qualified member vacates
office under section 39, it shall be deemed that the Commission consists of the
remaining members and an appointment of a new member to fill the vacancy
shall be made within sixty days as from the date the member vacates office.
The qualif1 'ld member appointed to fill the vacancy shall be in
office for the remaining term of the replaced person.

Section 41. At a meeting of the Commission, the presence of
not less than one-half of the total number of members is required to constitute a
quorum.
If the Chairman is not present at the meeting or is unable to
perform the duty, the Commission shall elect one member to preside over the
meeting.
A decision of the meeting shall be by a majority of votes. In
casting votes, each member shall have one vote. In the case of an equality of
votes, the person presiding over the meeting shall have an additional vote as a
casting vote.
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Section 42. The Commission has the power to appoint a subcommittee for considering or performing any act on behalf of the Commission.
The provisions of section 41 shall apply to a meeting of the subcommittee mutatis mutandis.
Section 43. The National
Electronics
and
Computer
Technology Centre, National Science and Technology Development Agency
shall serve as the secretariat of the Commission.
CHAPTER VI
PENALTIES

Section 44. Any person who operates the business of providing
services related to electronic transactions without making the notification to or
registration with the competent official as prescribed in the Royal Decree
under section 33 paragraph one or in violation of the Commission's order
prohibiting the operation of business under section 33 paragraph six shall be
liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or to a fine not
exceeding one hundred thousand Baht or to both.
Section 45. Any person who operates the business of providing
services related to electronic transactions without obtaining a licence under
section 34 shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or
to a fme not exceeding two hundred thousand Baht or to both.
Section 46. For a11 offences under this Act, if an offence is
committed by a juristic person, then, the manager or the person representing
that juristic person or the person taking part in the operation of that juristic
person shall also be liable to the penalty for i' uch offence unless it is proved
that he had no knowledge of, or connivance at , the commission thereof.

Countersigned by:
Pol. Lieutenant Major Taksin Shinawatra
Prime Minister
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Remark :- The reasons for promulgation of this Act is as follows . Electronic
transactions nowadays tend to have been adapted in their methods of
communication such that they are based upon electronically technological
advancements which facilitate convenience, swiftness and efficiency. However,
such methods of electronic transactions are fundamentally different from the
methods of transactions supported by existing laws. This necessitates legal
recognition of data messages by treating them as the functional equivalent of a
writing or evidence in writing and recognising methods of dispatch and receipt
of data messages, the use of electronic signaturesas well as admissibility in
evidence of data messages, with a view to promoting electronic transactions to
achieve reliability and be accorded the same legal effect as that given to
transactions made by traditional means. It is also expedient to establish the
Electronic Transactions Commission, with the duties to lay down policies and
prescribe rules for promoting electronic transactions, monitor the operation of
businesses related to electronic transactions as well as the duties to promote
technological developments for following up advancements of technologies
which, all the time, undergo change and development in their potential, so that
reliable standards can be achieved and to recommend solutions to relevant
problems and obstacles, thereby promoting the use of electronic transactions
domestically and internationally. This can be carried out through enactment of
a law which is uniform in substance and in line with internationally recognised
standards. It is, therefore, necessary that this Act be enacted.

File: Pinai\Ecommerce\E-tranAct200 l.doc

465

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PART I. BOOKS & ARTICLES
Abraham, Kenneth S. The Forms and Functions of Tort Law: An Analytical Primer on Cases
and Concepts. New York: the Foundation Press, 1997.
Adams, Carlisle, and Steve Lloyd. Understanding Public-Key Infrastructure: Concepts.
Standards, and Deployment Consideration. Indianapolis: Macmillan Technical
Publishing, 1999.

l

r'·
~·

~

Akdenie, Yaman, et al., eds. The Internet, Law and Society. New York: Longman, 2000.
Alderman, Richard M. A Transactional Guide to the Uniform Commercial Code. 2d ed.
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: American Law Institute-An1erican Bar Association, 1983.
Allen, Ken. "Utah Digital Signature Act Executive Summary'' Utah Bar Journalll (1998): 15.
Amor, Daniel. The E-business(R) Evolution: Living and Working in an Interconnected World.
Saddle River, N.J. : Prentice-Hall, 1999.
Anderson, John C., and Michael L. Closen. "Document Authentication in Electronic
Commerce: The Misleading Notary Public Analog for the Digital Signature
Certification." John Marshall Journal of Computer and lnfo~a~ion Law. 17 (1999): 833.
Anderson, John Christopher. "Transmitting Legal Documents Over the Internet: How to Protect
Your Client and Yourself." Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal 27 (2001):1.

.1.•

Anson, William R., Sr. Principle ofthe English Law of Contract and of Agency in its Relation
to Contract. 4th ed. Chicago: Callaghan and Company, 1887.
Anson, William R., Sr.Principle of the English Law of Contract and of Agency in its Relation
to Contract. 8th ed. New York: The Banks Law Publishing Company, 1899.

I

Armond, Michelle. "Cyberlaw: State Internet Regulation and the Dormant Commerce Clause."
Berkeley Technology Law Journal 17 (2002): 379.

r:[

Arnold, Tom, et al., eds. Internet Identity Theft: A Tragedy for Victims. Software &
Information Industry Association, 2000.

466

[

~

1.,

.,

Artruksa, Piroj. Law of Consumer Protection. Bangkok: Winyuchon Publication House, 2000.
Arvanitakis, Dian Athanasopoulos, and Marilynn J. Dye. "A Proposed Code ofProfessional
Responsibility for Certification Authorities." Jolm Marshall Journal of Computer and
Information Law 17 (1999): 1003.
Atallah, Mikhail J., ed. Algorithms and Theory of Computer Handbook. New York: CRC
Press, 1998.
Atiyah, Partick Selim. Essays on Contract. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.
Atkins, Derek, et al., eds. Internet Security: Professional Reference. USA: New Riders
Publishing, 1996.

L

I

1
i

August, Ray. International Business Law: Text, Cases. and Readings. Upper Saddle River, N.J.:
Prentice Hall, 1993.
Bacard, Andre. The Computer Privacy Handbook. Berkeley: Peachpit Press, 1995.
Bacchetta, Marc., et al., eds. "Special Studies 2: Electronic Commerce and the Role ofthe
WTO." (1998).
Bainbridge, David I. Introduction to Computer Law .3d ed. London: Pitman Publishing, 1996.

I,
I I

Bainbridge, David I. Introduction to Computer Law. 4th ed. London: Longman Publishing,
2000.
Baker, Steward A., and Paul R. Hurst. "The Limits of Trust: Cryptography, Governments, and
Electronic Commerce." Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series (1998).
Bailon, Anthony M. "From Wax Seals to Hypertext: Electronic Signatures, Contract
Formation, and a New Model for Consumer Protection in Internet Transactions." Emory
Law Journal 50 (2001): 905.
Banisar, David, and Simon Davies. "Global Trends in Privacy Protection: An International
Survey ofPrivacy, Data Protection, and Surveillance Laws and Developments." Jolm
Marshall Journal of Computer and Information Law 18 (1999).
Barassi, Theodore S. "Digital Signature legislation: International Developments." Glasser
Legal Works (1998).
Barnes, A. James, Terry M. Dworkin. Law for Business. 3d ed. Homewood, lllinois: Irwin,
L987.
Bartee, Thomas C., ed. Data Communications, Networks. and Systems. h1dianapolis: Howard
W. Sams & Co., 1991.

467

r ,
~

Baum, Michael S., and Henry H. Perritt, Jr. Electronic Contracting. Publishing, and EDI Law.
New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1991.
Berman, Jerry, and Deirdre Mulligan "The Internet and the Law: Privacy in the Digital Age:
Work in Progress." Nova Law Review 23 (1999): 549.
Berman, Jerry, and Paula Bruening. "Is privacy Still Possible in the Twenty-first Century?"
Social Research (2001).
Bernstein, Terry, et al., eds. Internet Security For Business. New York: John Wiley & Sons,
1996.
Biddle, C. Bradfard. "Misplaced Priorities: The Utah Digital Signature Act and Liability
Allocation in a Public Key Infrastructure." San Diego Law Review (1996).
Biddle, C. Bradford. "Legislating Market Winners: Digital Signature Laws and the Electronic
Commerce Marketplace." World Wide Web Journal 2 (1997).
Bigelow, Robert P., and Susan H. Nycum. Your Computer and the Law. Upper Saddle River,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1975.
Binder, David F. The Hearsay Handbook: The Hearsay Rule and its 40 Exceptions. New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1975.
Binder, David F. Evidence Series: Hearsay Handbook. 3rd ed. New York: Shepard's!
McGraw-Hill, 1991.
Blun, Brian A. Contracts: Examples and Explanations. 2d ed. New York: Aspen Law &
Business, 2001.
Boam, Christopher Paul. "The Internet, Information and the Culture of Regulatiory Change: A
Modem Renaissance." Communication Law Conspectus 9 (2001): 175.
Boonyapan, Paijit. Law of Torts: Presumption of Fault. 2d ed. Bangkok: Nitibannagarn, 1990.
Boonyapan, Paijit. Law ofTorts. 8th ed. Bangkok: Nitibannagarn, 1998.
Boonyoun, Kusol. Law of Agency and Broker. 12th ed. Bangkok: Nitibannagarn. 1998.
Brinson, J. Dianne, and Mark F. Radcliffe. Internet Legal Forms for Business: 12 Ready-to-Use
Forms for Doing Business on the Internet. Menlo Park, CA.: Ladera Press, 1997.
Bronstein, Daniel A. Law of the Expert Witness. Boca Raton: Lewis Publishers, 1993.
Brown, Peter, and Wayne E. Webb, Jr. 18th Annual Institute on Computer Law. New York:
Practicing Law Institute, 1'998.

468

Brown, Toby. "Legal Economics: From Paper to Electronic." Utah Bar Joumal10 (1997): 18.
Brown, Toby. "Feature: Confidentiality on the Internet." South Carolina Lawyer 12 (2000): 28.
Bruce, Glen, and Rob Dempsey. Security in Distributed Computing: Did You Lock the Door?.
Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1997.
Buckley, William R., and Cathy J. Okrent. Torts and Personal Injury Law. USA: Delmar
Publishers, 1997.
Burdick, Francis M. The Law ofTort: A Concise Treaties on the Civil Liability at Common
Law and under Modem Statutes for Actionable Wrongs to Person and Property. 3d.
Albany: Banks & Company, 1913.

~

,~·

'r

Campbell, Dennis, et al., eds. Law of International On-Line Business: A Global Perspective:
Supplement No.1. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1999.
Carroll, John M. Computer Security. United States of America: Security World Publishing Co.,
1977.

1

\

]f
I

Casamiquela, Ryan J. "Contractual Assent and Enforceability in Cyberspace." Berkeley
Technology Law Journal 17 (2002): 475.
Chaum, David, et al., eds. Advances in Cryptology: Proceedings ofCrypto82. New York:
Plenum Press, 1982.

.:

Cheshire, G. C., and C.H.S Fifoot. The Law of Contract. 4th ed. London: Buttwerworth & Co.
(Publishers) LTD, 1956.
Cheshire, G. C., and C.H.S Fifoot. The Law of Contract. 7th ed. London: Buttwerworth & Co.
(Publishers) LTD, 1969.
Chissick, Michael, and Alistair Kelman. Electronic Commerce: Law and Practice. 2d ed.
London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2000.
Chung, Christine Sgarlata, and David J Byer. "Evidentiary Obstacles to Discovery and
Admission of Electronic Evidence." Boston University Journal of Science and
Technology Law 4 (1998): 5.
Closen, Michael L., and R. Jason Richards. ''Notaries Public- Lost in Cyberspace, or Key
Business Professionals of the Future." John Marshall .Journal of Computer and
Information Law 15 (1997): 703.
Colberg, Thomas P., et al., eds. The Price Waterhouse: EDI Handbook. New York: John Wiley
& Sons, 1995.

469

~

I

r...'

~'

r..
l
l

~··

'

Comer, Douglas E. Computer Networks and Intemets. 2d ed. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1999.
Cona, Frank A. "Application of Online Systems in Alternative Dispute Resolution." Buffalo
Law Review 45 (1997): 975.
Conley, John M., et al., eds. "Database Protection in a Digital World." Richmond Journal of
Law and Technology. 6 (1999): 2.
Cronin, Daniel J. Microcomputer Data Security: Issues and Strategies. Upper Saddle River,
N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1986.
Davies, D.W, and W.L. Price. Security for Computer Networks: An Introduction to Data
Security in Teleprocessing and Electronic Funds Transfer. 2d ed. New York: John Wiley
& Sons, 1989.

·'

Delta, George B., and Jeffrey H. Matsuura. Law of the Internet. New York: Aspen Law &
Business, 1997.
Delta, George B., and Jeffrey H. Matsuura. Law of the Internet. 2d ed. New York: Aspen Law
& Business, 2001.
Denny, William R. "Electronic Contracting in Delaware: The E-Sign Act and the Uniform
Electronic Transactions Act." Delaware Law Review 4 (2001): 33.

I·

Dobbs, Dan B., and Paul T. Hayden. Torts and Compensation: Personal Accountability and
Social Responsibility for Injury. 4th ed. , St. Paul, M.N.: West Group 2001.
Dockey, Mike, and John Zajac. "Solving the E-mail Dilemma." Electronic Evidence Journal 1
(1996).
Dockey, Mike, and John Zajac, ed. "Fraudulent Claims & EE "Slip and Fall?" (1997).
Dolak, Lisa A. "Patents Without Paper: Proving a Date of Invention with Electronic Evidence."
Houston Law Review 36 (1999): 471.
Dorney, Maureen S. "Doing Business on the Internet: The Law of Electronic Commerce,
Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property" Course Handbook Series
(1997).

I,

Dulayakarn, Thanongsak. Principles and Problems in Contracts of Current Accounts and Credit
Cards. 2d ed. Bangkok: Jirarat Publishing, 2001.
Edwards, Leslie, and Rachel Barnes. Professional Services Agreements. London: Thomas
Telford Publishing, 2000.

470
I.

"I'

Edwards, Lilian, and Charlotte Waelde, ed. Law and the Internet: A Framework for Electronic
Commerce. Oxford and Portland Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2000.
Eldrige, Lonnie. "Internet Commerce and the Meltdown of Certification Authorities: Is the
Washington State Solution a Good Model?." UCLA Law Review 45 (1998): 1805.
Elizabeth, Dorothy, and Robling Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. Massachusetts:
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1982.
Emmelhaninz, Margaret A. EDI: A Total Management Guide. 2d ed. New York: Van Nostrand
Reinhold, 1993.
Epstein, Richard A., Charles 0. Greory and Harry Kalven, Jr. Cases and Materials on Torts. 4th
ed. Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1984.
Faerber, Charles N. "The Prospects and Desirability of a Paperless Society." John Marshall
Journal of Computer and Information Law 17 (1999): 797.
Farnsworth, E. Allan, and William F.Young. Contracts: Cases and Materials. 5th ed. New
York: The Foundation Press, 1995
Farnsworth, E. Allan, and William F.Young. Sections for Contracts: Uniform Commercial
Code, Restatement Second, UN Sales Convention, Undroit Forms, Forms. New York:
The Foundation Press, 1998.
Farnsworth, E. Allan. United States ContraGt Law. New York: Transnational Juris Publications,
1991.
Federal Rule of Evidence 2000-2001 Edition. St. Paul, M.N.: West Group [2000]

:I

Feinman, Jay M. Professional Liability to Third Parties. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: American
Bar Association, 2000.
Fernandez, E.B, et al., eds. The Systems Programming Series: Data Base Security and Integrity.
Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1936.
Field, Richard L. "The Electronic Future of Cash: Survey: 1996: Survey ofthe Year's
Developments in Electronic Cash Law and the Laws Affecting Electronic Banking in the
United States." American University Law Review 46 (1997): 967.

,.
J.,

l,•: .
j·

Finch, James H., and E. Graham Dougall, ed. Computer Security: A Global Challenge. NorthHolland: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., 1984.
Fischer, Susanna Frederick. "A Comparative Look at Recent Global Electronic Signature
Legislation." Boston University Journal of Science and Technology Law 7 (2001): 229.
I

~

~ '

471

iJoo
~·

.f.r

!
,t

l!
Folsom, Ralph H. International Business Transactions. 4th ed. St. Paul, M.N.: West Group,
1999.
Forcht, Karen A. Computer Security Management. Ferncroft Village Danvers, M.A. : Boyd &
Fraser Publishing Company, 1994.
Ford, Warwick. Computer Communication Security: Principles, Standard, Protocols, and
Techniques. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1994.
Ford, Warwick, and MichaelS. Baum. Secure Electronic Commerce: Building the
Infrastructure of Digital Signature and Encryption. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: PrenticeHall, 2000.
Franklin, Marc A. Gilbert Law Summaries : Torts. 19th ed. Chicago : Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich Legal and Professional Publications, Inc, 1991.
I

Freed, Roy N. Computer and Law: A Reference Work. 5th ed. Boston: Roy N. Freed, Esq,
1976.

f

Froomkin, A. Michael. "Flood Control on the Information Ocean: Living With Anonymity,
Digital Cash, and Distributed Databases." University of Pittsburgh Journal of Law and
Computer 15 (1996): 395.
Froomkin, A. Michael. "It Came From Planet Clipper: The Battle Over Cryptographic Key
"Escrow." University of Chicago Legal Forum 996 (1996): 15.
Froomkin, A. Michael. "The Essential Role of Trusted Third Parties in Electronic Commerce."
Oregon Law Review 75 (1996): 49.
Froomkin, A.Michael. "Article 2B as Legal Software for Electronic Contracting- Operating
System or Trojan Horse." Berkeley Technology Law Journal13 (1998): 1023.

I,•
I

'I

Greenspan, Alan N. 17 "Ethical Challenges in an Electronic Age." Sum Commercial Law 18
(2000): 17.
Gripman, David L. "Electronic Document Certification: A Primer on the Technology Behind
Digital Signature." John Marshall Journal of Computer and Information Law 17 (1999):
769.
Gahtan, Alan M. , Martin P. Kratz, and J. Fraser Mann. Internet law: A Practical Guide for
Legal and Business Professionals. Scarborough, Ontario: Carswell Thomson Professional
Publishing, 1998.
Gale, Jody Storm. "Service Over the Net: Principle of Contract Law in Conflict." Case Western
Reserve 49 (1999): 567.

472

1•.

Gallo, Victor J., Ned M. Gelhaar, and Scott M. Hervey. The Law of the Internet in California.
Eau Claire, W.I.: NBI, 2000.
Garfinkel, Simson. PGP: Pretty Good Privacy. California: O'Reilly & Associates, 1995.
Garfinkel, Simson. Web Security & Commerce. California: O'Reilly & Associates, 1997.
Gasser, Morrie. Building a Secure Computer System. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold
Company, 1988.
Gemignani, Michael C. Computer Law. New York: The Lawyers Co-Operative Publishing,
1985.
Georges, Richard M. "The Impact of Technology on the Practice ofLaw-2000." Florida Bar
Journal 71 (1997): 36.
Gladstone, Julia Alpert. "Designing Legislation to Facilitate Electronic Commerce on the
Internet." RIBar Inter 45 (1997): 13.
Glannon, Joseph W. The Law of Torts: Examples and Explanations. Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1998.
Goldman, James E. Applied Data Communications: A Business-Oriented Approach._New
York: John Wiley & Sons, 1995.
Goldsmith, Jack L. "Against Cyber anarchy." University of Chicago Law Review 65 (1998):
1199.
Gollmann, Dieter. Computer Security. New York: John Wiley & Sons,1999.
Goncalves, Marcus. Protecting Your Web Site with Firewall. Upper Saddle River, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1997.
Graf, Christine A., et al., eds. Guide to Computer Law. Illinois: Commerce Clearing House,
2001.
Gralla, Preston. How Intranets Work. USA: Macmillan Computer Publishing, 1996.
Gray, Pamela A. Open Systems: A Business Strategy for the 1990s. New York: McGraw-Hill,
1991.
Greenlaw, Raymond, and Ellen Hepp. In-line/On-line: Fundamentals of the Internet and the
World Wide Web. New York: WCB/McGraw-Hill, 1999.
Greenstein, Marilyn, and Todd M Feinman. Electronic Commerce: Security, Risk Management
and Control. New York: Irwin & McGraw-Hill, 2000.

473

~·.

I

~

,.

Grewlich, Klaus W. Governance in Cyberspace: Access and Public Interest in Global
Communications. London: Kluwer Law International, 1999.

'

Grismore, Grover C. The Principle ofthe Law of Contracts. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965.
Halsall, Fred. Data Communications, Computer Networks and OSI. 2d ed. Massachusetts:
Addison-·wesley Publishing Company, 1989.
Harron, Thomas J. Business Law. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1981.
Harvey, Brian W. The Law of Consumer Protection and Fair Trading. 2d ed. London:
Butterworths, 1982.

.

I

Hays, Michael J. "TheE-Sign Act of2000: The Triumph ofFunction over Form in American
Contract Law." Notre Dame Law Review 76 (2001): 1183.
Held, Gilbert, and Kent Hundley. Cisco Securitv Architectures. New York: McGraw-Hall,
1999.
Henderson, James A, Jr. and Richard N. Pearson. The Torts Process. 3d. ed. Boston and
Toronto : Little, Brown and Company, 1988.
Hiller, Janine S., and Don Lloyd Cook. "From Clipper Ships To Clipper Chips: The Evolution
ofPayment Systems for Electronic Commerce." Journal of Law and Commerce 17
(1997): 53.

I

.

Hodkowski, William A. "The Future oflntemet Security: How New Technologies Will Shape
the Internet and Affect the Law." Computers & High Technology Law Journal13 (1997):
217.
Hoffman, Christopher D. "Encrypted Digital Cash Transfers: Why Traditional Money
Laundering Controls May Fail Without Uniform Cryptography Regulations." Fordham
International Law Journal 21 (1998): 799.
Hoffman, Lance J. Modem Methods for Computer Security and Privacy. Upper Saddle River,
N.J. :Prentice-Hall, 1977.
Hogan, Tara C. "Technology Now That the Floodgates Have Been Opened, Why Haven't
Banks Rushed Into the Certification Authority Business?." North Carolina Banking
Institute 4 (2000): 417.
Holmes, Grace W., and Craig H. Norville, ed. The Law of Computer. Ann Arbor, Michigan:
The Institute of Continuing Legal Education, 1971.
Hoque, Faisal. E-Enterprise: Business Models, Architecture, and Components. London:
Cambridge University Press, 2000.

474

<

I'· I
~

I

'

Hugenholtz, P. Bernt, et al., eds. Copyright and Electronic Commerce: Legal Aspects of
Electronic Copyright Management. London: Kluwer Law Intemational, 2001.
Hundley, Richard. Conference Proceedings on Security in Cyberspace: Challenges for Society,
Proceedings of an International Conference. Rand, 1996.
Hunt, Craig. TCP/IP Network Administration. 2d ed. Cambridge: O'reilly & Associates, 1998.
Hutt, Arthur E., et al., eds. Computer Security Handbook. 2d ed. New York: Macmillan
Publishing, 1995.

·,.

Hutt, Arthur E., et al., eds. Computer Security Handbook. 3d ed. New York: John Wiley &
Sons, 1995.
Ivascanu, Daniela. "Legal Issues in Electronic Commerce in the Western Hemisphere."
Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 17 (2000): 219.
Jacqueline, Susan- Butler H. "Part I: Panel Report: Panel IV: Certification, Authentication, and
Electronic Signatures." Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 17
(2000): 149.

II

Jeed Sethabute, Law of Torts. Bangkok: Thammasart University, Faculty of Law, 1975.
Jensen, Scott. "Regulates the Use ofDigital Signature in Wisconsin." Wisconsin Lawyer
(1998).
Johnston, David, and Sunny Handa. Cyberlaw: What You Need to Know About Doing
Business Online. Canada: Stoddart, 1997.
Kalakota, Ravi, and Andrew B. Whinston. Electronic Commerce: A Manager's Guide.
Massachusetts: Addison Wesley Longman, 1997.
Kandt, Brett. ''Nevada Law Governing Electronic Transaction: Creating a Legal Framework for
Commerce in Cyberspace." Nevada Lawyer 8 (2000): 22.
Kania, Edward D. "The ABA's Digital Signature Guidelines: An Imperfect Solution to Dig1tal
Signatures on the Internet." Communication Law Conspectus 7 (1999): 287.
Katsh, M. Ethan. Law in a Digital World. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
Keeton, Page and Robert E. Keeton. Cases and Materials on the Law ofTorts. 2d. St. Paul,
M.N.: West Publishing, 1977.
Kegler, Kimbrelly. "Electronic Banking: Security, Privacy, and CRA Compliance." North
Carolina Banking Institute 2 (1998): 426.

·,

I

I •

475

'I

Khan·, Rohit. "Digital Signature Label Architecture." (1997), available at
httP://www.w3.org/pub/WWW/TR.
Kim, Kwangjo, ed. Public Key Cryptography: Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Germany:
Springer, 2001.

.,
I,

'

King, Herry R. "The Holding Company: A Review ofKey-Escrow Encryption Technology."
Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal 21 (1995): 224.
Kionka, Edward J. Torts in a Nutshell: Injuries to Persons and Property. St. Paul: M.N.: West
Publishing, 1977.

K.itsanajinda, Yingsak, and Wuttipong Weichayanon. Law ofEvidence. Bangkok: Pimaksom,
1998.
Korper, Steffano, and Juanita Ellis. TheE-Commerce Book: Building theE-Empire. San
Diego: Academic Press, 2000.
Kosiur, David. Understanding Electronic Commerce: How Online Transactions Can Grow
Your Business: Includes Six Innovative Case Studies. United States of American:
Microsoft Press, 1997.
Kossick, Robert. "The Internet in Latin America: New Opportunities, Developments, &
Challenges." American University International Law Review 16 (2001): 1309.
Kronman, Anthony T., and Richard A. Posner. The Economic of Contract Law. Boston and
Toronto: Little, Brown & Company (Canada) Limited, 1979.
I

Kurz, Raymond A. Internet and the Law: Legal Fundamentals for the Internet User. Rockeville,
Maryland: Government Institutes, 1996.

r

\

\..

Law, Laurie, et al., eds. "The Electronic Future of Cash: Essay: How to Make a Hint: The
Cryptography of Anonymous Electronic Cash." American University Law Review 46 (
1997): 1131.
Lawrence, Elaine, et al., eds. Internet Commerce: Digital Modes for Business. New York: John
Wiley & Sons, 1998.
Lawrence, Victor B., et al., eds. Tutorials In Modem Communications. United States of
America: Computer Sc.ience Press, 1982.

I

I

Lee, Lewis C., and J. Scott Davidson. Intellectual Property for the Internet. New York: Aspen
Law & Business, 2000.

,·,
I'

,.

476

I·I

··-

Lehnert, Wendy G. Internet 101: A Beginner's Guide to the Internet and the World Wide Web.
Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1998.
Leksakuldilok, Jakkapong. Law of Agency, Commission Agency, and Broke:r:. Bangkok:
Nitibannagam, 1991.
Lemley, Mark A., et al., eds. Software and Internet Law Updates. New York: Aspen Law &
Business, 2000.
Lemley, Mark A., et al., eds. Software and Internet Law. New York: Aspen Law & Business,
2000.
Levmore, Saul. Foundations of Tort Law. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
Litan, Robert E., and Clifford Winston, ed. Liability: Perspectives and Policy. Washington: The
Brookings Institution, 1988.
Litan, Robert E., and William Niskanen. Going Digital: A Guide to Policy in the Digital Age.
USA: Brookings Institution Press, 1998.
Lloyd, Ian. Legal Aspects of the Information Society. London: Butterworths, 2000.
Loewy, Arnold H. Criminal Law in a Nutshell. 2d ed. St. Paul, M.N.: West Publishing, 1987.
Lui-Kwan, Kalama K. "VI. Business Law: 1. Electronic Commerce: a) Digital Signature:
Recent Developments in Digital signature Legislation and Electronic Commerce."
Berkeley Technology Law Journal 14 (1999): 463.
Lupton, W. Everett. "The Digital Signature: Your Identity by the Numbers." Richmond Journal
ofLaw and Technology 6 (1999): 10.
Lusa, John M. The Network Manager's Handbook. United States of America: Auerbach, 1998.
Macgregor, RobertS., et al, eds. WWW.Security:How to Build a Secure World Web
connection. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice-Hall PTR, 1996.
Macintosh, Kerry Lynn. "How to Encourage Global Electronic Commerce: The Case for
Private Currencies on the Internet." Harvard Journal ofLaw and Technology 11 (1998):
733.

I.·

h•

l'

[I.

Mack, Raneta Lawson. "Digital Signatures, The Electronic Economy and the Protection of
National Security: Some Distinctions with an Economic Difference." John Marshall
Journal of Computer and Information Law 17 (1999): 981.

I'

Madron, Thomas W. Network Security in the 90's: Issues and Solutions for Managers. New
York: John Wiley & Sons, 1992.
I

477

'

I·

Madsen, Wayne, David L. Soble, Marc Rotenberg, and David Banisar, eds. "A Perspective on
Privacy, Information Technology, and the Interest: Article: Cryptography and Liberty:
An International Survey ofEncryption Policy." John Marshall Journal of Computer and
Information Law. 16 (1998): 475.
Mandell, Steven L. Computers, Data Processing, and the Law, Text and Cases. St. Paul, M.N.:
West Publishing Company, 1984.
Mandelman, Joel C. "Lest We Walk into the Well: Guarding the Keys-Encrypting The
Constitution: To Speak, Search & Seize in Cyberspace." Albany Law Journal of Science
and Technology 8 (1998): 227.
Martin, Jafl?.eS. Security, Accuracy, and Privicy in Computer Systems. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1973.
Matson, Jack V. Effective Expert Witnessing. 2d ed. Boca Raton, F.L.: Lewis Publishers, 1994.
Mcdonal, Brian D. "Computer Information, Contract Enforceability: The Uniform Computer
Information Transaction Act." Berkeley Technology Law Journal16 (2001): 461.
Melling, Thomas G. "Washington's Electronic Authentication Act: Eliminating Legal
Uncertainties Through Default Rules." San Diego Law Review 34 (1997): 1247.
Menna, Marianne. "From Jamestown to the Silicon Valley, Pioneering a Lawless Frontier: The
Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act." Virginia Journal of Law
and Technology 6 (2001): 12.
Merkle, Ralph C. Secrecy, Authentication and Public Key Systems. Ann Arbor, Michigan:
UMI Research Press, 1982.
Miller, Roger LeRoy, and Gaylord A. Jentz. Management and E- Commerce: The Online Legal
Environment. Florence, K.Y.: West Thomson Learning, 2002.
Millham, Lyle T. "Digital Signature Act." Utah Law Review (1995): 1157.

'I

.'
'I

~

Minoli, Daniel, and Emma Minoli. Web Commerce Technology Handbook, Secure Electronic
Transaction, Internet EDI. Digital Signatures. New York: McGraw-Hill, (1997).

l]·
t'

1',1

Morganstern, Stanley. Legal Protection for the Consumer. 2d ed. New York: Oceana
Publications, 1978.
Morris, Clarence. Morris on Torts. New York: The Foundation Press, 1953.
Muftic, Sead, et al., eds. Security Mechanisms for Computer Networks. New York: John Wiley
& Sons, 1989.
II

II
~

478

..

I

''(

X.

-

Myers, Stephen G. "Comment: Potential Liability under the Illinois Electronic Commerce
Security Act: ls it a Risk Worth Taking?." John Marshall Journal of Computer and
Information Law 17 (1999): 909.
Naccache, David, ed. Topics in Cryptology-CT-RSA 2001:The Cryptographers' Track at RSA
Conference. Germany: Springer, 2001.
Na. Nakom, Pinai. "Electronic Commerce and Electronic Signature Law." Thai Bar Law
Journal (Botbundit) 56 (2000)(B.E 2543): 8.
Newell, James A., and Michael R. Gordon. "Electronic Commerce and Negotiable Instruments
(Electronic Promissory Notes)." Idaho Law Review 31 (1995): 819.
Nimmer, Laymond T., and Patricia Krauthouse. "Electronic Commerce: New Paradigms in
Information Law. Idaho Law Review 31 (1995): 937.
Nimmer, Raymond T. The Law of Computer Technology: Rights. Licenses, Liabilities. 3d ed.
St. Paul, M.N.: West Group, 2001.
Okamoto, Tatsuaki, ed. Advances in Cryptology: 6th International Conference on the Theory
and Application of Cryptology and Information Security. Germany: Springer, 2000.
Oleck, Howard L. Oleck's Tort Law Practice Manual. Upper Saddle River, N.J. :PrenticeHall, 1982.
O'Neil, Michael J., and James X. Dempsey. "Critical Infrastructure Protection: Threats to
Privacy and Other Civil Liberties And Concerns with Government Mandates on
Industry." DePaul Business Law Journal (1999/2000).
Overby, A.Brooke. ''UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: Will
Cyberlaw Be Uniform?: An Introduction to the UNCITRAL Mod~;:l Law on Electronic
Commerce." Tulane Journal oflnternational and Comparative Law 7 (1999): 219.

i·

Panko, Raymond R. Business Data Communications. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall,
1997.
Pejovic, Caslav. "Legal Challenges in the Implementation of Electronic Data Interchange in
International Trade." ROSEl KENKYU Journal of Law and Politics 65 (July 1998): 323349.
Perritt, Henry H., Jr. "Cyber Payment Infrastructure." Journal of Online Law 6 (1996).
Perritt, Henry H., Jr. "Legal and Technological Infrastructures for Electronic Payment
Systems." Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal 22 (1996): 1.

479

:t
~

l

r

I.

Perritt, Henry H., Jr. Law and the Information Superhighway. 2d ed. New York: Aspen Law &
Business, 2000.
Perry, William E. Management Strategies for Computer Security. Stoneham, M.A.:
Butterworth Publishers, 1985.
Perry, James T. & Gary P. Schneider. New Perspective on: The Internet. Cambridge: An
International Thomson Publishing Company, 1998.
Pfitsmann, Birgit. Digital Signature Schemes: General Framework and Fail-Stop Signatures.
Edited by G. Goos and J. Hartmanis et al., eds. Germany: Springer, 1996.
Plamer, I.C., and G.A. Potter, Computer Security Risk Management. New York: Van Nostrand
Reinhold, 1990.
1:

.,,

Pompian, Shawn. "Is the Statute ofFrauds Ready for Electronic Contracting?." Virginia Law
Review 85 (1999): 1447.
Power, Michael. "Bill C-6: Federal Legislation in the Age of the Internet." Man. Law Journal
26 (1999): 235.
Praneetpolkang, Supit. Principle ofFacts Analysis and Weighing of Evidence. 3d ed.
Bangkok: Jirarat Publishing, 1994.
Praneetpolkang, Supit. Law of Evidence: Problem and Precedents. Nonthaburi: Pimaksorn,
1995.
Prosser, William L. Law ofTorts. St. Paul, M.N.: West Publishing, 1971.

''
~

~!

I

Prosser, William L. Handbook ofthe Law ofTorts. St. Paul, M.N.: West Publishing, 1971.
~

•'

.

Prosser, William L., John W. Wade and Victor E. Schwartz. Cases and Materials on Torts. 7th
ed. New York: The Foundation Press, 1982.
Putsapakom, Phot. Torts. Bangkok: Krungsiam Publishing, 1987.
Putthisombat, Prajak. Torts and Management of Affairs without Mandate._Bangkok: Srisombat
Publishing, 1991.

I

I(

, 1.1
I

Quinn, Thomas M. Quinn's Uniform Commercial Code Commentary and Law Digest. 2d ed.
New York: Warren, Gorham & Lamont, 1991.
Ratanakorn, Sophon. Law of Evidence. Bangkok: Thammasart University Press, 1993.
Reed, Chris, ed. Computer Law. London: Blackstone Press, 1990.

t
480

'

Reed, Chris. Internet Law: Text and Materials. London: Butterworths, 2000.

'·
I•

Reed, Christ, and John Angel, ed. Computer Law. 4th ed. London: Blackstone Press, 2000.
Reed, Christopher. "Legally Binding Electronic Documents: Digital Signatures and
Authentication." International Lawyer 35 (2001): 89.
Reiman, Phillip E. "Cryptograph and the Fist Amendment: The Right to be Unheard." John
Marshall Journal of Computer and Information Law 14 (1996): 325.
Richards, R. Jason. "The Utah Digital Signature Act as Model Legislation: A Critical
Analysis." John Marshall Journal of Computer and Information Law 17_(1999): 873.
I

Ritrugsa, Polphasit. Tort Liability of State Officers. Bangkok: Winyuchon Publication House,
1996.
Roady, Thomas G., Jr., and William R. Andersen. ed. Professional Negligence. Tennessee:
Vanderbilt University Press, 1960.

'

~\
I

!•

'l

Robertson, R. J., Jr. "The lllinois Electronic Commerce Security Act: A Response to Martin
Behn." South Illinois University Law Journal 24 (2000): 473.
Robertson, R. J., Jr. "Electronic Commerce on the Internet and the Statute of Frauds." South
Carolina Law Review 49 (1998): 787.
Rose, Lance. Net Law: Your Rights in the Online World. Berkley, California: Osborne
McGraw-Hill, 1995.
Rostoker, Michael D., and Robert H. Rine. Computer Jurisprudence: Legal Responses to the
Information Revolution. New York: Oceana Publications, 1986.

,,r.

~I

Rotenberg, Marc. "Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy: What Larry
Doesn't Get." Stanford Technology Law Review 2001 (2001): 1.
Rowland, Diane, Elizabet Macdonald, Michael Hirst. Information Technology Law. London:
Cavendish Publishing, 1997.
Rubin, Aviel D., Daniel Geer, and Marcus J. Ranum. Web Security Sourcebook. New York:
John Wiley & Sons, 1997.
Rueda, Andres. "The Implications of Strong Encryption Technology on Money Laundering."
Albany Law Journal ofScience and TechnQlQgy 12 (2001): 1.
Russell, Deborah, and G.T. Gangemi Sr. Computer Security Basics. California: O'Reilly &
Associates, 1991.
~.

I

481

'.
j

Rychlak., Ronald J. Real and Demonstrative Evidence: Applications and Theory. Virginia: The
Michie Company Law Publishers, 1995.
Sabett, Randy V. "International Hannoniztion In Electronic Commerce and Electronic Data
Interchange: A Proposed First Step Toward Signing on the Digital Dotted Line."
American University Law Review 46 (1996): 511.
Sak.s, Michael J., and Richard Van Duizend. The Use of Scientific Evidence in Litigation.
United States of American: National Centre for State Courts, 1983.
Sanongchat, Sak. Law of Torts. 3d ed. Bangkok: Nitibannagam, 1989.
Saundersby, Kurt M. "The Regulation of Internet Encryption Technologies: Separating the
Wheat from the Chaff." John Marshall Journal ofComputer and Information Law 17
(1999): 945.
Sawangsak., Charnchai. Law of State Officer Liability. Bangkok: Winyuchon Publication
House, 1996.
Schatt, Stan. Understanding Network Management: Strategies and Solutions. New York:
Windcrest/McGraw-Hill, 1992.
Scheurer, Kirsten. "The Clipper Chip: Cryptography Technology and The Constitution- The
Government's Answer to Encryption Chips away at Constitutional Rights." Rutgers
Computer and Technology Law Journal 21 (1995): 263.
Scheweitzer, James A. Managing Information Security: A Program for the Electronic
Information Age. London: Butterworth(Publishers), 1929.

..

·~.

·t•

L

Schneider, Fred B., ed. Trust in Cyberspace. National Academy Press, 1998.
Schneider, Gary P., and James T. Perry. Electronic Commerce. Cambridge: Course
Technology, 2000.
Schneier, Bruce. Applied Cryptography: Protocols. Algorithms, and Source Code in C. 2d ed.
New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1996).
Schuck, Peter H., ed. Tort Law and the Public Interest: Competition, Innovation, and Consumer
Welfare. New York: W.W. Norton Company, 1991.

I

l

Schwartau, Winn. CyberShock: Surviving Hackers, Phreakers, Identity Thieves, Internet
Terrorists and Weapons ofMass Disruption. New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 2000.
Scott, Michael D. Scott on Computer Law. 2d ed. New York: Aspen Law & Business, 2002.
)•

482

Scoville, Adam White. "Clear Signatures, Obscure Signs." Cardozo Arts and Entertainment
Law Journal 17 (1999): 345.
Seberry, Jennifer, and JosefPieprzyk. Cryptography: An Introduction to Computer Security.
Edited by Richard P. Brent. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1988.
Sergienko, Greg S. "Self Incrimination and Cryptographic Keys." Richmond Journal of Law
and Technology 2 (1996): 1.
Shapo, MarshallS. The Duty to Act: Tort Law, Power. and Public Policy. Texas : University of
Texas Press, 1936.
Shaw, Paul D. Managing Legal and Security Risks in Computing and Communications.
London: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1998.
Shieh, Shiuh-Pyng, et al., eds. "Digital Multisignature Schemes for Authenticating Delegates in
Mobile Code Systems." IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology. 49(2000).
Shutivong, Khemchai. Law ofEvidence. 4th ed. Bangkok: Nitibannagarn, 1992.
Simon, David F. Computer Law: Handbook: Software Protection, Contract. Litigation, Forms.
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: The American Law Institute-American Bar Association,
1990.
Singer, Anthony Martin. "Electronic Commerce: Digital Signatures and the Role of the Kansas
Digital Signature Act." Washburn Law Journal 37 (1998): 725.
Sirpibol, Visit. "Information Technology Law in the Aspect of Consumer Protection."
Intellectual Property and International Trade Court Forum: Special Issue (2000).

~~
11'
'I

•'

Smedinghoff, Thomas J., ed. Online Law: The SPA's Legal Guide to Doing Business on the
Internet. New York: Addison-Wesley Develops Press, 1999.
Smedinghoff, Thomas J., and Ruth Hill Bro. "Moving the Change: Electronic Signature
Legislation as a Vehicle for Advancing E-Commerce." John Marshall Journal of
Computer and Information Law 17(1999): 723.
Smith, Brian W., and Ramsey J. Wilson. "The Electronic Future of Cash: How Best to Guide
the Evolution of Electronic Currency Law." American University Law Review 46
(1997): 1105.
Smith, Graham J H. Internet Law and Regulation. 2d ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1999.
Smith, Graham J H. Internet Law and Regulation. 3d ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2002.

483

"

~. I

~·

..

r

t:

•'

Smith, Kenneth, and Denis J. Keenan, English Law. 6th ed. London: Pitman Publishing
Limited, 1979.
Smith, Neil., and Andrew V. Smith. "Technical Protection Devices and Copyright Law."
Boston University Journal of Science and Technology Law 3 (1997): 7.
Soma, John T. Computer Technology and the Law. Colorado Spring and New York: Shepard's!
McGraw-Hill, 1983.
Soma, John T. Computer Technology and the Law: Cumulative Supplement Current Through
June 2000. St. Paul, M.N.: West Group, 2000.
Sonthikasetthin, Kamal. Law of Agency and Broker. Bangkok: Nitibannagarn, 1987.
Stallings, William. Practical Cryptography for Data Internet Works. California: IEEE
Computer Society Press, 1996.
Stallings, William, and Richard VanSlyke. Business Data Communications. 3d ed. Upper
Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1998.
Stallings, William. Cryptography and Network Security: Principle and Practice. 2d ed. Upper
Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1999.
Steiner, Henry J. Moral Argument and Social Vision in the Courts: a Study of Tort Accident
Law. Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1987.
Stephenson, G., and P. Clark. Commercial & Consumer Law. 4th ed. London: Blackstone
Press Limited, 1998.

')

1.'

Stepheson, Graham, and Peter Clark. Commercial & Consumer Law. 4th ed. London:
Blackstone Press, 1998.
Stem, Jonathan E. "Business Law A, Electronic Commerce 1. Digital Signatures a) Federal
Legislation: The Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act." Berkeley
Technology Law Journal16 (2001): 391.

I
I•

Stem, Nancy, and Robert A. Stem. Computing in the Information Age. New York: John Wiley
& Sons, 1993.
Stuckey, Kent D. Internet and Online Law. New York: Law Journal Press, 2000.
nuktassanee, Soraphon. Law ofEvidence. Bangkok Winyuchon Publication House, 1991.
Suphanit, Susom. Law of Consumer Protection. Bangkok: Chulalongkom University Press,
1991.

484

,i

I,'

II

Susskind, Richard. The Future of Law: Facing the Challenges of Information Technology. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
Suwannasorn, Pramool. Law ofEvidence. Bangkok: Nitibannagam, 1982.
Szafran, Marc E. "A Neo-Institutional Paradigm for Contracts Formed in Cyberspace:
Judgment Day for the Statute of Frauds." Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Jouma 14
(1996): 491.

~ ;,
I

Tapper, Colin. Computer Law. New York: Longman, 1978.
Tapper, Colin. Computer Law. 4th ed. New York: Longman, 1986.
Tarantino, John A. Strategic Use of Scientific Evidence. New York: Kluwer Law Book
Publishers, 1988.
Tassel, Dennis Van. Computer Security Management. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
1972.
Thierauf, Robert J. Electronic Data Interchange in Finance and Accounting. Westport,
Connecticut: Quorum Books, 1990.
Thirawat, Daraporn. Contract Law: New Status of Current Contract and Unfair Contract Terms.
Bangkok: Thammasart University Press, 1995.
Thomas J. Smedinghoff, Securing Trust.
Thomas, Sanu K. "The Protection and Promotion ofE-Commerce; should there be a Global
Regulatory Scheme for Digital Signatures?" Fordham International Law Journal 22
(1999): 1002.
Thomas, Stephen A. IPng the TPCIIP Protocols: Implementing the Next Generation Internet.
New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1996.
Tinnes, Christy. "Digital Signatures Come to South Carolina: The Proposed Digital Signature
Act of 1997 ." South Carolina Law Review 48 (1997): 417.

.

I'

,,
j.,

Tsoi, Douglas T., et al., eds. "Click-Wrap Agreement-Background and Guidelines for
Enforceability."(2000).
Tomaszewski, John P. "Emerging Technologies and the Law: Comment: the Pandora's Box of
Cyberspace: State Regulation of Digital Signatures and the Dormant Commerce Clause."
Gonzaga Law Review 33 (1997/1998): 417.
Tomeski, Edward A., et al., eds. Fundamentals of ComP-uters in Business: A Systems
Approach. San Francisco: Holden-Day, 1979.

485

,~:

I
jr

'\'I

. I
I

Toscano, Paul. "Cyber, Cypher, and Sense: Aie You Ready for 0 D.A-Year Zero of the
Digital Age." Utah Bar Journal12 (1999): 8.
Towle, Holly K. Electronic Transactions and Contracting: Second Annual Internet Law
Institute. New York: Practicing Law Institute, 1998.

I..

Towle, Holly K. "E-Signatures: Basics of the U.S. Structure." Houston Law Review 38
(2001): 921.
Tuma, Shawn E., and Chirstropher R. Ward. "Contracting Over the Internet in Texas." Baylor
Law Review 52 (2000): 381.
Tupper, Stephen Leal. "From Sea Seal to Cyber-Notary: Uncertainty in Electronic Commerce
and The Case for a Digital Signature law in Michigan." Wayne Law Review 45 (1999):
237.
Turban, Efraim, et al., eds. Electronic Commerce: A Managerial Perspective. Upper Saddle
River, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1999.
Tum, Rein, ed. Advances in Computer System Security. Massachusetts: Aitech House, 1982.

II

'•

Varseg, Alex. Practical Business Systems Implementation: ADP Guide. New York: Van
Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1988.
Vartanian, Thomas P ., Robert H. Ledig, and Lynn Bruneau. 21st Century: Money, Banking &
Commerce. Washington D.C.: Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, 1998.
Vergari, James V., and Virginia V. Shue. Fundamentals of Computer-High Technology Law.
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: American Law Institute-American Bar Association, 1991.
Waltz, Jon R., and Rogers C. Park. Evidence: Cases and Materials. 9th ed. New York: The
Foundation Press, 1999.
Walker, David B. "Privacy in the Digital Age: Encryption Policy- A call for Congressional
Action." Stanford Technology Law Review 1999 (1999): 3.
Wassom, Brian D. "Technology-A Reasonable Expectation ofPrivicy: Can Michigan
Attorney Safely Use Unencrypted Internet E-Mail for Confidential Communications?"
MI Bar Inl. 78 (1999): 590.
Waters, Gill, ed. Computer Communication Networks. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991.
Wayner, Peter. Disappearing Cryptography: Being and Nothingness on the Net. Chestnut Hill,
M.A.: AP Professional, 1996.

486

~I

1: I.

I,
I'

"'

fI
I
I

w ·eme:c, Jens. "E-Commerce.CO.UK: Local Rules in a Global Net: Online Business
Transactions and the Applicability of Traditional English Coni:ract Law Rules.''
International Journal of Commerce and Public Policy 6 (2000/2001): 1.

,,

Whiteley, David. e-Commerce: Strategy, Technologies and Applications. New York: McGrawHill, 2000.
Wichitchornlachai, Pornphet. Law ofEvidence. 4th ed. Bangkok: Ganeko Company, 1999.

,

II

Williams, Richard D., and Bruce T. Smyth. Computer and Internet Liability: Strategies, Claims
and Defenses. 2d ed. New York: Aspen Law & Business, 2000.

,II
'I

Williams, Richard D., and Bruce T. Smyth. Law of the Year 2000 Problem: Strategies, Claims
and Defenses. New York: Aspen Law & Business, 2001.

I·j

Wilson, Catherine Lee. "Banking on the Net: Extending Bank Regulation to Electronic Money
and Beyond." Creighton Law Review 30 (1997): 671.
Winn, JaneK. "Couriers Without Luggage: Negotiable Instruments and Digital Signature."
South Carolina Law Review 49 (1998): 739.
Winn, Jane Kaufman. "Open Systems, Free Markets, and Regulation of Internet Commerce."
Tulane Law Review 72 (1998): 1177.
Winn, Jane Kaufman. "Electronic Chattel Paper Under Revised Article 9: Updating the
Concept of Embodied Rights for Electronic Commerce." Chicago-Kent Law Review 74
(1999): 1055.
Winn, JaneK: "The Emperor's New Clothes: The Shocking Truth about Digital Signatures and
Internet Commerce." Idaho Law Review 37 (2001). 353

.,.
\,.
I

Winn, JaneK., and Benjamin Wright. The Law ofElectronic Commerce. 4th ed. New York:
Aspen Law & Business, 2001.
Woelki-Boele, Katharina, and Catherince Kessedjian, ed. Internet: Which Court Decides?:
Which Law Applies?. London: Kluwer Law International, 1998.
Won, Dongho. ed. Information Security and Cryptology-ICISC 2000, Third International
Conference. Germany: Springer, 2000.

I

1
II

"\'
II
I

Wongwattanasart, Chaiwat. Law of Consumer Protection. Bangkok: Winyuchon Publication
House, 2000.

I

l•
jl.

I

•1

\

II

Wright, Benjamin. "A Cyberspace Perspective: Eggs in Baskets: Distributing the Risks of
Electronic Signatures." John Marshall Journal of Computer and Information Law 15
(1997): 189.

I

'
I

487

I

I
II

j'

il!
#right, Benjamin, and JaneK. Winn. The Law ofElectronic Commerce. 3d ed. New York:
Aspen law & Business, 1998.
Zeleszny, John D. Communications Law: Liberties. Restraints, and the Modern Media. 2d ed.
Belmont: Wadswotth Publishing Company & An International Thomson Publishing
Company, 1997.
Zemnick, Scott R. "The E-Sign Act: The Means to Effectively Facilitate the Growth and
Development ofE-Commerce." Chicago-Kent Law Review 76 (2001): 1965.
Zimmermann, Philip R. The Official PGP User's Guide. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995.

PART II. ONLINE WORKS

Aalberts, B.P., and S. VanDer Hof. ''Digital Signature Blindness, Analysis of Legislative
Approaches Toward Electronic Authentication." (November 1999), at
http://cwis.kub.nll-frw/people/hof/ds-fr.htm.
ABA Information Security Committee. ABA Digital Signature Guidelines: Legal Infrastructure
for Certification Authorities and Secure Electronic Commerce. American Bar
Association, 1996.
Abelson, Hal, et al., eds. ''The Risks of Key Recovery, Key Escrow, & Trusted Third Party and
Encryption. "(1998), available at http://www .cdt.org/crypto/risks98/.
Abreu, Elinor. "Savings Seen in E-Sign Law." (2000), available at
http://www .thestandard.com/article/0, 1902. 19039,00.html.

I

i

I

Agin, Warren E. "An Introduction to the .com Phenomenon." available at
http://www.profs.lp.findlaw.com/e-commerce2.html.

I

.

'

Aglion, Marie G. "The EU Data Protection Directive: Iflt's a Door, Industry Has the Key."
(1999}, available at http://www.perkinscoie.com/resource/ecomm/euprivacy.htm.
Alston, By, and Bird LLP. "How the New E-Sing Act will Affect E-Commerce."(2000), at
http://www.gigalaw.com/articles.alston-2000-060p2.html.
Ametican Bar Association Information, Security Committee, Section of Science and
Technology. Digital Signature Guidelines: Legal Infrastructure for Certification
Authorities and Secure Electronic Commerce. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: American Bar
Association, 1996.

'I

I.

!j

,·

I~
ll•'

I.
f

'I

'·t•

,,
,I

488

I'

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Audit Implications ofEDI. New York:
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1996.

An Ad Hoc Group of Cryptographers and Computer Scientists. "The Risks ofKey Recovery,
Key Escow, and Trusted Third Parity Encryption." (1998), at
http://www .cdt.org/crypto/risks98.
Angel, Jonathan. "PKI And The Law: Electronic Signatures And Contracts Made Is PKI Are
Legally Valid, But The Jury's Still Out On How Enforceable They're Going To Be."
(2000), available at http://www.networkmagazine.com/article/NMG200 1004SOO 10/3.
Arruda, Michael E., and Irian A. Shestakova. "U.S. Enacts E-Sign: The Electronic Signatures
in Global and National Commerce Act."

I

'
I

'· I
('

,,
'

Baker, and Mckenzie. "eFraud: How Safe are you from Fraud." (2000), available at
http://www.bakemet.com/documents/1271 tx.htm.
Baker, and Mckenzie. "E-Law Alert: USA: Electronic Signatures in Global and National
Commerce Act." (2000), available at http://www.bmck.com/ecommmerce/ESign Act.htm.
Baker, McBride, and Coles. "Summary of Electronic Commerce and Digital Signature
Legislation." (2000), available at http://www.mbc.com/ecommerce/legis.html.
I

1

Baker, McBride, and Coles. "The Federal E-Sign Law: The Electronic Signature in Global and
National Commerce Act.", at http://www.mbc.com/newdev/FedEsign.html.
Barassi, Theodore Sedgwick. ''The Cybemotary: Public Key Registration and Certification and
Authentication of International Legal Transactions.", at
http://www.abanet.org/scitech/ec/cn/cybernote.html.
Baker, Steward A. "International Developments Affecting Digital Signatures." (1997), available at
http://www. stepote.com.
Baum, MichaelS. "Workshop on Security Procedures for the .Interchange of Electronic
Documents: Linking Security and the Law ofComputer-Based Commerce." (1992).
Baum, Michael S. "Technology Neutrality and Secure Electronic Commerce: Rule Making in
the Age of" Equivalence."(l999), available at
http://www. verisign.com/repository/pubs/tech neutral.
· Be1man, Kenneth R., and David A. Brown. "Practical Issues in Framing and Responding to
Discovery Requests for Electronic Information." (1999), available at
http://Mvw .kenwithers.comlbem1an.htm.

489

.-

Best, Richard E. "Discovery ofElectronic Data & Documents." (1998/1999), available at
http://www.californiadiscovery.findlaw.com/El%20Disco.html.
Biddle, C. Bradford. "Misplaced Priorities: The Utah Digital Signature Act and Liability
Allocation in a Public Key Infrastructure." (1996).
Biddle, Brad. "Public Key Infrastructures and & Quot; Digital Signature& Quot; Legislation."
(1997), at http://www.magnet.state.ma.us/itd/legal/biddle l.html.

.

I,

I' J

~~

I .

.'

Biddle, Brad. "In Defense ofE-Sign."(2000), available at
http://www.commons.somewhere.com/rrw/2000/RRE.In.Defense.of.E-Sign.html.
Biddle, Brad. "A Short History of Digital Signature and Electronic Signature Legislation."
(200 1), at http://www. bradbiddle.com/history.html.
Blair, Barclay T. "TheE-Sign Bill-How did we Arrive here?'', available at
http://www. uwi.com/resources/esig/timeline.htm.
Blanc, Gerard. "Legal Aspect of the use ofTTPs to Verify Digital Signatures." (1999),
available at http://www .ej eisa.com/nectar/update/stori es/ 1999041604.htm.

·,

Blaze, Matt, et al., eds. "A Formal Treatment ofRemotes keyed Encryption."

I•

Blaze, Matt. "High-Bandwidths Encryption with Low-Bandwidth Smart Card." (1995).
Boesch, Christian. "Electronic Commerce: An Infrastructure for Public Key Certificates.", at
http://www.verisign.com.
Boonruang, Sasiwimon. "E-Commerce Law not yet Passed." Bangkok Post Newspaper, 2001,
at http://www.bangkokpost.net/e2001/e-013.html.
Brown, Eric S. "Sign at the Digital X- E-Sign Law Takes Effect." (2000), available at
http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/O,aid,31133,00.asp.
Brown, Richard L. "TheE-Signature Act-A Brief Overview.", available at
http://www .kforce.com/kforcelkfUOO/me.get? WEB.websection.show&KFORCE_ 2123.
Jl

Buonomo, Giovanni. "Italian Laws and Regulations Concerning the Creation, Storage, and
Transmission of Documents by means of Computer-Based System and Digital
Signature." (1997).

,I

I!''

Business Computer Magazine (BCM), 12 March 2000.

'!~

1,

Dygrave, Lee A., and Morten Foss. "International Consumer Purchases Through the Internet:
An Inter-legal Perspective.", at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/icpw/comments/nrccl.htm.

490

CA IT Security Guidance. "Model GOC PKI CA: Information Technology Security Guidance
Document.", available at http://www.cio-dpi.gc.ca/pkiicp/guidedocs/model security e.pdf.
Camp, L. Jean, et al., eds. "Token and Notational Money in Electronic Commerce.", at
http://www.ksghome.harvard.edu/~.jcamp.academic.ksg/usenix/usenix.htrnl.

Changkom, Kitsana. Digital Signature Law. Bangkok: National Electronics and Computer
Technology Center, 1999.
Charles, Deborah. "Clinton Signs Digital Signature Bill." Reuters, 30 June 2000, available at
http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2597132,00.html.
Clausing, Jeri. ''U.S. Fraud Case Ends in Lifetime Internet Commerce Ban."(1998), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/98/09/cyber/articles/09/fraud.html.
Coester, Dagmar. "Constitutional Aspects of Party Autonomy and its Limits- the Prospective of
Law."
Connor, Sean 0. "Legal Issues in the Burgeoning Use of Biometrics for Personal
Identification." (1998), available at
http://stlr.standford.edu/STLR!Working Papers/98 0 Connor 11

.,.

"I

(

li

Cooper, David A. "A Model of Certification Revocation, in Proceeding of the Fifteenth Annual
Computer Security Application Conference." (December 1999): 256-264.

I·
I

Cooper, John. "Legal Focus Digital Signatures and Electronic Trading." (2001), at
http://www. justis.com/news/jc 010515 .html.
Country Report on Public Key Infrastructure (PKD in Thailand. 2001.
Crede, Andreas ...Electronic Commerce and the Banking Industry: The Requirement and
Opportunities for New Payment Systems Using the Internet.", available at
http://www .ascusc.org/jcmc/volllissue3/crede.html.
"

I

Crouch, Angela. "Request for Proposals for Development of Public Key Infrastmcture
Standards." (1997), available at http://www.magnet.state.ma.us/itd/Jegallnasire5.htm l.
Daniel, Greenwood. "Electronic Signatures and Records: Legal Policy and Technical
Considerations.", available on-line at
http://www.magnet.state.ma.us/itd/legal/article9.doc.
Darrow, Barbara. "£-Signature Gold Rush is on." Today's News, 25 August 2000, available at
http://www .intemetweek.com/story/INW20000825S0004.

I

I

491

I

Daukantas, Patricia. "What apps are out there to help you?"(2000), available at
http://www .gcnstateandlocal.cornlvoll9 no 19/news.2408-1.html.
Davis, Deth. "Insurers Plan to Offer Antihacker Policies: Coverage Could make E-Commerce
Less Risky." (1998), available at http://www.inforrnationweek.com/703/03/iuins.html.
Davis, Don. "Compliance Defects in Public Key Cryptography, Proc. 6th Usenix Security
Symp.", (1996): 171-178, available at
http://world.std.com/dtdlcompliance/compliance.ps.
Degan, Nancy Scott, and Thomas M. Beh. "The Golden Needle in the Electronic Haystack:
Electronic Messaging and Modem Litigation." (1999), available at
http://www.kenwithers.com/degan.html.
Denning, Dorothy E. "Descriptions of Key Escrow Systems." (1997), available at
http://www.cs.georgetown.edu./~denning/crypto/ Appendix.html.
Department of Commerce, Thailand E-Commerce Update: Market Research Reports:
International Market Insights. Bangkok: Department of Commerce, 1999.
Dorney, Maureen. "Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act.", available at
http://www .gcwf.cornlarticles/interest/interest 36 html.
Dorobek, Christopher J. "Agencies Expect E-Sign Law to Spur E-Gov."(2000), available at
http://www. gcnstateandlocal.cornlvol19 no 19/news/2407 l.html.
Downing, Robbie, and Ross Mckean. "Digital Signatures: Addressing the Legal Issues.",
available at http://www.bakemet.com/ecommerce.
Dregory, John D. "UNCITRAL meeting on Electronic Signatures." (2000), at
http://rechten .kub. nl/simone/gregory.htm.
Driscoll, Mark. "Legal Developments Regarding E-commerce in Thailand." (2000), at
http://v..rww.coudert.com/practice/thaiecommlhhn.
Dryden, John. "The Work of the OECD on Electronic Commerce."
Dumortier, J. "Directive 1999/93/EC on a Community Framework for Electronic Signatures.",
at http://www.law.kuleuven.ac.be/icri.
Durongkaveroj, Pichet. "Workshop on Cryptography Policy OECD's Emerging Market
Economy Forum." (1997).
Durongkaveroj, Pichet. "Electronic Commerce in Thailand." (1997).

492

Electronic Authentication and Digital Signature: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial
Services and Teclmology of the Comm. On Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 1osth
Cong. 15t(1997).
Ellison, Carl M. "Establishing Identity without Certification Authorities."(l996), at
http :I/www. world.std.cornl-cme/usenix.html
Ellison, Carl, and Bruce Sclmeier. "Ten Risks ofPKI: What you are not Being Told About
Public Key Infrastructure." Computer Security Journal, 16 (2000): 1-7, available at
http://www.counterpane.com/pki-risks.html.
European Electronic Signature Standardization Initiative Steering Group, "Algorithms and
Parameters for Secure Electronic Signatures."(2001).
Federal Trade Commission Staf£ A Report ofthe FTC's First Five Years Protecting
Consumers Online. 1999, available at http://www.ftc.gov
Federal Trade Commission. "Summary of Public Workshop: Alternative Dispute Resolution
for Consumer Transactions in the Borderless Online Marketplace." (2000).
Feldman, Joan E., and Rodger I. Kolm. "Collecting Computer-Bases Evidence." (1998),
available at http://www.nylj.com/tech/012698t6.html.
France, Mike. "Snares ofthe £-Signatures Act." (2001), available at
http://www.businessweek.com/ebiz/0101/ep0180.htm.
Fry, Patricia Brumfield. "A Preliminary Analysis of Federal and State Electronic Commerce
Laws."
Fumy, Walter. "Authentication- Trend in Private Sector Standards Initiatives."
Glater, Jonathan D. ''Using Software To Sniff Out Electronic Evidence." (2001), available at
http://www .nytimes.com/200 1/09/04/teclmology/0 1DIS .html.
Greco, Thomas J. "Digital Signature Trust Co."(2001), available at
http://www .ftc. govlbcp/workshops/esi gn/comments/dstc.htm.
Greengard, Samuel. "E-sign on the Dotted Line."(2001), available at
http://www. bionetrix.com/news/inthenews 18.htm1
Greenleaf, Graham, and Roger Clarke. "Privacy Implication ofDigital Signatures." (1997),
available at http://www.anu.cdu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/DigSig.html.
Greguras, Fred M. "An Overview of Global E-Commerce Legal Issues: Consumer Protection
Laws.", available at http ://www.gigal a~, com/articles/greguras-2000-03-p5.html.

493

~.

Greguras, Fred M. "Global Electronic Commerce at the Millellllium: Legal Issues.", available
at http://www.batnet.com/oikownene/ecommerce%40mill.html.
Greguras, Fred M., et al., eds."Electronic Commerce: Online Contract Issues."(l995), available
at http://www.batnet.com/oikoumene/ec contracts.html.
Hajimiragha, Mir. et al., eds. "Legally Binding Contract Management Over the Internet.", at
http://www .docutouch.com.
Hamilton, Kathleen. "Re: E-Sign Study Comment P004102." (2001), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/esign/comments/cca.htm.
Harper, Georian. Report of the Digital Signature Task Force., available at
http://www.utsystem.edu/ogc/intellectualproperty/disgistf.htm.
Heffernan, Tony. "E-Sign Act Speeds Online Business Transactions." (2000), available at
http://www .atlnata.bizjournals.com/atlanta/stories/2000/1 0/16/focus3 7.html
Heintz, Rebecca C. "Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act."(2001), at
http://www.cmaccom.com/articles/art129.html.
Higgins, Kelly Jackson. "Digital Certificates: Take on a New E-Dentity." In Depth, 13
December 1999, available at http://www .internetweek.com/indepthlindepth 121399 .htm.
Homme, Pascale Prud. "B2C E-Commerce from a Legal Perspective.", available at
http://www.tginfo.com.
Information Technology News, 5 July 2000.
Inslee, Jay. "What Features of an E-Sign Bill will Most Effectively Impact E-Commerce: ESign Bill Must Include Protections for Consumers." (2000), available at
http://www .rollcall.com/pages/pb/00/03/pb27h.html.
Intarakomalyasut, Nondhanada. "Electronic Commerce- Credit Card Security Worry."
Bangkok Post Newspaper, 14 December 1999.
International Chamber of Commerce. "General Usage for International Digitally Ensured
Commerce (GUIDEC)."(2001), available at
http://www .iccwbo .org/home/guidec/guidec.asp.
htternational Chamber of Commerce. "Jurisdiction and Applicable Law in Electronic
Commerce: Electronic Commerce Project (ECP)'s Ad Hoc Task Force." (2001), at
hitp://www. iccwbo.org/home/statements rules/statements/200 1/jurisdict.ion and app li r~
ble law.

494

I

I

I

I

,

t~ · I

n l

I

International Working Group On Electronic Authentication. "International Consensus
Principles for Electronic Authentication." (1999), available on-line at
http://www .ilpf.org.digsig/intlprin.html.

,

I

I

Internet Law and Policy Forum-Working Groups and Publications. "Survey of International
Electronic & Digital Initiatives", available at http://www.ilpf.org/groups/survey.htm.
Internet Law and Policy Forum-Working Groups and Publications "The Role of Certification
Authorities in Consumer Transactions.", available at
http://www.ilpf.org/groups/caJexec.htm.
lshiguro, Kazunori. "Jurisdiction: Building Confidence in a Borderless Medium." (1999), at
http://www.ilpf.org/events/jurisdiction/presentations/ishiguro addl.htm.
ISTEV. "Legal and Regulatory Issues for the European Trusted Services Infrastructures- ETS."
(1997), available at http://www.infosociety.gr/policies/digital/docs/lrfets.doc.
Jacobus, Patricia. "Digital Signatures Prepare to Wipe Away Ink." (2000), available at
http://www .news.net.com/news/0-1 005-200-2894498.html.
Johnson, James A. "Enacted State Digital Signature Legislation." (1997), at
http://www.nii.nist.gov/pubs/enstsign.html.
Jones, Bill. Sununary Report on the Multi-State Digital Signature Sununit. 2000.
Kaner, Cern. "The Insecurity of the Digital Signature."(l997), available at
http://www.badsoftware.com/digsig.htm.
Kamjanatawe, Kamjana. "Thailand's E-Transactions Bill Faces Further Delay." (2001),
available at http://www.newsbytes.com/news/O 1/1681 02.html.
Kilbane, Catherine M., and Heidi L. Goebel. "Electronic Signature Law Enacted." (2000),
available at http://www.bakerlaw.com
Koannatakool, Thaweesak. "Current Status and Future of the Internet and E-Commerce in
Thailand." (2000), available at
http://www .asiamf.org/newsletter/vo 14/dr koanantakool.html
Koannatakool, Thaweesak. "Electronic Commerce Development in Thailand." (1999), at
http://www.nectec.or.thlusers/htk/e-commerce/intro.html
T<.oannatakool, Thaweesak. "Getting Ready for the New Millennium: What are the Thai
Government's actions toward the year 2000?", at http://www.nectec.or.th/it-projects/
I<.rigel, Beth Lipton. "Agencies Crack Down on Net Scams." (1998), available at
http://www.news.com.com/2100-1023-2143339.html?legacv=cnet.

495

I

i

'

.. 1

Kromer, John. "ABCs of TheE-Sign Act for Community Banks."(2001).
Kuester, Jeffrey R. "Cyber-Sheriffs in Town: Critics Say Wisdom, Justice and Moderation are
Lacking in New Georgia Online IP Law." (1996), available at
http://www .kuesterlaw.com/nli la. htm.
Kuner, Christopher, et al., eds. "Written Signature Requirements and Electronic
Authentication: A Comparative Perspective." (1999).
Kutler, Jeffrey. "Digital Certificates Catch On with Securities Firms." American Banker
164(21 January 1999): 13.
Laokitpaisam, Padungsak. "Thaimarketingcenter.com Supports Thais to Sell Products Online."
Bangkok Newspaper, 29 July 2002, 34.
Laokitpaisam, Padungsak. "Window Store Provides Offline Services." Bangkok Newspaper, 9
July 2002, 32.
Laurie, Ben. "Seven and a HalfNon-Risk ofPK.I.", available at http://www.apachessl.org/7 .5things.txt.
Law ofEvidence. Bangkok: Amarin Publishing [1986].
Law Reform Commission of British Columbia. Report on Parol Evidence Rule., 1979,
available at
http://www. bcli.org!pages/publications/lrcreports/reports/(html)!Lrc44text.html.
Lee, Chris. "E-Signatures to Get Legal Recognition Across Europe." (2001), available at
http://www.news.zdnet.co.uk/story/O,s2088631 .OO.html.
Leeds, Jonathan. "Guide To Legal Issue Concerning Internet Usage." (2000), at
http://www.members.tripod.com/asialaw/articles/leedsinter.html.
Lessig, Larry, et al., eds. "The Requirement of a Signed Contract.", at
http://www.ssrn.com/update/lsn/cyberspace/lessons/contr05.html.
Lewis, Jamie. "Digital-Signature Standard Gets Closer With Industry Support." Internetweek,
11 October 2000, available at http://www.internetweek.com/columnsOO/lewis 1011 OO.htm
Lewis, Jamie. "Law Alone Won't Pave Way For Digital Signatures; It takes Practice."
Internetweek, 17 July 2000, available at
http://www .internetweek.com/columns00/lewis071 700.htm.
Liberto, Shelley M. "Supreme Court Strikes Down Decency Act in Defense of Internet Chaos."
(1997), available at http://www.libertolaw.com/9-97.html.

496

Ling, Theodore C., and Sharon Boeyen "Technical, Business and Legal Issues in Establishing a
Secure Environment for Electronic Communication and Commerce: A Discussion of the
Spectrum of Business and Applications which may be Supported by a Public Key.",
available on-line at http://www.bakernet.com/documents/770 tx.htm.
MacMillan, Robert. "E-Sign Law Appears To Work Fine So Far- Govt. Study." (2001),
available at http://www .newsbytes.com/news/0 1/167338 .html.
Marinier, Francois. "25 Steps to the Successful Implementation of a Corporate Public Key
Infrastructure.", available at pttp://www.pkiJaw.com/25step.htm.
Mcculllagh, Adrian, et al., eds. "Electronic Signatures: Understanding the Past to Develop the
Future." UNSW Law Journal (December 2000), available at
http://www.law.unsw.edu.au/unswli/ecommerce/mccullagh.html.
Mccullagh, Adrian. "Non-Repudiation in the Digital Environment." (2000), at
http:/lwwv..' .firstmonday.orglissues/issue5 8/mccullagh/index .html.
Marchant, Robert J. "Electronic Commerce Under the Federal E-Sign Legislation." (2001),
available at http://www.wisbar.orglwislawmag/200 I /07 /marchant.html.
Mmjanovic, Steven. "Zions Unit Wins Digital Security Job From U.S.", American Banker
(September 1999).
Merrill, Charles R. "ProofofWHO, WHAT and WHEN in Electronic Commerce."(1997),
available at pttp ://www .abanet.org/sci tech/ ammerr .html.
MHA, Ted Wright. "Electronic Signatures in Behavioral Health." (2001), available at
http://www.echoman.com/knowledgesource/K.S tech esignature v3.htm
Miller, Riel. "The Internet in Twenty Years: Cyberspace, The Next Frontier?"(1997), available
at http://www.oecd.org//sge/aulhighligh.htm
Mitrakas, Andreas. "Digital Certification for Consumers: The Experience of Global Sign.",
available at http://www.globalsign.net.
Morgan, John P. "Electronic Authentication Standards & Development." (1999), available at
http://www.perkinscoie.com/resource/ecorrun/electronic.htm.
Morgan, John P. "Round Three: Encryption Software & Export Controls.", available at
http://wv..rw.perkinscoie.com/resource/ecomrnlencryption.htm.
Morris, Stan. "Regulating Decency Online: Analyzing the Past and Predicting the Future.",
available at http://v.,rww.gigalaw.com/articles/morris-2000-05-p2.htmJ

497

Mosquera, Mary. "E-signatures Out of the Gate." Today's News, 2 October 2000, available at
http://www .intemetweek.com/story/INW2000 1002SOOO 1.
Mosquera, Mary. "House Passes FinalE-sign Bill." Today's News, 15 June 2000, available at
hnp://www .intemetweek.cornlstory!INW20000615S0003.
Mosquera, Mary. "Lawmakers Agree on FinalE-Signature Bill." (2000), available at
http://www .intemetweek.com/story/INW20000612S0002.
Mosquera, Mary. "Lawmakers Agree on FinalE-Signature Bill." Today's News, 12 June 2000,
available at http://www .intemetweek.com/story/INW20000612S0002.
Murphy, Mary L., and Laurence H. Reece. "Discovering and Managing Electronic Evidence:
Be Careful What You Ask For: Rules and Recent Cases Regarding the. Discovery of
Electronic Evidence." ( 1999), available at http://www.kenwithers.com/reece.htm.
Nader, Ralph. "Digital Signature Legislation Must Protect Consumers." (2000), at
http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/info-policy-notes/2000q/000005.html.
National Electronic Authentication Council (NEAC). Legal Liability and e-Transactions: A
Scoping Study for the National Electronic Authentication Council. REP, 2000.
National Electronic Authentication Council (NEAC). The Integration ofBusiness E-Commerce
Systems: Scoping Study for the National Electronic Authentication Council. REP, 2000.
National Notary Association, "A Position On Digital Signature laws And Notarization"(2000),
available at http://www.nationalnotary.org/Digitalsignature.pdf.
Neethling, Rupert. "E-Signatures Become Legal Tender." (2000), available at
http://www.citi.org.zalcgi-bin/readlpl? DBNAME=NEWS&ID=30.
Nezu, Risaburo. "E-Commerce: A Revolution with Power."
Nilles, Jack M. "Electronic Commerce and New Ways ofWorking in Thailand." (1999), at
http://www.ecatt.com/ecattlcountry/thailand/inhalt th.htm.
Nimmer, Raymond T. "Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act of2000:
Effect on State Laws."
Nouwens, John, and Harry Bouwman. "Living Apart Together in Electronic Commerce: The
use of Information and Communication Technology to Create Network Organizations.",
available at http://W¥-1W.ascusc.org.jcmc/volllissue3/nouwens.html.
OCC Bulletin. "Certification Authority System: Guidance for Bankers and Examiners." (1999).

498

OECD. Report on Background and Issues of Cryptography Policy. , available at
http://www.oecd.org//dsti/stilit/secur/prodlcrypto31htm.
Olender, Kurt. "Sealing Contracts with Digital Signatures." (1999), available at
http://www.ecommercetimes.com/perl/printer/1719/.
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development. "Measuring Electronic
Commerce." (1997).
Paterson, Michael. "A Legal Perspective ofthat Risky Internet Business." (1999), available at
http://www .patersons.com.aulonline_resource .. ./legal_perspective_risky_internet_busine
ss.html
Paterson, Michael. "Contracted Computer Programming: 5 Steps to Take to Avoid Misery.",
available at
http://www.patersons.com.au/online resources/technology/5 steps to avoid misery 2.h
tml.
PC Magazine, October 2000.
Perritt, Henry H., Jr. "The Internet is Changing the Public h1ternational Legal System.",
available at http://www.kentlaw.edu/cyberlaw/perrittnetchg.html.
Polk, William T., and Nelson E. Hastings, National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST). "Bridge Certification Authorities: Connecting B2B Public Key Infrastructures."
undated, available at http://csrc.nist.gov/pkildocuments/B2B-article.pdf.
Prud'homme, Pascale. "Sale of Goods in Cyberspace Under Thai Law." (2000), available at
http://www. tginfo.com/pu blications/legal development/cyberspace.htm.
Rabello, Alfredo Mordechai. "Freedom of Contract and Constitutional Law." (1994), available
at Jntp://v.,ww .mishpatim.mscc.huj i.ac.il/sacher/rabe 198e.html.
Ratanasrithai, Lalida. "Thailand's £-Government." Thai Rath Newspaper, 3 September 2001,
available at http://www.thairath.com.
Reed, Chris. "What is a Signature?" The Journal of Information, Law and Technology (2000),
at http:/I eli. warwick.ac. uk/j ilt/00-3/reed.html.
Richards, Asha. "E-Sign and State Electronic Commerce Laws: What Comes Hone in the Sea
ofLegislation?"(2001), available at
http://www .tilj .cornlcontent/ecomarticle041401 Ol.htm.
Rivera, Henry M. "The Legal and Policy Foundations of a Global E-Commerce System:
Remarks, Speeches at the National Law Center Before Inter-A.merican Free Trade

499

Organization of American States Business Software Alliance (September 30, 1999)."
Arizona Journal oflnternational and Comparative Law 17 (2000): 199.
Rivest, Ronald L. "SDSI- A Simple Distributed Security Infrastructure." (1996), available at
http://www.theory.lcs.mit.edu/~rivest/sdsi10.html.

Rosenthal, Louis F. "Statement Before the House Financial Service Subcommittee on Domestic
Monetary Policy, Technology and Economic Growth." (28 June 2001).
Rudl, Corey. "How to Start and Promote Virtually Any Business, Product or Service on the
Internet: Increase Traffic to our Website 400% in less than a Month.", available at
http://www .rnarketingtlps.com/tipsltr2php3
Sarnoriski, Jan H., et al., eds. "Encryption and the First Amendment.", available at
http://www.umd.umid.edu/casllhurnlcomm/crypto-1.htrn
Sander, Tod. "Digital Signatures: Can be Wave ofthe Future." (1999), available at
http://www. govtech.net/publications/ gt/1999/oct/ ecomrnerceofolder/ecommerce.shtrn.
Saunders, Margot, and Gail Hillebrand. "E-Sign and UETA: What Should States Do Now?",
available at http://www.consumerlaw.org/e-sign.html.
Sax, Michael M. "International Law Issues Relating to Electronic Commerce." (1999).
Schneider, Fred B. "Trust in Cyberspace." (1998), available at http://cryptome.orgjtic.htm
Schneier, Bruce. "Crypto-Gram." (1998), at http://www.counterpane.com/cryto-gram9808.html.
Schneier, Bruce. "Electronic Commerce: The Future of Fraud." ( 1998), at
http://v.ww.countemane.com/crypto-grarn-981l.html.
Schneier, Bruce. "Crypto-Gram." (2000), available at
http://www.commons.somewhere.com/rre/2000/RRE.hacking.digital.sign.html.
Schneier, Bruce. "Why Computers are Insecure.", at http://www.counterpain.com/crypto-gram99ll.htrnl.
Schneier, Bruce. "Why Cryptography Is Harder Than It Looks."(2001), at
http://www .counterpane.com/whycrypto.htrnl.
~chrader,

Russell W. "Re: E-Sign Study-Comment P004102." (2001).

Self-Regulation and Privacy Online: Statement Before the Subcomrn. on Telecommunications,
Trade, and Consumer Protection of the Comm.(1999).

500

Sherman, Andrew J. "The Legal and Strategic Aspects ofE-Commerce Series." (April2001),
available at http://www .mdhitech.org/N ews/ articles/34.html.
Smedinghoff, Thomas J. "Certification Authority Liability Analysis."(1998), at
http://wwv.:.bakernet.com/ecommerce
Smedinghoff, Thomas J., and Ruth Hill Bro. E-Commerce in Illinois: Is it Legal?, 14 CBA
Record 26(2000).
Sobel, David L. "Governmental Restrictions on the Development and Dissemination of
Cryptographic Digital ID Introduction.", available on-line at
http://digitalid. verisign.cornlclientlhelp/id intro.btm.
Sorieul, Renaud. "The UNCITRAL's Model Law on Electronic Signatures." (2001), available
at http://droit-internet-200 l.univ-paris1.fr/pdf/ve/Sorieul ve.pdf.

Special Studies: Electronic Commerce and the Role ofWTO. [1998].
Stern, Jonathan. "Briefmg Paper on the Electronic Signatures in Global and National
Commerce Act." (2000).
Symposium. "Proceedings ofthe 1985 Symposium on Security and Privacy." Oakland: IEEE
Computer Society, 1985.
Symposium. "Emerging Technologies and the Law: Comment: The Pandora's Box of
Cyberspace: State Regulation of Digital Signature and the Dormant Commerce Clause."
Gonzaga Law Review 33 (1997/1998): 417.
Symposium. "International Developments Affecting Digital Signatures." International Law
(1998).
Task Force on Stored Value Card, American Bar Ass'n. The Commercial Lawyer's take on the
Electronic Purse: An Analysis of Commercial Law Issues Associated with Stored-Valued
Card. Section ofBusiness Law, 1999.
Taylor, Ian. "Licensing of Trusted Third Parties for the Provision of Encryption Services."
(1997), available at
http://www .steptoe.com/WebDoc/NSF/Law+&+ The+Net+ All/Licensing+of+Trusted+Th
rid+Parties.
Thailand Engineering Journal, 3 March 2000.
The Department of Public Enterprise and European Union. "Call fore-Commerce
Infrastructure Proposals." (2000), at http://www.ecommercegov.re/launchlcalllhtml.

501

The Department of Public Enterprises & The European Union. "Call for e-Commerce
Infrastructure Proposals.", at http://www .ecommercegov.ie/launch/call.html.
The Digital Signature and Electronic Authentication Law (Seal) of 1998-S.1594: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Financial Services and Technology of the Comm. On Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 1051h Cong. 2"d(1998).
The Hon Mr. Justice Jacob, and His Honor Judge Overend. "Digital Signature Guidelines."
Journal Studies Board (July 2000).
The National Consumer Law Center. "Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce
Act: E-Sign Study- Comment P004102." (2001).
The Relay Group. "Security for All: The Digital Signature Law." Bangkok Post Newspaper,
July2000.
Thibodeau, Patrick. "Business Seeking Changes toE-Sign Act."(2001), available at
http://www.itworld.com/Man/2681/CWD010402ST059147/.
Tikwart, Alan. "The Admissibility of Digital Signatures and E-cash in Relation to the Statue of
Frauds." (1998), available at
http://www.ravernlcc/ilams/edu/~cybermom/CLJ/tickwart.html.

Tung, Jeffrey C. ~'The Dawn of a New Industry: E-Sign Act Ignites the Digital Signature
Revolution." (2001), available at http://www.docutouch.com/library/e-signact.asp.
Tungkitvanit, Somkiat. Electronic Signatures and Certification Authorities. Bangkok, 1999.
U.S Department of Commerce/National Institute of Standards and Technology. Digital
Signature Standard.
U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau ofExport Administration. Commerce Updates Export
Controls on Encryption Products. (1998), available at
http://www.bxa.doc.gove/PRESS/98/1230Encrytion.html.
Udell, Jolm. "Digital Signature Laws." (2000), at
http://www.byte.com/documents/s=505/BYT20001222S0001/index.htm.
UNCITRAL Working Group on Electronic Commerce, Planning of Future Work on Electronic
Commerce: Digital Signatures, Certification Authorities and Related Legal Issues. U.N
Commission on International Trade Law, 31 51 Sess., U.N Doc.A/CN.9/WG.IVIWP.71,
1996.
UNCITRAL. Report of the Working Group on Electronic Commerce on the Work of Its ThirtyFirst Session. U.N Commission on International Trade Law, 32"d Sess., U.N
Doc.A/CN.9/446, 1998.

502

lJ1-.I"CITRAL Working Group on Electronic Commerce. "Deliberations and Decision at its 33rd
Meeting." (1999), available at
http://www .law .gov .au.publications/ecommmerce/summary.html.
UNCITRAL. Report ofthe Working Group on Electronic Commerce on the Work of Its Thirty-:
Seventh Session. U.N Commission on International Trade Law, 34th Sess., at 39, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.9/483, 2000.
UNCITRAL Working Group on Electronic Commerce. Electronic Signatures: Draft Guide to
Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures. 38th Sess., U.N
Doc.A/CN.9/WG.IV/WP.88, 2001.
UNCITRAL Working Group on Electronic Signatures. Draft Model Law on Electronic
Signatures: Compilation of Comments by Governments and International Organizations.
34th Sess., U.N Doc.A/CN.9/492, 2001, available at http://www.uncitral.org.
United Nation, Conference on Trade and Development. Building Confidence: Electronic
Commerce and Development. Federal Information Processing Standards Publication,
1994.
United Nations, Conference on Trade and Development. E-Commerce and Development
Report. New York: United Nations Publication, 2001.
Vargas, Chris. "F-Secure Praises Passages ofDigital Signature Legislation As Long-Awaited
Move to Validate eBusiness Transactions." (2000), available at http://www.europe.fsecure.com/news/2000/news 200006210 l.shtml.
Verheul, Eric, et al., eds. "Binding Cryptography: A Fraud-Detectible Alternative to KeyEscrow Proposals." (1997), available at http://www.cwis.kub.nl/-~frw/people/koops/bi nd:
art.htm.
Walsh, Ekaterian 0., et aL eds. "The Truth about the Digital Divide."(2000), at
http://www.forrester.com/ER!Research/Brief/0,137,9208,00.html.
Weatherill, Stephen. "Party Autonomy for the Internet Market- the Role of Information."
Weinstein's Federal Evidence. Matthew Bender & Company [2000].
Wheeler, Lynn. "Digital Signature Model.", at http://www.garlic.com/-lynn!aadsover.htm.
Williams, Robert, and Randolph Kahn Esq. "TheE-Sign Act.", available at
http://www.KMWorld.com
Winn, Jane Kaufinan, and Carl Ellison. "Regulating the Use of Electronic Authentication
Procedures by US Consumers in the Global Electronic Market." (1999), available at
http://www. ftc.gov/bcp/icpw/comrnent.§/revwin-l.htrn.

503

Winn, Jane Kaufman. "Cryptography and Electronic Commerce: Update on Recent
Developments." (1999), Journal of Internet Law, available at
http://www.smu.edu/-jwinn/crypto-update.htm.
Winn, Jane Kaufman. ''The Emerging Law of Electronic Commerce.", available at
http://www.smu.edu/-jwinn/mbachapter.htm.
Winn, Jane Kaufman. "The Hedgehog and the Fox: Distinguishing Public and Private Sector
Approaches to Managing Risk for Internet Transactions." (2000), available at
http://www .smu.edul-jwinnlhedgehogfox.htm.
Wittie, Robert A., and JaneK. Winn. "E-Sign of the Times." (2000), at
http://www.kl.com/practiceAreas/Technology/pubs/page20.stm.
Wittie, Robert A., and JaneK. Winn. "Electronic Records and Signatures under the Federal ESign Legislation and the UETA.", available at http://www.faculty.smu.edu/jwinn/ESIGNUETA.htm
Wolf, Manfred. "Party Autonomy and Information in the Unfair Contract Terms Directive."
Wongwatanasan, Chaiwat, Thaweesak Kornatakul, and Surangkana Kaewjamnong.
Explanation of the Electronic Transactions Act. B.E. 2544. Bangkok: Jirarat Publishing,
2002.
Working Groups and Publications. "Survey of State Electronic & Digital Legislative
Initiatives.", at httP://www.ilpf.org/groups/digrep.htm.
Yasin, Rutress. "Vendors Adding To PKI Interoperability." Today's News, 22 January 1999,
available at http://www .internetweek.cornlnewsO 199/newsO 12200-S.htm
Yasin, Rutrell. "Vendors Adding To PKI Interoperability." (1999), available at
http://wwv..'.internetweek.com/news0199/news0 12299-S.htm.
Yasin, Rutress. "Financial Services Firms Tackle Technical Hurdles ofE-Sign." Today's
News, 21 June 2000, available at
http://www .internetweek.cornlstorv/INW20000621 S0006.
Yasin, Rutress. "Enterprises to Sign on Digital Line." Today's News, 18 August 2000,
available at http://wv.rw .intemetweek.cornlstory/INW20000818SOOO 1.
Yasin, Rutress. "Entrust Brings Digital Ids To IBM Mainframes." Today's News, 26 January
2001 , available at http_;//www .intemetweek. com/story/INW200 1012680005.
Zanger, Larry M. ''Electronic Contracts: Some of the Basics.", available at
http://www.mbc .~Qffi.

504

,l
,,
I

Zanger, Larry M. "Some Rules to Follow to Ensure Your Faxed Signatures are Valid.",
available at http://www .mbc.com/news/anicle.asp?pubid= 1429261162000.
Zanger, Larry M. "The Federal E-sign Law: The Electronic Signatures In Global and National
Commerce Act.", available at http://·.vww.mbc com.
"A Consumer's Guide toE-Payments.", available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/online/payments.htm.
"Attorney General's Electronic Commerce Expert Group (ECEG): Issues Paper No. 1.", at
http://www.law.gov.aulaghome/advisory/edeg/edegissue1.htm
"Bush To Invest$ 100 Million In £-Government." lntemetweek, (2001), available at
http://www .intemetweek.com/story/INW2001 022850004.
''Business and Professions Code: Section 17530-17539.6.", available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section =bpc&group=170011800&file=17 ..
"Business Guide to Thailand: Introduction to Thailand.", available at
http://www.thailandlaw.com/bizthaiintro.html.
"Cases Finding Jurisdiction on the Basis of Internet Contracts.", available at
http://www .ssbb.com/yesjuris.html.
"Certificate Practice Statement ofthe Thai Digital ID Root Certificate Authority." (2001),
available at http: //www.thaidigjtalid.com/cps th.html.
"Certification Practice Statement.", (1998), available at
http://www .sos.state.mn.us/business/digitallcps2.html.
"Commercial Encryption Export Controls: Encryption Policy." (2000), available at
http://www. bxa.doc.gov/Encryption/ganda.htrn.
"Commission Welcomes New Legal Framework to Guarantee Security of Electronic
Signatures.", available at
http://www.euroa.eu.int/comrnlintemal market/en/media/sign/99-915.htm.
"Cryptography Policy: The Guidelines and the Issues: The OECD Cryptography Policy
Guidelines and the Report on Background and Issues of Cryptography Policy." (1997),
available at http: Ilwww .oecd.org/dsti/stilit/secur/prodle-crypto.htm
"Digital IDs: The New Advantage.", available at
http://www.verisign.com/repository/clienttauth/clienttauth.html.

505
II

..Digital Signature and Confidentiality Certificate Policies For the Government of Canada
Public Key Infrastructure." (Aprill999), available at http://www.cio-dni.gc.ca/pkiicp/guidedocs/cert-policy/cp-pc e.pdf(last visited Nov. 1, 2002).
"Dismantling the Barriers to Global Electronic Commerce.", available at
http://www.oecd.org//dsti/sti/it/ec/prod!DISMANTL.HTM.
"Draft: Analysis of International Electronic and Digital Signature Implementation Initiatives.",
athttp ://www .steptoe.comlwebdoc.nsf/File/AuthenticationStudy/$file/AuthenticationStud
y.doc.
"Draft ofE-Commerce Law Ready." 4 February 2000, available at
http://www.bbl.co.th/mreview/200003mup1.htm.

[I

"DSA and RSA Key and Signature Encoding For the Keynote Trust Management System."
(2000).
"E-Commerce: Security Issues." Thansetthakit Newspaper, 4-6 July 2002, 44.
"E-Commerce: the Development ofE-Commerce." Watthajak Newspaper, July 22 2002,2.
"E-Commerce Legal Guide To Thailand: Online Contract Law.", at
http://www. bakerinfo.comlapec/thaiapec main.htm
"EFF's Top 12 Ways to Protect Your Online Privacy."(2000), available at
http://www.ef.org/pub/privacy/eff privacy·top 12.html.
"Electronic Commerce: Building the Legal Framework, Report of the Electronic Commerce."
(1998), available online at http://www.law.gov.au.aghome/advisory/eceg/ecegreport.html

.! I
I

I

o

I

"Electronic Commerce in the 18 APEC Economies: A Legal Guide.", at
http://www.dfat.gov.au/apec/LEGAL.html.
"Electronic Document and Electronic Signature: Law Development Process.", available at
http://www.csd.bg/news/law!E-CommercePublE.htm.
"Electronic Records In the New York State Archives.", available at
hJtp://www.archives.nysed.gov/holding/fact/er-fact.htm.
"Electronic Signature: Authenticating Identities Online Confidence." The Internet Newsletter,
January 1999, 9.
"Electronic Signature Law Enacted." (2000), available at
http://www.asmma.com/Newsroom!Lega1/Leg Sum 00/]eg sum OO.htm.

506

i'I

"Electronic Signature Technology Takes off In U.S." Reuters, 4 October 2000, available at
http://www .legalnews. find law .com/legalnews/techsignture.htm
"Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act."(2000), available at
http://www .tkcrowe.com/pub sepOO.htm.
"Electronic Transaction Act and Digital Signature Act of Republic of Korea: Background,
Major Provision and Implication." (1999).
"Encryption and Digital Certificates.", available on-line at
http://www.verisign.com/whitepaper/enterprise/overivew/page2.html.
"Entrust Announces Trade Services Solution for ldentrus System; Extends Lead in Financial
Services Market: Sanwa Bank Selects Entrust/ PKI To Delivery ldentrus Identity
Services."(2000), available at http://www.entrust.com/news/files/09 11 00 588.htm.
"Escrowed Encryption and Related Issues.", available at
http://www .nap.edu/readingroom/books/crisis/chapterS. txt.
"E-Sign Study-Comment P004102.", available at http://www.consumersunion.org.
"European Electronic Signature Standardization Initiative, Final Report ofthe EESSI Expert
Team." (1999).
"GOC PKI Object Identifiers: Governance and Registration Process.", available at
http://wvvw.cio-dpi.gc.ca/pki/Documents/oids e.htm.
"Information Technology and Broadcasting Bureau, Comparison ofthe Approach adopted
under the Electronic Transactions Bill and in Overseas Legislation in respect of the
Provision on Legal Recognition ofDigital Signature/Electronic Signature."(1999).
"International Business Comments on the Proposed EU Directive on Certain Legal A.spects of
Electronic Commerce." (1999), at
http://www .iccwbo.org!home/statements/ rules/statements/1999/proposed eu irective.as
p.
"International Chamber of Commerce, Recommendations on Authentication in Electronic
Commerce." (1999), available at http://www.iccwbo.org.
"Introduction to Cryptography.", at http://www.digitalid.verisign.com/clientlhelp.crp intr.htm.
"Introduction to Public-Key Cryptography.", available at
pttp://docs.iplanet.com/docs/manuals/security/pkin/index.htm.
"IT In Thailand: Priority Goes to the Push for Legal Reforms." (2000), at
l:.mp ://www. businessinthailandmag.com/archive/ apr00/32.html.

507

"Key Escrow: Its Impact and Alternatives." (1994), available at
http://hotwiredJY£os.com/clipper/diffie.html.
·xey Recovery.", available at http:/lcwis.kub.nV-frw/people/koops/recovery.htm.
''Legal Recognition ofDigital Signatures in Hong Kong."(1999), at
http://www .coudert.cornlpractice/digsig.htm.
"Legislative and Regulatory Law and Policy Issues.", at
http://www .abanet.org/scitechlec/isc/policy.htrnl.
"Microsoft Security Breach Underscores the Risks of Digital Certificates." (2001), at
http://www.surety.com/home/pr-msdigitalsig.html.
"Netscape Certificate Server 1.0 Evaluation Guide.", available at
http://Vvww .netscape.com/certificate/v 1.0/evalguide/.
''Newest Mobile Commerce Service." (2000), at
http://v.'WW.businessthailandmag.com/archive/dec00/39.html. "
"PKI Basics Digital Signatures and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) 101.", available at
http://www .digsigtrust.cornlsupport/pki basics.html
"Proposed Law: The Internet Promotion Act.", available at
}lttp://www .sala.net/law/ver/v6eng.html.
"Political Agreement on a Common Position of the Council on a Framework for Electronic
Signatures." (1999), at
http://www.europa.eu.int/comrnlinternal market/en/media/sign/composen.htm.
"Public-Key Infrastructures (PKI)-The Veri Sign Difference.", availahle at
}lttp ://www. verisign.com/whi tepaper/enterprise/di fference/introduction.html.
"Recommendation on the Legal Value of Computer Records." (1985), available at
http://www. uncitral.orglenglish/texts/electcornllegval.html.
"Recommendation ofthe Council Concerning Guidelines for Cryptography Policy." (1997),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dsti/sti/it/secur/prod!crypto l.htm.
"Recognition of Certification Authorities and Certificates.", available at
http ;//www .itsd.gov .hk/itsd/caro/ecaro.htm.
''Record Management Guidance for Agencies Implementing Electronic Signature
Technologies." (2000), available at http://www.nara.gov/records/policy/gpea.html.

508

[,

"RSA Security and PricewaterhouseCoopers Team to Bring PKI to Global e-Business."
(2000 1), available at http://www .rsasecuritv.com/news/pr/000914.html.
''Sending E-mail Instead of Letters." Dailynews Newspaper, 25 October 2001, available at
http://www.dailynews.co.th/politics/16122.html.
"Sign and Verify Signatures." (2000), available at
http://coverage.cnet.com/Content/F eatures/Howto/Privacy/ss5 .html.
"State ofDelaware Notarizes Digital Signature Legislation Using Surety.com's Digital Notary
Service." (2000).
"Summary ofPrinciple Regarding the Draft of Electronic Signatures.", (2 February 2000).
"'Technologies: The Controversy Over the Digital Signature Standard.", available at
http://www.epic.org/cryto/dss/sobel dss paper.html.
"Technology Law: Federal Appellate Court Upholds Validity of Shrink-wrap License.",
available at http://www.pcnet.com/-jbrans/tech.html.
"Thailand's First Digital Signature Law: Security Technology is Trustworthy, but What about
Security Operation?, at
http://www .ethail and.com/IT/Columns/Sianrrelay/watching the watchers. htm
"The Basic ofPublic Key Cryptography and Digital Signature."(1996), at
http://www .magnet.state.ma. us/itd/legal/crypto-3 .htm.
"The Consumer Protection Act 1979 of Thailand.", at
http://www.ciroap.org/apcl/countries/thailand.overview.html

I'

"The Development ofUniform Rules on Electronic Signatures: Issues Paper." (1999), at
http://www .law .gov .au/publications/ecommerce/issues 1%5F99 .html
I'

"The Digital Signature Law Gives Legality to Certification Company: The Society that Already
Facilitated Electronic Identities Enter the Registry." (1999), available at
http://www.idata.intelideas.com/news/30-9-99-l.html.
''The Dynamics of Consumer Protection in Light ofUETA and E-Sign." (2002), available at
http://www .consumerlaw .org/ecommerce/ dynamics of consprotection .html.
"The Economic and Social Impact of Electronic Commerce.", available at
http://www.oecd.org/subject/e commerce/summary.htm
''The Federal E-sign Law The Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act.",
at http://www .mbc.com/newdev/FedEsign.htm.

509

"The Five Lega1 Requirements for Signing." (2000), available at
http://www.silanis.com/news/feature .. ./article/asp?ID48&back.
"The Need to Protect Consumers-Especially Low-Income Consumers-from UETA.",
available at http://www.consumersunion.org/finance/uetawc20l .htm.
"Thai Digital ID Root Certificate Authority." (2001), available at
http://www.thaidigitalid.com/abouttdid th.html.
''Uniform Commercial Code Article 2B: Software Contracts and Licenses of Information."
(1998), available at http://www.law.uh.edu/ucc2b/080198/080198html.
''Update on Thailand's Electronic Transaction Bill.", available at
http://www. thailegalservice.com/index/as[?id2= 11 &tbl=utet
"Using PICS 1.1 Labels For Digital Signatures." (1997), available at
h!m://www.w3journal.com/7/s2.dsig.wrap.html
"WEPIN S·r.ore: All Law is Contract." available at http://www.wepin.com/3steps/contractlhtml.
Working Group on International Consensus Principles for Electronic Authentication, 1999.

SlO

